Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum ad contrahendum matrimonium sufficiat consensus vocalis absque mentali.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; here the markers are renumbered sequentially across pp. 679–681.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ad contrahendum matrimonium sufficiat consensus vocalis absque mentali. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicit Magister in littera¹: « Si verbis explicant quod tamen corde non volunt, obligatio illa verborum, quibus consentiunt, dicentes: accipio te in virum, matrimonium facit ».

2. Item, hoc ostenditur ratione in simili, scilicet in iuramento: quia, « quacumque arte verborum quis iuret, in ea significatione Deus accipit, in qua accipit ille cui iuratur », sicut dicit Isidorus²: ergo in matrimonio similiter videtur, quod Deus accipiat in illa intentione, in qua accipit coniux: ergo si coniux credit, per verba illa ipsum vere consentire, talis consensus facit matrimonium, et sic etc.

3. Item, Ecclesia iudicat, matrimonium esse, quandocumque aliquis contrahit cum aliqua per verba de praesenti in publico; et si dicat, se non intendisse, nihilominus sententiat, ipsum debere reddere quod exigit ius matrimonii: ergo si Ecclesia recte iudicat et non credit illi, cum credendum sit homini ferenti testimonium contra se; sine consensu cordis solo consensu exteriori est matrimonium.

4. Item, hoc pro regula in canone³ habetur, quod « fraus et dolus nemini debet patrocinari »: si ergo iste dolose agit in consentiendo ore, non corde; non debet sibi dolus eius suffragari: ergo ita obligat, sicut si corde et ore consentiret.

5. Item, hoc videtur ratione deducente ad inconveniens: si enim requiritur interior consensus; cum nemo de illo sit certus nec esse possit, nemo scit, utrum matrimonium contraxit: ergo quotiescumque debitum petit vel reddit, discrimini se committit.

6. Item, esto quod quis contrahat cum duabus per verba de praesenti, primo cum una et postea cum alia; nescit, quae istarum interius consenserit: ergo nescit, quae sit eius uxor vera; sed tenetur uxori verae debitum reddere: ergo videtur talis perplexus esse.

Contra: 1. Innocentius in quadam decretali, de Sponsalibus libro quarto⁴, respondens cuidam casui in hac materia, ubi defuit interior consensus, et vir mutavit sibi nomen, dicit, quod non est matrimonium; et ratio, quam assignat in fine, his verbis continetur: « Quia dolus affuit, et defuit omnino consensus, sine quo nequeunt cetera foedus perficere coniugale ».

2. Item, in alia decretali proxima⁵ ante illam dicit: « Pueri ante annos legitimos per verba sola non contrahunt, cum intelligantur minime consentire ».

3. Item, hoc ratione videtur: quia in aliis Sacramentis, sicut in baptismo, ad hoc, quod sit Sacramentum, necessario requiritur intentio dispensantis, sicut supra⁶ ostensum est in baptismo in his qui iocolariter baptizant: ergo pari, immo multo fortiori ratione in matrimonio, cum ad hoc Sacramentum requiratur consensus maximae libertatis.

4. Item, quandocumque in Sacramento deficit illud quod tenet rationem medii inter rem et signum, nihil factum est, ut puta, si in baptismo non imprimatur character, et in eucharistia non sit corpus Christi verum; sed in hoc Sacramento locum medii tenet consensus animorum⁷: ergo quando ille deficit, irritum est matrimonium.

5. Item, quandocumque aliquid constat ex aliquo tanquam materiali et ex aliquo tanquam formali, quodcumque deficiat, et ipsum deficit; sed Sacramentum matrimonii est tale: ergo cum solus consensus animorum sit dispositio, et forma verborum sit complementum, quodcumque deficiat, non erit Sacramentum: ergo⁸ etc.

Conclusio.

Si deest interior consensus, non est matrimonium verum in foro conscientiae et poenitentiali; licet in foro iudiciali secundum allegata iudicetur, hoc esse matrimonium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de matrimonio dupliciter: aut in facie Ecclesiae, aut in foro conscientiae, secundum duplex forum, scilicet iudiciale et poenitentiale; et secundum hoc est dupliciter iudicare: quia in foro iudiciali iudicatur secundum allegata, in foro poenitentiali secundum veritatem et conscientiam. Si ergo in foro poenitentiali loquamur, quia hoc est iudicium secundum veritatem et in conspectu Dei; dicendum, quod, sicut dicunt doctores nostri, nec est matrimonium nec matrimonium iudicandum. Et cum sit multiplex ratio, haec tamen est praecipua: quia in omnibus Sacramentis requiritur intentio voluntaria faciendi quod facit Ecclesia; quia ergo talis secundum veritatem non intendebat contrahere matrimonium, non fuit Sacramentum. — Si autem loquamur in foro iudiciali, ubi secundum allegata oportet iudicari, et probari potest consensus per verba exteriora, in quibus non apparuit evidens dolus; matrimonium iudicatur. Sed tamen Ecclesia decipitur, sed non est deceptio contra iustitiam, quia non est ibi ignorantia iuris, sed facti⁹. Ergo si sit consensus exterior sine interiori, non est matrimonium secundum veritatem nec secundum divinum iudicium nec secundum conscientiae forum; quamvis esse videatur et indicetur secundum iudicium ecclesiasticum.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de Magistro, patet responsio, quoniam loquitur secundum forum ecclesiasticum¹⁰.

