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Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus
p. 490

Quaestio II. An fides informis sit infusa, an acquisita.

Secundo quaeritur de fide informi quantum ad originem, et quaeritur, utrum fides informis sit infusa, an acquisita. Et quod infusa, videtur:

1. Primae ad Corinthios duodecimop490-1: Alii datur fides in eodem Spiritu etc.; et constat, quod Apostolus ibi loquitur de donis gratiae gratis datae: ergo loquitur de fide, circumscripta caritate; et haec est fides informis: ergo fides informis est a Spiritu sancto.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios decimo tertiop490-2: Si habuero fidem, ita ut montes transferam; ibi Glossa: « Quae fides donum Dei dici potest, quia in malis quaedam dona Dei sunt »: si ergo illa est fides informis: ergo fides informis est a dono Dei.

3. Item, ad Romanos octavop490-3: Non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore; Glossa: « Est timor servilis et filialis, et uterque est a Spiritu sancto »: si ergo timor servilis est donum Spiritus sancti, et timor servilis oritur ex fide informi: ergo fides informis est donum Spiritus sancti.

4. Item, per nullum habitum naturalem, vel acquisitum elevatur intellectus supra se; sed per habitum fidei informis elevatur intellectus supra sep490-4, ut assentiat primae Veritati propter se et super omnia: ergo habitus fidei informis non est acquisitus, vel innatus; et est acquisitus, vel innatus, vel infusus: ergo est habitus infusus.

5. Item, quod potest in ea quae sunt contra naturam nec est a natura nec est ab acquisitione; sed habitus fidei informis potest in miracula facienda, sicut patet per Evangelia, quod mali faciunt miracula, et expresse dicitur Matthaei septimop490-5 et primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio: igitur fides informis nec est innata nec acquisita: sequitur ergo, quod sit infusa.

Sed contra:

1. Ad Romanos decimop490-6: Fides est ex auditu; sed quae novimus audiendo ab aliis novimus per acquisitionem: ergo si fidem habemus per auditum, fidem habemus per acquisitionem.

2. Item, Augustinusp490-7: « Quod credimus, debemus auctoritati; quod intelligimus, rationi »; sed doctrina, quae auctoritati alienae innititur, ab alio acquiritur: si ergo cognitio fidei innititur auctoritati, videtur, quod per acquisitionem habeat in nobis oriri.

3. Item, alias virtutes informes possumus habere per acquisitionem, sicut continentiam et iustitiam: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod et fidem informem per acquisitionem similiter possumus habere.

4. Item, aliquis transiens de infidelitatep490-8 ad haeresim credit aliquos articulos fidei, et hoc quidem sine aliqua infusione habitus, cum Deus non infundat haeresim, sed per solam acquisitionem doctrinae; sed qua ratione potest cognoscere unum articulum, eadem ratione potest cognoscere alterum: ergo si per acquisitionem potest cognoscere aliquos, eadem ratione videtur, quod possit cognoscere omnes: ergo videtur, quod fides informis de omnibus articulis per acquisitionem possit haberi.

5. Item, si fides informis est habitus infusus,

p. 491

cum habitus infusi ita infundantur parvulis, sicut adultis, ita erit habitus fidei informis in parvulo baptizato, sicut est in Christiano iam provecto; sed in Christiano iam provecto, si peccet mortaliter, nihilominus tamen remanet in eo fides informis, esto quod nihil ultra addiscat: ergo pari ratione parvulus, si peccet, cum ad adultam aetatem pervenerit, fidem informem habebit, sip491-1 nihil ab aliis doceatur; et hoc est manifeste falsum, quia si talis poneretur inter Saracenos, antequam aliquid didicisset, nihil plus haberet de fide, quam si nunquam baptizatus fuisset.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Fides informis quoad suum formale, et ut est virtus, est donum divinum et habitus infusus.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum credere, sicut dicit Augustinusp491-2, sit « cogitare cum assensione », ad hoc quod habitus fidei plene et integre habeatur, necesse est, quod intellectus instruatur de credibilibus, ut possit illa cogitare, et inclinetur, ut possit illis assentire; et primum quidem est materiale in fide, secundum vero est formale, et utrumque reperitur tam in fide informi quam in fide formatap491-3. Non enim dicitur informis, quia careat omni forma, sed quia caret forma gratiae gratum facientis.

