Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 5
QUAESTIO II.
Utrum lucifer appetiverit Deo aequiparari.
Secundo quaeritur, quid appetiit ipse lucifer. Et quod appetiverit Deo parificari, ostenditur:
1. Per textum Isaiae decimo1, quarto ubi describitur eius peccatum: Ascendam in caelum, et ero similis Altissimo; sed non dixit de caelo empyreo, quia ibi erat: ergo de caelo Trinitatis; sed in illo non est nisi aequalitas: ergo etc.
2. Item, super illud Psalmi2: Quae non rapui, Glossa: «Quia Adam et diabolus voluerunt rapere divinitatem, amiserunt felicitatem»; sed non voluerunt rapere divinitatem quantum ad identitatem: ergo quantum ad aequalitatem.
3. Item, Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis3: «Haec iniquitas tua non ira momentanea, sed odio digna est sempiterno, quod tuo dilectissimo et altissimo Domino desideras semper aequari».
4. Item, quod sit appetibile, videtur ratione, quia similitudo est appetibilis, ergo maior similitudo magis, et maxima similitudo maxime appetibilis; sed similitudo aequiparantiae est huiusmodi: ergo videtur, quod valde facile fuit eam appetere, eo quod magna esset inclinatio.
5. Item, omne quod potest cogitari delectabile, potest appeti; sed diabolus potuit cogitare delectabile esse tale, qualis est Deus, quia summe delectabile est esse Deum: ergo videtur rationabiliter, quod hoc potuerit appetere.
6. Item, quod appetierit, videtur. Diabolus superbus appetiit aliquid, quod vidit supra se, quia hoc est ratio superbiae; sed supra luciferum in statu illo nihil erat nisi Deus et eius celsitudo: ergo appetiit divinam celsitudinem.
7. Item, tantum excellens fuit superbia, quantum excellit invidiae et odii malitia; sed non tantum diabolus odit et invidet creaturis Dei, ut homini, immo etiam invidet ipsi Deo: ergo non tantum creaturis praeesse, sed etiam Deo se voluit aequare.
8. Item, licitum est appetere similitudinem conformitatis: si ergo diabolus illicitum appetiit, ultra hanc progressus est; sed ultra similitudinem conformitatis non est nisi similitudo aequalitatis: ergo hanc appetiit lucifer, ut videtur.
Contra: 1. Primae ad Timotheum secundo4: Adam non est seductus etc., Glossa: «Non est credendum, quod vir spirituali mente praeditus appetierit esse sicut Deus». Si non est credendum de homine, cum adhuc sapientior esset illi Angelus, multo minus est credendum de eo.
2. Item, Anselmus in libro de Casu diaboli5: «Nihil appetiit, ad quod non pervenisset, si stetisset»; sed nunquam fuisset parificatus Deo: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod hoc non sit appetibile, videtur. Divina immensitas non potest mente capi, ergo nulp. 149lus potest cogitare aequalitatem ad Deum: sed nihil potest appeti, quod non potest intellectu capi: ergo etc.
4. Item, hoc probat Anselmus6: «Si Deus non potest cogitari nisi ita solus, ut nihil ei simile possit cogitari: quomodo potuit diabolus velle, quod non potuit cogitare»?
5. Item, quod diabolus hoc non appetierit, ostenditur, quia nihil appetiit, nisi ad quod se venire posse credidit — hoc patet, quia ipse dixit: Ponam sedem meam7 — sed nullus, nisi demens, posset unquam credere, quod creatura Creatori posset aequari: ergo cum diabolus adhuc omnino stultus non esset, hoc nunquam appetiit.
6. Item, diabolus diligebat se super omnia, ergo non volebat esse alius, quam ille qui erat; sed si esset par Deo, esset alius quam ille qui erat, quia esset Deus: ergo cum hoc non appeteret, non appetiit Deo omnino aequari. Si tu dicas, quod bene appetitur antecedens sine consequente; verum est appetitu desiderativo; sed electivo nullus, nisi stultus, vult esse abbas deliberative, quin velit esse monachus8.
7. Item, omne peccatum est per conversionem ad bonum commutabile9: ergo si diabolus appetiit parificari Deo, diabolus non peccavit; sed peccavit: ergo hoc non appetiit.
Conclusio.
