Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum voluntate deliberativa damnati malint non esse quam sic esse.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum voluntate deliberativa damnati malint non esse quam sic esse. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Apocalypsis nono⁴: In diebus illis desiderabunt homines mori, et fugiet mors ab eis.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Miseria huius mundi⁵, loquens de damnatis, dicit: «O mors, quam dulcis esses quibus tam amara fuisti! Te solum desiderant qui te vehementer oderunt».

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia maior est tristitia ex poena, quam sit delectatio ex esse, quia modicum habent gaudium et magnam tristitiam: ergo si electio rationis⁶ praeeligit fugam magis nocivi desiderio minus delectabilis, ut patet de illo qui vult lucrari argentum et fugit mortem; videtur, quod damnati malint omnino non puniri quam esse.

4. Item, si cederent in non-esse, poena esset momentanea; sed poena cruciatus eorum est aeterna: ergo si poena momentanea praeferenda est aeternae, sicut malum finitum infinito; videtur etc.

Contra: 1. Augustinus, in libro de Libero Arbitrio⁷: «Considera, quam bonum est esse, quod et beati et miseri volunt; magis tamen est esse et esse miserum quam omnino non esse, cum tamen miser esse nolis».

2. Item, ratio Augustini¹: praeelectio supponit electionem; sed non esse non est eligibile, quia omne eligibile habet apparentiam boni, sed ipsum non esse non habet boni apparentiam, quia quod apparet bonum apparet esse: ergo etc.

3. Item, omnis appetitus ordinatus est conformis naturae, quia «natura appetit semper quod melius est»; sed «natura semper appetit esse, ut ipse Philosophus² dicit, et nullo modo non-esse»: ergo etc.

4. Item, maius malum magis est fugiendum; sed maius malum est quod magis adimit; sed corruptio in non-esse adimit totum bonum, poena vero non totum, immo multum relinquit³: ergo magis fugiendum est non-esse quam puniri.

Conclusio

Damnati mallent non esse quam esse damnati; et illud appetitu commodi magis appetendum est, non tamen simpliciter.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod damnati mallent non esse quam sic esse; sed appetitus eorum est inordinatus et indiscretus et phantasticus, quia sibi nocivum appetit, sicut est appetitus febricitantis, qui non venit ex natura, sed ex phantastica imaginatione, quia existimat sibi prodesse quod nocet sibi. Sic damnati, quia existimant, se habere quietem, si omnino non essent, appetunt magis non esse quam esse in poenis; et hoc videtur dicere Augustinus. — Sed tamen Sapiens dicit in Ecclesiastis quarto⁴: Feliciorem utroque iudicavi etc.; et ipsa Sapientia, Matthaei vigesimo sexto: Melius erat ei, si natus non fuisset homo ille; et Hieronymus dicit: «Quod melius est non vivere quam male vivere».

Ideo dicendum aliter, quod non esse nullo modo est appetendum appetitu recto⁵; similiter nec esse damnatum, vel esse infelicem; et si horum aliquid appetatur, phantasia est, non ordinatio naturae; sed utrumque horum fugiendum. Et cum se habeant sicut excedentia et excessa, utrumque altero magis fugiendum diversis considerationibus.

Quia enim non esse adimit totum bonum, poena partem, ideo hoc magis fugiendum⁶, simpliciter tamen loquendo. — Quia corruptio in non-esse in infinitum excedit intensive, in infinitum, inquam, secundum proportionem, poena vero extensive in infinitum secundum veritatem; ideo credo, quod magis appetendum esset, si poneretur in optione, omnino non esse quam aeternaliter torqueri, loquor de appetitu, qui refugit incommodum. Hoc enim iudicat mens mea magis portabile, sicut decollationem magis quam diuturnam ignis adustionem. Verumtamen secundum appetitum honesti, quia cruciatus iniqui spiritus est ad gloriam Dei, utique malle deberet ignibus subiacere ad continuam Dei laudem, quam per omnimodam corruptionem manum Dei effugere⁷.

Concedo igitur, quod damnati mallent non esse; et omnis homo ratione illud debet appetere, considerata gravitate utriusque poenae; non tamen dico, quod sit magis appetendum simpliciter, tamen ipsi simpliciter magis appetunt. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

1. Ad rationes autem ad oppositum, solvendum⁸, quod Augustinus procedit ea via, qua corruptio in non-esse excedit, scilicet intensive.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praeelectio supponit electionem; dicendum, quod verum est de illa quae est per modum desiderii, non de ea quae est per modum fugae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura desiderat semper esse; dicendum, quod verum est, et etiam ratio recta; tamen natura magis refugit poenam aeternam quam momentaneam.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maius malum est, quod magis adimit; dicendum, quod maius malum dupliciter est, scilicet extensive et intensive, et similiter magis adimere; et natura magis refugit semper esse in omnimoda miseria quam omni bono privari; sicut frequenter de re, quam multum amamus, maluimus¹ illam non habere, quam propter illam induere conditionem servilem².