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum fides sit habitus acquisitus, vel infusus; respondendum est, quod si loquamur de fide quantum ad illud quod est materiale in ea, videlicet quantum ad cognitionem illam, qua cognoscimus, qui sunt articuli fidei, et scimus, « quid est quod per nomen diciturp491-4 »: sic concedendum est, quod fides est per auditum et per acquisitionem secundum legem communem. Nemo enim scit, qui et quot sint articuli fidei, nisi didicerit legendo vel audiendo, nisi forte hoc habeat per privilegium speciale.

Si autem loquamur de fide quantum ad formale, videlicet quantum ad illud quod facit assentire; sic dicendum est, quod quaedam fides informis est per acquisitionem, quaedam per infusionem. Nam quidam assentiunt veritati auditae, moti humana persuasione, utpote propter amorem et reverentiam dicentis, vel propter miraculap491-5, vel propter rationes et argumenta; et talis fides est simpliciter acquisita nec dicenda est habere rationem virtutis, quia nullius est vigoris nec roboris, sublata de medio ipsa humana ratione. — Quidam autem assentiunt veritati fidei propter divinam illustrationem, sicut illi qui innituntur primae Veritati super omnia et propter se, sicut multi Christiani, qui caritatem non habent; et in talibus fides est per infusionem. Voluntarie enim assentiunt, concomitante divina illuminatione, illuminatione, inquam, quae rationem elevat in his quae sunt supra ipsam. — Unde sicut illuminationem ad futura praecognoscenda dicimus esse infusam propter hoc, quod in ipsa elevatur anima supra ea quae sunt ei naturalia; sic intelligendum est etiam in parte istap491-6. — Concedendum est igitur, fidem informem, secundum quod virtus est, esse donum divinitus collatum et habitum infusum. Unde concedendae sunt etiam rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod fides est ex auditu; dicendum, quod illud dicitur de fide, non ratione eius quod est formale et completivum, sed ratione eius quod est materiale, utpote ratione illius cognitionis, qua cognosciturp491-7, « quid est quod per nomen dicitur », quae communiter non habetur nec in fide formata nec in informi nisi per acquisitionem. — Aliter etiam videtur aliquibus esse dicendum, quod illud verbum Apostoli intelligitur de fide informi, quae innititur humanae rationi, quae quidem non habet in se rationem virtutis. Sed primus modus dicendi rationabilior esse videtur, considerato intellectu Apostoli.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod credere debetur auctoritati; dicendum, quod credere, secundum quod est actus fidei-virtutis, debetur auctoritati, non cuilibet, sed auctoritati divinae, cui quidem auctoritati nemo assentit propter se et super omnia, nisi per divinam illuminationem; et sic talis credulitas non est acquisita, sed infusa. Illa vero credulitas, quae innititur rationi creatae principaliter, non spectat ad ipsam fidem, secundum quod fides est virtus; et de hac verum est, quod potest esse per acquisitionem. — Unde attendendum est, quod dupliciter potest aliquis per fidem suam inniti sacrae Scripturae: aut quia credit, sacram Scripturam a Spiritu sancto fuisse inspiratam et editam, iuxta quod dicitur secundae Petri primop491-8: Spiritu san-