Angelus malus appetiit quodam modo Dei similitudinem imitationis, quodam modo aequalitatis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod duplex est similitudo Dei, scilicet aequiparantiae sive aequalitatis, et imitationis10. Similitudo imitationis potest appeti ordinate et inordinate; ordinate, ut appetatur similitudo in his quae nostrae sunt aptitudinis et divinae acceptionis, cuiusmodi sunt perfectiones et decores virtutum; inordinate vero, ut homo appetat id quod non decet, vel quod Deo non placet, ut si appetat hominibus praeesse, vel se de adversariis vindicare11. — Similitudo aequalitatis nullo modo potest appeti ordinate, sed aliquo modo est appetibilis, aliquo modo non. Nam omnimoda similitudo non est appetibilis, quia non potest cadere in cognitionem sive in intellectum, et ideo nec in appetitum; et si aliquis fingat, non appetit aequalitatem, sed suam fictionem. Alio modo est similitudo aequalitatis in aliqua conditione, ut in dominio, praesidentia, scientia; et sic credo, quod potest appeti.
Notandum est igitur, quod diabolus quodam modo appetiit similitudinem imitationis, quodam modo aequalitatis. Et hoc apparet, si attendatur appetibile et modus appetendi. Diabolus enim appetiit aliis praeesse, sua tamen auctoritate. Quod appetiit praeesse, hoc fuit imitationis, et hoc quidem aliquando obtinuisset, si stetisset. Quod autem propria auctoritate, ita quod sine meritis et sine datore et ita, quod nulli subesset; hoc est solius Dei, et hoc est aequiparantiae. — Et ita patet, quid appetiit; et patent multae auctoritates Sanctorum, quia Gregorius12 dicit, quod appetiit esse sui iuris, ita quod nulli subesset; Bernardus dicit, quod appetiit aequalitatem potentiae; Anselmus, quod appetiit praeesse sine meritis; et omnes verum dicunt, et diversae auctoritates circumloquuntur hoc quod est praeesse omnibus propria auctoritate.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod appetiit divinam aequalitatem; concedendum est in aliquo; et sic currunt rationes ad illam partem inductae, quia bene potuit appeti, et maxime ab illo qui fuit superbissimus inter omnes, est appetita.
Quod tamen obiicitur ultimo, non valet, quia quamvis licitum esset appetere similitudinem imitationis, non tamen omnem similitudinem, sicut ostensum est.
Ad 1. Ad illa quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, facile est respondere per iam dicta. — Quod enim obiicitur de Adam, non est simile, quia Adam gratiam habuit; et praeterea non habuit tantam occasionem efferendi se.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, iam patet responsio, quia verum dicit quantum ad ipsum appetibile, non quantum ad circumstantiam, sub qua appetiit, scilicet quod propria auctoritate.
Ad 3. 4. Duae sequentes rationes, quae probant, quod non potest appeti, loquuntur de omnimoda assimilatione; quia si aliquis cogitet Deum in generali et cogitet ei similem, non cogitat Deum, sed fingit; et ideo non appetit esse similis Deo, sed fictioni suae. p. 150
Ad 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non appetiit; dicendum, quod illae rationes probant, quod non appetiit omnem13; et hoc verum est.
Ad 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod non peccavit, si appetiit similitudinem, quia non est conversus ad bonum commutabile; dicendum, quod ipse convertit se ad bonum incommutabile, ut esset proprium, et ita ut ad commutabile, ac per hoc inordinate. Et inordinate ad Deum converti superbiendo est averti a Deo et converti ad se. Et hoc patet, quia diabolus quod Dei erat appetebat sibi, et ita finaliter ad se convertebatur, non ad Deum. Et sic patent omnia quaesita.
