Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 46
Articulus I. De mitigatione poenae damnatorum.
Quaestio III. Utrum Deus misericordius agat cum uno quam cum alio.
Nota de numeratione notarum. Quaracchi restarts its footer numbering on every printed page. The apparatus below is therefore labelled by page: notes 3–11 belong to the footer of page 960 (notes 1–2 of that page are anchored in the preceding question), and notes 1–2 to the footer of page 961.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus misericordius agat cum uno quam cum altero. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Ad Romanos nono3: Cui vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat: si ergo misericordius agit cum uno, quem revocat, quam cum eo quem indurat: patet etc.
2. Item, ordo et gradus est in effectibus divinis propter sapientiam, cuius est ordinare4; sed divina misericordia non miseretur nisi sapienter et ordinate: ergo magis uni quam alii.
3. Item, misericordia intuetur miseriam5; sed unus magis est miser quam alter: ergo Deus debet magis misereri unius quam alterius.
4. Item, magis miseretur qui miseriam totam aufert, quam qui temperat6; sed Deus ab aliquibus aufert totam miseriam, aliquibus mitigat: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Actus et effectus respondent habitui sive origini in quolibet7; sed divina misericordia est summa: ergo cuiuscumque miseretur, miseretur in summo.
2. Item, misericordia intuetur miseriam: ergo si magis miseretur alicui, ergo magis misero; sed in futuro magis miser est qui magis peccavit: ergo magis miseretur eius qui magis peccavit. Sed hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.
3. Item, quia Deus est sapientissimus, ideo facit sapientissime, quidquid facit: ergo8 cum sit misericordissimus, misericordissime se habet ad quemlibet: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Respectu effectus sive relevationis a miseria Deus misericordius agit cum uno quam cum altero, tam in praesenti quam in futuro, sed aliter.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod magis misereri hoc potest intelligi tripliciter: aut maiori habitu, aut actu, aut effectu. Primo modo et secundo impossibile est; sed tertio modo, scilicet quantum ad effectum, qui est relevatio a miseria, verum est tam in praesenti quam in futuro9; sed aliter nunc, aliter tunc: quia nunc misericordiae effectus sunt principales, et effectus iustitiae sunt annexi; tunc autem effectus iustitiae erunt principales, et misericordiae erunt annexi. Tunc enim reddet Deus secundum opera sua unicuique10, nunc autem secundum benignitatem suam. Et ideo simpliciter magis miseretur in praesenti eius cui magis vult, in futuro magis eius qui magis indiget; unde magis misero plus condonabit secundum quantitatem absolutam, non tamen secundum quantitatem relatam, ut patebit postea11.
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod effectus respondet habitui; dicendum, quod verum est in agente inferiori, qui facit omne quod potest; non sic est in Deo1.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccator reportat commodum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia semper sibi remanet poena maior.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia sapientia connotat ordinem, non effectum absolutum, ut misericordia2.
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Article I. On the mitigation of the punishment of the damned.
Question III. Whether God acts more mercifully with one than with another.
Thirdly it is asked whether God acts more mercifully with one than with another. And that he does, seems [to be the case].
1. Romans, chapter nine3: He has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens: if therefore he acts more mercifully with the one whom he calls back than with him whom he hardens: it is clear, etc.
2. Likewise, there is order and degree in the divine effects on account of wisdom, whose office it is to set in order4; but the divine mercy does not show mercy except wisely and in an ordered way: therefore more to one than to another.
3. Likewise, mercy looks upon misery5; but one man is more miserable than another: therefore God ought to have more mercy on the one than on the other.
4. Likewise, he has more mercy who takes away the whole misery than he who tempers it6; but God takes away the whole misery from some, and mitigates it for others: therefore, etc.
On the contrary: 1. Acts and effects correspond in every case to the habit or the origin7; but the divine mercy is supreme: therefore on whomever he has mercy, he has mercy in the supreme degree.
2. Likewise, mercy looks upon misery: therefore if he has more mercy on someone, therefore on one more miserable; but in the future the one who has sinned more is more miserable: therefore he has more mercy on him who has sinned more. But this is unfitting: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, because God is most wise, therefore he does most wisely whatever he does: therefore8, since he is most merciful, he bears himself most mercifully toward everyone: therefore, etc.
Conclusion. With respect to the effect, that is, to the relieving from misery, God acts more mercifully with one than with another, both in the present and in the future, but in different ways.
