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Dist. 29, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
p. 708

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Dicimus, Adam non tunc habuisse virtutes, quando peccavit. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia, si non habuit eas, quando peccavit, ergo ante amisit eas, quam peccaret; sed virtutes non possunt amitti sine peccato: ergo ante peccavit, quam peccavit. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum homo, quando peccavit, erat sapiens, vel stultus. Si sapiens: ergo non peccabat. Si stultus: ergo non videtur stultitia esse poena peccati.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tempus commissionis peccati Adae potest dupliciter determinari: aut secundum inchoationem, aut secundum consummationem. Utroque istorum modorum sermo Magistri habet veritatem secundum intellectum differentem.

Si enim intelligatur de initio, ut sit sensus: non habuit virtutes, quando peccavit, id est, quando peccare inchoavit; dicendum est, quod sermo iste intelligitur, quod non habuit virtutes quantum ad usum, licet haberet virtutes quantum ad habitum. Unde in peccati sui inchoatione quodam modo virtutes habuit, quodam modo virtute caruit; habuit secundum habitum, sed caruit secundum usum. — Si autem intelligatur de tempore consummationis peccati, sic, cum consummatio peccati fuerit in instanti, et simul sint peccatum consummari et esse; sic etiam praedictus sermo veritatem habet, non solum propter hoc, quod Adam tunc non habuerit virtutes quantum ad usum, verum etiam quantum ad habitum. Si enim tunc habuit peccatum, constat, quod non habuit virtutis habitum. Sicut enim in peccato simul est consummari et consummatum esse, sic et in habitu virtutis simul est amitti et amissum esse; et si amissus est, non habetur. Planum est igitur, quod quando peccavit, virtutes non habuit; nec tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod non amiserit. Amittere enim in his quae subito amittuntur, non ponit habere in actu, sed habuisse de praeterito et non habere de praesenti. Hoc autem melius manifestatur in quarto1, in tractatu de iustificatione impii. Et per hoc patent illa duo quae obiecta sunt.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nunc ergo, ne forte mittat manum suam et sumat de ligno vitae etc. Si enim hoc verum esset, iam sequeretur, quod Adam ex primo peccato non incidisset in necessitatem moriendi, quod est contra textum2: In quacumque die comederis, morte morieris. — Item, lignum vitae signum erat illius ligni vitae, quod Christus est, quod est in medio paradisi Ecclesiae3; sed istud lignum potius obest quam prosit illis qui indigne sumunt: ergo videtur, quod si Adam comedisset de illo ligno, potius sibi nocuisset quam profuisset: ergo non viveret in aeternum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod verbum illud est4 verbum Domini loquentis ad Angelos. Unde littera supplenda est sic: Nunc ergo — supple videte — ne mittat manum suam etc. Hoc autem dixit Dominus, non quod Adam in aeternum viveret, si post peccatum de illo ligno comederet, sed quia longiori vixisset tempore. Unde verbum illud potest intelligi fuisse verbum misericordiae, quia Dominus nolebat ipsum diu vivere in calamitate praesentis vitae, in quam retrusus erat merito culpae suae5.

p. 709

— Vel potest esse verbum rigoris iustitiae, ut quia Adam gustando cibum ligni vetiti se indignum reddiderat ad percipiendum effectum ligni vitae: ideo Dominus in verbo praemisso, in quo fert sententiam contra eum, indicat, se Adam duplici bono privare, videlicet ligni esu et ligni effectu; non quia post peccatum posset ad illum effectum pervenire, sed quia merito peccati utrumque meruit amittere6.