p. 492

cto inspirati, locuti sunt sancti Dei homines, et sic talis credulitas spectat ad fidem-virtutem; aut ideo credit sacrae Scripturae, quia patres sui crediderunt, a quorum semitis non vult recedere, et hoc modo humanam respicit rationem, nec est talis credulitas fidei-virtutis, sed potius cuiusdam assuetudinis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliae virtutes informes habentur per acquisitionem; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod actus aliarum virtutum concordant ipsi rationi secundum naturale dictamen. Unde iustitia naturalis dirigit ad opera virtutum politicarump492-1; non sic autem est de fide, quae dirigit ad aliqua credenda, quae sunt praeter et contra et supra iudicium rationis; ideo non sic subiacet nostrae acquisitioni, secundum quod aliae virtutes morales.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliquis de infidelitate transiens ad haeresim acquirit cognitionem aliquorum articulorum; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, sicut idem ipsum potest amari amore divinitus infuso et amore etiam innato et libidinoso, et multum refert, utrum aliquid sic vel sic ametur: sic etiam intelligendum est in cognitione, quod idem ipsum aliter et aliter potest credi: vel ex persuasione veritatis humanae, vel ex illustratione Veritatis aeternae. Et haeretici quidem, si cognoscunt aliquos articulos, hoc est ex quadam persuasione humanae rationis, immo fictionis suae; et si secundum illam omnibus articulis fidei assentirent, adhuc tamen virtutem fidei non haberent, cuius est intellectum in Christi obsequium captivarep492-2. Ideo non est simile de cognitione articulorum in viro fideli et in viro infideli; et pro tanto non sequitur, quod si illa cognitio in haereticis est acquisita, quod propter hoc in fidelibus non sit infusa. — Si quis tamen de fideli et Catholico fiat haereticus et remaneat sibi cognitio alicuius articuli; non habet eam omnino per acquisitionem; nec tamen dicendus est habere virtutem, quia ibi illuminatio prior permixta est quodam modo falsitati erroris, et ideo non habet perfectionem competentem virtuti.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de parvulo, qui cadit de gratiap492-3, antequam aliquid de fide acquirat; dicendum, quod parvulus habet habitum fidei quantum ad illud quod est in ea formale; habet enim aliquid quo promptus erit et facilis ad assentiendum omnibus articulis fidei, si ei proponantur, cum ad adultam aetatem pervenerit. Caret tamen ea cognitione, quae est materialis respectu fidei, sine qua, etsi illud formale possit in animam parvuli infundi, non tamen potest radicari et stabiliri. Et propterea, si, cum ad adultam aetatem pervenerit, proponatur ei error sub ratione credibili, facillime expellitur habitus fidei, et ita de facili assentit, ac si habitum fidei nunquam habuisset, propter hoc quod liberum arbitrium propter inassuetudinem nescit illo uti, et ille habitus non fuit in potentia radicatus, quamvis esset in ea infusus. De hoc autem in quarto librop492-4 habetur sufficientiusp492-5.

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English Translation
p. 490

Question II. Whether unformed faith is infused or acquired.

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning unformed faith with respect to its origin, and the question is whether unformed faith is infused or acquired. And that it is infused seems to follow:

1. First to the Corinthians, chapter twelvep490-1: To another is given faith in the same Spirit, etc.; and it is agreed that the Apostle there speaks of the gifts of grace freely given: therefore he speaks of faith circumscribed apart from charity; and this is unformed faith: therefore unformed faith is from the Holy Spirit.

2. Likewise, First to the Corinthians, chapter thirteenp490-2: If I should have faith, so that I might move mountains; there the Gloss: « Which faith can be called a gift of God, because in evil persons there are certain gifts of God »: if therefore that is unformed faith: therefore unformed faith is from a gift of God.

3. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter eightp490-3: You have not received the spirit of servitude again in fear; the Gloss: « There is a servile fear and a filial fear, and each is from the Holy Spirit »: if therefore servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and servile fear arises from unformed faith: therefore unformed faith is a gift of the Holy Spirit.

4. Likewise, through no natural or acquired habit is the intellect elevated above itself; but through the habit of unformed faith the intellect is elevated above itselfp490-4, so that it assents to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things: therefore the habit of unformed faith is not acquired, nor innate; and it is either acquired, or innate, or infused: therefore it is an infused habit.

5. Likewise, that which has power over things which are contrary to nature is neither from nature nor from acquisition; but the habit of unformed faith has power to work miracles, as is clear from the Gospels, that evil persons work miracles, and it is expressly said in Matthew, chapter sevenp490-5, and First to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen: therefore unformed faith is neither innate nor acquired: it follows therefore that it is infused.

On the contrary:

1. To the Romans, chapter tenp490-6: Faith is from hearing; but the things we come to know by hearing from others we come to know by acquisition: therefore if we have faith through hearing, we have faith through acquisition.

2. Likewise, Augustinep490-7: « What we believe, we owe to authority; what we understand, to reason »; but a teaching which rests upon another's authority is acquired from another: if therefore the cognition of faith rests upon authority, it seems that it arises in us through acquisition.

3. Likewise, we can have other unformed virtues through acquisition, such as continence and justice: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that we can likewise have unformed faith through acquisition.

4. Likewise, someone passing from unbeliefp490-8 to heresy believes some articles of faith, and this indeed without any infusion of a habit, since God does not infuse heresy, but only through the acquisition of teaching; but by the same reasoning by which he can know one article, by the same he can know another: therefore if through acquisition he can know some, by the same reasoning it seems that he can know all: therefore it seems that unformed faith concerning all the articles can be had through acquisition.

5. Likewise, if unformed faith is an infused habit,

p. 491

since infused habits are infused into little ones just as into adults, so the habit of unformed faith will be in a baptized little one just as it is in a Christian already advanced; but in a Christian already advanced, if he sins mortally, nevertheless unformed faith remains in him, even though he learns nothing further: therefore by parity of reasoning a little one, if he sins, when he has reached adult age, will have unformed faith, ifp491-1 he is taught nothing by others; and this is manifestly false, because if such a one were set among the Saracens, before he had learned anything, he would have no more of faith than if he had never been baptized.

