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Dist. 24, Part 2, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
p. 586

Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si peccatum non diu teneatur in delectatione, veniale est; si vero diu in delectatione cogitationis teneatur, etsi voluntas perficiendi desit, mortale est. Ex hoc enim videtur, quod sola mora de veniali faciat mortale. Sed contra: circumstantia non mutat genus peccati: ergo si mora temporis est circumstantia1, nunquam faciet de eo quod erat veniale, esse mortale. — Item, mortale excedit veniale in infinitum; sed circumstantia non aggravat in infinitum: ergo si mora temporis circumstantia est, videtur etc.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quanta mora temporis faciat, quod erat veniale esse mortale — et utrum hoc sit in aliis generibus peccatorum, sicut in peccato carnis — et iterum, quando quis dubitat, utrum mortaliter vel venialiter peccaverit, qualiter sit ei consulendum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod mora temporis, quantum est de se, non facit, ut quod prius erat veniale fiat mortale, sed solum occasionaliter, videlicet, quia inducit consensum verum, vel interpretativum. Tunc autem inducit consensum verum, quando ex diuturnitate delectationis crescit libido adeo, ut homo velit omnino in interiori delectatione persistere et morari. Tunc vero inducit consensum interpretativum, quando homo, advertens periculum delectationis retentae, negligit eam reprimere; hoc enim non est absque contemptu salutis propriae, pro eo quod discrimini se exponit. Illa enim delectatio subintrat sicut serpens et venena diffundit, per quae rationalis spiritus interit morte culpae. Sicut igitur salutem suam corporalem negligeret qui serpentem iuxta se scienter collocaret, sic in tali delectatione advertens periculum, vel debens advertere, voluntarie versatur et2 exponit se discrimini, quando negligit repellere; et pro tanto dicit Magister, ipsum peccare mortaliter. — Et patet responsio ad obiecta, quia hoc non facit mora de se, sed ratione consensus vel contemptus.

Ad illud vero, quod quaeritur, quanta mora hoc faciat; dicendum, quod in generali determinatur, quod tanta mora hoc facit, in qua adeo crescit delectatio et libido, quod supervenit consensus; vel adeo est repellendi negligentia et propriae salutis incuria3, quod supervenit contemptus et consensus interpretativus. — Si autem in speciali quaeratur, quanta sit ista mora, utrum sit unius horae, vel dimidiae, vel amplioris spatii; non potest una responsio dari, quia aliquando est maioris, aliquando minoris secundum diversos status et conditiones personarum; unde hoc non determinat scientia vel lectio, sed potius conscientia recta et unctio4. Bene autem advertit conscientia recta, se non modicum laedi, quando ex morosa delectatione consensus supervenit, vel contemptus. — Quod si non advertat aliquando propter tenebras et involutiones affectionum nostrarum, securiorem partem debet eligere et confiteri pure, sic etiam dolere, quasi peccaret mortaliter.

p. 587

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum ita sit in omnibus generibus peccatorum; respondendum est, quod in omnibus peccatis delectatio morosa vigilanter et strenue vitanda est. Tamen verbum Augustini5 praecipue videtur intelligi in peccato carnis, quod habet ex carnis incentivo delectationem magis sibi coniunctam, et ad quam homo facilius incurvatur; et ideo cum magna diligentia est vitanda, non solum autem hoc, sed etiam omne peccatum. Multa enim frequenter creduntur esse venialia, quae sunt mortalia, et difficillimum est in talibus discernere; et ideo quasi a facie colubri necesse habet homo, qui vult salvari, peccatum fugere6.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod quaedam sunt, quae, si tantum semel fiunt, damnant; quaedam vero non, nisi saepius fiant. Sed contra: multiplicatio actuum non mutat genus: ergo si primum peccatum est veniale, et secundum et tertium: ergo nunquam faciunt unum mortale. — Praeterea, quodlibet veniale stat cum gratia: ergo si nullum aufert gratiam, nullum aufert vitam7: ergo nunquam damnant venialia, quantumcumque multiplicentur.

Ad hoc breviter respondendum est ad praesens, quod ista quaestio determinatur in libro quarto, distinctione decima sexta8; ideo ad praesens tantum dixisse sufficiat, quod plura venialia non damnant nec faciunt mortale, quantum est de se, sed solum dispositive; ex frequenti enim iteratione venialium augetur libido, et frequenter intervenit contemptus; et pro tanto intelligendum est verbum Magistri esse dictum.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit ultimo capitulo: Saepe in Scriptura nomine sensualitatis inferior portio rationis intelligitur. Hoc enim non videtur rationabiliter dictum, quia, cum rationalis portio dividatur contra sensibilem9, nullo modo videtur, quod ratio sensualitatis nomine debeat censeri. — Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod saepe in Scriptura hoc reperitur. Cum enim philosophi de viribus animae sufficienter tractaverint et nullam mentionem faciant de sensualitate; unde est hoc, quod sacra Scriptura et doctores sacrae Scripturae hoc nomine utuntur?