Et sic patent illa quae obiecta sunt. Verumtamen illud quod obiicit de Sacramento altaris, non est simile, quia istius Sacramenti est efficacia spiritualis, et ei debetur reverentia singularis ratione suae dignitatis et excellentiae; nullum autem horum reperitur in eo qui manducat et bibit indigne; non sic autem erat de illo ligno vitae7.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod emisit eum Deus de paradiso voluptatis in locum sibi congruum. Videtur enim, quod hoc non debuerit Deus facere. Cum enim Deus sit maioris misericordiae, quam sit homo; et nos videamus, peccatores sustineri intra Ecclesiam, quae est paradisus quaedam8: non videtur, quod Deus debuisset eum eiicere, sed potius longanimiter ad poenitentiam exspectare. — Item quaero: quare dicit, mundum istum fuisse sibi locum congruum? Aut enim erat deterioratus, aut non. Si non erat deterioratus, non videtur, quod esset habitatio sibi congrua post culpam9. Si deterioratus erat, videtur, quod magis debuisset deteriorari locus ille, in quo peccaverat, quam ille, in quo non peccaverat. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur, de quo serviat ille locus homini, quia modo non servit nec post diem iudicii serviet: ergo videtur, quod frustra factus sit locus ille.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Deus hominem de paradiso eiecit aequo iudicio, ita quod simul fuit ibi misericordia et veritas10. Veritas namque fuit ibi, quia, sicut Angelus de paradiso caelesti eiectus est, quia ibi peccaverat et se indignum illo loco reddiderat: sic et homo de amoenitate paradisi terrestris eiici debuit. Misericordia etiam ibi fuit, ut homo, in loco maioris calamitatis existens et sciens, se extra paradisum terrestrem esse, quasi exulem in hoc mundo se ipsum reputaret, et praesentem vitam contemnendo ad bona invisibilia assurgeret et illa desideraret, et sic ad illa perveniret. Si enim temporalia amaret, impediretur, ne spiritualia apprehenderet; et si nunc amat corruptus concupiscentia, quando est in hac valle miseriae, quanto magis tunc amaret, si esset in illius paradisi amoenitate, postquam morbo concupiscentiae11 corruptus esset? Tanta enim ex tunc adhaerentia quieti temporali inhaereret, ut nunquam aeternam requireret: et ideo cum eo actum est misericorditer et iuste. — Et per hoc patent dubitationes praemissae. Patet enim, quod non est simile de paradiso Ecclesiae; patet etiam, quod locus iste magis est congruus statui miseriae, etiamsi uterque deterioratus esset. — Postremo patet, quod locus ille fructuosus non est; multum enim facit ad nostram eruditionem et occasionem nobis praebet requirendae salutis, in qua consistit summa et12 perfectio totius humanae utilitatis.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod lignum illud non conferebat immortalitatem, nisi saepe de illo sumeretur. Hoc enim videtur esse falsum, quia immortalitas perfecta ponit hominem extra statum animalitatis: sed frequens comestio ponit hominem in statu animalitatis: ergo per frequentem usum ligni non perduceretur ad perfectam immortalitatem13. — Item, frequentatio alicuius rei non variat effectum secundum speciem, sed solum confirmat vel intendit: ergo si unica comestio non poterat facere immortalem, videtur pari ratione, quod nec frequentatio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister hic dubie14 loquitur, nec sine causa; utraque enim pars potest sustineri satis probabiliter, et quod15 lignum vitae unica comestione conferret immortalitatem. Nec huic obviat, quod Dominus praeceperat Adae, quod de omni ligno paradisi comederet16; praeceptum enim affirmativum non obligat ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore. — Potest etiam intelligi, quod non conferret illum effectum unica comestione, sed pluribus, et hoc, quia lignum illud non conferebat immortalitatem, sicut causa principalis et effectiva, sed sicut dispositiva. Et quemadmodum videmus in medicina, quod frequentata disponit ad sanitatem, ad quam non sufficienter disponeret semel sumta, sic et in proposito intelligendum est. — Et per hoc patent quae obiecta sunt; procedunt enim, ac si lignum vitae esset principale effectivum immortalitatis. De effectu autem istius ligni planius habitum est supra17; haec autem dicta sufficiant.

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English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: We say that Adam did not have the virtues at the time when he sinned. For this seems to say something false, because, if he did not have them when he sinned, then he lost them before he sinned; but the virtues cannot be lost without sin: therefore he sinned before he sinned. — Along with this it is asked whether the man, when he sinned, was wise or foolish. If wise, then he was not sinning. If foolish, then folly does not seem to be the punishment of sin.

I respond: It must be said that the time of the committing of Adam's sin can be determined in two ways: either according to its inception, or according to its consummation. In each of these ways the saying of the Master holds true, according to a differing understanding.

