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Dist. 36

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus
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DISTINCTIO XXXVI.

Cap. I. De connexione virtutum, quae non separantur.

Solet etiam quaeri, utrum virtutes ita sint sibi coniunctae, ut separatim non possint possideri ab aliquo, sed qui unam habet omnes habeat. De hoc Hieronymus1 ait: «Omnes virtutes sibi haerent, ut qui una caruerit omnibus careat. Qui ergo unam habet omnes habet». — Quod quidem probabile est. Cum enim caritas mater sit omnium virtutum, in quocumque mater ipsa est, scilicet caritas, et cuncti filii eius, id est virtutes, recte fore creduntur. Unde Augustinus2: «Ubi caritas est, quid est quod possit deesse? Ubi autem non est, quid est quod possit prodesse»? — Cur ergo non dicimus, qui hanc virtutem habet habere omnes, cum plenitudo Legis sit caritas? quae quanto magis est in homine, tanto magis est virtute praeditus; quanto vero minus, tanto minus inest virtus; et quanto minus inest virtus, tanto magis inest vitium».

Cap. II. An cunctae virtutes pares sint, in quocumque sunt.

Utrum vero pariter quis omnes possideat virtutes, an aliae magis, aliae minus in aliquo ferveant; quaestio est. — Quibusdam enim videtur, quod aliae magis, aliae minus habeantur ab aliquo, sicut in Iob3 patientia emicuit, in David humilitas, in Moyse mansuetudo. Qui etiam concedunt, magis aliquem mereri per aliquam unam virtutem quam per aliam, sicut eam plenius habet quam aliam. Non tamen magis per aliquam mereri dicunt quam per caritatem, nec aliquam plenius a quoquam haberi quam caritatem. Alias igitur magis, et alias minus in aliquo esse dicunt, sed nullam plenius caritate, quae ceteras gignit; hasque dicunt esse multas facies, quas memorat Apostolus4 dicens: Ex personis multarum facierum etc.

Alii verius dicunt, omnes virtutes et simul et pares esse in quocumque sunt, ut qui in una alteri par extiterit, in omnibus eidem aequalis sit. Unde Augustinus5: «Virtutes, quae sunt in animo humano, quamvis alio et alio modo singulae intelligantur, nullo modo tamen separantur ab invicem, ut quicumque fuerint aequales, verbi gratia in fortitudine, aequales sint et prudentia et iustitia et temperantia. Si enim dixeris, aequales esse istos in fortitudine, sed illum praestare prudentia; sequitur, ut huius fortitudo minus prudens sit; ac per hoc nec fortitudine aequales sunt, quia est illius fortitudo prudentior. Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem consideratione percurras». — Ex his clarescit, omnes virtutes non modo esse connexas, sed etiam pares in animo hominis. Cum ergo dicitur aliquis aliqua praeeminere virtute, ut Abraham fide6, Iob patientia; secundum usus exteriores accipiendum est, vel in comparatione aliorum hominum, quia vel humilitatis habitum maxime praefert, vel opus fidei, vel alicuius ceterarum virtutum praecipue exsequitur. Unde et ea prae aliis pollere, vel inter alios homines singulariter excellere dicitur secundum hunc modum, scilicet secundum rationem actuum exteriorum. — Alibi7 Augustinus dicit, in aliquo aliam magis esse virtutem, aliam minus, et unam esse, et non alteram. Ait enim sic: «Clarissima disputatione tua satis apparuit, non placuisse auctoribus nostris, immo ipsi Veritati, omnia paria esse peccata, etiam si hoc de virtutibus verum sit»: «quia, etsi verum est, eum qui habet unam, omnes habere virtutes, et eum qui unam non habet, nullam habere, nec sic peccata sunt paria, quia ubi nulla virtus est, nihil rectum est; nec tamen ideo non est pravo pravius distortoque distortius. Si autem, quod puto esse verius sacrisque Litteris congruentius, ita sunt animae intentiones, ut corporis membra — non quod videantur locis8, sed quod sentiantur affectibus — et alius illuminatur amplius, alius minus, alius omnino caret lumine; profecto ut quisque illustratione piae caritatis affectus est, in alio actu magis, in alio minus, in aliquo nihil, sic dici potest habere aliam et aliam non habere, et aliam magis, aliam minus. Nam et maior est in isto caritas quam in illo, recte9 possumus dicere; et aliqua in isto, nulla in illo, quantum pertinet ad caritatem, quae pietas est; et in uno homine, quod maiorem habeat pudicitiam quam patientiam, et maiorem hodie quam heri, si proficit; et adhuc non habeat continentiam, et habeat non parvam misericordiam. Et ut generaliter breviterque complectar quam de virtute habeo notionem: virtus est caritas, qua id quod diligendum est, diligitur; haec in aliis maior, in aliis minor, in aliis nulla est; plenissima vero, quae iam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo vivit, in nemine». — Hic insi-