Iuxta hoc est quaestio, utrum nomine sensualitatis intelligatur una vis vel plures, et utrum intelligatur vis cognitiva, aut motiva. Quod enim intelligatur vis cognitiva, videtur per hoc, quod dicitur a sensu; sensus enim vis cognitiva est. Quod autem dicatur motiva, videtur per hoc, quod in ea habet esse peccatum et ad malum habet inclinare.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Scriptura distinguit hominem interiorem et exteriorem, sicut habetur secundae ad Corinthios quarto10: Etsi is, qui exterior est noster homo corrumpitur; interior tamen renovatur de die in diem. Exteriorem autem hominem vocat non ipsum corpus tantum, sed corpus cum viribus animae, per quas habet his sensibus11 intendere et eis inhaerere. Interiorem autem hominem vocat ipsum spiritum rationalem, secundum quod habet circa caelestia se ipsum occupare. Secundum hoc intelligendum est, quod homo habet potentias animae, per quas convertitur ad spiritualia; et habet potentias, per quas convertitur ad sensibilia. Et illae virtutes, per quas convertitur ad spiritualia, insimul collectae unum posse perfectum animae integrant; et quaedam potestas resultat interioris hominis regitiva, quae quidem vocatur arbitrii libertas, in qua consistit principaliter12 meritum et laus et vituperium. Secundum autem quod homo habet converti ad haec sensibilia, similiter habet et suas potentias, quae similiter in unum concurrentes integrant quasi unum perfectum posse, per quod intenditur circa ista sensibilia; et hoc nomine sensualitatis censetur in Scriptura, quae simul comprehendit sensibiles cognitivas et motivas, sicut et arbitrii libertas, ut videbitur infra13. Et hoc est quod habitum est supra, eadem distinctione, quod sensualitas est quaedam vis animae inferior, ex qua est motus, qui intenditur in corporis exterioris sensus atque appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium; et ita comprehendit de sua propria acceptione sensitivam et motivam brutalem14. Et

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quoniam inferior portio rationis per peccatum multum trahitur a sensualitate, et homo comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis15; ideo inferior portio rationis aliquando in Scriptura nomine sensualitatis censetur propter nimiam conversionem sui ad sensibilia. Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia obiecta.

Ad illud tamen quod quaeritur, quare philosophi non hoc nomine utuntur: dicendum, quod sensualitas non tantum nominat ipsam potentiam sensibilem quantum ad propriam naturam, sed etiam in quantum respectu rationalis habet quandam rebellionem, quae ex peccato originali in homine traducitur. Et quoniam non pervenerunt ad cognitionem originalis peccati nec lapsus hominis, ideo non utuntur hoc nomine, sicut sacra Scriptura16.

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English Translation

Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says: If a sin is not held long in delight, it is venial; but if it is held long in the delight of thought, even though the will to carry it out is absent, it is mortal. For from this it seems that delay alone makes a venial sin into a mortal one. On the contrary: a circumstance does not change the kind of a sin: therefore if delay of time is a circumstance1, it will never make that which was venial to be mortal. — Likewise, the mortal exceeds the venial infinitely; but a circumstance does not aggravate infinitely: therefore if delay of time is a circumstance, it seems, etc.

In connection with this it is asked, how great a delay of time makes that which was venial to be mortal — and whether this holds in other kinds of sins, as in the sin of the flesh — and again, when someone doubts whether he has sinned mortally or venially, how he is to be counseled.

I respond: It must be said that delay of time, as far as it is of itself, does not make that which was previously venial become mortal, but only occasionally, namely, because it induces consent, true or interpretative. Now it induces true consent when, from the long duration of the delight, desire grows so much that a man wishes utterly to persist and tarry in the inner delight. But it induces interpretative consent when a man, perceiving the danger of the retained delight, neglects to repress it; for this is not without contempt of his own salvation, inasmuch as he exposes himself to peril. For that delight slips in like a serpent and pours out venom, by which the rational spirit perishes by the death of guilt. As, therefore, a man would be neglecting his bodily safety who knowingly placed a serpent beside himself, so in such delight one who perceives the danger, or ought to perceive it, willingly tarries and2 exposes himself to peril when he neglects to drive it off; and to that extent the Master says that he sins mortally. — And the answer to the objections is clear, because delay does not do this of itself, but by reason of the consent or the contempt.