Conclusion

Conclusion. Unformed faith, as regards its formal element, and insofar as it is a virtue, is a divine gift and an infused habit.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that since to believe, as Augustine saysp491-2, is « to think with assent », in order that the habit of faith be had fully and entirely, it is necessary that the intellect be instructed concerning the things to be believed, so that it can think upon them, and be inclined, so that it can assent to them; and the first of these is the material element in faith, while the second is the formal element, and both are found as much in unformed faith as in formed faithp491-3. For it is not called unformed because it lacks every form, but because it lacks the form of sanctifying grace.

When therefore it is asked whether faith is an acquired or an infused habit; the answer must be that if we speak of faith as regards that which is material in it, namely as regards that cognition by which we know which are the articles of faith, and know « what it is that is signified by the namep491-4 »: thus it must be granted that faith is through hearing and through acquisition according to the common law. For no one knows which and how many are the articles of faith, unless he has learned them by reading or hearing, unless perhaps he has this by a special privilege.

But if we speak of faith as regards its formal element, namely as regards that which makes one assent; thus it must be said that some unformed faith is through acquisition, some through infusion. For some assent to a heard truth, moved by human persuasion, as on account of love and reverence for the one speaking, or on account of miraclesp491-5, or on account of reasons and arguments; and such faith is simply acquired and is not to be said to have the character of a virtue, because it is of no vigor nor strength, once human reasoning itself is removed from the midst. — But some assent to the truth of faith on account of divine illumination, such as those who rely upon the first Truth above all things and for its own sake, like many Christians who do not have charity; and in such persons faith is through infusion. For they assent voluntarily, with divine illumination accompanying — illumination, I say, which elevates the reason in those things which are above it. — Whence, just as we say that the illumination for foreknowing future things is infused on account of this, that in it the soul is elevated above those things which are natural to it; so it must be understood also in this present matterp491-6. — It must therefore be granted that unformed faith, insofar as it is a virtue, is a gift divinely conferred and an infused habit. Whence the arguments which show this are also to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that faith is from hearing; it must be said that this is said of faith, not by reason of that which is formal and completive, but by reason of that which is material, namely by reason of that cognition by which is knownp491-7 « what it is that is signified by the name », which commonly is not had either in formed faith or in unformed faith except through acquisition. — Otherwise also it seems to some that it must be said that that word of the Apostle is understood of unformed faith, which rests upon human reason, which indeed does not have in itself the character of a virtue. But the first manner of speaking seems more reasonable, considering the Apostle's meaning.

2. To that which is objected, that to believe is owed to authority; it must be said that to believe, insofar as it is an act of faith-as-virtue, is owed to authority, not to any whatever, but to divine authority, to which authority indeed no one assents for its own sake and above all things, except through divine illumination; and thus such belief is not acquired, but infused. But that belief which rests principally upon created reason does not pertain to faith itself, insofar as faith is a virtue; and of this it is true that it can be through acquisition. — Whence it must be attended to that a person can rely upon sacred Scripture through his faith in two ways: either because he believes that sacred Scripture was inspired and set forth by the Holy Spirit, according to what is said in Second Peter, chapter onep491-8: By the Holy Spi-

p. 492

rit inspired, the holy men of God spoke, and thus such belief pertains to faith-as-virtue; or because he believes sacred Scripture for the reason that his fathers believed, from whose paths he does not wish to depart, and in this manner he regards human reason, nor is such belief that of faith-as-virtue, but rather of a certain habituation.

3. To that which is objected, that the other unformed virtues are had through acquisition; it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that the acts of the other virtues accord with reason itself according to the natural dictate. Whence natural justice directs toward the works of the political virtuesp492-1; but it is not so concerning faith, which directs toward certain things to be believed which are beside and contrary to and above the judgment of reason; therefore it is not subject to our acquisition in the way that the other moral virtues are.

