Dist. 31, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 31
Articulus Unicus.
De nominibus similis et aequalis.
Quaestio I.
Utrum aequalitas et similitudo positive vel privative de Deo dicantur.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Et quod dicantur secundum privationem, videtur:
1. Per auctoritatem Magistri in littera1: «Quibusdam videtur nomine aequalitatis et similitudinis non aliquid poni, sed removeri, ut dicatur Filius aequalis Patri, quia nec maior nec minor est eo».
2. Item, hoc potest probari sic: Euclides2 definit aequale sic: «Aequale est quod alteri suppositum non excedit nec exceditur»: ergo cum haec definitio sit data secundum privationem, patet etc.
3. Item, aequale et simile non tantum dicunt unitatem, sed etiam diversitatem3; sed non est ponere diversitatem in divinis: ergo haec nomina non dicuntur secundum positionem, sed secundum privationem.
4. Item, aequale, secundum quod dicit positionem, dicit commensurationem4; sed in divinis non est commensuratio nec excessus: ergo dicuntur per privationem excessus, non per positionem.
Sed contra:
1. Similitudo et aequalitas in his inferioribus dicuntur positive; sed haec completius sunt in Deo, quia, ut dicit Augustinus5 in Filio primo reperitur ratio similitudinis et aequalitatis: ergo multo fortius in Deo dicunt positionem.
2. Item, omnis negatio, quae non est pura negatio, fundatur supra positionem: ergo cum hoc quod dico aequale importet remotionem excessus et non importet puram negationem — quia tunc chimaera esset aequalis Deo — oportet quod importet positionem.
3. Item, haec est falsa: Pater et Filius sunt inaequales: ergo hoc quod est inaequale aliquid privat quod est in Deo; sed hoc non est nisi importatum per aequalitatem: ergo aequalitas aliquid ponit, quia si eius oppositum privat, necesse est ipsum ponere.
4. Item, haeretici dicunt hanc6 falsam: Pater est aequalis Filio, aut ergo quia aliquid ponitur, aut quia aliquid removetur. Non quia removetur, quia dicunt hanc veram: Pater est inaequalis, quae removet: ergo quia aliquid ponitur, ergo etc. — Et fundatur utraque istarum rationum7 super oppositionem inaequalis ad aequale. Si enim aequale et inaequale acciperentur remotive, tunc, eo quod opposita, acciperentur positive.
Conclusio.
Aequalitas et similitudo non dicuntur de Deo privative, sed positive.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum quod in littera innuitur et doctores antiqui dicunt, positio Magistri fuit, quod nomina, quae non dicunt personalem proprietatem vel essentiae unitatem, privative accipiantur. Unde quia similis et aequalis dicit respectum Patris ad Filium, et ille respectus non est personalis proprietas nec essentia; voluit ponere, quod omnia talia secundum privationem dicerentur, sicut duo, tres, similes et aequales et consimilia. — Tamen ista positio stare non potest, sicut supra probatum est de unitate et pluralitate nominum divinorum. Si enim in divinis est unitas positive et pluralitas, et haec duo faciunt similitudinem et aequalitatem, necesse est, haec positive accipi in divinis. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod aequale est quod non excedit; dicendum, quod illi negationi substernitur affirmatio et positio, quae notificatur per privationem oppositi, scilicet excessus.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est diversitas in divinis; dicendum, quod non indicant diversitatem nisi suppositi, non formae de se; et quia in divinis est pluralitas suppositorum, patet etc.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum quod dicuntur positive, dicunt commensurationem; dicendum, quod in divinis non est commensuratio simpliciter, sed tamen est commensuratio respectu infiniti, et haec non ponit simpliciter commensurationem.
Aliter potest dici, quod aequale et simile de natura, suo primo intellectu ponunt unitatem quantitatis et qualitatis; quod autem ponat commensurationem hoc quod est aequale, est, quia quantitas illa est mensurata. Quoniam ergo in divinis est immensa, dicit ibi convenientiam in quantitate virtutis, quamvis non ponat ibi commensurationem.
I. S. Bonav., qui iam d. 19. p. I. q. I. 2. de aequalitate in divinis tractavit, hic, Magistrum secutus, ad eandem rem, sed sub alia ratione, discutiendam redit ob causam infra in dub. 1. dictam. — Quoad rationem similitudinis notandum, nonnullos Patres eam noluisse in Deo admittere, ad cautelam, quia Ariani ecclesiastico termino ὁμοούσιον (consubstantiale) fraudulenter substituerant ὁμοιούσιον (similis substantiae). At cessante erroris periculo, haec locutio communiter recipitur (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 42. a. 1. ad 2. 3.).