2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de iuramento, similiter potest dici, quod secundum humanum iudicium obligatur, si tamen dicatur obligari secundum Deum, hoc est propter hoc, quod Deus talem reputat dignum poena periurii, sicut et illum qui iuramentum non implet, et hoc propter suam fraudem¹¹.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de iudicio Ecclesiae, dicendum, quod Ecclesia fallitur; et quamvis contingat, ipsam seduci a veritate rei, non tamen recedit a veritate iustitiae, quia debet iudicare secundum allegata. Et si tu obiicias mihi, quod in foro iudiciali contra se ipsum allegat, et unicuique credendum est ferenti testimonium contra se; dicendum, quod quia Ecclesia habet testimonium in contrarium, et quia etiam tale testimonium certitudinis est in praeiudicium causae matrimonialis, quae maxime favorabilis est; ideo talis viri testimonium non auditur, tamen et¹² sibi creditur in foro poenitentiae sive conscientiae, ubi creditur homini confitenti suam turpitudinem, quia nihil ibi dicendum est nisi turpitudo.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fraus non debet alicui patrocinari; dicendum, quod duo sunt ibi, scilicet verbi dolositas sive falsitas¹³ et vera carentia consensus. Verbi dolositas non patrocinatur, immo obest in omni foro, sive iudiciali sive poenitentiali, quia utrobique vel punitur, vel pro obligatione reputatur. Sed vera carentia haec est, quae suffragatur in conspectu Dei, ut verum matrimonium non sit.

5. 6. Ad illud, quod nemo scit, utrum interius consentiatur; dicendum, quod quia de quolibet praesumendum est bonum, nisi manifestus dolus appareat¹⁴; de quolibet praesumendum est, quod corde consentiat, si ore exprimat, nec est aliud credendum. Et si non sit ita, ignorantia facti in altera persona, quae ignorat, coitum excusat — sicut Iacob excusatur in hoc, quod cognovit Liam, quia credebat cognoscere suam¹⁵ — nec committit se discrimini nec perplexitati. Quia enim prima credi debet consensisse, ideo ei adhaerendum est et debitum reddendum. Et sic patet totum.

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Question II. Whether for contracting marriage vocal consent suffices without mental consent.

Secondly it is asked whether for contracting marriage vocal consent suffices without mental consent. And that it does, seems [to be shown]:

1. First, from what the Master says in the text¹: « If they express in words what nonetheless they do not will in their heart, that obligation of the words by which they consent, saying: I take thee as husband, makes the marriage ».

2. Likewise, this is shown by reasoning in a similar case, namely in an oath: because, « by whatever craft of words one swears, God takes it in that meaning in which he takes it to whom the oath is sworn », as Isidore says²: therefore in marriage likewise it seems that God accepts it in that intention in which the spouse accepts it: therefore if the spouse believes that by those words he is truly consenting, such consent makes the marriage, and so on.

3. Likewise, the Church judges that there is a marriage whenever someone contracts with a woman through words of the present tense in public; and if he says that he did not intend it, nonetheless it decrees that he ought to render what the law of marriage exacts: therefore if the Church judges rightly and does not believe him, since a man bearing testimony against himself ought to be believed; then without the consent of the heart, by the exterior consent alone there is a marriage.

4. Likewise, this is held as a rule in the canon³, that « fraud and deceit ought to be a protection to no one »: if therefore this man acts deceitfully in consenting with his mouth, not with his heart; his deceit ought not to be of advantage to him: therefore he is bound just as if he had consented with heart and mouth.

5. Likewise, this seems [to follow] from a reasoning leading to an absurdity: for if interior consent is required; since no one is or can be certain of it, no one knows whether he has contracted a marriage: therefore whenever he asks for or renders the debt, he exposes himself to peril.

6. Likewise, suppose that someone contracts with two women through words of the present tense, first with one and afterwards with another; he does not know which of them consented interiorly: therefore he does not know which is his true wife; but he is bound to render the debt to his true wife: therefore such a man seems to be in a quandary.

