Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum in eodem opere Domini sit misericordia et veritas.

The numbered notes below are Quaracchi's page footers. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, so the markers here are page-qualified: note 5 of page 963, and notes 1–6 of page 964. Notes 1–4 of page 963 are anchored in the preceding quaestio and are printed there; note 7 of page 964 is anchored in the following quaestio.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in eodem opere Domini sit misericordia et veritas. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia in nobis est alius effectus misericordiae, ut parcere; alius effectus iustitiae, ut punire: ergo si a nobis transfertur ad Deum, videtur, quod similiter sit in Deo, cum hoc non repugnet divinae simplicitati.

2. Item, etsi misericordia et iustitia in Deo secundum principale significatum sint idem⁵, tamen ratio dicendi est altera et altera; hoc ergo erit a parte connotati: ergo alium effectum connotat misericordia quam iustitia. Quodsi eundem, tunc nec est differentia a parte connotati nec in se.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia misericordia facit contra merita, ut bonum ei qui male meruit, sed iustitia secundum merita; sed idem opus non potest fieri contra merita et secundum merita: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Super illud Psalmi¹: Universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas; dicit Cassiodorus: « Haec duo in omni opere Domini simul sunt, etsi non nobis simul appareant ».

2. Item, Augustinus, de Concordia Evangelistarum²: « Deus, qui res humanas curat, iuste et misericorditer curat, ut nec praecludat misericordia iustitiam, nec iustitia misericordiam excludat ».

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia Deus remunerat aliquem supra condignum; constat, quod istud unum est opus, nec est misericordiae tantum, quia meruit praemiari, nec iustitiae tantum, quia non tantum meruit praemiari: ergo simul misericordiae et iustitiae.

Conclusio

In eodem opere Dei simul sunt misericordia et veritas secundum tres modos, sed non secundum easdem rationes.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod misericordia dicitur tripliciter, similiter et iustitia. Uno modo misericordia largissime dicitur divinae bonitatis affluentia; communiter vero dicitur benignitas in supererogatione bonorum; stricte vero dicitur pietas in sublevatione malorum. — Similiter et iustitia dicitur communissime divinae bonitatis condecentia; communiter vero dicitur liberalitas in retributione praemiorum; stricte severitas in punitione malorum³.

Secundum igitur hos tres modos simul currunt in eodem opere. Nam primo modo misericordia, divinae bonitatis affluentia, et iustitia, divinae bonitatis condecentia, sunt in eodem opere, ita quod in omni opere, quia omnia facit ex affluenti bonitate et nihil facit ex affluenti bonitate, nisi quod decet bonitatem suam. — Similiter secundo modo misericordia, quae est benignitas in supererogatione bonorum, et iustitia, quae est liberalitas in retributione praemiorum, simul concurrunt, quia, cum⁴ retribuit bona, non retribuit nisi merenti et supra id quod meruit. — Similiter tertio modo misericordia, quae est pietas in sublevatione malorum, et iustitia, quae est severitas in retributione malorum, simul currunt, quia nunquam ita severe punit, quin aliquod debitum de poena dimittat. — Sic igitur patet, quod misericordia et veritas communissime sunt in eodem opere, quia in omni opere Dei; sed communiter sunt in omni opere retributionis bonorum; proprie sunt in retributione poenarum et suppliciorum. — Sunt tamen in eodem opere secundum aliam et aliam conditionem: in quantum enim retribuit quod meruit, iustitia; in quantum supra, vel infra, misericordia.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1 et 2. Ex his patent omnia obiecta, quia in eodem opere necessario concurrit esse misericordiam et iustitiam; et differunt⁵ in connotatis, ideo non ratione operum diversorum, sed ratione diversarum conditionum in eodem opere.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod misericordia facit contra merita; dico, quod non dicitur eo ipso misericordia, quia facit contra merita, sed quia facit supra; et hoc simul cum iustitia stat⁶.

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Question II. Whether in the same work of the Lord there are mercy and truth.

Secondly it is asked whether in the same work of the Lord there are mercy and truth. And it seems that there are not:

1. Because in us one is the effect of mercy, namely to spare; another the effect of justice, namely to punish: therefore if this is transferred from us to God, it seems that it is similarly so in God, since this is not repugnant to the divine simplicity.

2. Likewise, even if in God mercy and justice are, according to their principal signification, the same⁵, nevertheless the account of predication is one and another; this therefore will be on the side of the connoted: therefore mercy connotes a different effect than justice does. But if it connotes the same, then there is no difference either on the side of the connoted or in itself.

3. Likewise, it seems from reason: because mercy acts against merits, as when good comes to one who has deserved ill, whereas justice acts according to merits; but the same work cannot be done against merits and according to merits: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. On that verse of the Psalm¹: All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth; Cassiodorus says: « These two are together in every work of the Lord, even though they do not appear to us together ».

2. Likewise, Augustine, On the Concord of the Evangelists²: « God, who cares for human affairs, cares for them justly and mercifully, so that mercy does not shut out justice, nor justice exclude mercy ».

3. Likewise, it seems from reason: because God rewards someone beyond what is condign; it is established that this is one work, and it is not of mercy alone, since he deserved to be rewarded, nor of justice alone, since he did not deserve to be rewarded so much: therefore it is at once of mercy and of justice.

Conclusion

In the same work of God there are together mercy and truth according to three modes, but not according to the same accounts.

I respond: It must be said that mercy is spoken of in three ways, and likewise justice. In one way mercy is spoken of most broadly as the affluence of the divine goodness; but commonly it is called kindness in the superabundant bestowal of goods; while strictly it is called pity in the relieving of evils. — Likewise justice is spoken of most commonly as the befittingness of the divine goodness; but commonly it is called liberality in the rendering of rewards; strictly, severity in the punishment of evils³.

According, therefore, to these three modes they run together in the same work. For in the first mode mercy, the affluence of the divine goodness, and justice, the befittingness of the divine goodness, are in the same work, and this in such a way that they are in every work, because he does all things out of an affluent goodness and does nothing out of an affluent goodness except what befits his own goodness. — Likewise in the second mode mercy, which is kindness in the superabundant bestowal of goods, and justice, which is liberality in the rendering of rewards, concur together, because, when⁴ he renders good things, he renders them only to one who merits and beyond what he has merited. — Likewise in the third mode mercy, which is pity in the relieving of evils, and justice, which is severity in the rendering of evils, run together, because he never punishes so severely but that he remits some debt of the penalty. — Thus therefore it is plain that mercy and truth are most commonly in the same work, because they are in every work of God; but commonly they are in every work of the rendering of goods; properly they are in the rendering of penalties and punishments. — Yet they are in the same work according to one and another condition: for insofar as he renders what one has merited, it is justice; insofar as he renders above, or below, it is mercy.

To the arguments:

To 1 and 2. From these things all the objections are plain, because in the same work there necessarily concur the being of mercy and of justice; and they differ⁵ in what is connoted, and therefore not by reason of diverse works, but by reason of diverse conditions in the same work.

To 3. To that which is objected, that mercy acts against merits; I say that it is not called mercy on that very account, because it acts against merits, but because it acts above them; and this stands together with justice⁶.

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