Bonaventure

Articulus I. De mitigatione poenae damnatorum.

Quaestio II. Utrum fiat mitigatio damnatis propter misericordiae pietatem.

Nota de numeratione notarum. Quaracchi restarts its footer numbering on every printed page. The apparatus below is therefore labelled by page: notes 1–10 belong to the footer of page 959, notes 1–2 to the footer of page 960.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum fiat mitigatio propter misericordiae pietatem de poenis damnatorum. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia dicitur Apocalypsis decimo octavo¹: Quantum se glorificavit et in deliciis fuit, tantum date illi tormentum.

2. Item, Isaiae quadragesimo²: Suscepit de manu Domini duplicia; dicitur de anima peccatrice.

3. Item, super illud Psalmi³: Ex usuris et iniquitate; Glossa: « Usurae dicuntur peccata, quia plus mali invenitur in suppliciis, quam commissum est in culpis »: igitur ibi non est aliqua mitigatio.

4. Item, ratione videtur: quia delectatio est momentanea et modica, sed⁴ punitur poena aeterna et acerbissima; sed hoc in infinitum excedit istud: ergo punitur supra condignum: ergo non est ibi mitigatio.

Contra: 1. In Psalmo⁵: Nunquid obliviscetur misereri Deus? aut continebit in ira sua misericordias suas? quasi diceret, non: ergo tunc aliquid relaxat.

2. Item, peccator, cum peccat mortaliter, offendit Deum, a quo est omne bonum: ergo meretur amittere omne bonum, ergo et esse⁶: ergo cum Deus neminem reducat ad non-esse, omnes punit citra condignum.

3. Item, peccator offendit Deum, a quo est omnis ordo, ergo se deordinat: ergo si peccantes merentur in suppliciis ordinari⁷, statim ergo merentur puniri: ergo cum non puniantur statim, patet, quod citra condignum.

4. Item, peccator offendit Deum, qui est bonum infinitum omni infinitate, ergo infinita poenae⁸ acerbitate debet puniri; sed non punitur: ergo citra condignum punitur.

Conclusio. Divina pietate interveniente, est aliqua mitigatio poenae quoad ipsam taxationem et inflictionem eiusdem, sed non post eandem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod mitigatio poenae damnatorum dupliciter potest intelligi: aut quantum ad taxationem et inflictionem poenae; et sic absque dubio est ibi mitigatio, quia divina iustitia non totum exigit, pro eo quod, eius pietate interveniente, aliquam partem poenae infligendo remittit. Alio modo potest intelligi mitigatio post poenae taxationem et inflictionem; et hoc modo nulla cadit mitigatio a divina misericordia, quia ex tunc claudit eis Dominus viscera pietatis⁹.

Rationes igitur ostendentes, quod est ibi mitigatio, omnes procedunt secundum istam viam, scilicet quantum ad inflictionem; unde ostendunt ibi mitigationem quantum ad ea, in quibus homo punitur, quantum ad tempus et quantum ad mensuram: quia non tantum infert Deus, quantum homo meruit, Threnorum tertio¹⁰: Misericordiae Domini est, quod non sumus consumti; et iterum, poenam differt; et postremo, acerbitatem minuit: et ideo illae rationes concedendae sunt.

Ad oppositum responderi potest per unicam distinctionem.

Ad 1. 2. 3. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Scriptura, quae dicit, quod tantum, et quod duplum, et quod amplius; ad illa omnia respondendum, quod est comparare delectationem ad poenam secundum duplicem comparationem: aut secundum intensionem huius in genere poenae, et illius in genere delectationis; et sic multo maior est poena quam delectatio, nec est ibi proportio, sed excessus. Est iterum comparare hoc ad illud secundum rationem meriti vel demeriti; et sic dico, quod meritum delectationis inordinatae excedit poenam, quia dignus esset amplius puniri. Servatur ergo in punitione proportionalitas, quia magnae culpae magna infligitur poena; sed non proportio, quia quantum ad intensionem et durationem poena excedit culpam, sed quantum ad meritum culpa poenam¹.

