Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 31
Articulus I.
De appropriatione Hilarii.
Quaestio I.
Utrum imago in divinis secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem dicatur.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Quod autem imago dicatur secundum substantiam, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Hilarius quarto de Trinitate1: «Deus ad communem sibi cum Deo imaginem eandemque similitudinem reperitur hominem operari».
2. Item, Beda2 super illud: Faciamus hominem etc.: «In hoc, quod dicit imaginem, notatur una et aequalis substantia Trinitatis»: ergo imago, cum pertineat ad communitatem et unitatem substantiae, dicitur secundum substantiam.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia illud idem, quod dicit3 exemplar active, dicit imago passive; sed exemplar in divinis dicitur secundum substantiam, non secundum relationem: ergo etc.
4. Item, imago consistit in repraesentando aliquid non tantum in substantia, sed etiam in distinctione et ordine distinctorum: si ergo in divinis non cadit distinctio in una persona, necesse est, quod in divinis attendatur imago, secundum quod unitas essentiae est in tribus personis: ergo non notionaliter, sed essentialiter dicitur imago in divinis.
Sed contra:
1. Augustinus in septimo de Trinitate4: «Quid absurdius quam imaginem dici ad se»? sed omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam, dicitur ad se: ergo cum imago non dicatur ad se, non dicitur secundum substantiam.
2. Item, Hilarius tertio de Trinitate5: «Imago sola non est», ergo imago in divinis est cum alio6; sed essentia non est cum alio: ergo etc.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per definitionem imaginis, quia Hilarius7 dicit, quod «imago est rei ad rem coaequandam» etc.; sed res, quae coaequatur rei, est persona: ergo imago est personae ad personam. Sed quod dicit respectum unius ad alterum dicitur secundum relationem: ergo et imago.
4. Item, hoc videtur per etymologiam. Imago enim dicitur quasi imitago8: ergo ubi est ratio imaginis, ibi est imitatio; sed divina essentia non imitatur aliquid, quia omne tale est ab aliquo: ergo imago non dicitur secundum substantiam vel essentiam.
Conclusio.
Imago, proprie loquendo, dicitur non secundum substantiam, sed notionaliter.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut exemplar secundum proprietatem vocabuli dicit expressionem per modum activi — unde exemplar dicitur ad cuius imitationem fit aliquid9 — sic e contrario imago dicitur per modum passivi, et dicitur imago quod alterum exprimit et imitatur. Et hoc modo accipitur imago dupliciter, secundum quod duplex est expressio, scilicet vel in naturae unitate, vel in naturae diversitate: in naturae communitate sive unitate, sicut filius imperatoris dicitur imago patris; in naturae diversitate, sicut imago imperatoris est in nummo10.
Sic respectu Dei dicitur imago per expressionem secundum identitatem naturae; et sic est imago increata et dicitur notionaliter sive secundum relationem, quia imago dicit emanationem, emanatio autem in unitate naturae non est nisi personae. Dicitur etiam imago per expressionem in diversitate naturae; et sic dicitur imago creata respectu totius Trinitatis. Et sic patet, quod imago, in divinis accepta, dicitur secundum relationem personae ad personam; et hoc secundum vocabuli proprietatem, sicut probant rationes ad hoc inductae.
Sed quoniam contingit abuti11 nomine exemplaris, ut etiam dicatur exemplar, quod ad imitationem alterius fit, sic e contrario contingit abuti imagine, ut dicatur imago, ad cuius expressionem fit aliud; et sic cum creatura fiat ad expressionem unitatis essentiae in trinitate personarum, potest dici imago de tota Trinitate; et sic dicitur imago imaginans, cum de ratione nominis dicat12 imaginatum; sicut exemplar dicitur exemplatum abusive, quamvis exemplar sit exemplans. Et secundum istum modum videntur accepisse Hilarius et Beda, ut dicit decima sexta distinctione secundi libri.
Tamen potest dici, quod uterque loquitur de imagine creata, quae cum sit respectu unius essentiae, est communis imago trium personarum et indicat unitatem substantiae in tribus. Unde nunquam imago pure dicitur ad se, quia semper dicit respectum vel ad aliam personam vel ad creaturam13, sive creaturae ad divinam naturam. Nunquam etiam dicitur pure secundum substantiam, quia semper notat distinctionem vel interius, vel exterius. Unde imago non dicitur essentia simpliciter, sed essentia ut in tribus personis considerata. — Tamen proprietatem sermonis servando, imago dicitur secundum relationem personalem, prout dicitur imago aeterna. Et concedendae sunt auctoritates et rationes ad hoc.
Ad argumenta in oppositum:
1. 2. Ad auctoritates in oppositum patet responsio.
3. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod exemplar dicitur essentialiter, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia tota Trinitas est principium. Et ideo quia exemplar rationem producentis dicit — unde secundum substantiam dicitur et convenit toti Trinitati, sed non tota Trinitas est principiata — et quia imago dicit rationem producti proprie: ideo non convenit toti Trinitati nec dicitur secundum substantiam.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad hoc, quod sit imago, debet exprimere distinctionem et ordinem; dicendum, quod illud verum est in imagine, quae est imago rei habentis distinctionem et ordinem, sicut habet homo in partibus1415, et tota Trinitas in personis; sed cum res, cuius est imago, non habeat distinctionem, ut puta una persona, non oportet sic exprimi. — Vel potest dici, quod illud verum est, quando imago substantialiter differt. Tunc enim ad hoc, quod expresse exprimat, necesse est imitari in conditionibus consequentibus substantiam: sed cum imitatur in eadem forma substantiae, non oportet.
I. De creata imagine Dei actum est supra d. 3. p. I. q. 2. in fine, et p. II. a. I. q. 2, et diffusius agetur II. Sent. d. 16. Hic vero tractatur de imagine increata, quae nomen proprium est Filii. — Primo definitur et explicatur nomen imago in sensu proprio, deinde idem nomen in sensu improprio («contingit abuti imagine»), quatenus est imago imaginans sive faciens imaginem (cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. dub. 3.). — In fine respons. auctor concludit, quod imago, in quocumque sensu intelligatur, semper includit respectum, et quidem in ipso Deo respectum secundum relationem personalem, si intelligitur in sensu proprio. — Ex hac quaest. et dub. 2. 3. aliisque locis eruitur secundum mentem S. Bonaventurae tria requiri ad perfectam imaginis rationem, scil. ut aliquid sit simile ei, quod repraesentat, vel specie, vel saltem in signo speciei — ut illud alterum imitetur et exprimat (unde deficiente hac conditione, ovum non est imago ovi, ut dicit S. August., 83 Quaestion. q. 74.) — ut imago referatur ad imaginatum ut ad suum prototypum realiter ab ipso distinctum. Aliis verbis idem docet S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 28. q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 35. a. 1.
II. Quod imago et secundum relationem dicatur, et «secundum vocabuli proprietatem», et quod Filii sit proprium nomen (q. seq.), inter doctores Latinos est sententia communis contra paucos, inter quos Durandus (I. Sent. d. 28. q. 3.), qui sicut de verbo (cfr. supra d. 27. p. II. q. 1.), ita de imagine docet, quod «non conveniat proprie divinis, prout tamen dicitur personaliter, et non essentialiter».
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 61. m. 1. 2. — S. Thom., locis cit. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. I. Sent. d. 28. a. 9; S. p. I. tr. 8. q. 35. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 28. q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 28. a. 3. q. 1. — Ægid. R., I. Sent. princ. 2. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 68. q. 2. n. 21 seqq. — Durand., loc. cit. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 28. q. 4.
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Article I. On the appropriation of Hilary.
Question I. Whether 'image' is said in divine matters according to substance, or according to relation.
That image is said according to substance is shown thus.
1. Hilary, in the fourth book On the Trinity1: "God is found to have wrought man toward an image and likewise a likeness common to himself with God."
2. Likewise, Bede2 on that text: Let us make man etc.: "In this, that he says image, is signified one and equal substance of the Trinity": therefore image, since it pertains to the commonality and unity of substance, is said according to substance.
3. Likewise, this same point seems [to follow] by reason, since that very thing which exemplar says actively, image says passively3; but exemplar in the divine is said according to substance, not according to relation: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, image consists in representing something not only in substance, but also in the distinction and order of the things distinguished: if therefore in the divine no distinction falls within one person, it is necessary that in the divine image be considered insofar as the unity of essence is in three persons: therefore image in the divine is said not notionally, but essentially.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine, in the seventh book On the Trinity4: "What is more absurd than that image be said toward itself?" but everything that is said according to substance is said toward itself: therefore since image is not said toward itself, it is not said according to substance.
2. Likewise, Hilary, in the third book On the Trinity5: "An image alone does not exist," therefore an image in the divine is with another6; but the essence is not with another: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, this same point seems [to follow] by the definition of image, since Hilary7 says that "an image is a thing's [relation] to a thing for the sake of co-equating" etc.; but the thing that is co-equated to a thing is a person: therefore image is of person to person. But what expresses the regard of one to another is said according to relation: therefore image also.
4. Likewise, this is shown by etymology. For image (imago) is so called as if imitago8: therefore wherever the account of an image is, there imitation is; but the divine essence does not imitate anything, since every such thing is from another: therefore image is not said according to substance or essence.
Conclusion.
Image, properly speaking, is said not according to substance, but notionally.