I. Hic quaeritur de obiecto a lucifero inordinate desiderato. Quod appetierit aliquo modo fieri aequalis Deo, inter theologos constat. Conveniunt iidem etiam in distinctione, quam ex Alexandro Hal. sumsit S. Bonav., scil. inter similitudinem imitationis et aequalitatis (cfr. S. Thom., S. p. I. q. 63. a. 3.). — Petrus Lombardus cum aliis putat, daemonem simpliciter similitudinem aequalitatis appetivisse (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2.). Communiter autem negatur, tum ipsum de facto hoc appetivisse, tum hoc possibile fuisse, si intelligitur de voluntate efficaciter et directe hoc volente. Si autem hoc intelligitur de voluntate conditionata et inefficaci, Scotus censet eum potuisse desiderare simpliciter deitatem; sed de facto inordinate appetivisse suam beatitudinem, quae inordinatio pluribus modis fieri potuerit; in quibus modis recensendis fere convenit cum S. Thoma. — Alex. Hal. vult, eundem indirecte aequalitatem cum Deo appetivisse, «quia appetiit aliquid, quo habito sequeretur, quod Deo erat aequalis, scilicet nulli subesse». — Sed S. Thomas hanc sententiam non approbat (hic q. 1. a. 2.), cum Angelus nullo modo similitudinem aequalitatis potuerit desiderare. Hinc docet, inordinatum eius desiderium aliquo modo circa ordinem supernaturalem versatum esse, ita dicens in Summa (loc. cit.): «In hoc appetiit indebite esse similis Deo, quia appetiit ut finem ultimum beatitudinis id, ad quod virtute suae naturae poterat pervenire, avertens suum appetitum a beatitudine supernaturali, quae est ex gratia Dei. Vel si appetiit ut ultimum finem illam Dei similitudinem, quae datur ex gratia, voluit hoc habere per virtutem suae naturae, non ex divino auxilio secundum Dei dispositionem». — Durand. (hic q. 1.) probabile putat, illud peccatum fuisse transgressionem alicuius praecepti positivi nobis ignoti. — S. Bonav. convenit fere cum Alexandro Hal. et restringit aequalitatem ad aliquas proprietates, «ut in dominio, praesidentia, scientia». Non autem satis apparet, utrum docuerit, daemonem voluntate conditionata et inefficaci etiam omnimodam aequalitatem potuisse desiderare, ut vult B. a Barberiis (Cursus theolog. t. II. disp. 9. q. 4.), qui hoc ex verbis (in corp. et ad 3. 4.): «non appetit aequalitatem, sed suam fictionem», concludi posse putat. Confirmatur hoc iis quae dicuntur infra d. 7, p. I. a. I. q. 2. ad 7. Patet autem, quod voluntate inefficaci etiam ea quae cognita sunt ut impossibilia et mala, possint desiderari, quia «in malis ratio ordinationis non est ex parte ordinatorum, sed ex parte ordinantis» (S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 1. a. I. q. 2.).
II. Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 98. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 5. q. 21. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.
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QUESTION II.
Whether Lucifer desired to be made equal to God.
Secondly it is asked, what Lucifer himself desired. And that he desired to be made equal to God is shown:
1. By the text of Isaiah, chapter ten1 — rather, fourteen — where his sin is described: I will ascend into heaven, and I will be like the Most High; but he did not say [it] of the empyrean heaven, since he was there: therefore of the heaven of the Trinity; but in that there is nothing but equality: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm2: What I did not take away, the Gloss: «Because Adam and the devil wished to seize divinity, they lost felicity»; but they did not wish to seize divinity as to identity: therefore as to equality.
3. Likewise, Bernard, On the Steps of Humility3: «This iniquity of yours is worthy not of a momentary anger but of an everlasting hatred, in that you desire always to be made equal to your most beloved and most high Lord».
4. Likewise, that it was an object of appetite, it seems by reason, because likeness is an object of appetite, therefore a greater likeness more so, and the greatest likeness most of all an object of appetite; but the likeness of equivalence is of this kind: therefore it seems that it was very easy to desire it, because the inclination would be great.
5. Likewise, everything that can be thought delightful can be desired; but the devil could think it delightful to be such as God is, since to be God is supremely delightful: therefore it seems reasonable that he could desire this.
6. Likewise, that he desired [it], it seems. The proud devil desired something which he saw above himself, because this is the ground of pride; but above Lucifer in that state there was nothing but God and his loftiness: therefore he desired the divine loftiness.
7. Likewise, pride was as much surpassing as the malice of envy and hatred surpasses; but the devil does not so much hate and envy the creatures of God, as man, nay envies God himself: therefore [he wished] not only to be set over creatures, but he wished also to make himself equal to God.
8. Likewise, it is licit to desire a likeness of conformity: if therefore the devil desired the illicit, he progressed beyond this; but beyond a likeness of conformity there is nothing but a likeness of equality: therefore Lucifer desired this, as it seems.
On the contrary: 1. First to Timothy, chapter two4: Adam was not seduced etc., the Gloss: «It is not to be believed that a man endowed with a spiritual mind would have desired to be as God». If it is not to be believed of man, since the Angel was still wiser than he, much less is it to be believed of him.