For if it be understood of the beginning, so that the sense is: he did not have the virtues when he sinned, that is, when he began to sin; it must be said that this saying is understood thus, that he did not have the virtues as to their use, although he had the virtues as to their habit. Hence at the inception of his sin he in a certain manner had the virtues, and in a certain manner lacked virtue; he had them according to habit, but lacked them according to use. — But if it be understood of the time of the consummation of the sin, then, since the consummation of the sin was in an instant, and the being consummated and the being of the sin are simultaneous; in this way too the aforesaid saying holds true, not only on account of the fact that Adam then did not have the virtues as to their use, but also as to their habit. For if he then had the sin, it is established that he did not have the habit of virtue. For just as in sin the being consummated and the having been consummated are simultaneous, so also in the habit of virtue the being lost and the having been lost are simultaneous; and if it has been lost, it is not had. It is plain, therefore, that when he sinned, he did not have the virtues; nor yet does it follow from this that he had not lost them. For to lose, in those things which are lost suddenly, does not posit to have in act, but to have had in the past and not to have at present. This, however, is better made manifest in the fourth book1, in the treatise on the justification of the impious. And by this those two things which were objected become plain.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: Now therefore, lest perhaps he put forth his hand and take of the tree of life etc. For if this were true, it would now follow that Adam, from his first sin, would not have fallen into the necessity of dying, which is against the text2: In whatever day thou shalt eat, thou shalt die the death. — Likewise, the tree of life was a sign of that tree of life which is Christ, which is in the midst of the paradise of the Church3; but that tree is rather a hindrance than a help to those who take it unworthily: therefore it seems that, if Adam had eaten of that tree, it would rather have harmed him than profited him: therefore he would not live forever.

I respond: It must be said that those words are4 the words of the Lord speaking to the Angels. Hence the text is to be supplied thus: Now therefore — supply see ye — lest he put forth his hand etc. But the Lord said this, not that Adam would live forever if after sin he ate of that tree, but because he would have lived a longer time. Hence those words can be understood to have been words of mercy, because the Lord did not wish him to live long in the calamity of the present life, into which he had been thrust back by the merit of his fault5.

— Or they can be words of the rigor of justice, in that, because Adam by tasting the food of the forbidden tree had rendered himself unworthy to receive the effect of the tree of life: therefore the Lord, in the foregoing words, in which He pronounces sentence against him, indicates that He is depriving Adam of a twofold good, namely of the eating of the tree and of the effect of the tree; not because after sin he could attain to that effect, but because by the merit of his sin he deserved to lose both6.

And thus those things which were objected become plain. Nevertheless that which he objects concerning the Sacrament of the altar is not similar, because the efficacy of that Sacrament is spiritual, and a singular reverence is due to it by reason of its dignity and excellence; but none of these is found in him who eats and drinks unworthily; whereas it was not so with that tree of life7.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure into a place suited to him. For it seems that God ought not to have done this. For since God is of greater mercy than man is; and since we see that sinners are borne with inside the Church, which is a certain paradise8: it does not seem that God ought to have cast him out, but rather to have waited long-sufferingly for his repentance. — Likewise I ask: why does he say that this world was a place suited to him? For either he was worsened, or not. If he was not worsened, it does not seem that it was a fitting dwelling for him after his fault9. If he was worsened, it seems that the place in which he had sinned ought rather to have been worsened than that in which he had not sinned. — Along with this it is asked, of what use that place is to man, since now it does not serve, nor after the day of judgment will it serve: therefore it seems that that place was made in vain.

I respond: It must be said that God cast man out of paradise by a just judgment, so that mercy and truth10 were both there together. For truth was there, because, just as the Angel was cast out of the heavenly paradise, because he had sinned there and had rendered himself unworthy of that place: so also man had to be cast out from the pleasantness of the earthly paradise. Mercy too was there, that man, dwelling in a place of greater calamity and knowing himself to be outside the earthly paradise, might reckon himself as it were an exile in this world, and by despising the present life might rise up to invisible goods and desire them, and so come to them. For if he were to love temporal things, he would be hindered from apprehending spiritual things; and if now, corrupted by concupiscence, he loves them when he is in this valley of misery, how much more would he then love them, if he were in the pleasantness of that paradise, after he had been corrupted by the disease of concupiscence11? For so great an adherence to temporal rest would from then on cleave to him, that he would never seek the eternal: and therefore he was dealt with both mercifully and justly. — And by this the foregoing doubts become plain. For it is plain that it is not similar with the paradise of the Church; it is plain also that this place is more suited to the state of misery, even if each had been worsened. — Finally it is plain that that place is not unfruitful; for it does much for our instruction and affords us occasion of seeking salvation, in which consists the highest and12 perfection of all human utility.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that that tree did not confer immortality, unless one took of it often. For this seems to be false, because perfect immortality places man outside the state of animality: but frequent eating places man in the state of animality: therefore by the frequent use of the tree he would not be brought to perfect immortality13. — Likewise, the frequenting of a thing does not vary the effect according to species, but only confirms or intensifies it: therefore, if a single eating could not make one immortal, it seems by parity of reasoning that neither could the frequenting.

