Bonaventure

Articulus II. Quomodo misericordia et veritas eandem respiciant operationem.

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur, quomodo misericordia et veritas eandem respiciant operationem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in aliquo opere Domini sit misericordia et veritas.

Secundo, utrum in eodem opere Domini sit misericordia et veritas.

Et dato, quod in eodem, secundum quod misericordia et veritas dicuntur largissime, tertio quaeritur, utrum secundum quod proprie accipiuntur, concurrant in eodem.

Quarto, utrum misericordia et veritas possint ab invicem in aliquo opere separari.

Quaestio I. Utrum in aliquo opere Domini sit misericordia et veritas.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts its footer numbering on every printed page, so the markers here are page-qualified: notes 3 through 11 of printed page 962, and notes 1 through 4 of printed page 963.

Quantum ad primum proceditur sic, et ostenditur, quod in aliquo opere Domini sit

1. Misericordia, Lucae sexto³: Estote misericordes, sicut et Pater vester misericors est: ergo etc.

2. Item, in Psalmo⁴: Reddes unicuique iuxta opera sua; sed hoc est iustitiae: ergo etc.

3. Item, ista duo decorant rectorem, unde Proverbiorum vigesimo⁵: Misericordia et veritas custodiunt regem, et clementia etc.; sed Deus est rector omnium rerum: ergo etc.

4. Item, ratione videtur: quia istae sunt duae virtutes in nobis: ergo habent exemplaria in Deo⁶; et si hoc: ergo cum nos operemur iuste et misericorditer, ergo et Deus similiter.

Contra:

1. Damascenus⁷: « Misericordia est compassio de alienis malis »; sed Deus nihil operatur ex compassione, quia non compatitur: ergo in nullo opere eius concurrit misericordia.

2. Item, iustitia est, cum fit quod debet fieri⁸; sed Deus nihil operatur ex debito, quia nulli est obnoxius: ergo nihil iuste, et sic etc.

3. Item, si misericordia et veritas est conditio Dei operantis; cum ergo conditio operantis reluceat in opere, ut patet — quia enim bonus est, ideo bona sunt facta⁹ — ergo pari ratione, quia iustus est, omnia facta sunt iusta: ergo et lapis iustus, et lapis misericors est. Quod si non conceditur: ergo nec Deus operatur secundum misericordiam, aut veritatem.

4. Item, nihil ponendum est in Deo, quod non debeat poni in summo; sed iustitia non debet poni in aliquo in summo, unde Ecclesiastis septimo¹⁰: Noli esse multum iustus.

Conclusio

In operibus Dei est misericordia et veritas.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod misericordia et veritas est¹¹ in opere creaturae rationalis; et hoc quidem nobilitatis est: ergo multo fortius et nobilius in operibus Dei.

Ad 1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur quod in Deo non cadit compassio nec debitum; dicendum,

quod misericordia et veritas sive iustitia — quia veritas pro iustitia accipitur¹ — in creatura duo dicunt, scilicet effluxum bonitatis in alterum secundum merita, vel supra, et in eo qui effluit, compassionem, vel debitum; et primum quidem nobilitatis est, secundum vero imperfectionis est. Et quia omne quod nobilitatis est, Deo attribuendum est, quod vero imperfectionis est non est ei attribuendum; ideo est in eo misericordia et iustitia quantum ad primum, sicut probant rationes primae; non quantum ad secundum, sicut probant rationes sequentes.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc omnia opera Dei deberent dici iusta; dicendum, quod est conditio operantis, quae respicit ipsum secundum naturam, et est conditio, quae respicit ipsum secundum actum; « bonum enim respicit naturam, ut dicit Boethius in libro de Hebdomadibus², sed iustum dicit actum ». Conditio ergo illa, quae respicit naturam operantis, communicatur rei productae, ut Dei natura bona, et natura operati bona. Sed conditio, quae respicit actum, communicatur non in natura rei productae, sed ipsi productioni; unde cum Deus sit iustus, non oportet, quod omnis creatura vel factum sit iustum, sed quod ipsa factio sit iusta. Et sic patet illud.