Ad 4. Et per hoc patet prima ratio: quia, etsi delectatio sit momentanea, quia tamen offenditur ea bonum infinitum, meretur poenam aeternam².

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Article I. On the mitigation of the punishment of the damned.

Question II. Whether mitigation is granted to the damned on account of the tenderness of mercy.

Secondly it is asked whether mitigation is granted, on account of the tenderness of mercy, in the punishments of the damned. And that it is not, seems [to be the case]:

1. Because it is said in Apocalypse, chapter eighteen¹: As much as she glorified herself and lived in delights, so much torment give to her.

2. Likewise, Isaiah, chapter forty²: She has received of the hand of the Lord double; which is said of the sinful soul.

3. Likewise, upon that text of the Psalm³: From usuries and iniquity; the Gloss: « Sins are called usuries, because more evil is found in the punishments than was committed in the faults »: therefore there is no mitigation there.

4. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because the delight is momentary and slight, but⁴ one is punished with an eternal and most bitter punishment; but this latter exceeds the former infinitely: therefore one is punished beyond what is deserved: therefore there is no mitigation there.

On the contrary: 1. In the Psalm⁵: Will God forget to show mercy? or will he in his anger shut up his mercies? as if he were saying, No: therefore then he relaxes something.

2. Likewise, the sinner, when he sins mortally, offends God, from whom is every good: therefore he deserves to lose every good, and therefore also being⁶: therefore, since God reduces no one to non-being, he punishes all short of what is deserved.

3. Likewise, the sinner offends God, from whom is all order, therefore he puts himself out of order: therefore if those who sin deserve to be set in order in punishments⁷, they therefore deserve to be punished at once: therefore, since they are not punished at once, it is clear that they are punished short of what is deserved.

4. Likewise, the sinner offends God, who is a good infinite with every infinity, therefore he ought to be punished with an infinite bitterness of punishment⁸; but he is not so punished: therefore he is punished short of what is deserved.

Conclusion. With the divine tenderness intervening, there is some mitigation of the punishment as regards the very assessing and inflicting of it, but not after the same.

I respond: It must be said that the mitigation of the punishment of the damned can be understood in two ways: either as regards the assessing and the inflicting of the punishment; and in this way there is without doubt mitigation there, because the divine justice does not exact the whole, inasmuch as, with his tenderness intervening, it remits some part of the punishment in inflicting it. In another way mitigation can be understood after the assessing and inflicting of the punishment; and in this way no mitigation falls from the divine mercy, because from that time on the Lord closes to them the bowels of tenderness⁹.

The reasons, therefore, which show that there is mitigation there all proceed along this way, namely as regards the infliction; whence they show a mitigation there as regards the things in which a man is punished, as regards the time and as regards the measure: because God does not inflict as much as the man has deserved, Lamentations, chapter three¹⁰: It is the mercies of the Lord that we are not consumed; and again, he defers the punishment; and lastly, he lessens the bitterness: and therefore those reasons are to be conceded.

To the opposite it can be answered by a single distinction.

To 1, 2, 3. To that, therefore, which is objected from Scripture, which says "so much," and "double," and "more"; to all those it must be answered that delight may be compared to punishment according to a twofold comparison: either according to the intensity of the one in the genus of punishment, and of the other in the genus of delight; and thus the punishment is much greater than the delight, nor is there proportion there, but excess. There is, again, a comparing of the one to the other according to the account of merit or demerit; and thus I say that the merit of an inordinate delight exceeds the punishment, because he would be worthy to be punished more. Therefore in the punishing proportionality is preserved, because upon a great fault a great punishment is inflicted; but not proportion, because as regards intensity and duration the punishment exceeds the fault, but as regards merit the fault exceeds the punishment¹.

To 4. And by this the first reason is clear: because, although the delight be momentary, yet because by it an infinite good is offended, it deserves an eternal punishment².

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