I respond: It must be said that to have more mercy can be understood in three ways: either by a greater habit, or by a greater act, or by a greater effect. In the first way and in the second it is impossible; but in the third way, namely as regards the effect, which is the relieving from misery, it is true both in the present and in the future9; but otherwise now, otherwise then: because now the effects of mercy are the principal ones, and the effects of justice are annexed; but then the effects of justice will be the principal ones, and those of mercy will be annexed. For then God will render to each one according to his works10, but now according to his own kindness. And therefore, simply speaking, in the present he has more mercy on him whom he loves more, in the future more on him who is more in need; whence to the more miserable he will remit more according to the absolute quantity, yet not according to the relative quantity, as will appear later11.
To 1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that the effect corresponds to the habit; it must be said that this is true in a lower agent, which does everything it can; it is not so in God1.
To 2. To that which is objected, that the sinner carries off an advantage; it must be said that this is false, because a greater punishment always remains for him.
To 3. To that which is objected concerning wisdom, it must be said that the case is not alike: because wisdom connotes order, not an absolute effect, as mercy does2.
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- 3Vers. 18: Ergo cuius vult etc. — Inferius pro uno codd. G aa (bb a secunda manu) eo.Verse 18: "Therefore of whom he will" etc. — Below, in place of uno, codices G and aa (bb by a second hand) read eo.
- 4Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 2: Non enim ordinari, sed ordinare oportet sapientem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 685, nota 1.Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 2: "For the wise man must not be ordered, but must order." Compare tom. I, p. 685, note 1.
- 5Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 14: Misericordia [est] tristitia in alienis malis [ed. Migne: ob res aliorum adversas]. Gregor., XX. Moral. c. 32. n. 63: Misericordia autem a misero corde vocata est, eo quod unusquisque intueatur quempiam miserum... ipse [dolor] cor miserum facit, ut eum a miseria liberet, cui intendit.Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 14: "Mercy [is] sorrow at the evils of others" [the Migne edition: "over the adversities of others"]. Gregory, Moralia XX, c. 32, n. 63: "Mercy (misericordia) is so named from a miserable heart (miserum cor), because each one looks upon someone miserable... the grief itself makes the heart miserable, so that it may free from misery him upon whom it is intent."
- 6Edd. quam qui miseriam mitigat.The editions read quam qui miseriam mitigat ("than he who mitigates the misery").
- 7Permulti codd. et ed. 1 hoc axioma attribuunt Augustino, voci Actus praemittentes Augustinus. Praeter verba tom. II. pag. 760, nota 6. allata: Qualis homo est, tales actus habet; si bonus homo est, bonos actus habet etc., cfr. etiam XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 6, ubi ait: « Interest autem, qualis sit voluntas hominis; quia, si perversa est, perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt » etc. Vide etiam Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, ubi de virtutis habitu docet, ipsum et « id cuius est virtus, bene affectum reddere et opus eius bene efficere » etc. — Pro effectus Vat. affectus; cod. E legit Affectus et effectus.Very many codices and edition 1 attribute this axiom to Augustine, prefixing Augustinus to the word Actus. Besides the words cited in tom. II, p. 760, note 6: "As a man is, such acts he has; if he is a good man, he has good acts" etc., compare also City of God XIV, c. 6, where he says: « But it matters what sort the will of a man is; for if it is perverse, it will have these movements perverse; but if it is right, they will be not only blameless but even praiseworthy » etc. See also Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6, where he teaches concerning the habit of virtue that it renders both « the thing whose virtue it is well disposed, and its work well done » etc. — In place of effectus the Vatican edition reads affectus; codex E reads Affectus et effectus.
- 8Cod. U ergo similiter.Codex U reads ergo similiter.
- 9Anselm., Proslog. c. 10: Misericors es, non quia tu sentias affectum, sed quia nos sentimus effectum.Anselm, Proslogion c. 10: "You are merciful, not because you feel the affection, but because we feel the effect."
- 10Matth. 16, 27: Et tunc reddet unicuique secundum opera eius. Cfr. Rom. 2, 6.Matthew 16:27: "And then he will render to every man according to his works." Compare Romans 2:6.
- 11Quaest. seq.The following question.
- 1Cod. aa addit: Deus enim est agens voluntarius.Codex aa adds: Deus enim est agens voluntarius ("for God is a voluntary agent").
- 2Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.See the scholion on the first question of this article. ---