← Back to Distinction 27

Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
p. 678

Articulus II. De matrimonii causalitate.

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de matrimonii causalitate. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum consensus sit causa matrimonii. Secundo, utrum solus consensus vocalis faciat matrimonium.

Quaestio I. Utrum consensus sit causa matrimonii.

Quantum ergo ad primum ostenditur, quod consensus sit causa matrimonii:

1. Per Chrysostomum1, qui dicit, quod «matrimonium non facit coitus, sed voluntas».

p. 679

2. Item Ambrosius2: «Non defloratio virginitatis facit coniugium, sed pactio coniugalis».

3. Item exemplo probatur: quia inter Mariam et Ioseph fuit matrimonium, et tamen non intervenit nisi consensus3.

4. Item ratione probatur: quia maioris libertatis est pactio coniugalis quam servitutis; sed solo consensu aliquis facit se servum: ergo solo consensu potest fieri alterius coniux.

Contra: 1. Nihil est causa efficiens sui ipsius4; sed matrimonium non est aliud quam consensus, quia ille est signum coniunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae: ergo consensus non est causa efficiens matrimonii.

2. Item, «si propositum est causa propositi, et oppositum oppositi5»: ergo si consensus est causa matrimonium constituens, dissensus est destruens; sed matrimonium non destruitur per dissensus hominum: ergo nec per consensum constituitur.

3. Item, multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus6: ergo si consensus est causa, et duo sunt consensus; videtur, quod duo sunt matrimonia inter virum et mulierem. Sed non sunt duo matrimonia: ergo etc.

4. Item, si duo consensus faciunt unum matrimonium, necesse est uniri; sed tunc uniuntur, quando sunt in idem; sed in matrimonio non uniuntur in unum, quia consensus viri est in mulierem, consensus mulieris in virum: ergo diversi7, non ergo etc.

Conclusio

Consensus utriusque personae est causa proxima matrimonii, sed simul cum institutione divina.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut baptismus dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, prout comprehendit exteriorem ablutionem et interiorem characteris impressionem, alio modo pro interiori charactere; sic matrimonium uno modo comprehendit vinculum et exterius signum, et sic matrimonium est consensus expressus, non eius effectus; alio modo, prout stat pro vinculo interiori8. Huiusmodi autem vinculum habet causam primam, et habet causam proximam; prima est divina institutio, proxima est humana pactio, quae est in convenientia consensuum duorum, scilicet maris et feminae9. Et ideo dicendum, quod consensus est causa matrimonii, sed non tota, immo cum institutione divina; consensus autem non alterius, sed utriusque personae.

Ad opposita: Ad 1. Et per hoc patet primum argumentum.

Ad 2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si oppositum non est causa oppositi etc.; dicendum, quod est causa efficiens et conservans, et est causa solum efficiens, non conservans; sicut patet, quia sol est causa luminis primo modo, cultellus causa vulneris secundo modo10. Sic matrimonium habet causam efficientem consensum, sed non conservantem. Est ergo consensus causa, ut matrimonium fiat, non ut permaneat. Similiter oppositum consensus, id est dissensus, non est causa dissolvens factum, sed impediens, ne fiat.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non uniuntur; dicendum, quod est uniri et in obiecto et in subiecto, et est uniri in effectu. Dico ergo, quod quamvis duo consensus non uniantur in subiecto nec in obiecto, uniuntur tamen in effectu, qui surgit ex illo mutuo consensu. Dum enim haec vult illum in virum, vult esse uxor eius; et dum ille hanc in uxorem, efficitur vir eius. Et si tu obiicias, quod non uniuntur in effectu, nisi etiam uniantur in obiecto; dico, quod11 uniuntur in effectu, secundario et in obiecto12.

---

English Translation
p. 678

Article II. On the causality of marriage.

Next inquiry is made concerning the second article, namely the causality of marriage. And concerning this two things are asked.

First it is asked whether consent is the cause of marriage. Second, whether vocal consent alone effects marriage.

Question I. Whether consent is the cause of marriage.

As to the first, then, it is shown that consent is the cause of marriage:

1. Through Chrysostom1, who says that «it is not intercourse that makes marriage, but the will».

p. 679

2. Likewise Ambrose2: «It is not the deflowering of virginity that makes marriage, but the conjugal compact».

3. Likewise it is proved by example: because between Mary and Joseph there was a marriage, and yet nothing intervened except consent3.

4. Likewise it is proved by reason: because a conjugal compact is of greater liberty than one of servitude; but by consent alone a person makes himself a slave: therefore by consent alone he can become another's spouse.

On the contrary: 1. Nothing is the efficient cause of its own self4; but marriage is nothing other than consent, since it is the sign of the union of Christ and the Church: therefore consent is not the efficient cause of marriage.

2. Likewise, «if the proposition is the cause of the proposition, then also the opposite is the cause of the opposite5»: therefore if consent, as constituting marriage, is a cause, dissent is what destroys it; but marriage is not destroyed by the dissent of men: therefore neither is it constituted by consent.

3. Likewise, when the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied6: therefore if consent is a cause, and there are two consents, it seems that there are two marriages between the man and the woman. But there are not two marriages: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if two consents make one marriage, they must be united; but they are united only when they are toward the same thing; but in marriage they are not united into one, because the man's consent is toward the woman, the woman's consent toward the man: therefore they are diverse7, and so [there is] no [marriage], etc.