4. To that which is objected, that someone passing from unbelief to heresy acquires cognition of some articles; it must be said that it is not alike, because, just as the very same thing can be loved with a love divinely infused and also with an innate and libidinous love, and it matters greatly whether something is loved in this way or in that: so also it must be understood in cognition, that the very same thing can be believed in one way and another: either from persuasion of human truth, or from the illumination of eternal Truth. And heretics indeed, if they know some articles, this is from a certain persuasion of human reason, indeed of their own fabrication; and even if according to it they were to assent to all the articles of faith, still they would not have the virtue of faith, whose office is to take captive the intellect unto obedience to Christp492-2. Therefore it is not alike concerning the cognition of the articles in a believing man and in an unbelieving man; and to that extent it does not follow that if that cognition in heretics is acquired, that on this account it is not infused in the faithful. — If, however, someone who is faithful and Catholic should become a heretic and there should remain to him the cognition of some article; he does not have it altogether through acquisition; nor yet is he to be said to have the virtue, because there the prior illumination is mixed in a certain way with the falsity of error, and therefore he does not have the perfection befitting a virtue.

5. To that which is objected concerning the little one who falls from gracep492-3 before he acquires anything of faith; it must be said that the little one has the habit of faith as regards that which is formal in it; for he has something whereby he will be ready and easy to assent to all the articles of faith, if they are proposed to him, when he has reached adult age. He lacks, however, that cognition which is material with respect to faith, without which, even though that formal element can be infused into the soul of the little one, it nevertheless cannot be rooted and stabilized. And therefore, if, when he has reached adult age, an error is proposed to him under the aspect of something credible, the habit of faith is most easily expelled, and so he readily assents, as if he had never had the habit of faith, on account of this, that the free choice on account of disuse does not know how to use it, and that habit was not rooted in the power, although it was infused in it. But concerning this, in the fourth bookp492-4, it is treated more sufficientlyp492-5.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 9. — Mox pro datae codd. G I K V datis.
    Verse 9. — Soon, for datae ("given"), codices G I K V read datis.
  2. Vers. 2. Verba, quae hic (et etiam a S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2.) Glossae appellatione notantur, Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 64. m. 2, ipsi Magistro tribuere videtur, cum dicat: quod probat Magister Sententiarum. Et revera exstant etiam hic in lit. Magistri, c. 4. exhibentque summam illorum testimoniorum (Glossae ordinariae et praesertim S. Augustini), quae Magister in suo Commentario in s. Scripturam super hunc locum affert. Cfr. August., Serm. 95. n. 7. — In fine arg. Vat. addit vel donum Dei.
    Verse 2. The words which here (and also in St. Thomas, here q. 3 a. 2) are marked under the name of the Gloss, Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III q. 64 m. 2, seems to attribute to the Master himself, since he says: which the Master of the Sentences proves. And indeed they are extant here too in the Master's text, c. 4, and present the substance of those testimonies (of the ordinary Gloss and especially of St. Augustine) which the Master adduces in his Commentary on sacred Scripture upon this passage. Cf. Augustine, Sermon 95 n. 7. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition adds or a gift of God.
  3. Vers. 15. De Glossa, quae est ordinaria et plenius quum hic a Strabo exhibetur, vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4. seqq., et Comment. ibid. p. II. a. I. q. I. seqq.
    Verse 15. Concerning the Gloss, which is the ordinary Gloss and is presented more fully than here by Strabo, see below in the Master's text, d. XXXIV c. 4 ff., and the Commentary there, p. II a. I q. I ff.
  4. Verba sed per habitum fidei informis elevatur intellectus supra se desiderantur in edd.
    The words but through the habit of unformed faith the intellect is elevated above itself are wanting in the editions.
  5. Vers. 22. Seq. Script. locus est I. Cor. 13, 2. (iam in 2. arg. allat.). — Codd. E H I N T U V X et edd. 1, 2 bis mirabilia pro miracula.
    Verse 22. The following scriptural passage is I Cor. 13:2 (already adduced in the second argument). — Codices E H I N T U V X and editions 1, 2 read mirabilia twice for miracula.
  6. Vers. 17.
    Verse 17.
  7. De Utilitate credendi, c. II. n. 25. Cfr. I. Retract. c. 14. n. 3. — In fine arg. pro oriri cod. U originem.
