Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 5
ARTICULUS II.
De aversione minorum Angelorum.
Consequenter secundo loco quaeritur de aversione minorum Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primum est, quo genere peccati peccaverunt minores Angeli. Secundum est de comparatione peccati minorum Angelorum ad peccatum luciferi.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum minores Angeli peccaverint peccato superbiae.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum minores Angeli peccaverunt peccato superbiae. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Gregorius secundo Moralium1: «Tanto magis homines ad caelestia ascendere invident, quanto se a caelestibus per immunditiam elationis deiectos vident»; loquitur de daemonibus.
2. Item, Hugo de sancto Victore2: «Omnes in eandem malitiam consenserunt, et unum ordinem perversae societatis fecerunt»; sed si omnes consenserunt in eandem malitiam, cum malitia diaboli fuerit superbia: ergo omnes consenserunt in superbiam. Sed nullus in superbiam consentit nisi superbus: ergo etc.
3. Item, libido est fundamentum civitatis diaboli, et radix omnis peccati: ergo cum libidinosus amor sit amor ad se recurvus et amor privatus, quia in hoc differt ab amore casto3: ergo p. 151quilibet aliquid sibi appetiit. Sed non appetiit appetibile oculorum nec carnis: ergo superbiae vitae.
4. Item, «est amor commodi, et amor honesti», ut vult Anselmus4. Si ergo peccaverunt daemones, aut igitur amore commodi, aut honesti, cum omnis affectio ortum habeat ex amore; sed non amore honesti: ergo amore commodi; sed hic est amor proprii boni: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Quod non peccaverunt peccato superbiae, videtur, quia superbi est appetere praeesse et non subesse; sed minores Angeli voluerunt lucifero subesse: ergo non superbierunt. Maior manifesta est. Minor probatur per Hugonem5 et Magistrum, quorum uterque dicit, quod lucifero consenserunt: ergo voluerunt, quod praeesset, sicut optabat.
2. Item, maioris dignitatis et sublimitatis est subesse summo domino quam minori, ergo Deo quam Angelo: ergo si superbus appetit quod maioris est dignitatis, si superbierunt, potius appetierunt subesse Deo quam lucifero. Sed voluerunt a dominio Dei transire in omnimodum dominium luciferi: ergo etc.
3. Item, omnis superbus appetit aliquam excellentiam: si ergo superbierunt, aliquid appetierunt, scilicet se parificari Deo, ut videtur dicere Magister in littera6, quod superbia «voluerunt se parificare Deo». Tunc igitur, cum minus haberent motivum ad hoc quam lucifer, ergo gravius peccaverunt; quod est contra totam Scripturam, quae dicit ipsum caput malitiae. Si tu dicas, quod voluerunt quiescere sine meritis, et ideo superbierunt; sed contra: laus est et gloria consequi praemium per merita: ergo cum superbus appetat laudem et gloriam, appetere beatitudinem sine meritis non erit superbiae, immo ignaviae. — Item, aut appetebant sine meritis propter vitandam dilationem, aut propter vitandum laborem. Non propter vitandum laborem, quia Angeli non lassantur, sicut nec motor primi mobilis: ergo propter dilationem. Sed sancti viri vitant dilationem, qui cupiunt dissolvi et esse cum Christo7: ergo videtur tunc, quod ipsi superbiant.
Conclusio.
Angeli mali inferiores peccaverunt superbia, non tantum consentiendo lucifero, sed etiam sibi excellentiam appetendo.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod planum est ex dictis Sanctorum et Glossis8, quod Angeli minores peccato superbiae sunt aversi. Sed tamen in modo superbiendi diversitas est inter doctores. Nam aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod superbia eorum fuit in consentiendo superbiae luciferi; et consentire superbiae non potest esse nisi superbientis, sicut etiam Adam dicitur superbisse, quia mulieri superbienti consensit. — Sed tamen illud non videtur probabile, quod Angeli minores prius appetierint alii aliquod bonum commutabile quam sibi, cum uniuscuiusque affectus maxime sit iunctus sibi, et9 primo appetat sibi inordinate quam alii, et si alii, propter se hoc facit. Secunda vero positio est, quod Angeli minores superbierunt non tantum consentiendo, sed sibi excellentiam appetendo; et cum se non crederent posse ad illud pervenire sine ipsius luciferi sublimitate, qui erat quasi caput, et sibi et illi appetierunt; et ideo superbierunt proprie et superbiae etiam consenserunt. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.
Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum in contrarium notandum, quod superbia daemonum conformis fuit capiti totius malitiae, principi scilicet tenebrarum. Ipse autem diabolus, attendens suorum naturalium strenuitatem et excellentiam et praecellentiam, voluit praeesse et requiescere sua auctoritate, hoc est sine meritis, sine ministerio. Daemones vero ei subiecti non sunt ausi tantum appetere; sed considerantes naturalium strenuitatem, voluerunt sub umbra illius requiescere, ita quod non ministrarent, sed quadam sub illo potirentur voluntaria libertate, quam videbant se non posse habere sub divino dominio. Cognoverunt enim Angeli, se esse factos ad participandum quietis beatitudinem, et acquirendum per merita et ministeria. In hoc ergo superbierunt, quod sine meritis voluerunt beati esse et sine ministerio quiescere et sine limite propriam voluntatem implere; et hoc totum est superbire, quamvis non sit tantae superbiae, quantae fuit appetere omnibus praecellere et nulli subesse. His visis, facile est ad obiecta respondere.
Ad 1. 2. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod non superbierunt, quia non appetierunt praeesse; dicendum, quod quamvis non appetierint praeesse, noluerunt tamen debito modo subesse, quia non voluerunt subesse illi Domino, qui praecipit solum quod bonum est, et restringit voluntatem, sed ei qui permittit laxari fraenum concupiscentiae. Ideo mali homines et superbi potius volunt subesse diabolo quam Deo; similiter potuit esse de Angelis. Praeterea, alia fuit ratio, quia10 non cupiebant ei subesse, sed sub eius dominio sine servitio vel ministerio requiescere; et hoc superbiae est. — Et p. 152ita patet sequens quod obiicit, quod gloriosius est Deo subesse; verum est secundum veritatem, sed non secundum aestimationem superbi.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio: quid appetierunt? utrum parificari Deo? dicendum, quod in aliquo voluerunt parificari Deo, in hoc scilicet quod sine meritis et obsequio voluerunt esse quieti et beati in aeternum, quod solius Dei est proprium; non tamen adeo parificari voluerunt, ut lucifer, et ideo non adeo peccaverunt.
Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod gloria est obtinere cum meritis; dicendum, quod superbus magis reputat esse gloriosum habere11, et non ab alio, quam per merita ab alio obtinere; tum quia dedignatur servire, tum quia dedignatur ab alio recipere. Et quia Angeli voluerunt propria auctoritate quiescere, patet, quod secundum aestimationem superbi excellentiam appetierunt, non veram, sed falsam; sicut patet in superbis, qui appetunt magis gloriam et excellentiam vanam quam veram. Et per hoc patet quod quaeritur, quare appetebant sine meritis; dico, quod non quia laboriosum, nec quia gravem propter desiderium; sed vile reputabant obsequium et ministerium; et hoc superbiae est.
I. Haec et seq. quaest. secundum principia in praecedenti articulo stabilita solvuntur. Quoad q. 2. aliqui dicunt, peccatum luciferi non praecessisse peccatum aliorum, nec tempore nec aliqua causalitate; alii vero, illud praecessisse quidem causalitate, non autem tempore; alii cum S. Bonav. probabilius esse putant, praecessisse et tempore et causalitate. — Alex. Hal. diffuse de hoc disputat; alii plerumque auctores has duas quaestiones vel tantum tangunt, vel una quaestione absolvunt.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 99. m. 1. 2. 5. 6. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 6. a. q. 1. n. 9, et alii loci collecti ab Hier. de Montefortino t. II. q. 63. a. 9. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 6. q. unica, a. 2; S. I. q. 63. a. 8. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 6. a. 2. 3; S. p. II. tr. 3. q. 20. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. dub. later. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 6. q. unica in fine.
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ARTICLE II.
On the aversion of the lesser Angels.
Consequently, in the second place, it is asked about the aversion of the lesser Angels. And concerning this two [things] are asked. The first is, by what kind of sin the lesser Angels sinned. The second is, concerning the comparison of the sin of the lesser Angels to the sin of Lucifer.
QUESTION I.
Whether the lesser Angels sinned by the sin of pride.
Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked, whether the lesser Angels sinned by the sin of pride. And that [they did] thus, it seems.
1. Gregory, on the second [book] of the Moralia1: «So much the more do they envy men ascending to heavenly things, the more they see themselves cast down from heavenly things through the uncleanness of elation»; he speaks of the demons.
2. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor2: «All consented into the same malice, and made one order of a perverse society»; but if all consented into the same malice, since the malice of the devil was pride: therefore all consented into pride. But no one consents into pride except a proud one: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, lust is the foundation of the city of the devil, and the root of every sin: therefore, since lustful love is a love curved back to itself and a private love, because in this it differs from chaste love3: therefore p. 151each one desired something for himself. But he did not desire the object of appetite of the eyes nor of the flesh: therefore [the object] of the pride of life.
4. Likewise, «there is a love of advantage, and a love of the honorable», as Anselm holds4. If therefore the demons sinned, then either by love of advantage or of the honorable, since every affection has its origin from love; but not by love of the honorable: therefore by love of advantage; but this is the love of one's own good: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. That they did not sin by the sin of pride, it seems, because it belongs to a proud one to desire to be set over and not to be subject; but the lesser Angels wished to be subject to Lucifer: therefore they were not proud. The major is manifest. The minor is proved through Hugh5 and the Master, each of whom says that they consented to Lucifer: therefore they wished that he should be set over [them], as he desired.
2. Likewise, it is of greater dignity and sublimity to be subject to a supreme lord than to a lesser one, therefore to God than to an Angel: therefore if a proud one desires what is of greater dignity, if they were proud, they would rather have desired to be subject to God than to Lucifer. But they wished to pass from the dominion of God into the all-encompassing dominion of Lucifer: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, every proud one desires some excellence: if therefore they were proud, they desired something, namely to be made equal to God, as the Master seems to say in the text6, that by pride «they wished to make themselves equal to God». Then therefore, since they had less motive for this than Lucifer, they sinned more gravely; which is against the whole of Scripture, which says that he [Lucifer] is the head of malice. If you say that they wished to rest without merits, and therefore were proud; but on the contrary: it is praise and glory to obtain a reward through merits: therefore, since a proud one desires praise and glory, to desire beatitude without merits will not be [a mark] of pride, nay of sloth. — Likewise, either they desired [it] without merits to avoid delay, or to avoid labor. Not to avoid labor, because the Angels are not wearied, as neither is the mover of the first movable: therefore to avoid delay. But holy men avoid delay, who desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ7: therefore it then seems that they themselves are proud.
Conclusion.
The wicked lower Angels sinned by pride, not only by consenting to Lucifer, but also by desiring excellence for themselves.
I respond: It must be said that it is plain from the sayings of the Saints and from the Glosses8 that the lesser Angels were averted by the sin of pride. Yet there is a diversity among the doctors in the manner of being proud. For some wished to say that their pride was in consenting to the pride of Lucifer; and to consent to pride can only be [the act] of one who is proud, just as Adam too is said to have been proud, because he consented to the proud woman. — Yet that does not seem probable, that the lesser Angels first desired for another some changeable good rather than for themselves, since each one's affection is most of all joined to himself, and9 desires for himself inordinately before [for] others, and if for others, he does this for his own sake. But the second position is, that the lesser Angels were proud not only by consenting, but by desiring excellence for themselves; and since they did not believe they could attain to that without Lucifer's sublimity, who was as it were the head, they desired [it] both for themselves and for him; and therefore they were proud properly and also consented to [his] pride. And the arguments adduced for this side are to be conceded.
But for the understanding of the objections on the contrary it must be noted that the pride of the demons was conformed to the head of all malice, namely the prince of darkness. But the devil himself, attending to the strenuousness and excellence and pre-eminence of his own natural [gifts], wished to be set over [others] and to rest by his own authority, that is, without merits, without ministry. But the demons subject to him did not dare to desire so much; but, considering the strenuousness of [their] natural [gifts], they wished to rest under his shadow, so that they should not minister, but should enjoy a certain voluntary liberty under him, which they saw they could not have under the divine dominion. For the Angels knew that they were made to share the beatitude of rest, and to acquire [it] through merits and ministries. In this therefore they were proud, that they wished without merits to be blessed and without ministry to rest and without limit to fulfill their own will; and all this is to be proud, although it is not of so great a pride as it was to desire to excel all and to be subject to none. These things seen, it is easy to respond to the objections.
To 1. 2. For to that which is objected, that they were not proud, because they did not desire to be set over [others]; it must be said that, although they did not desire to be set over, yet they were unwilling to be subject in the due manner, because they did not wish to be subject to that Lord who commands only what is good and restrains the will, but to him who permits the bridle of concupiscence to be loosened. Therefore wicked and proud men rather wish to be subject to the devil than to God; similarly it could be with the Angels. Moreover, there was another reason, because10 they did not desire to be subject to him, but to rest under his dominion without service or ministry; and this is [a mark] of pride. — And p. 152so the following [objection] which it objects is clear, that it is more glorious to be subject to God; that is true according to the truth, but not according to the estimation of the proud one.