But to that which is asked, how great a delay does this; it must be said that in general it is determined that so great a delay does this, in which the delight and desire grow so much that consent supervenes; or there is such negligence in repelling and such carelessness of one's own salvation3, that contempt and interpretative consent supervene. — But if it be asked in particular how great this delay is, whether of one hour, or of half an hour, or of a longer span; no single answer can be given, because sometimes it is greater, sometimes less according to the diverse states and conditions of persons; whence neither knowledge nor learning determines this, but rather an upright conscience and the anointing4. And an upright conscience well perceives that it is not slightly harmed when, from morose delight, consent or contempt supervenes. — But if it does not perceive this at times, on account of the darkness and the entanglements of our affections, it ought to choose the safer part and confess purely, and likewise grieve as though it had sinned mortally.

To that which is asked, whether it is so in all kinds of sins; it must be answered that in all sins morose delight is to be vigilantly and strenuously avoided. Nevertheless the saying of Augustine5 seems chiefly to be understood of the sin of the flesh, which from the incitement of the flesh has a delight more closely joined to itself, and toward which a man is more easily bent down; and therefore it is to be avoided with great diligence, yet not this alone, but every sin. For many things are frequently believed to be venial which are mortal, and it is most difficult to discern in such matters; and therefore, as it were from the face of the serpent, the man who wishes to be saved must flee sin6.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that there are certain things which, if they are done but once, condemn; and certain others which do not, unless they are done more often. On the contrary: the multiplication of acts does not change the kind: therefore if the first sin is venial, so also the second and the third: therefore they never make one mortal sin. — Furthermore, every venial sin stands with grace: therefore if none takes away grace, none takes away life7: therefore venial sins never condemn, however much they are multiplied.

To this it must be briefly answered for the present that this question is determined in the fourth book, distinction sixteen8; therefore for the present let it suffice to have said that many venial sins do not condemn nor make a mortal sin, as far as it is of itself, but only dispositively; for from the frequent repetition of venial sins desire is increased, and contempt frequently intervenes; and to that extent the saying of the Master is to be understood as having been said.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says in the last chapter: Often in Scripture by the name of sensuality the lower portion of reason is understood. For this does not seem to be reasonably said, because, since the rational portion is divided against the sensible9, in no way does it seem that the account of sensuality ought to be reckoned under that name. — Likewise it is asked about what he says, that this is often found in Scripture. For since the philosophers have treated sufficiently of the powers of the soul and make no mention of sensuality; how is it that sacred Scripture and the doctors of sacred Scripture use this name?

In connection with this there is a question, whether by the name of sensuality one power is understood or several, and whether a cognitive or a motive power is understood. For that a cognitive power is understood seems to follow from this, that it is called from sense; for sense is a cognitive power. But that it is called motive seems to follow from this, that in it sin has its being and it inclines to evil.

I respond: It must be said that Scripture distinguishes the interior and the exterior man, as is had in the second to the Corinthians, the fourth chapter10: Though our exterior man is corrupted, the interior is nevertheless renewed from day to day. Now by the exterior man it calls not the body alone, but the body together with the powers of the soul, by which it has to attend to these senses and to cling to them11. But by the interior man it calls the rational spirit itself, according as it has to occupy itself about heavenly things. According to this it must be understood that man has powers of the soul by which he is turned to spiritual things; and he has powers by which he is turned to sensible things. And those powers by which he is turned to spiritual things, gathered together at once, make up one perfect capacity of the soul; and there results a certain power governing the interior man, which indeed is called the freedom of choice, in which merit and praise and blame principally12 consist. But according as man has to be turned to these sensible things, he likewise has also his powers, which likewise concurring into one make up as it were one perfect capacity, by which there is an attending about these sensible things; and this is reckoned under the name of sensuality in Scripture, which together comprehends the sensible cognitive and motive powers, as also the freedom of choice does, as will be seen below13. And this is what was had above, in the same distinction, that sensuality is a certain lower power of the soul, from which arises the motion that is directed to the senses of the exterior body and to the appetite for things pertaining to the body; and so by its own proper acceptation it comprehends the sensitive and the brute motive power14. And

since the lower portion of reason is much drawn by sin toward sensuality, and man is compared to the senseless beasts and is made like to them15; therefore the lower portion of reason is sometimes reckoned in Scripture under the name of sensuality on account of the excessive turning of itself toward sensible things. And by this the answer to all the objections is clear.