    On the Usefulness of Believing, c. II n. 25. Cf. Retractations I c. 14 n. 3. — At the end of the argument, for oriri, codex U reads originem.
  8. Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 hic perperam fidelitate, dum infra in solut. fere omnes recte exhibent infidelitate.
    Most codices and editions 1, 2 here wrongly read fidelitate, while below in the solution nearly all correctly present infidelitate.
  9. Edd. non bene etiam si. Mox pro et hoc codd. A K Z sed hoc; in fine arg. pro fuisset cod. A esset.
    The editions wrongly read etiam si. Soon, for et hoc, codices A K Z read sed hoc; at the end of the argument, for fuisset, codex A reads esset.
  10. De Praedest. Sanctor. c. 2. n. 5. — Pro assensione codd. A H I N Z et alii, sicut supra, pag. 474, nota 1, iam monuimus, assertione.
    On the Predestination of the Saints c. 2 n. 5. — For assensione ("assent") codices A H I N Z and others, as we already noted above, p. 474 note 1, read assertione.
  11. Cfr. supra a. I. q. 2. in corp. De seq. propos. cfr. d. 36. q. 6. — Subinde ante informis codd. A H Z bb supplent fides, et proxime post pro quia careat codd. A G U exhibent quia caret. Mox pro sed quia caret edd. cum non paucis codd. sed quia careat.
    Cf. above a. I q. 2 in the body. On the following proposition cf. d. 36 q. 6. — Then before informis codices A H Z bb supply fides, and just after, for quia careat, codices A G U present quia caret. Soon, for sed quia caret, the editions with not a few codices read sed quia careat.
  12. His verbis Arist., II. Poster. c. 7. et 10. (c. 9.), describit vim definitionis nominalis.
    With these words Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II c. 7 and 10 (c. 9), describes the force of a nominal definition.
  13. Edd. 1, 2 et aliquot codd. mirabilia.
    Editions 1, 2 and several codices read mirabilia.
  14. Damasc., IV. de Fide orthod. c. 10: Fides duplex est; est enim fides ex auditu (Rom. 10, 17.); audientes enim divinas Scripturas credimus doctrinae Spiritus sancti... Est autem rursus fides eorum quae sperantur hypostasis, rerum redargutio, quae non videntur, vel est indistabilis et iniudicabilis spes eorum quae a Deo nobis annuntiata sunt... Prior mentis nostrae est, secunda charismatum Spiritus. Cfr. infra dub. 1. et 5.
    John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith IV c. 10: Faith is twofold; for there is a faith from hearing (Rom. 10:17); for hearing the divine Scriptures we believe the teaching of the Holy Spirit... But again there is a faith which is the substance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen, or it is the unwavering and unjudging hope of those things which are announced to us by God... The former is of our mind, the latter of the charisms of the Spirit. Cf. below dub. 1 and 5.
  15. Edd. cognoscit.
    The editions read cognoscit ("he knows").
  16. Vers. 21. — Mox pro ad fidem-virtutem edd. cum cod. A ad fidei virtutem.
    Verse 21. — Soon, for ad fidem-virtutem ("to faith-as-virtue"), the editions with codex A read ad fidei virtutem ("to the virtue of faith").
  17. Cfr. infra d. 33. dub. 1. et 5. — Paulo inferius pro praeter et contra edd. praeter naturam. Mox post non sic [cod. A sic non] subiacet cod. O supplet fides informis.
    Cf. below d. 33 dub. 1 and 5. — A little below, for praeter et contra ("beside and contrary to"), the editions read praeter naturam ("beside nature"). Soon after non sic [codex A: sic non] subiacet, codex O supplies fides informis ("unformed faith").
  18. Epist. II. Cor. 10, 5. — Pro assentirent et haberent multi codd. assentiret et haberet. Paulo superius pro illustratione cod. Z illuminatione. Paulo inferius edd. 1, 2 bis in vero pro in viro, et deinde pro quod propter hoc cum Vat. quod haec.
    The Epistle II Cor. 10:5. — For assentirent et haberent many codices read assentiret et haberet. A little above, for illustratione, codex Z reads illuminatione. A little below editions 1, 2 read twice in vero for in viro, and then for quod propter hoc with the Vatican edition quod haec.
  19. Codd. A K (N a secunda manu) P Q a gratia. Subinde pro in ea cod. F in eo. Aliquanto inferius pro sine qua (deest in codd. B C D O et edd. 1, 2) cod. H suae. In hac solut. edd. cum nonnullis codd. pro proponere perperam exhibent praeponere.
    Codices A K (N by a second hand) P Q read a gratia. Then for in ea codex F reads in eo. Somewhat below, for sine qua (lacking in codices B C D O and editions 1, 2) codex H reads suae. In this solution the editions with some codices wrongly present praeponere for proponere.
  20. Dist. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. — Pro propter hoc quod plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 propter quod, cod. bb sed propter quod.
    Dist. 4 p. I a. 2 q. 2. — For propter hoc quod most codices and editions 1, 2 read propter quod, codex bb sed propter quod.
  21. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion on the preceding question.
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