Nec obstat, quod in Deo, in quo eadem est natura, excludi videatur ratio aequalis vel similis. Distinguuntur enim hae tres relationes, ut iam observavit Aristoteles (cfr. supra pag. 342, nota 6.), et quidem sic, ut idem fundetur super unitate substantiae, simile super qualitate, sed aequale super quantitate. Unde apte ad divina transferri possunt. Et bene observat Scotus (hic q. 1. n. 6.), consentiente S. Thom. (loc. cit.), quod aequalitas etiam in divinis includit in se similitudinem et aliquid addit, quod scil. excludit excessum. — Quoad obsoletam opinionem Magistri in hac re et quoad rationem unitatis et pluralitatis cfr. supra d. 24. a. 1. q. 1, a. 2. q. 1.
II. Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. q. 54. m. I. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. unica; Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 42. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. n. 70. q. 1. n. 46. seqq. — Durand., hic q. 2.
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Articulus Unicus. On the names "like" and "equal."
Question I. Whether equality and likeness are said of God positively or privatively.
That they are said by way of privation is shown:
1. By the authority of the Master in the text1: "It seems to some that by the name of equality and likeness nothing is posited but [something is] removed, so that the Son is said to be equal to the Father because he is neither greater nor less than he."
2. Likewise, this can be proved thus: Euclid2 defines equal thus: "The equal is what, when applied to another, neither exceeds nor is exceeded": therefore since this definition is given by way of privation, it is clear etc.
3. Likewise, equal and like express not only unity but also diversity3; but diversity is not to be posited in the divine: therefore these names are said not by way of position, but by way of privation.
4. Likewise, equal, insofar as it expresses position, expresses commensuration4; but in the divine there is no commensuration nor excess: therefore they are said by way of privation of excess, not by way of position.
On the contrary:
1. Likeness and equality among lower things are said positively; but these are more completely in God, since, as Augustine says5, in the Son is first found the account of likeness and equality: therefore much more strongly do they express position in God.
2. Likewise, every negation that is not a pure negation is founded upon position: therefore since this which I call equal imports a removal of excess and does not import a pure negation — for then a chimaera would be equal to God — it must be that it imports position.
3. Likewise, this is false: "the Father and the Son are unequal": therefore that which is unequal deprives [the Father and Son] of something that is in God; but this is nothing other than what is imported by equality: therefore equality posits something, because if its opposite deprives, it is necessary that it itself posits.
4. Likewise, the heretics call this6 false: "the Father is equal to the Son" — therefore either because something is posited, or because something is removed. Not because something is removed, since they call this true: "the Father is unequal," which removes: therefore [it must be] because something is posited, therefore etc. — And each of these reasons7 is founded upon the opposition of unequal to equal. For if equal and unequal were taken privatively, then, since they are opposites, they would [equally] be taken positively.
Conclusion.
Equality and likeness are not said of God privatively, but positively.
I respond: It must be said that, according to what is intimated in the text and what the ancient doctors say, the position of the Master was that names which do not express a personal property or unity of essence are taken privatively. Hence, since like and equal express the relation of the Father to the Son, and that relation is neither a personal property nor essence, he wished to hold that all such [names] are said by way of privation, just as two, three, like and equal and similar [terms]. — Yet this position cannot stand, as was proved above concerning the unity and plurality of the divine names. For if in the divine there is unity positively and plurality, and these two make likeness and equality, it is necessary that these be taken positively in the divine. And the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.
To the arguments on the affirmative side:
2. To that which is objected, that the equal is that which does not exceed; it must be said that beneath that negation lies an affirmation and a position, which is signified through the privation of its opposite, namely excess.
3. To that which is objected, that there is no diversity in the divine; it must be said that they indicate no diversity except of supposit, not of form in itself; and since in the divine there is a plurality of supposits, it is clear etc.
4. To that which is objected, that insofar as they are said positively, they express commensuration; it must be said that in the divine there is no commensuration absolutely, but nevertheless there is commensuration with respect to the infinite, and this does not posit commensuration absolutely.
Otherwise it can be said that equal and like, by [their] nature, in their primary understanding posit a unity of quantity and quality; but that equal posits commensuration is because that quantity is measured. Since therefore in the divine [the quantity] is immense, [equal] there expresses an agreement in the quantity of power, although it does not posit commensuration there.