2. Likewise, Anselm in the book On the Fall of the Devil5: «He desired nothing to which he would not have come, if he had stood»; but he would never have been made equal to God: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, that this is not an object of appetite, it seems. The divine immensity cannot be grasped by the mind, therefore no p. 149one can think equality to God: but nothing can be desired which cannot be grasped by the intellect: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, Anselm proves this6: «If God cannot be thought except as so alone that nothing like him can be thought: how could the devil will what he could not think»?
5. Likewise, that the devil did not desire this is shown, because he desired nothing except that to which he believed he could come — this is clear, because he himself said: I will set my throne7 — but no one, unless mad, could ever believe that a creature could be made equal to the Creator: therefore, since the devil was not yet wholly a fool, he never desired this.
6. Likewise, the devil loved himself above all things, therefore he did not wish to be other than he who he was; but if he were equal to God, he would be other than he who he was, because he would be God: therefore, since he did not desire this, he did not desire to be wholly equal to God. If you say that an antecedent is well desired without the consequent; that is true with a desiderative appetite; but with the elective no one, unless a fool, wishes deliberatively to be an abbot without wishing to be a monk8.
7. Likewise, every sin is by a conversion to a changeable good9: therefore if the devil desired to be made equal to God, the devil did not sin; but he did sin: therefore he did not desire this.
Conclusion.
The wicked Angel desired in one manner a likeness of imitation to God, in another manner [a likeness] of equality.
I respond: It must be said that there is a twofold likeness of God, namely of equivalence or equality, and of imitation10. A likeness of imitation can be desired ordinately and inordinately; ordinately, that the likeness be desired in those things which are of our aptitude and of divine acceptance, of which kind are the perfections and adornments of the virtues; inordinately, that a man desire what is not fitting, or what does not please God, as if he desire to be set over men, or to avenge himself on his adversaries11. — A likeness of equality can in no way be desired ordinately, but in one way is an object of appetite, in another not. For an all-encompassing likeness is not an object of appetite, because it cannot fall into cognition or into the intellect, and therefore neither into the appetite; and if anyone imagines [it], he does not desire equality, but his own fiction. In another way there is a likeness of equality in some condition, as in dominion, presidency, knowledge; and thus I believe it can be desired.
It must therefore be noted that the devil in one manner desired a likeness of imitation, in another manner of equality. And this appears, if the object of appetite and the manner of desiring be attended to. For the devil desired to be set over others, yet by his own authority. That he desired to be set over [them], this was of imitation, and this indeed he would at some time have obtained, if he had stood. But that [he desired it] by his own authority, so that without merits and without a giver and so that he should be subject to none; this is of God alone, and this is of equivalence. — And so it is clear what he desired; and many authorities of the Saints are clear, because Gregory12 says that he desired to be of his own right, so that he should be subject to none; Bernard says that he desired equality of power; Anselm, that he desired to be set over [others] without merits; and all say what is true, and the diverse authorities speak circuitously of this which is to be set over all by one's own authority.
To that, then, which is objected, that he desired divine equality; it must be conceded in something; and thus the arguments adduced for that side run on, because it could well be desired, and most of all by him who was the proudest among all, it was desired.
But what is objected last does not hold, because, although it were licit to desire a likeness of imitation, yet not every likeness, as has been shown.
To 1. To the things objected on the contrary it is easy to respond through what has been said. — For what is objected concerning Adam is not similar, because Adam had grace; and besides he did not have so great an occasion of exalting himself.
To 2. To that which is objected concerning Anselm, the response is now clear, because he says what is true as to the object of appetite itself, not as to the circumstance under which he desired [it], namely that [it was] by his own authority.
To 3. 4. The two following arguments, which prove that it cannot be desired, speak of an all-encompassing assimilation; because if anyone thinks of God in general and thinks of something like him, he does not think God, but imagines; and therefore he does not desire to be like God, but his own fiction. p. 150
To 5. 6. To that which is objected, that he did not desire [it]; it must be said that those arguments prove that he did not desire every13 [likeness]; and this is true.
To 7. To that which is objected last, that he did not sin, if he desired a likeness, because he was not converted to a changeable good; it must be said that he converted himself to an unchangeable good, that it might be his own, and thus as to a changeable [good], and through this inordinately. And to be converted inordinately to God by being proud is to be averted from God and converted to oneself. And this is clear, because the devil desired for himself what was God's, and so was finally converted to himself, not to God. And thus all that was asked is clear.