On the contrary: 1. Innocent, in a certain decretal, On Betrothals, in the fourth book⁴, answering a certain case in this matter, where interior consent was lacking and the man changed his own name, says that it is not a marriage; and the reason which he assigns at the end is contained in these words: « Because deceit was present, and consent, without which the rest cannot perfect the conjugal covenant, was entirely lacking ».

2. Likewise, in another decretal next before that one⁵ he says: « Children before the lawful years do not contract through words alone, since they are understood to consent least of all ».

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reasoning: because in the other Sacraments, as in baptism, for it to be a Sacrament, the intention of the one dispensing is necessarily required, as was shown above⁶ concerning baptism in the case of those who baptize in jest: therefore with equal, indeed with much stronger reason in marriage, since for this Sacrament consent of the greatest freedom is required.

4. Likewise, whenever in a Sacrament there fails that which holds the character of a mean between the reality and the sign, nothing is done — as for instance, if in baptism the character is not imprinted, and in the Eucharist the true body of Christ is not present; but in this Sacrament the consent of minds holds the place of the mean⁷: therefore when it fails, the marriage is void.

5. Likewise, whenever something is constituted out of one thing as material and out of another as formal, whichever fails, the thing itself also fails; but the Sacrament of marriage is such: therefore, since the consent of minds alone is the disposition, and the form of words is the completion, whichever fails, there will be no Sacrament: therefore⁸ etc.

Conclusion.

If interior consent is lacking, there is no true marriage in the forum of conscience and the penitential forum; although in the judicial forum, according to what is alleged, it is judged that this is a marriage.

I respond: It must be said that marriage may be spoken of in two ways: either in the face of the Church, or in the forum of conscience, according to the twofold forum, namely the judicial and the penitential; and according to this there is a twofold way of judging: because in the judicial forum judgment is made according to what is alleged, in the penitential forum according to truth and conscience. If therefore we speak of the penitential forum, since this is judgment according to truth and in the sight of God; it must be said that, as our doctors say, it is neither a marriage nor to be judged a marriage. And though the reason is manifold, this nonetheless is the principal one: because in all the Sacraments there is required a voluntary intention of doing what the Church does; since therefore such a person according to the truth did not intend to contract marriage, it was not a Sacrament. — But if we speak in the judicial forum, where judgment must be made according to what is alleged, and consent can be proved through the exterior words, in which no evident deceit appeared; it is judged a marriage. But nevertheless the Church is deceived, yet the deception is not against justice, because there is not there an ignorance of law, but of fact⁹. Therefore if there be exterior consent without the interior, it is not a marriage according to truth, nor according to the divine judgment, nor according to the forum of conscience; although it may seem to be one and be adjudged one according to the ecclesiastical judgment.

1. To that which is objected first concerning the Master, the answer is plain, since he speaks according to the ecclesiastical forum¹⁰.

2. To that, then, which is objected concerning the oath, it can similarly be said that according to human judgment he is bound; if however it be said that he is bound according to God, this is on this account, that God reckons such a man worthy of the penalty of perjury, just as also the man who does not fulfill his oath, and this on account of his fraud¹¹.

3. To that which is objected concerning the judgment of the Church, it must be said that the Church is deceived; and although it happens that she is led astray from the truth of the matter, nevertheless she does not depart from the truth of justice, because she must judge according to what is alleged. And if you object to me that in the judicial forum a man alleges against himself, and everyone bearing testimony against himself ought to be believed; it must be said that, because the Church has testimony to the contrary, and because also such testimony of certitude is to the prejudice of the matrimonial cause, which is most favorable; therefore such a man's testimony is not heard, yet he is¹² believed in the forum of penance or of conscience, where a man is believed when confessing his own baseness, because nothing is to be said there except baseness.

4. To that which is objected, that fraud ought not to be a protection to anyone; it must be said that there are two things there, namely the deceitfulness of the word or falsity¹³ and the true lack of consent. The deceitfulness of the word is no protection, nay it is a hindrance in every forum, whether judicial or penitential, because in either it is either punished or reckoned as an obligation. But the true lack is this, which avails in the sight of God, so that there is no true marriage.

5. 6. To that, that no one knows whether interior consent is given; it must be said that, because concerning anyone the good is to be presumed, unless manifest deceit appear¹⁴; concerning anyone it is to be presumed that he consents in his heart if he expresses it with his mouth, nor is anything else to be believed. And if it be not so, ignorance of fact in the other person, who is unaware, excuses the intercourse — just as Jacob is excused in this, that he knew Leah, because he believed he was knowing his own [wife]¹⁵ — nor does he expose himself to peril nor to a quandary. For since the first woman ought to be believed to have consented, therefore he must adhere to her and the debt must be rendered. And thus the whole is plain.

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