I. St. Bonaventure, who already in d. 19, p. I, q. I, 2 treated of equality in the divine, here, following the Master, returns to discuss the same matter, but under a different account, for the reason given below in dub. 1. — Concerning the account of likeness, it must be noted that some of the Fathers were unwilling to admit it in God, as a precaution, because the Arians had fraudulently substituted ὁμοιούσιον (similis substantiae) for the ecclesiastical term ὁμοούσιον (consubstantiale). But once the danger of error had ceased, this manner of speaking is commonly received (cf. St. Thomas, S. I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 2, 3).
Nor is it an objection that in God, in whom the nature is the same, the account of equal or like would seem to be excluded. For these three relations are distinguished, as Aristotle already observed (cf. above p. 342, n. 6), and indeed in such a way that the same is founded upon unity of substance, like upon quality, but equal upon quantity. Hence they can fittingly be transferred to the divine. And Scotus rightly observes (here q. 1, n. 6), with St. Thomas in agreement (loc. cit.), that equality even in the divine includes in itself likeness and adds something, namely that it excludes excess. — Concerning the obsolete opinion of the Master in this matter, and concerning the account of unity and plurality, cf. above d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1.
II. Alex. Hal., on this and the following question, S. p. I, q. 54, m. I, a. 1. — Scot., here q. unica; Report. here q. 2. — St. Thom., here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 42, a. 1. — B. Albert., here a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 1. — Ægid. R., here 1 princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. n. 70, q. 1, n. 46 seqq. — Durand., here q. 2.
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- Cap. 1. — Pro et similitudinis cod. W cum textu Magistri vel similitudinis.Chapter 1. — In place of et similitudinis, codex W with the text of the Master [reads] simply similitudinis.
- Libr. I. Element. § de animi conceptionibus: Si aliqua res alicui supponatur appliceturque ei nec excedat altera alteram, illae sibi invicem erunt aequales (ed. Venet. 1509). — In ipso textu pro suppositum, codd. AFGKPQWXY cum ed. 1 superpositum.Book I of the Elements, § On the conceptions of the mind: "If any thing be set under another and applied to it and one does not exceed the other, they will be equal to each other" (Venice ed. 1509). — In the text itself, in place of suppositum, codices AFGKPQWXY with edition 1 [read] superpositum.
- Scilicet diversas res, inter quas est aequalitas et similitudo. Sub quo respectu Hilarius, III. de Trin. n. 23. ait: Similitudo non sibi est.Namely diverse things, between which there is equality and likeness. Under which respect Hilary, On the Trinity III, n. 23, says: "Likeness is not [a relation] of a thing to itself."
- Nam aequale ita acceptum dicit relationem realem, fundatam in unitate determinatae quantitatis. Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 13.).For equal taken in this way expresses a real relation, founded in the unity of a determinate quantity. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 20 (IV, c. 13).
- Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 11: Ubi (scil. in Filio) iam est tanta congruentia et prima aequalitas et prima similitudo, nulla in re dissidens et nullo modo inaequalis et nulla ex parte dissimilis, sed ad identidem respondens ei cuius imago est. — Pro primo ed. 1 prius.Book VI of On the Trinity, c. 10, n. 11: "Where (namely, in the Son) there is already so great a congruity and first equality and first likeness, in no thing differing and in no way unequal and in no part dissimilar, but answering identically to him whose image he is." — In place of primo, edition 1 [reads] prius.
- Cod. V hic et aliquanto inferius post hanc interiicit esse, et subinde post inaequalis addit Filio.Codex V here and a little later inserts esse after hanc, and subsequently adds Filio after inaequalis.
- Ex vetustioribus codd. et ed. 1 restituimus rationum, pro qua voce Vat. cum cod. cc positionum; lectio falsa, quia hic duo ultima argumenta respiciuntur. Paulo inferius pro eo quod, quae lectio probatur ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1, Vat. eorum; etiam cod. W eorum, sed minus male, cum paulo ante pro inaequale exhibeat simile.From older codices and edition 1 we restore rationum, for which word the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] positionum; a false reading, since the last two arguments are referred to here. A little below, in place of eo quod, which reading is proved from very many manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican [edition reads] eorum; codex W also [reads] eorum, but less badly, since a little before, in place of inaequale, it exhibits simile.