I respond: It must be said that, just as exemplar according to the propriety of the word expresses [its meaning] by way of the active — whence exemplar is said [of that] toward whose imitation something is made9 — so on the contrary image is said by way of the passive, and that is called an image which expresses and imitates another. And in this way image is taken in two ways, according as expression is twofold, namely either in unity of nature, or in diversity of nature: in commonality or unity of nature, as the son of an emperor is called the image of the father; in diversity of nature, as the image of the emperor is in a coin10.
Thus with respect to God image is said by expression according to identity of nature; and so it is the uncreated image and is said notionally or according to relation, since image expresses an emanation, and emanation in unity of nature is only [an emanation] of a person. Image is also said by expression in diversity of nature; and so the created image is said with respect to the whole Trinity. And so it is clear that image, taken in the divine, is said according to the relation of person to person; and this according to the propriety of the word, as the reasons adduced for this prove.
But since it happens that the name exemplar is misused11, so that even that is called an exemplar which is made in imitation of another, so on the contrary it happens that image is misused, so that that is called image toward whose expression another is made; and thus, since the creature is made for the expression of the unity of essence in the trinity of persons, it can be called image of the whole Trinity; and thus it is called an imaging image, since by the account of the name it expresses12 the imaged; just as an exemplar is called an exemplated abusively, although the exemplar is the exemplating. And in this way it seems that Hilary and Bede took it, as he says in the sixteenth distinction of the second book.
Yet it can be said that each speaks of the created image, which, since it is with respect to one essence, is the common image of the three persons and indicates the unity of substance in the three. Hence image is never said purely toward itself, since it always expresses regard either to another person or to a creature13, or [the regard] of a creature to the divine nature. Nor is it ever said purely according to substance, since it always denotes distinction either internally or externally. Hence image is not called essence simply, but essence as considered in three persons. — Yet preserving the propriety of speech, image is said according to personal relation, insofar as it is called the eternal image. And the authorities and reasons for this are to be conceded.
To the arguments on the opposite side:
1. 2. To the authorities on the opposite side the response is plain.
3. To that which is objected, that exemplar is said essentially, therefore etc.; it must be said that the case is not the same, since the whole Trinity is the principle. And therefore, since exemplar expresses the account of the producer — whence it is said according to substance and applies to the whole Trinity, but the whole Trinity is not principiated — and since image properly expresses the account of the produced: therefore it does not apply to the whole Trinity nor is it said according to substance.
4. To that which is objected, that for there to be an image, it must express distinction and order; it must be said that this is true of an image which is the image of a thing having distinction and order, as a man has [distinction and order] in his parts1415, and the whole Trinity in the persons; but since the thing of which it is the image does not have distinction, as for instance one person, it is not necessary that it be expressed thus. — Or it can be said that this is true when the image differs substantially. For then, in order that it expressly express, it is necessary to imitate in the conditions consequent upon the substance: but when it imitates in the same form of substance, this is not necessary.
I. Of the created image of God treatment was had above d. 3, p. I, q. 2, at the end, and p. II, a. I, q. 2, and more at length it will be treated in II Sent. d. 16. Here, however, treatment is had of the uncreated image, which is the proper name of the Son. — First, the name image is defined and explained in its proper sense; then the same name in an improper sense ("it happens that image is misused"), insofar as it is an imaging image or one making an image (cf. II Sent. d. 16, dub. 3). — At the end of the response the author concludes that image, in whatever sense it be understood, always includes a regard, and indeed in God himself a regard according to personal relation, if it is understood in the proper sense. — From this question and dub. 2 and 3 and other places it is gathered, according to the mind of St. Bonaventure, that three things are required for the perfect account of an image, namely: that something be like that which it represents, either in species, or at least in a sign of the species — that it imitate and express the other (whence, this condition failing, an egg is not the image of an egg, as St. Augustine says, 83 Questions, q. 74) — that the image be referred to the imaged as to its prototype really distinct from itself. In other words, St. Thomas teaches the same thing, I Sent. d. 28, q. 2, a. 1; S. I, q. 35, a. 1.
II. That image is said also according to relation, and "according to the propriety of the word," and that it is the proper name of the Son (next q.), is among the Latin doctors the common opinion, against a few, among whom Durandus (I Sent. d. 28, q. 3), who, just as he teaches concerning the Word (cf. above d. 27, p. II, q. 1), so concerning image teaches that "it is not properly applied to the divine, although [yet] it is said personally and not essentially."
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 61, m. 1, 2. — St. Thom., at the places cited. — B. Albert., on this and the next question, I Sent. d. 28, a. 9; S. p. I, tr. 8, q. 35, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., I Sent. d. 28, q. 3, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., I Sent. d. 28, a. 3, q. 1. — Ægid. R., I Sent. princ. 2, q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 68, q. 2, n. 21 seqq. — Durand., at the place cited. — Dionys. Carth., I Sent. d. 28, q. 4.
