Bonaventure

Quaestio II.

Utrum aequalitas et similitudo in divinis dicantur secundum substantiam an secundum relationem.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum nomina supradicta dicantur secundum substantiam an secundum relationem. Et quod secundum substantiam, videtur:

1. Auctoritate Magistri in littera¹: «Aequalitas, inquit, non est relatio vel notio, sed naturae unitas vel identitas»; et Hilarius de Trinitate²: «Similitudo est indifferens essentia»: ergo tam similitudo quam aequalitas dicit divinam essentiam.

2. Item, aequalitas dicitur secundum quantitatem, et similitudo secundum qualitatem³; sed in divinis qualitas et quantitas transeunt in substantiam: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod dicitur secundum relationem, importat distinctionem de suo principali intellectu; sed simile et aequale dicunt convenientiam: ergo non dicuntur secundum relationem.

4. Item, nihil quod dicitur secundum relationem, dicitur de duobus, nisi importet relationem in communi — hoc dico propter hoc nomen relatus et distinctus — sed simile et aequale important specialem relationem, si eam important⁴, quia non est assignare specialiores sub ipsis, et dicuntur de pluribus: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Hilarius de Trinitate⁵: «Similitudo sibi non est»; sed omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam, dicitur ad se: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam, dicitur de pluribus singulariter; sed similis et aequalis dicitur pluraliter: ergo etc.

3. Item, aequalitate refertur Pater ad Filium, et Filius ad Patrem, sed non essentia: ergo aequalitas non dicit essentiam.

4. Item, aut Pater est aequalitas Filii ad Patrem, aut non. Si sic: ergo cum Filius aequalitate illa sit aequalis Patri⁶, Pater est aequalis sibi; quod non conceditur. Quod si Pater non est aequalitas Filii ad Patrem, ergo aequalitas non dicitur de omnibus: ergo non dicit essentiam; essentia enim Filii est Pater.

Conclusio.

Similitudo et aequalitas dicuntur aliquo modo tum secundum substantiam tum secundum relationem, sed proprie et principaliter secundum relationem, ex consequenti et causaliter secundum substantiam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum communem omnium opinionem, cum simile et aequale dicant convenientiam plurium in uno, quod⁷ de se important distinctionem in suppositis et unionem sive unitatem in essentia. Et quia distinctio personarum spectat ad modum dicendi secundum relationem, unitas essendi ad modum dicendi secundum substantiam, ideo huiusmodi nomina nec omnino dicuntur secundum substantiam, nec omnino secundum relationem, sed quodam modo secundum substantiam, quodam modo secundum relationem. Sed quia non possunt secundum hunc duplicem modum dici principaliter⁸, sed necesse est, quod secundum alterum, ideo ulterius oportet quaerere, secundum quem modum dicendi accipiantur in divinis. Et hic sunt diversae opiniones.

Quidam enim dicunt quod huiusmodi nomina, secundum concretionem significata, dicuntur principaliter secundum relationem. Nam similes dicuntur habentes eandem qualitatem. Quia ergo respicit suppositum per se secundum quod concretum, ideo dicitur secundum relationem. Sed in abstractione, quia similitudo est unitas naturae vel essentiae, quia respicit unitatem formae primo, non distinctionem suppositorum nisi ex consequenti, principaliter dicitur secundum substantiam. — Sed iste modus solvendi non est conveniens. Nam est eadem significatio in concreto et in abstracto in principali significato⁹¹⁶: ergo si dicitur secundum substantiam unum, et reliquum similiter: ergo hoc non solvit quod dictum est.

Secunda opinio est, quod huiusmodi nomina et in concretione et in abstractione dicuntur principaliter secundum substantiam, et connotant distinctionem in suppositis. Et ratio ipsorum est, quia cum similitudo respiciat ista duo, scilicet convenientiam et differentiam¹⁷, immediatius et completius respicit convenientiam¹⁰. Dicuntur enim differentes esse similes, in quantum conveniunt, convenientes vero non dicuntur similes, in quantum differunt. Respicit ergo similitudo distinctionem per modum materiae¹¹¹⁸, sed per modum formae respicit unitatem essentiae; et ideo completive dicitur secundum substantiam tam similitudo quam similis. — Sed ista positio non potest stare. Certum enim est, quod similitudo dicitur respectus aliquorum ad invicem; sed in divinis non est nisi respectus personae ad personam. Respectus autem personae ad personam non potest dici secundum substantiam: ergo necesse est, quod hoc nomen simile, quod a similitudine imponitur, secundum substantiam non dicatur.