I. Here it is asked about the object inordinately desired by Lucifer. That he desired in some manner to become equal to God is established among theologians. The same [theologians] also agree in the distinction which St. Bonaventure took from Alexander of Hales, namely between a likeness of imitation and of equality (cf. St. Thomas, S. p. I, q. 63, a. 3). — Peter Lombard with others holds that the demon simply desired a likeness of equality (cf. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2). But it is commonly denied, both that he in fact desired this, and that this was possible, if it is understood of a will efficaciously and directly willing this. But if this is understood of a conditioned and inefficacious will, Scotus holds that he could desire deity simply; but in fact inordinately desired his own beatitude, which inordinateness could come about in several ways; in enumerating which ways he nearly agrees with St. Thomas. — Alexander of Hales holds that the same [devil] indirectly desired equality with God, «because he desired something which, being had, it would follow that he was equal to God, namely to be subject to none». — But St. Thomas does not approve this opinion (here q. 1, a. 2), since the Angel could in no way desire a likeness of equality. Hence he teaches that his inordinate desire was occupied in some manner about the supernatural order, saying thus in the Summa (loc. cit.): «In this he desired unduly to be like God, because he desired as the ultimate end of beatitude that to which he could come by the virtue of his own nature, turning away his appetite from the supernatural beatitude which is from the grace of God. Or if he desired as the ultimate end that likeness of God which is given from grace, he wished to have this by the virtue of his own nature, not from divine help according to God's disposition». — Durandus (here q. 1) thinks it probable that that sin was the transgression of some positive precept unknown to us. — St. Bonaventure nearly agrees with Alexander of Hales and restricts equality to certain properties, «as in dominion, presidency, knowledge». But it is not sufficiently clear whether he taught that the demon could, by a conditioned and inefficacious will, desire even an all-encompassing equality, as B. a Barberiis holds (Cursus theolog. t. II, disp. 9, q. 4), who thinks it can be concluded from the words (in the body and ad 3, 4): «he does not desire equality, but his own fiction». This is confirmed by what is said below, d. 7, p. I, a. I, q. 2, ad 7. But it is clear that by an inefficacious will even those things which are known as impossible and evil can be desired, because «in evils the ground of ordering is not on the part of the things ordered, but on the part of the one ordering» (St. Bonaventure, I Sent., d. 1, a. I, q. 2).
II. Besides those praised: Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 98, m. 3. — Scotus, in each Scriptum, here q. 1. — Albert, here a. 3; S. p. II, tr. 5, q. 21, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2.
- Vers. 13. — De caelo Trinitatis cfr. supra d. 2. p. II. dub. 2.Verse 13. — On the heaven of the Trinity cf. above, d. 2, p. II, dub. 2.
- Psalm. 68, 5. — Glossa sumta est ex August. enarratione in hunc Psalm. Serm. 1. n. 9.Psalm 68:5. — The Gloss is taken from Augustine's enarration on this Psalm, Sermon 1, n. 9.
- Cap. 10. n. 33, ubi textus originalis qua tuo substituit pro quod tuo, et dein desideras tamen ac speras pro desideras semper; plures codd. desiderasti, Vat. desiderares pro desideras.Chapter 10, n. 33, where the original text substitutes qua tuo for quod tuo, and then desideras tamen ac speras for desideras semper; several codices [read] desiderasti, the Vatican edition desiderares for desideras.
- Vers. 14. — Glossa formata est ex August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 42. n. 58, ubi ponit quaestionem: utrum Adam crediderit serpenti?Verse 14. — The Gloss is formed from Augustine, XI de Gen. ad litt., c. 42, n. 58, where he poses the question: whether Adam believed the serpent?