To 3. To that which is objected thirdly: what did they desire? to be made equal to God? it must be said that in something they wished to be made equal to God, namely in this, that without merits and homage they wished to be at rest and blessed forever, which is proper to God alone; yet they did not wish to be made equal to such a degree as Lucifer, and therefore they did not sin to such a degree.
To that which is objected last, that glory is to obtain [it] with merits; it must be said that the proud one reckons it more glorious to have11, and not from another, than to obtain through merits from another; both because he disdains to serve, and because he disdains to receive from another. And because the Angels wished to rest by their own authority, it is clear that according to the estimation of the proud one they desired excellence, not true, but false; as is clear in the proud, who desire a vain glory and excellence more than a true one. And through this it is clear what is asked, why they desired [it] without merits; I say that [it was] not because [it was] laborious, nor because [it was] burdensome by reason of desire; but they reckoned homage and ministry vile; and this is [a mark] of pride.
I. This and the following question are solved according to the principles established in the preceding article. As to q. 2, some say that the sin of Lucifer did not precede the sin of the others, neither in time nor by any causality; but others, that it did precede indeed by causality, but not in time; others, with St. Bonaventure, think it more probable that it preceded both in time and by causality. — Alexander of Hales disputes diffusely about this; other authors mostly either merely touch these two questions, or settle [them] in one question.
II. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 99, m. 1, 2, 5, 6. — Scotus, II Sent., d. 6, a. q. 1, n. 9, and other places collected by Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. II, q. 63, a. 9. — St. Thomas, II Sent., d. 6, q. unica, a. 2; S. I, q. 63, a. 8. — B. Albert, II Sent., d. 6, a. 2, 3; S. p. II, tr. 3, q. 20, m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 3, dub. lateral. — Durandus, II Sent., d. 6, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, II Sent., d. 6, q. unica at the end.
- Cap. 47. n. 74, ubi textus originalis corda hominum pro homines et proiectos pro deiectos.Chapter 47, n. 74, where the original text [reads] corda hominum for homines and proiectos for deiectos.
- Libr. I. de Sacram. p. V. c. 30: In una simul omnes malitia consenserunt, quasi unum ex se perversae societatis ordinem effecerunt.Book I On the Sacraments, p. V, c. 30: All together consented into one malice, as it were making of themselves one order of a perverse society.
- De his duabus propositionibus cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 19. seq., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 33, et XIV. c. 28.Concerning these two propositions cf. Augustine, XI de Gen. ad litt., c. 13, n. 19 ff., XI de Civ. Dei, c. 33, and XIV, c. 28.
- Monol. c. 1. et de Casu diaboli, c. 4. et 12. Argumentum ipsum insinuatur libr. de Casu diaboli, c. 4, de quo vide supra pag. 148, nota 5.Monologion, c. 1, and On the Fall of the Devil, c. 4 and 12. The argument itself is suggested in the book On the Fall of the Devil, c. 4, on which see above, p. 148, note 5.
- Verba Hugonis vide supra pag. 150, nota 3. Sententiam Magistri reperies infra d. VI. c. 2.For Hugh's words see above, p. 150, note 3. The opinion of the Master you will find below, d. VI, c. 2.
- Hic c. 1.Here, chapter 1.
- Phil. 1, 23. — Quod motor primi mobilis non fatigetur, docet Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 83. (c. 10.) et II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 3. (c. 1.).Philippians 1:23. — That the mover of the first movable is not wearied, Aristotle teaches, VIII Physics, text 83 (c. 10), and II On the Heaven and the world, text 3 (c. 1).
- Glossa ordinaria et interlinearis in Epist. Iudae 1, 6.The ordinary and interlinear Gloss on the Epistle of Jude 1:6.
- Vat. ut. Paulo ante plures codd. ut I W aa bb magis sit pro maxime sit.The Vatican edition [reads] ut. A little before, several codices such as I W aa bb [read] magis sit for maxime sit.
- Non pauci codd. qua et nonnulli cum ed. 1 quare; incongrue.Not a few codices [read] qua and some, with edition 1, quare; incongruously.
- Vat. supplet a se, cod. 1 autem sine meritis.The Vatican edition supplies a se, but codex 1 sine meritis.