Et ideo est tertia opinio, quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur secundum relationem, formaliter loquendo. Dicunt enim respectum suppositorum distinctorum convenientium in aliquo uno; et ita respectus cadit ibi per modum formalis, sed unitas essentiae et pluralitas suppositorum¹² cadit per modum causae. Ideo proprie et principaliter secundum relationem, ex consequenti vero secundum substantiam causaliter loquendo dicuntur. Et hoc magis patet, si consideremus significationem horum nominum in creaturis, unde fit translatio. Similitudo enim est¹³ secundum qualitatem, similiter et aequalitas secundum quantitatem; et similitudo dicit relationem formaliter, sed qualitatem causaliter, similiter aequalitas dicit quantitatem causaliter sed relationem formaliter. Non enim est similitudo qualitas, sed relatio, quae attenditur secundum qualitatem.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Magistro et Hilario, quod est essentia; dicendum, quod causaliter intelliguntur omnes tales sermones.

2. Ad illud quod postea dicitur, quod aequale dicitur secundum quantitatem; dicendum, quod secundum dicit causam efficientem, non dicit formam; sic de simili.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod relativa important distinctionem; dicendum, quod quaedam in divinis dicuntur secundum relationem, quae sunt distinctiva relatorum, ut Pater et Filius; et talia¹⁴ important respectum distinguentem, et talia important distinctionem ut exercitam. Quaedam autem dicuntur secundum relationem, quae sunt relativa distinctorum, ut similis et aequalis; et talia important respectum, sed ille respectus non est notio distinguens, sed consequens distinguentem. Importat enim distinctionem non ut exercitam, sed ut conceptam. Nam respectus distinguens est unius personae ad aliam, secundum quod est ab illa. In huiusmodi vero nominibus importatur respectus unius personae ad aliam, secundum quod communicant unam naturam. Et quia respectus est relatio, ideo plurificatur; quia vero respectus unius essentiae, ideo dicitur de pluribus.

4. Et ideo patet ultimum quod dicitur, quod nullum relativum dicitur de pluribus, nisi dicat relationem in communi. Dicendum enim, quod hoc non solum est in his nominibus, quae important distinctionem in communi, ut relatus et distinctus, verum etiam in his¹⁵ quae dicunt respectum plurium, ut communicant in aliquo. Tale enim nomen dicit respectum in communi, specificatum tamen ratione communicationis in uno; unde similes dicuntur ad invicem relati, participantes unam qualitatem.

Question II. Whether equality and likeness in divine matters are said according to substance or according to relation.

Secondly it is asked whether the aforesaid names are said according to substance or according to relation. And that [they are said] according to substance, is shown:

1. By the authority of the Master in the text¹: "Equality," he says, "is not relation or notion, but unity or identity of nature"; and Hilary, On the Trinity²: "Likeness is undifferentiated essence": therefore both likeness and equality express the divine essence.

2. Likewise, equality is said according to quantity, and likeness according to quality³; but in the divine, quality and quantity pass over into substance: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything that is said according to relation imports distinction in its principal understanding; but like and equal express agreement: therefore they are not said according to relation.

4. Likewise, nothing that is said according to relation is said of two things, unless it imports relation in general — I say this on account of this name related and distinct — but like and equal import a special relation, if they import [any]⁴, since one cannot assign more specific [relations] under them, and they are said of more than [two]: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Hilary, On the Trinity⁵: "Likeness is not [a relation] of a thing to itself"; but everything that is said according to substance is said with respect to itself: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything that is said according to substance is said of many in the singular; but like and equal are said in the plural: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by equality the Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, but not by essence: therefore equality does not express essence.