But to that which is asked, why the philosophers do not use this name: it must be said that sensuality names not only the sensible power itself as to its proper nature, but also inasmuch as, with respect to the rational, it has a certain rebellion, which is transmitted into man from original sin. And since they did not arrive at the knowledge of original sin nor of the fall of man, therefore they do not use this name, as sacred Scripture does16.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cod. O addit non mutat genus peccati: ergo.
    Codex O adds does not change the kind of the sin: therefore.
  2. Particulam et, quae deest in Vat., restituimus ex cod. cc et ed. 1; aliter supplendum qui post sic. Paulo inferius pro Et patet Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 Et per hoc patet.
    The particle et (and), which is lacking in the Vatican edition, we have restored from codex cc and edition 1; otherwise qui (who) is to be supplied after sic. A little below, for Et patet (And the answer is clear) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads Et per hoc patet (And by this it is clear).
  3. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 vitiorum.
    The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads of the vices.
  4. Epist. I. Ioan. 2, 27: Et vos unctionem, quam accepistis ab eo, maneat in vobis. Et non necesse habetis, ut aliquis doceat vos; sed sicut unctio eius docet vos de omnibus, et verum est, et non est mendacium. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 unctio. Paulo inferius eadem Vat. omittit vel ante contemptus, et dein post affectionum cum edd. 3, 4 nostrarum.
    First Epistle of John 2:27: And let the anointing which you have received from him abide in you. And you have no need that any man teach you; but as his anointing teaches you concerning all things, and it is true, and is no lie. — The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads the anointing. A little below the same Vatican edition omits or before contempt, and then after of the affections reads, with editions 3, 4, of our.
  5. De quo hoc dubium tractat.
    Concerning which this doubt treats.
  6. Eccli. 21, 2. — Idem dubium solvitur a Petro a Tar., hic circa lit.
    Ecclesiasticus 21:2. — The same doubt is resolved by Peter of Tarentaise here, on the text.
  7. Edd., excepta 2, sic: ergo si nullam aufert gratiam, nullam aufert vitam.
    The editions, except the second, read thus: therefore if it takes away no grace, it takes away no life.
  8. Parte II. a. 3. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro quod ista quaestio edd. F Y aa quia ista quaestio. Mox pro damnant Vat. et codd. 3, 4 determinant.
    Part II, article 3, question 1. — A little above, for that this question editions F Y aa read because this question. Soon, for condemn the Vatican edition and codices 3, 4 read determine.
  9. Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 3; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 113. m. 4. a. 4; S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 6; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3.
    Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa, part II, q. 108, member 3; Blessed Albert, Summa, part II, treatise 18, q. 113, member 4, article 4; St. Thomas, here, q. 3, article 6; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, here, on the text; Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, article 3.
  10. Vat. aliaeque edd. sensualitatem et infra sensualia, refragantibus antiquioribus codd., ut F Iv T W Y aa etc.
    The Vatican and the other editions read sensuality and below sensible things, against the more ancient codices, such as F Iv T W Y aa etc.
  11. Vers. 16: Sed licet is, qui foris est, noster homo corrumpatur; tamen is qui intus est, renovatur de die in diem.
    Verse 16: But though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed from day to day.
  12. Mallemus sensibilibus. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 secundum quem pro secundum quod.
    We should prefer to the sensible powers. — A little below the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads according to whom for according as.
  13. Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt principaliter; deinde in seq. propos. pro similiter substituunt sic, ac paulo post concordantes pro concurrentes; demum paulo inferius supprimunt per quod intenditur.
    The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 omit principally; then in the following clause for likewise they substitute thus, and a little after agreeing for concurring; finally a little below they suppress by which there is an attending.
  14. Dist. 2-3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. seqq. — Seq. propos. est Magistri hic c. 4. Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Post sicut et arbitrii libertas cod. aa bene addit rationem et voluntatem.
    Distinctions 2–3, part I, article 1, question 2 and following. — The following clause is from the Master here, chapter 4. Cf. above, article 2, question 1, in the body. — After as also the freedom of choice codex aa rightly adds reason and will.
  15. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 voci brutalem praemittit et; perperam, quia brutalis non est specialis potentia animae, sed tantum subiectum potentiae sensitivae et motivae.
    The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 prefixes et (and) to the word brute; wrongly, because the brute power is not a special power of the soul, but only the subject of the sensitive and motive power.
  16. Psalm. 48, 13: Et homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est etc. — Pro et homo codd. aa quia homo. Vat. substituit numerum pluralem, scil. sacrae Scripturae, multis codd. contradicentibus, cod. N tractatores sacrae Scripturae. S. Thom., hic circa lit., annotat: Hic per scripturas non canonem Bibliae, sed dicta Sanctorum significat. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 68. per totam; B. Albert., hic a. 8, et S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 92. m. 1. seqq.; S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. et circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic n. 2. q. 8; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. et dub. lit. 1.
    Psalm 48:13: And man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he was compared etc. — For and man codices aa read because man. The Vatican edition substitutes the plural number, namely of sacred Scriptures, with many codices contradicting; codex N reads the treatise-writers of sacred Scripture. St. Thomas, here on the text, notes: Here by "Scriptures" he signifies not the canon of the Bible, but the sayings of the Saints. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, part II, q. 68, throughout; Blessed Albert, here, article 8, and Summa, part II, treatise 13, q. 92, member 1 and following; St. Thomas, here, q. 3, article 1, and on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here, on the text; Richard of Middleton, here, n. 2, q. 8; Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, article 1, and doubt on the text 1. ---
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