Bonaventure

Quaestio III.

Utrum aequalis et similis secundum mutuam relationem in divinis dicantur.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Tertio quaeritur, utrum praedicta nomina, scilicet aequalis et similis, dicant mutuam relationem, secundum quam Pater Filio, et Filius Patri sit aequalis. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia secundum Dionysium¹: «In causalibus non recipimus reciprocationem»; sed Pater est principium Filii: ergo non cadit ibi reciprocatio, ut dicatur Pater aequalis Filio.

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione; quia enim Filius similis est Patri, ideo dicitur similitudo Patris: ergo si e converso Pater est similis Filio perfecte, ergo Pater est similitudo Filii. Haec autem non recipitur: ergo etc.

3. Item, qui est aequalis alii secundum aequalitatem sibi adaequatur: si ergo Pater est aequalis Filio, ergo ei² adaequatur; quaero: a quo? aut a se, aut ab alio. Non a se, quia quicumque aequat se alii, aliquid agit in se; sed Pater nihil agit in se, ergo non adaequatur nec a se; nec ab alio aequatur: ergo non est aequalis Filio.

Contra:

1. Simile et aequale sunt relativa aequiparantiae; sed ista denominant consimiliter³ utrumque extremum: ergo si Filius est similis Patri, pari ratione Pater est similis Filio.

2. Item, ratio similitudinis est convenientia vel indifferentia in qualitate vel substantia; sed convenientia aequaliter respicit utrumque extremum, et indifferentia⁴: ergo si Filius est indifferens Patri et e converso, Pater est similis Filio.

3. Item, omne plurale geminat suum singulare; sed haec conceditur: Pater et Filius sunt similes et aequales, ergo Pater est similis; quaero: cui? aut sibi, aut alii⁵. Non sibi: ergo alii.

Conclusio.

Similis et aequalis in divinis dicuntur secundum mutuam relationem, prout simpliciter dicunt convenientiam in quantitate et qualitate; non vero, prout superaddunt rationem originis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod similis et aequalis dupliciter accipiuntur: aut prout dicunt convenientiam in quantitate vel qualitate, aut prout supra convenientiam addunt imitationem vel expressionem perfectam. Primo quidem modo sunt relativa aequiparantiae, et dicuntur ad convertentiam, secundum quod probant rationes secundo inductae. Alio modo similis et aequalis addunt super hoc⁶ rationem originis — unde aequalis dicitur quasi adaequatus, et similis quasi assimilatus — hoc modo non convenit nisi ei qui est ab altero, et hoc modo procedunt primae rationes, quod Pater non dicitur similitudo Filii per imitationem, nec aequatur Filio per emanationem ab alio, sed aequat sibi Filium.

Ad argumenta:

1. Quod tamen dicit Dionysius, quod non recipimus reciprocationem etc.; loquitur de causa⁷ proprie, prout differt ab effectu per essentiam: hoc autem modo Pater non est causa Filii, immo bene est habitudo Filii ad Patrem, sicut e converso; et sic patent omnia.

Question III. Whether 'equal' and 'like' are said in divine matters according to a mutual relation.

Thirdly it is asked whether the aforesaid names, namely equal and like, express a mutual relation, according to which the Father is equal to the Son, and the Son to the Father. And that they do not, is shown:

1. Because according to Dionysius¹: "In causal [things] we do not admit reciprocation"; but the Father is the principle of the Son: therefore reciprocation does not fall there, such that the Father be called equal to the Son.

2. Likewise, this seems [to be so] by reason; for since the Son is like the Father, therefore he is called the likeness of the Father: therefore if conversely the Father is perfectly like the Son, then the Father is the likeness of the Son. But this is not admitted: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, he who is equal to another according to equality is equated to him: if therefore the Father is equal to the Son, then he is equated to him²; I ask: by whom? either by himself, or by another. Not by himself, since whoever equates himself to another, does something in himself; but the Father does nothing in himself, therefore he is not equated either by himself; nor is he equated by another: therefore he is not equal to the Son.

On the contrary:

1. Like and equal are relatives of equivalence (aequiparantiae); but these denominate similarly³ each extreme: therefore if the Son is like the Father, by equal reasoning the Father is like the Son.

2. Likewise, the ground of likeness is agreement or undifferentiation in quality or substance; but agreement looks equally to each extreme, and so does undifferentiation⁴: therefore if the Son is undifferentiated from the Father and conversely, the Father is like the Son.

3. Likewise, every plural doubles its singular; but this is conceded: the Father and the Son are like and equal; therefore the Father is like; I ask: like whom? either to himself, or to another⁵. Not to himself: therefore to another.

Conclusion.

'Like' and 'equal' are said in the divine according to a mutual relation, insofar as they simply express agreement in quantity and quality; but not insofar as they superadd a ground of origin.

I respond: It must be said that like and equal are taken in two ways: either insofar as they express agreement in quantity or quality, or insofar as, beyond agreement, they add imitation or perfect expression. In the first way they are relatives of equivalence (aequiparantiae), and are said with convertibility, according to which the reasonings adduced second prove [their point]. In the other way, like and equal add upon this⁶ a ground of origin — whence equal is said as if adequated, and like as if assimilated — in this way it [only] applies to him who is from another, and in this way the first reasonings proceed, [namely] that the Father is not called the likeness of the Son by imitation, nor is he equated to the Son by emanation from another, but rather equates the Son to himself.

To the arguments:

1. As to what Dionysius says, that we do not admit reciprocation, etc.; he is speaking of cause⁷ properly, insofar as it differs from its effect by essence: but in this way the Father is not the cause of the Son; rather, there is indeed a relation (habitudo) of the Son to the Father, just as conversely; and so all [the points] are clear.