Bonaventure

Capitulum X.

(Vers. 1.). Ideo subdit: muscae morientes, id est cogitationes peccatorum sibi succedentes et ad peccatum mortale inclinantes, perdunt suavitatem unguenti, id est, perdunt unctionem, et ita multa bona, quia primae Ioannis secundo⁶: « Unctio docet vos de omnibus ». Vel: suavitatem unguenti, id est internam devotionem et dulcorem sapientiae; Proverbiorum vigesimo septimo: « Unguento et variis odoribus delectatur ».

(Vers. 1. 2.). Pretiosior est sapientia. Hic tertio praemittitur sapientia altitudini mundanae gloriae, vel etiam stultitiae, quam stulti appetunt. Propterea dicit: Pretiosior est sapientia parvaque gloria, id est cum parva gloria, ad tempus, id est temporaliter; melior, inquam, stultitia, etiam cum magna gloria; supra quarto⁷: « Melior est puer pauper et sapiens rege sene et stulto ». Vel potest esse sensus, ut sapientia melior sit stultitia; et etiam parva gloria, ad tempus, id est in debito tempore collata, melior est stultitia. — Et subditur ratio: Cor sapientis in dextera eius, et cor stulti in sinistra illius, per dexteram bona, per sinistram mala; Matthaei vigesimo quinto⁸: « Statuet oves a dexteris suis, haedos autem a sinistris ». Vult ergo dicere, quod sapientes cogitant bona, et stulti cogitant mala; Proverbiorum decimo: « Labia iusti considerant placita, os impiorum perversa ». Dextera dat intelligere bona aeterna, sinistra temporalia; unde p. 80 Proverbiorum tertio: « Longitudo dierum in dextera eius, in sinistra illius divitiae et gloria ». Vult ergo dicere, quod sapientes cogitant bona aeterna et cupiunt, et stulti temporalia; Cantici secundo: « Laeva eius sub capite meo, et dextera illius amplexabitur me ». Cogitat igitur stultus vana et nescit aliquo modo considerare¹ discreta, nec in se nec in aliis, quod est maius inconveniens. Ideo subdit: Sed et in via stultus ambulans, in via scilicet illa, quae videtur sibi bona; Proverbiorum duodecimo²: « Via stulti recta in oculis eius ». Cum sit ipse insipiens, id est, cum insipienter ambulet, quia in tenebris; supra secundo: « Stultus in tenebris ambulat ». Omnes stultos aestimat, unde Proverbiorum vigesimo sexto: « Sapientior sibi videtur piger septem viris loquentibus sententias ».

Quaestio.

Incidit hic quaestio de hoc quod dicit³: Qui in uno peccaverit etc.

1. Si enim Deus semper punit citra condignum⁴, ergo qui peccat in uno non debet puniri nisi in uno: ergo non debet perdere multa, sed unum.

2. Item, ex hoc videtur, quod sit connexio in vitiis, sicut in virtutibus⁵; quia, si vitium est privatio boni, ergo si uno peccato privantur multa bona, ergo uno peccato incurrit homo multa vitia; sed hoc non est nisi per connexionem: ergo connexio est in vitiis.

3. Item, quod sit connexio in vitiis quantum ad omnia, videtur; dicitur Iacobi secundo⁶: Qui in uno peccaverit factus est omnium reus: ergo videtur, quod qui perpetrat unum vitium sit ita reus, ac si omnia perpetraret.

Sed contra: 1. Quia aliqua vitia sunt contraria: ergo si in vitiis esset connexio, tunc duo contraria simul in eodem, quod nefas est dicere⁷.

2. Item, vitia non sunt a Deo, sed acquisita ex opere nostro; sed certum est, quod non eodem actu acquiritur in nobis temperantia et iustitia, quando sunt consuetudinales⁸: ergo similiter et in vitiis.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod est loqui de peccato ratione deformitatis et ratione obligationis ad poenam. Si ratione deformitatis, illa quidem respicit tria, scilicet privationem boni gratuiti, privationem boni naturalis sive naturalis habilitatis et ulterius inclinationem ad actum inordinatum, quae dicitur habilitatio quaedam. Ratione primi boni est bene connexio in vitiis, quia qui peccat in uno peccato amittit gratiam et omnes virtutes, quatenus sunt gratuitae. Ratione vero privationis habilitatis non est connexio, sed eorum distinctio, quia unumquodque vitium propriam privat habilitatem. Ratione tertii, scilicet inclinationis ad actum, non est omnimoda distinctio nec omnimoda connexio, nec in quibusdam unum inclinat ad alterum, in quibusdam inclinat aliquando, sicut peccatum gulae ad peccatum luxuriae, similiter in spiritualibus superbia ad invidiam.