I respond: It must be said that the Master here speaks doubtfully14, and not without cause; for each side can be upheld with sufficient probability, even that15 the tree of life by a single eating conferred immortality. Nor does this stand against it, that the Lord had commanded Adam to eat of every tree of paradise16; for an affirmative precept does not oblige always, but for a [given] place and time. — It can also be understood that it did not confer that effect by a single eating, but by many, and this, because that tree did not confer immortality as a principal and effective cause, but as a dispositive one. And just as we see in medicine, that what is frequented disposes toward health, toward which what is taken once would not sufficiently dispose, so also it is to be understood in the matter at hand. — And by this those things which were objected become plain; for they proceed as if the tree of life were the principal efficient [cause] of immortality. But concerning the effect of this tree it has been treated more plainly above17; let these things, however, suffice.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Dist. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. I. seqq. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Thom., Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 4.
    [IV Sent.] Dist. 17, p. I, a. 2, q. I and following. — Cf. on this doubt Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 4.
  2. Gen. 2, 17.
    Genesis 2:17.
  3. Vide August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 8. seq., ubi textus Gen. 2, 9. exponitur, et XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 20. — In seq. propos. respicitur illud I. Cor. 11, 29: Qui enim manducat et bibit indigne, iudicium sibi manducat et bibit etc.
    See Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, Bk. VIII, c. 4, n. 8 ff., where the text of Genesis 2:9 is expounded, and City of God, Bk. XIII, c. 20. — In the following proposition reference is made to that of 1 Corinthians 11:29: For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself etc.
  4. Ita Glossa ordinaria super Gen. 3, 22, quae occurrit etiam in Rupert. Tuitiens. III. Comment. in Gen. c. 29. — Mox pro ut quia Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et nonnullis codd. Et quia. Aliquanto inferius pro privare Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 privari.
    So the Ordinary Gloss on Genesis 3:22, which occurs also in Rupert of Deutz, Commentary on Genesis, Bk. III, c. 29. — Shortly after, for ut quia the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 and several codices reads Et quia. Somewhat below, for privare the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads privari.
  5. Codd. Y aa addunt sed causa.
    Codices Y, aa add sed causa [but the cause].
  6. Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 39. n. 53. seq. — Paulo inferius pro spiritualis Vat. cum ed. 3 specialis.
    Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, Bk. XI, c. 39, n. 53 ff. — A little below, for spiritualis the Vatican edition with edition 3 reads specialis.
  7. Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 58. nn. 3. et q. 105. m. 3; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 106. m. 6.
    Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 58, nn. 3 and q. 105, m. 3; Bl. Albert, Summa, p. II, tr. 17, q. 106, m. 6.
  8. Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 40. n. 54.
    Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, Bk. XI, c. 40, n. 54.
  9. Edd., excepta 1, concupiscentiam.
    The editions, except the first, read concupiscentiam.
  10. Psalm. 84, 11: Misericordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi. — Vocem caelesti, a librariis praetermissam, ducibus Vat. et edd. 3, 4 retinuimus.
    Psalm 84:11: Mercy and truth have met each other. — The word caelesti [heavenly], omitted by the copyists, we have retained, following the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4.
  11. Edd., excepta 1, etiam. — Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 105. m. 3; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 106. m. 3; S. Thom., hic a. 5; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1; Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 1.
    The editions, except the first, read etiam. — Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 105, m. 3; Bl. Albert, Summa, p. II, tr. 17, q. 106, m. 3; St. Thomas, here, a. 5; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 3, a. 1; Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 3, q. 1; Giles of Rome, here, q. 3, a. 1.
  12. Edd. et aliqui codd. immortalitatem.
    The editions and some codices read immortalitatem.
  13. Edd. dubiose. Paulo inferius pro et [i. e. etiam] quod Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 scilicet quod.
    The editions read dubiose [doubtfully]. A little below, for et [i.e. etiam] quod the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads scilicet quod.
  14. Gen. 2, 16.
    Genesis 2:16.
  15. Edd., excepta 1, adiungunt immortalitatis.
    The editions, except the first, add immortalitatis.
  16. Dist. 19. a. 2. q. 2. — Cfr. B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 106. m. 5.
    [II Sent.] Dist. 19, a. 2, q. 2. — Cf. Bl. Albert, Summa, p. II, tr. 17, q. 106, m. 5.
  17. Dist. 19. a. 2. q. 2.
    [II Sent.] Dist. 19, a. 2, q. 2.
← Dist. 29, Art. 3, Q. 2