4. Likewise, either the Father is the equality of the Son to the Father, or he is not. If so: then since the Son by that equality is equal to the Father⁶, the Father is equal to himself; which is not conceded. But if the Father is not the equality of the Son to the Father, then equality is not said of all [the persons]: therefore it does not express essence; for the essence of the Son is the Father.

Conclusion.

Likeness and equality are said in some way both according to substance and according to relation, but properly and principally according to relation, consequentially and causally according to substance.

I respond: It must be said that, according to the common opinion of all, since like and equal express the agreement of many in one, [it is the case that]⁷ of themselves they import distinction in supposits and union or unity in essence. And since the distinction of persons pertains to the mode of speaking according to relation, and the unity of being to the mode of speaking according to substance, therefore names of this sort are neither said wholly according to substance, nor wholly according to relation, but in some way according to substance, in some way according to relation. But since they cannot be said in this twofold mode principally⁸, but it is necessary that [they be said] according to one or the other, therefore one must further inquire according to which mode of speaking they are taken in the divine. And here there are diverse opinions.

For some say that names of this sort, signified according to concretion, are said principally according to relation. For like are said [those] having the same quality. Since therefore [this name] looks to a supposit per se insofar as it is concrete, therefore it is said according to relation. But in the abstract, since likeness is the unity of nature or essence, since it looks first to the unity of form, not to the distinction of supposits except consequently, principally it is said according to substance. — But this manner of solving is not suitable. For the signification is the same in the concrete and in the abstract in [their] principal signification⁹¹⁶: therefore if one is said according to substance, the other is so likewise: therefore this does not solve what was said.

The second opinion is that names of this sort, both in concretion and in abstraction, are said principally according to substance, and connote distinction in supposits. And their reason is that, since likeness looks to these two, namely agreement and difference¹⁷, more immediately and more completely it looks to agreement¹⁰. For different things are said to be alike insofar as they agree, but agreeing things are not said to be alike insofar as they differ. Likeness therefore looks to distinction by way of matter¹¹¹⁸, but by way of form it looks to the unity of essence; and therefore completively both likeness and like are said according to substance. — But this position cannot stand. For it is certain that likeness is said [as] a respect of some things to one another; but in the divine there is only the respect of person to person. But the respect of person to person cannot be said according to substance: therefore it is necessary that this name like, which is imposed from likeness, not be said according to substance.

And therefore there is a third opinion, that names of this sort are said according to relation, formally speaking. For they express the respect of distinct supposits agreeing in some one thing; and so the respect falls there by way of the formal, but the unity of essence and the plurality of supposits¹² falls by way of cause. Therefore properly and principally [they are said] according to relation, consequently however according to substance, speaking causally. And this is more clear, if we consider the signification of these names in creatures, whence the transfer is made. For likeness is¹³ according to quality, likewise equality according to quantity; and likeness expresses relation formally, but quality causally, likewise equality expresses quantity causally but relation formally. For likeness is not a quality, but a relation, which is regarded according to quality.

To the arguments:

1. To that which is objected from the Master and Hilary, that it is essence; it must be said that all such expressions are understood causally.

2. To that which is afterwards said, that equal is said according to quantity; it must be said that according to expresses the efficient cause, not the form; so also of like.

3. To that which is objected, that relatives import distinction; it must be said that some [names] in the divine are said according to relation, which are distinctive of the related, as Father and Son; and such¹⁴ import a distinguishing respect, and such import distinction as exercised. But some are said according to relation, which are relative of the distinct, as like and equal; and such import a respect, but that respect is not a distinguishing notion, but consequent on the one distinguishing. For it imports distinction not as exercised, but as conceived. For the distinguishing respect is of one person to another, insofar as it is from that one. But in names of this sort there is imported the respect of one person to another, insofar as they share one nature. And since respect is relation, therefore it is pluralized; but since [it is] a respect of one essence, therefore it is said of more than [one].

4. And therefore the last [point] which is said is clear, that no relative is said of more than [two], unless it expresses relation in general. For it must be said that this is not only [the case] in those names which import distinction in general, as related and distinct, but also in those¹⁵ which express the respect of many, insofar as they share in something. For such a name expresses respect in general, specified however by reason of communication in one [thing]; whence like are said [to be] related to one another, sharing one quality.