Et ex hoc patet illud quod consuevit quaeri, quare misericordia vel veritas magis dicatur conditio operis divini quam bonitas vel potentia. Dico enim, quod illa respiciunt naturam, sed ista respiciunt actum; et ideo non tantum conditiones operis, sed etiam viae Domini appellantur in Psalmo³: Universae etc.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo de termino, dicendum, quod terminus in summitate alicuius potest attendi propter excessum, vel propter accessum ad medium. Et primum in iustitia reprehenditur, secundum commendatur⁴; et ratione huius dicitur iustissimus, non ratione primi.

Article II. How mercy and truth regard the same operation.

Next, as to the second article it is asked how mercy and truth regard the same operation. And concerning this four things are asked.

First it is asked whether in any work of the Lord there are mercy and truth.

Second, whether in the same work of the Lord there are mercy and truth.

And granted that they are in the same work, insofar as mercy and truth are said most broadly, third it is asked whether, insofar as they are taken properly, they concur in the same work.

Fourth, whether mercy and truth can be separated from one another in any work.

Question I. Whether in any work of the Lord there are mercy and truth.

As to the first the procedure is as follows, and it is shown that in some work of the Lord there is

1. Mercy, Luke six³: Be merciful, as your Father also is merciful: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in the Psalm⁴: Thou wilt render to every man according to his works; but this belongs to justice: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, these two adorn a ruler, whence Proverbs twenty⁵: Mercy and truth preserve the king, and clemency etc.; but God is the ruler of all things: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it is seen by reason: because these are two virtues in us: therefore they have their exemplars in God⁶; and if this is so: then, since we work justly and mercifully, therefore God likewise.

On the contrary:

1. Damascene⁷: « Mercy is compassion over another's evils »; but God works nothing out of compassion, because He does not suffer with another: therefore in no work of His does mercy concur.

2. Likewise, there is justice when what ought to be done is done⁸; but God works nothing out of debt, because He is bound to no one: therefore He does nothing justly, and so on.

3. Likewise, if mercy and truth are a condition of God working; since, then, the condition of the one working shines out in the work, as is plain — for because He is good, therefore the things made are good⁹ — therefore by parity of reasoning, because He is just, all things made are just: therefore even a stone is just, and a stone is merciful. But if this is not granted: then neither does God work according to mercy or truth.

4. Likewise, nothing is to be posited in God which ought not to be posited in the highest degree; but justice ought not to be posited in anything in the highest degree, whence Ecclesiastes seven¹⁰: Be not overmuch just.

Conclusion

In the works of God there are mercy and truth.

Respondeo: It must be said that mercy and truth are¹¹ in the work of the rational creature; and this indeed belongs to nobility: therefore much more strongly and more nobly are they in the works of God.

Ad 1, 2. To that, then, which is objected first, that in God there falls neither compassion nor debt; it must be said

that mercy and truth, or justice — since truth is taken here for justice¹ — say two things in the creature, namely an outflow of goodness upon another according to merits, or above them, and, in him who pours forth, compassion or debt; and the first indeed belongs to nobility, but the second belongs to imperfection. And because everything that belongs to nobility is to be attributed to God, whereas what belongs to imperfection is not to be attributed to Him; therefore there are in Him mercy and justice as regards the first, as the first arguments prove; not as regards the second, as the following arguments prove.

Ad 3. To that which is objected, that then all the works of God would have to be called just; it must be said that there is a condition of the one working which regards him according to nature, and there is a condition which regards him according to act; « for the good regards nature, as Boethius says in the book On the Hebdomads², but the just bespeaks act ». That condition, therefore, which regards the nature of the one working is communicated to the thing produced, as God's nature is good and the nature of what is worked is good. But the condition which regards act is communicated not in the nature of the thing produced, but to the production itself; whence, since God is just, it is not necessary that every creature or thing made be just, but that the making itself be just. And thus that is plain.

And from this is plain that which is customarily asked, why mercy or truth is said to be a condition of the divine work rather than goodness or power. For I say that the latter regard nature, but the former regard act; and therefore they are called not only conditions of the work, but also the ways of the Lord in the Psalm³: All the ways etc.

Ad 4. To that which is objected last concerning the limit, it must be said that a limit at the summit of anything can be regarded on account of excess, or on account of approach to the mean. And the first is reproved in justice, the second commended⁴; and by reason of this one is called most just, not by reason of the first.