- Haec sententia collecta videtur ex iis, quae libr. cit. c. 4. et 6. proponuntur. Nam c. 4. dicitur: «Voluit igitur aliquid, quod non habebat, nec tunc velle debebat; sicut Eva similis voluit esse diis, priusquam Deus hoc vellet... Nihil autem velle potuit nisi iustitiam, aut commodum... Iustitiam vero volendo peccare non potuit... Peccavit ergo volendo aliquod commodum, quod nec habebat nec tunc velle debuit [B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 5. q. 21. m. 1. allegat hunc textum, et hic interserit: sed per meritum exspectare], quod tamen ad augmentum beatitudinis esse illi potuit... Cernis, ut puto, quia plus aliquid, quam acceperat, inordinate volendo, voluntatem suam extra iustitiam extendit». Cap. 6. legitur: «Quid illud fuerit (quod mali angeli iniusto concupierunt), non video; sed quidquid fuerit, sufficit scire, quia fuit aliquid, ad quod crescere potuerunt; quod non acceperunt, quando creati sunt, ut ad aliud suo merito proficerent». Similis sententia occurrit supra d. III. c. 1, ubi Magister ex August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 23. n. 30. haec recitat verba: Cecidit, non ab eo quod accepit, sed ab eo quod accepisset, si Deo subdi voluisset.This opinion seems collected from those things which are proposed in the cited book, cc. 4 and 6. For in c. 4 it is said: «He willed therefore something which he did not have, nor ought then to will; just as Eve wished to be like the gods, before God willed this... But he could will nothing except justice or advantage... Justice indeed by willing he could not sin... He sinned therefore by willing some advantage, which he neither had nor ought then to will [B. Albert, S. p. II, tr. 5, q. 21, m. 1, alleges this text, and here inserts: but to await it through merit], which yet could be for the increase of his beatitude... You see, as I think, that by inordinately willing something more than he had received, he extended his will outside justice». In c. 6 it is read: «What that was (which the evil angels unjustly coveted), I do not see; but whatever it was, it suffices to know that it was something to which they could grow; which they did not receive when they were created, that they might advance to something else by their own merit». A similar opinion occurs above, d. III, c. 1, where the Master, from Augustine, XI de Gen. ad litt., c. 23, n. 30, recites these words: He fell, not from what he received, but from what he would have received, if he had been willing to be subject to God.
- De Casu diaboli, c. 4.On the Fall of the Devil, c. 4.
- Isai. 14, 13.Isaiah 14:13.
- Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 2. et Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22, qui praedictam appetitus distinctionem exprimunt vocabulis voluntas et electio, quarum prima potest esse impossibilium, altera autem non nisi possibilium. — Codd. X Y sed non electivo, nullus enim nisi pro sed electivo nullus, nisi.Cf. Aristotle, III Ethics, c. 2, and Damascene, II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22, who express the aforesaid distinction of appetite by the words will and choice, of which the first can be of impossible things, but the second only of possible things. — Codices X Y [read] sed non electivo, nullus enim nisi for sed electivo nullus, nisi.
- Vide August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 53.See Augustine, II On Free Choice, c. 19, n. 53.
- De quo vide August., I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 9.Concerning which see Augustine, I On Genesis according to the letter, c. 4, n. 9.
- Cfr. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 70, 19, Serm. 2. n. 6. seq. — Aliquanto superius plures codd. ut F K U X divinae acceptationis pro divinae acceptionis. Mox post Similitudo in Vat. additur omnimoda.Cf. Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 70:19, Sermon 2, n. 6 ff. — A little above, several codices such as F K U X [read] divinae acceptationis for divinae acceptionis. Soon after Similitudo the Vatican edition adds omnimoda.
- Libr. XXXIV. Moral. c. 21. n. 40: Leviathan vero iste omnis (Dei) celsitudinis culmen aspiciens ius perversae libertatis appetiit, ut et praeesset ceteris et nulli subesset. — Verba Bernardi vide supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 2. ad opp. — Anselm., de Casu diaboli, c. 4: Etiamsi noluit omnino par esse Deo, sed aliquid minus Deo contra voluntatem Dei, hoc ipso voluit inordinate similis esse Deo, quia propria voluntate, quae nulli subdita fuit, voluit aliquid. Solius enim Dei esse debet, sic voluntate propria velle aliquid, ut superiorem non sequatur voluntatem... Non solum autem voluit esse aequalis Deo, quia praesumsit habere propriam voluntatem, sed etiam maior voluit esse volendo, quod Deus illum velle nolebat, quoniam voluntatem suam supra voluntatem Dei posuit. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 148, nota 5.Book XXXIV Moralia, c. 21, n. 40: But that Leviathan, beholding the summit of all (God's) loftiness, sought the right of a perverse liberty, that he might both be set over the rest and be subject to none. — For Bernard's words see above, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, arg. 2 ad opp. — Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, c. 4: Even though he did not wish to be wholly equal to God, but something less than God against the will of God, by this very fact he wished inordinately to be like God, because by his own will, which was subject to none, he willed something. For it belongs to God alone thus to will something by one's own will, so that he does not follow a superior will... But he wished not only to be equal to God, because he presumed to have his own will, but he wished even to be greater by willing what God did not wish him to will, since he set his will above the will of God. Cf. also above, p. 148, note 5.
- Subaudi: similitudinem. — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. omnino.Understand: similitudinem. — The Vatican edition, with one or another codex, [reads] omnino.