De numeratione notarum. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page. The apparatus below is therefore keyed by page: notes 4–7 of page 1037, notes 1–8 of page 1038, and notes 1–2 of page 1039. Notes 1–3 of page 1037 anchor in the preceding question (Quaestio I) and are rendered there; notes 3–8 of page 1039 anchor in the following question (Quaestio III).

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Question II. Whether by deliberative will the damned would rather not be than be thus.

Secondly it is asked whether by deliberative will the damned would rather not be than be thus. And that they would, seems the case.

1. Apocalypse nine⁴: In those days men shall desire to die, and death shall flee from them.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On the Misery of This World⁵, speaking of the damned, says: «O death, how sweet you would be to those to whom you were so bitter! You alone are desired by those who vehemently hated you».

3. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because the sorrow from punishment is greater than the delight from being is, since they have little joy and great sorrow: therefore, if the choice of reason⁶ prefers the flight from what is more harmful to the desire of what is less delightful — as is plain in the case of the man who wants to gain silver and yet flees death — it seems that the damned would rather not be punished at all than be.

4. Likewise, if they were to pass into non-being, the punishment would be momentary; but the punishment of their torment is eternal: therefore, if a momentary punishment is to be preferred to an eternal one, as a finite evil to an infinite one; it seems etc.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine, in the book On Free Choice⁷: «Consider how great a good being is, which both the blessed and the wretched will; yet it is more to be and to be wretched than not to be at all, although you would not will to be wretched».

2. Likewise, the reasoning of Augustine¹: pre-election presupposes election; but not-being is not eligible, because everything eligible has the appearance of a good, whereas not-being itself does not have the appearance of a good, since what appears good appears to be: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every ordered appetite is conformed to nature, because «nature always seeks what is better»; but «nature always seeks to be, as the Philosopher² himself says, and in no way not-being»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a greater evil is more to be fled; but the greater evil is that which takes away more; but corruption into non-being takes away the whole good, whereas punishment does not take away the whole, but rather leaves much³: therefore non-being is more to be fled than being punished.

Conclusio

The damned would rather not be than be damned; and that is more to be sought by the appetite for the advantageous, yet not without qualification.

I respond: To this some say that the damned would rather not be than be thus; but their appetite is disordered and undiscerning and fantastical, because it seeks what is harmful to itself, as is the appetite of a man in fever, which does not come from nature but from a fantastical imagining, since he judges that what harms him is of benefit to him. So the damned, because they judge that they would have rest if they were not at all, seek not to be rather than to be in punishments; and this Augustine seems to say. — Yet nevertheless the Wise Man says in Ecclesiastes four⁴: And I judged him happier than both etc.; and Wisdom itself, Matthew twenty-six: It were better for him, if that man had not been born; and Jerome says: «That it is better not to live than to live badly».

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that not-being is in no way to be sought by a right⁵ appetite; likewise neither to be damned, nor to be unhappy; and if any of these is sought, it is fantasy, not the ordination of nature; but both of them are to be fled. And since they stand to one another as exceeding and exceeded, each is more to be fled than the other under different considerations.

For because not-being takes away the whole good, and punishment a part, therefore this is more to be fled⁶ — speaking, however, without qualification. — Because corruption into non-being exceeds infinitely intensively, infinitely, I say, according to proportion, whereas punishment exceeds extensively infinitely according to truth; therefore I believe that it would be more to be sought, if it were set before one as a choice, not to be at all rather than to be tormented eternally — I speak of the appetite which flees what is disadvantageous. For my mind judges this the more bearable, as beheading rather than the long burning of fire. Nevertheless, according to the appetite for the honourable, since the torment of a wicked spirit is unto the glory of God, one ought assuredly to prefer to lie under the fires unto the continual praise of God rather than to escape the hand of God through utter corruption⁷.

I concede, therefore, that the damned would rather not be; and every man by reason ought to seek that, the gravity of each punishment being considered; yet I do not say that it is more to be sought without qualification, although they themselves without qualification do seek it more. — And the reasons for this are to be conceded.

1. To the reasons for the opposite, however, it must be resolved⁸ that Augustine proceeds by that way in which corruption into non-being exceeds, namely intensively.

2. To that which is objected, that pre-election presupposes election; it must be said that this is true of the election which is by way of desire, not of that which is by way of flight.

3. To that which is objected, that nature always desires to be; it must be said that this is true, and right reason too; yet nature more flees an eternal punishment than a momentary one.

4. To that which is objected, that the greater evil is that which takes away more; it must be said that a greater evil is such in two ways, namely extensively and intensively, and likewise to take away more; and nature more flees always to be in utter misery than to be deprived of every good; as often, concerning a thing we love much, we have preferred¹ not to have it rather than to put on a servile condition on its account².

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