Est iterum loqui de peccatis quantum ad obligationem poenae, et sic obligant ad duplicem poenam, scilicet carentiae visionis et acerbitatis ignis. Quantum ad primam est connexio, quia qui in uno peccato peccat amittit gloriam debitam omnibus virtutibus. Quantum autem ad secundam non est connexio, sed distinctio, quia unicuique respondet propria acerbitas. — Istud ergo verbum Ecclesiastae et beati Iacobi intelligitur quantum ad amissionem gratiae et gloriae⁹.

1. Quod igitur obiicitur, quod punitur supra condignum; dico, quod falsum est, quia qui peccat in uno actu peccat contra gratiam omnium virtutum, et ideo totum meretur amittere.

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Chapter X.

(Vers. 1.). Therefore he adds: dying flies, that is, the thoughts of sins succeeding one another and inclining to mortal sin, spoil the sweetness of the ointment, that is, they spoil the unction, and so many good things, since the first of John, the second⁶: « The unction teacheth you of all things ». Or: the sweetness of the ointment, that is, inward devotion and the sweetness of wisdom; Proverbs, the twenty-seventh: « With ointment and divers perfumes it is delighted ».

(Vers. 1. 2.). Wisdom is more precious. Here, thirdly, wisdom is set before the height of worldly glory, or even before folly, which fools desire. Therefore he says: Wisdom is more precious with a little glory, that is, with a little glory, for a time, that is, temporally; better, I say, than folly, even with great glory; above, the fourth⁷: « Better is a child that is poor and wise than a king that is old and foolish ». Or the sense can be that wisdom is better than folly; and also a little glory, for a time, that is, conferred in due time, is better than folly. — And the reason is added: The heart of a wise man is in his right hand, and the heart of a fool is in his left, by the right hand good things, by the left evil things; Matthew, the twenty-fifth⁸: « He shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left ». He means, then, that the wise think good things, and fools think evil things; Proverbs, the tenth: « The lips of the just consider what is acceptable, the mouth of the wicked perverse things ». The right hand gives to understand eternal goods, the left temporal ones; whence p. 80 Proverbs, the third: « Length of days is in her right hand, in her left riches and glory ». He means, then, that the wise think and desire eternal goods, and fools temporal ones; the Canticle, the second: « His left hand is under my head, and his right hand shall embrace me ». The fool therefore thinks vain things and does not know how in any way to consider¹ things that are distinct, neither in himself nor in others, which is a greater unfittingness. Therefore he adds: Yea, and the fool when he walketh in the way, in that way, namely, which seems good to him; Proverbs, the twelfth²: « The way of a fool is right in his own eyes ». Whereas he himself is a fool, that is, since he walks foolishly, because in darkness; above, the second: « The fool walketh in darkness ». He esteemeth all men fools, whence Proverbs, the twenty-sixth: « The sluggard seemeth to himself wiser than seven men that speak sentences ».

Question.

Here a question falls in about what he says³: He that shall offend in one etc.

1. For if God always punishes short of what is condign⁴, then he who sins in one thing ought not to be punished except in one: then he ought not to lose many things, but one.

2. Likewise, from this it seems that there is a connexion in vices, as in virtues⁵; because, if vice is the privation of good, then if by one sin many goods are lost, then by one sin a man incurs many vices; but this is not except through connexion: then there is connexion in vices.

3. Likewise, that there is a connexion in vices as regards all of them seems so; it is said in James, the second⁶: He that shall offend in one is become guilty of all: then it seems that he who commits one vice is as guilty as if he committed all.

On the contrary: 1. Because some vices are contrary: then if there were connexion in vices, two contraries would be at once in the same thing, which it is wicked to say⁷.

2. Likewise, vices are not from God, but acquired from our working; but it is certain that temperance and justice are not acquired in us by the same act, when they are habitual⁸: then likewise also in vices.

I respond: it must be said that one can speak of sin by reason of deformity and by reason of the obligation to punishment. If by reason of deformity, that indeed regards three things, namely the privation of gratuitous good, the privation of natural good or of natural aptitude, and further the inclination to a disordered act, which is called a certain aptitude. By reason of the first good there is indeed connexion in vices, because he who sins in one sin loses grace and all the virtues, insofar as they are gratuitous. But by reason of the privation of aptitude there is not connexion, but their distinction, because each vice deprives of its own aptitude. By reason of the third, namely the inclination to act, there is neither complete distinction nor complete connexion, nor in some does one incline to another, in some it inclines at times, as the sin of gluttony to the sin of lust, likewise in spiritual things pride to envy.

Again, one can speak of sins as regards the obligation of punishment, and so they oblige to a twofold punishment, namely of the lack of vision and of the bitterness of fire. As regards the first there is connexion, because he who sins in one sin loses the glory due to all the virtues. But as regards the second there is not connexion, but distinction, because to each corresponds its own bitterness. — This word, then, of Ecclesiastes and of blessed James is understood as regards the loss of grace and of glory⁹.

1. As to what is objected, then, that he is punished beyond what is condign: I say that it is false, because he who sins in one act sins against the grace of all the virtues, and therefore merits to lose the whole.

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