Bonaventure

Articulus I. De mitigatione poenae damnatorum.

Quaestio IV. Utrum Deus agat iustius cum uno quam cum altero.

The numbered footnotes below are page-qualified, because Quaracchi restarts its footer numbering on every printed page: notes 3–9 belong to printed page 961, notes 1–2 to printed page 962. Notes 1–2 of page 961 are anchored in the preceding question and are rendered there.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum Deus agat iustius cum uno quam cum altero. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia, sicut iustitiae est punire, ita misericordiae est parcere: ergo cum magis puniat unum quam alterum, ergo iustius agit cum uno quam cum altero.

2. Item, quantum intenditur misericordia, tantum minuitur rigor iustitiae, et e converso: ergo cum agat misericordius cum uno quam cum altero³, ergo et iustius.

3. Item, quantum iste meruit praemiari, tantum iustum est, istum praemiari; sed unus magis meruit⁴ quam alter: ergo iustius est, magis unum praemiari quam alterum. Sed Deus praemiat, secundum quod meruit: ergo iustius praemiat unum quam alterum.

4. Item, demonstratis duobus, quorum unus peccat duplo magis quam alter, qui minus peccavit meruit sex, qui magis peccavit meruit duodecim; tunc esto, quod Dominus remittat duo illi qui minus peccavit, quaero: quantum illi remittit, qui magis peccavit? Si amplius quam duo: ergo misericordius agit cum eo qui magis peccavit, et ita reportat commodum de malitia⁵; quod est inconveniens. Si autem remittit duo, arguitur sic: ille punitur plus duplo et non meruit nisi duplo: ergo est magis dignus quatuor, quam ille sit dignus decem, quia ita dignus est sex, sicut ille duodecim: ergo ita quatuor, sicut ille octo: ergo si Deus isti infligit quatuor, illi decem; iustius agit cum illo qui recipit decem.

Contra: 1. Quod non iustius, videtur: quia, sicut Deus est optimus, ita et iustissimus; sed quia optimus est, optime agit⁶: ergo quia iustissimus, iustissime.

2. Item, quanto aliquis est iustior, tanto magis accedit ad medium in iudicando⁷: ergo si est iustissimus, summe accedit ad medium: cum ergo summe, non est ibi magis et minus.

3. Item, sicut Petrus est dignus gloria sua, ita et Linus sua: ergo similiter ex parte poenarum: si ergo considerat dignitatem meritorum, ergo non magis iuste agit cum uno quam cum alio.

Conclusio

Quoad ordinem in remunerando Deus non agit iustius cum uno quam cum alio, sed iustissime cum omnibus; tamen quoad severitatem poenae agit severius cum uno quam cum alio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod iustitia in opere uno modo dicit severitatem, alio modo ordinem; sicut et bene facere uno modo qualitatem absolutam, alio modo ordinem. Si iustitia in opere dicat severitatem sive qualitatem absolutam; dico, quod sic iustius agit cum uno quam cum alio, quia severius; et sic melius facit unum quam aliud⁸. — Alio modo iustitia dicit ordinem praemii ad meritum; et sic dico, quod iustissime retribuit. Sicut enim quae producit optime ordinat, sic in remunerando optime et aequissime ordinat praemia ad merita⁹. — Concedendae igitur sunt duae primae rationes ostendentes, quod iustius agit, quia severius.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 3. Quod vero obiicitur, quod quantum quis meruit, tantum iustum est praemiari; dico, quod concedendum est, et hoc similiter: iustius est, unum praemiari quam alterum, comparando ad idem praemium; unde si Deus tantum praemium daret Petro, quantum Lino; dico, quod iustius agit cum Petro. Sed maius praemium dat Petro et minus Lino, ita quod Petrus non est magis dignus suo praemio quam Linus suo. Quoniam ergo iustitia dicit ordinationem secundum diversitatem praemiorum, correspondentem diversitati meritorum; ideo non iustius agit cum uno quam cum alio.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de remissione, dico, quod si remittit duo ei qui meruit sex, remittit quatuor ei qui meruit duodecim, nec magis remittit comparando ad meritum sive ad quantitates diversas, licet absolute magis. — Quod ergo dicit, quod reportat commodum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia semper duplo punitur. Misericordia enim, quando currit cum iustitia, magis remittit quantitate absoluta, ubi est maior miseria; sed tamen aequaliter, loquendo proportionaliter, quia, sicut uni¹, ita et alteri.