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- Num. 18. Sensus verborum citatorum est: Deus (Pater) reperitur operari sive fecisse hominem ad imaginem sibi cum Deo (Filio) communem. Cfr. supra d. XXVIII. c. 7.Number 18. The sense of the words cited is: God (the Father) is found to have wrought, or made, man toward an image common to himself with God (the Son). Cf. above d. XXVIII, c. 7.
- In Hexaem. I. (ad Genes. 1, 26.) In eo vero quod sequitur: ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, una et aequalis substantia eiusdem sanctae Trinitatis indicatur.On the Hexaemeron I (on Genesis 1:26). In that which follows, namely toward our image and likeness, the one and equal substance of the same holy Trinity is signified.
- Vat., omisso quod, hic et immediate post pro dicit bis exhibet dicitur.The Vatican [edition], omitting quod, here and immediately after, twice exhibits dicitur in place of dicit.
- Cap. I. n. 2.Chapter I, n. 2.
- Num. 23.Number 23.
- Cod. W primo ergo praemittit «.Codex W puts the opening quotation mark « before primo ergo.
- De Synod. n. 13; in qua definitione sola Vat. coaequatio pro coaequandum etc. — Integram definitionem invenies in lit. Magistri hic c. 2, notula. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc omittit unius.On the Synods, n. 13; in which definition only the Vatican [edition reads] coaequatio for coaequandum etc. — You will find the entire definition in the Master's text here at c. 2, in the note. — A little later the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc omits unius.
- Haec etymologia nominis imitago attribuitur Sexto Pompeio Festo, qui Verrii Flacci librum de Verborum significatione in compendium redegit saec. 3. vel 4. post Christum natum (cfr. Forcellini). Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. (c. 2.) ait: Nam imago id est, cuius generatio per imitationem est.This etymology of the name imitago is attributed to Sextus Pompeius Festus, who reduced into compendium the book of Verrius Flaccus On the signification of words in the 3rd or 4th c. after Christ (cf. Forcellini). Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 1 (c. 2), says: "For an image is that whose generation is by imitation."
- Et si hoc exemplar est in mente artificis, vocatur idea, quae a Seneca, Epist. 65. ad Lucilium, sic definitur: exemplar, ad quod respiciens artifex, id quod destinabat, effecit. — Cod. T cum pluribus aliis paulo ante pro activi ponit activum, et dein passivum pro passivi.And if this exemplar is in the mind of the artist, it is called the idea, which is defined by Seneca, Epistle 65 to Lucilius, thus: "the exemplar, looking to which the artist makes that which he had intended." — Codex T with many others a little before puts activum for activi, and then passivum for passivi.
- August., Serm. IX (de Decem Chordis) c. 8. n. 9: Nam etiam imagines in hominibus diversae sunt. Filius hominis habet imaginem patris sui, et hoc est quod pater eius, quia homo est sicut pater eius; in speculo autem imago tua non hoc est quod tu... Sicut enim in nummo imago imperatoris aliter est, aliter in filio; nam imago et imago est, sed aliter impressa est in nummo, aliter in filio; aliter in solido aureo imago imperatoris; sic et tu nummus Dei es etc.Augustine, Sermon IX (On the Ten Strings) c. 8, n. 9: "For images in human beings are also various. The son of a man has the image of his father, and this is what his father is, since the man is as his father is; but in a mirror your image is not that which you are... For just as in a coin the image of the emperor is in one way, in the son in another; for an image is an image, but it is impressed in one way in a coin, in another in the son; and in another way in a gold solidus the image of the emperor; so you also are a coin of God" etc.
- Id est: improprie vel falso accipere.That is: to take improperly or falsely.
- Vat. cum paucis codd. et ed. 1 dicatur. Paulo inferius pro exemplans codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 non recte exemplaris, et subinde pro videntur Vat., faventibus nonnullis codd., dicitur.The Vatican [edition] with a few codices and edition 1 [reads] dicatur. A little below, in place of exemplans, the codices with editions 1, 2, 3 incorrectly [read] exemplaris, and subsequently in place of videntur the Vatican [edition], with several codices in agreement, [reads] dicitur.
- Sola Vat. textum sic supplet: vel personae ad aliam personam, vel essentiae ad creaturam. Mox post Nunquam pro etiam cod. R ergo.The Vatican [edition] alone supplies the text thus: "either of person to another person, or of the essence to a creature." Soon after Nunquam, in place of etiam, codex R [reads] ergo.
- Cod. W adiicit Dei.Codex W adds Dei.
- Codd. aa bb addunt animae, id est in potentiis, cod. T (in marg.) adiungit vel in potentiis.Codices aa, bb add animae, that is in potentiis; codex T (in margin) appends vel in potentiis.