Conclusion

The consent of both persons is the proximate cause of marriage, but together with the divine institution.

I respond: It must be said that, just as baptism is spoken of in two ways—in one way, insofar as it comprises the outer washing and the inner impressing of the character, in another way for the inner character alone—so marriage in one way comprises the bond and the outward sign, and in this way marriage is expressed consent, not its effect; in another way, insofar as it stands for the inner bond8. Now such a bond has a first cause and a proximate cause; the first is the divine institution, the proximate is the human compact, which lies in the agreement of the two consents, namely of the man and of the woman9. And therefore it must be said that consent is the cause of marriage, but not the whole cause, but rather together with the divine institution; and consent not of one alone, but of both persons.

To the arguments on the contrary: To 1. And by this the first argument is answered.

To 2 and 3. To that which is objected, that if the opposite is not the cause of the opposite etc.; it must be said that there is a cause [that is] efficient and conserving, and a cause [that is] only efficient, not conserving; as is plain, because the sun is the cause of light in the first way, a knife the cause of a wound in the second way10. Thus marriage has consent as its efficient cause, but not as its conserving cause. Consent, then, is a cause that marriage may come to be, not that it may endure. Likewise the opposite of consent, that is, dissent, is not a cause that dissolves what has been done, but that impedes it, lest it be done.

To 4. To that which is objected, that they are not united; it must be said that there is a being united both in the object and in the subject, and there is a being united in the effect. I say, then, that although the two consents are not united in the subject nor in the object, they are nevertheless united in the effect, which arises from that mutual consent. For when she wills him to be [her] husband, she wills to be his wife; and when he [wills] her to be [his] wife, he becomes her husband. And if you object that they are not united in the effect unless they are also united in the object; I say that11 they are united in the effect, and secondarily also in the object12.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Homil. 32. in Matth. (opus imperfect.). Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    Homily 32 on Matthew (the Opus imperfectum). Cf. here the Master's text, c. 3.
  2. 2
    De Institut. virgin. c. 6. n. 41. etiam hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3, allegatum.
    On the Instruction of a Virgin, c. 6, n. 41; cited also here in the Master's text, c. 3.
  3. 3
    Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.
    See here the Master's text, c. 4.
  4. 4
    Sive, ut ait Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.): «Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum», sive, ut dicit August., de Immortal. animae, c. 8. n. 14: Nulla res se facit aut gignit, alioquin erat, antequam esset (I. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1: Nulla omnino res est, quae se ipsam gignat, ut sit).
    Or, as Aristotle says, On the Soul II, text 47 (c. 4): «Nothing generates its own self»; or, as Augustine says, On the Immortality of the Soul, c. 8, n. 14: Nothing makes or begets itself, otherwise it existed before it existed (On the Trinity I, c. 1, n. 1: There is no thing at all that begets itself, so that it may be).
  5. 5
    Secundum Aristot. supra pag. 97, nota 3. — In fine arg. pro constituitur multi codd. construitur.
    According to Aristotle; see above, p. 97, note 3. — At the end of the argument, for is constituted many codices [read] is built up.
  6. 6
    Cfr. supra pag. 102, nota 3.
    Cf. above, p. 102, note 3.
  7. 7
    Codd. L W addunt termini.
    Codices L and W add of the terms.
  8. 8
    Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. — Superius voci vinculum codd. P Q aa (bb a secunda manu) praemittunt interius.
    See above, a. 1, q. 1. — Above, before the word bond, codices P, Q, aa (and bb by a second hand) prefix inner.
  9. 9
    Sub hoc respectu matrimonium definitur ab Hug. a S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. XI. c. 4, consensus legitimus maris et feminae, individualem vitae consuetudinem retinens. Cfr. infra dub. 1. — Pro in convenientia pauci codd. et Vat. convenientia.
    Under this aspect marriage is defined by Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments II, p. XI, c. 4, [as] the lawful consent of a man and a woman, retaining an undivided common way of life. Cf. below, dub. 1. — For in the agreement a few codices and the Vatican [edition read] the agreement.
  10. 10
    Cfr. supra d. 22. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. — In principio solut. post oppositum edd. cum uno alteroque cod. omittunt non.
    Cf. above, d. 22, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3. — At the beginning of the solution, after the opposite, the editions, with one or another codex, omit not.
  11. 11
    Cod. O addit principaliter, edd. perperam legunt: quod uniuntur in effectu secundario et in obiecto secundario.
    Codex O adds principally; the editions wrongly read: that they are united in the effect secondarily and in the object secondarily.
  12. 12
    Vide scholion ad 1. quaest. praecedentis articuli.
    See the scholion to question 1 of the preceding article. ---
Cited by

7 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

By whom the Sacrament of matrimony was instituted
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 26
infra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.
Whether he who consents to one who refuses him generates for himself a prejudice, such that he cannot contract marriage with another
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 29
supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.
Whether marriage has any impediment
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 34
supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.
Whether affinity can be contracted through every act of intercourse, whether legitimate or fornicating
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 41
supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.
Whether second marriages are sacramental
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 42
supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.
On the integrity of marriage
Breviloquium · Pars VI: De medicina sacramentali
IV. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.
On the dispensation of the Sacraments
Breviloquium · Pars VI: De medicina sacramentali
d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.

5 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

← Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 2→