Ad argumenta pro parte opposita: Rationes vero ad partem oppositam procedunt de iustitia, secundum quod dicit ordinem; et sic, quemadmodum sapientia optime producit secundum ordinem conditionum, ita iustitia iustissime remunerat secundum ordinem retributionum².

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Article I. On the mitigation of the punishment of the damned.

Question IV. Whether God acts more justly with one than with another.

Fourthly it is asked, whether God acts more justly with one than with another. And that he does so, it seems:

1. Because, just as it belongs to justice to punish, so it belongs to mercy to spare: therefore since he punishes one more than another, therefore he acts more justly with one than with another.

2. Likewise, by however much mercy is intensified, by so much is the rigor of justice diminished, and conversely: therefore since he acts more mercifully with one than with another³, therefore also more justly.

3. Likewise, by however much this man has merited to be rewarded, by so much is it just that he be rewarded; but one has merited⁴ more than another: therefore it is more just that the one be rewarded more than the other. But God rewards according to what one has merited: therefore he rewards one more justly than the other.

4. Likewise, two men being pointed out, of whom one sins twice as much as the other, the one who sinned less merited six, the one who sinned more merited twelve; then suppose that the Lord remits two to him who sinned less, I ask: how much does he remit to him who sinned more? If more than two: therefore he acts more mercifully with him who sinned more, and thus one gains an advantage from wickedness⁵; which is unfitting. But if he remits two, it is argued thus: that man is punished more than double and merited only double: therefore he is more deserving of four than the other is deserving of ten, because he is as deserving of six as that one is of twelve: therefore likewise of four, as that one of eight: therefore if God inflicts four on this one and ten on that one, he acts more justly with him who receives ten.

On the contrary: 1. That he does not act more justly, it seems: because, just as God is best, so also is he most just; but because he is best, he acts in the best way⁶: therefore because he is most just, he acts most justly.

2. Likewise, the more just anyone is, the more he approaches the mean in judging⁷: therefore if he is most just, he approaches the mean in the highest degree: since, therefore, in the highest degree, there is no more and less there.

3. Likewise, just as Peter is worthy of his glory, so also is Linus of his: therefore likewise on the side of punishments: if therefore he considers the worth of merits, therefore he does not act more justly with one than with another.

Conclusion

As regards order in rewarding, God does not act more justly with one than with another, but most justly with all; nevertheless, as regards severity of punishment, he acts more severely with one than with another.

I respond: It must be said that justice in a work in one way says severity, in another way order; just as to act well in one way says an absolute quality, in another way order. If justice in a work says severity, or an absolute quality, I say that in this way he acts more justly with one than with another, because more severely; and thus he makes one thing better than another⁸. — In the other way justice says the order of reward to merit; and in this way I say that he requites most justly. For just as he orders in the best way the things which he produces, so in rewarding he orders rewards to merits in the best and most equitable way⁹. — The first two arguments are therefore to be conceded, which show that he acts more justly because more severely.

To the arguments for the affirmative side:

To 3. As for what is objected, that by however much anyone has merited, by so much is it just that he be rewarded; I say that it is to be conceded, and this likewise: it is more just that the one be rewarded than the other, in comparison to the same reward; whence if God were to give as great a reward to Peter as to Linus, I say that he acts more justly with Peter. But he gives a greater reward to Peter and a lesser to Linus, so that Peter is not more worthy of his reward than Linus of his. Since therefore justice says an ordering according to the diversity of rewards, corresponding to the diversity of merits; therefore he does not act more justly with one than with another.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning remission, I say that if he remits two to him who merited six, he remits four to him who merited twelve, nor does he remit more in comparison to merit or to the diverse quantities, although absolutely more. — As for what he says, that one gains an advantage; it must be said that it is false, because he is always punished double. For mercy, when it runs together with justice, remits more in absolute quantity where there is greater misery; but nevertheless equally, speaking proportionally, because, as to the one¹, so also to the other.

To the arguments for the opposite side: But the arguments for the opposite side proceed concerning justice according as it says order; and thus, just as wisdom produces in the best way according to the order of created conditions, so justice rewards most justly according to the order of retributions².

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