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nuari videtur, quod aliquis ea ratione possit dici habere unam virtutem magis quam aliam, quia per caritatem magis afficitur in actu unius virtutis quam alterius, et propter differentiam actuum ipsas virtutes magis vel minus habere dici potest10, et aliquam non habere; cum tamen simul omnes et pariter habeat quantum ad mentis habitum vel essentiam cuiusque. In actu vero aliam magis, aliam minus habet, aliam etiam non habet, ut vir iustus, utens coniugio, non habet continentiam in actu, quam tamen habet in habitu. — «Cur ergo non dicantur paria peccata? Forte quia magis facit contra caritatem qui gravius peccat, minus qui levius. Nemo enim peccat, nisi adversus illam faciendo, quae est plenitudo Legis; ideo recte dicitur: Qui offenderit in uno, factus est omnium reus, id est, contra caritatem facit, in qua pendent omnia11».

Cap. III. Quomodo in caritate tota Lex pendet.

Cum sint duo praecepta caritatis, in quibus, ut praetaxatum est12, tota Lex pendet et Prophetae; advertendum est, quomodo hoc sit, cum in Lege et Prophetis multa fuerint caeremonialia mandata, quae, si ad caritatis sanctificationem pertinuissent, viderentur nondum debere cessare. Quia vero non iustificationis gratia, quam facit caritas, instituta sunt, sed in figura futuri et in onus imposita; ideo clarescente veritate, cessaverunt velut umbra. Verumtamen et ipsa caeremonialia secundum spiritualem intellectum, quem continent, et omnia moralia ad caritatem referuntur. Pertinent enim omnia ad decem mandata in tabulis scripta, ubi omnium summa perstringitur, ex quibus cetera emanant, sicut in sermone Domini octo virtutes praemittuntur, ad quas cetera referuntur13; et sicut ad decem mandata decalogi cetera referuntur, ita et ipsa decem ad duo mandata caritatis. Omnia ergo ad duo mandata caritatis pertinent, quia per caritatem implentur et ad caritatem tanquam ad finem referri debent. Unde Augustinus14: «Totam magnitudinem et amplitudinem divinorum Eloquiorum possidet caritas, qua Deum proximumque diligimus, quae radix est omnium bonorum. Unde Veritas ait: In his duobus mandatis universa Lex pendet et Prophetae. Si ergo non vacat omnes Paginas sanctas perscrutari, omnia involucra sermonum evolvere; tene caritatem, ubi pendent omnia», quia perfectio est et finis omnium. Tunc enim et praecepta et consilia recte fiunt, cum referuntur ad diligendum Deum et proximum propter Deum. «Quod vero timore poenae, vel aliqua intentione carnali fit, ut non referatur ad caritatem, nondum fit, sicut fieri oportet, quamvis fieri videatur15». «Inimicus enim iustitiae est qui poenae timore non peccat; amicus vero, qui eius amore non peccat». — «Omnium igitur haec summa est, ut intelligatur Legis et omnium divinarum Scripturarum plenitudo esse dilectio Dei et proximi».

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English Translation

DISTINCTION XXXVI.

Chapter I. On the connection of the virtues, which are not separated.

It is also wont to be asked whether the virtues are so joined together among themselves that they cannot be possessed separately by anyone, but he who has one has all. Concerning this Jerome1 says: «All the virtues cohere among themselves, so that he who has lacked one lacks all. He therefore who has one has all». — And this indeed is probable. For since charity is the mother of all the virtues, in whomever the mother herself, namely charity, is, all her children also, that is, the virtues, are rightly believed to be. Hence Augustine2: «Where charity is, what is there that can be lacking? But where it is not, what is there that can profit»? — Why therefore do we not say that he who has this virtue has all, since the fullness of the Law is charity? which, the more it is in a man, the more he is endowed with virtue; but the less, the less virtue is in him; and the less virtue is in him, the more vice is in him».

Chapter II. Whether all the virtues are equal, in whomever they are.

But whether one possesses all the virtues equally, or some glow more, some less in a person; is a question. — For to some it seems that some are had more, some less by a person, as in Job3 patience shone forth, in David humility, in Moses meekness. These also concede that one merits more through some one virtue than through another, inasmuch as he has it more fully than another. Yet they do not say that one merits more through any [virtue] than through charity, nor that any is had by anyone more fully than charity. They say therefore that some are more, and some less in a person, but none more fully than charity, which begets the rest; and these they say are the many faces which the Apostle4 mentions, saying: From the persons of many faces etc.

Others say more truly that all the virtues are both together and equal in whomever they are, so that he who in one has stood equal to another, is in all equal to the same. Hence Augustine5: «The virtues which are in the human soul, although each is understood in one mode and another, are nevertheless in no way separated from one another, so that whoever shall be equal, for example in fortitude, are equal also in prudence and justice and temperance. For if you shall say that these are equal in fortitude, but that one excels in prudence; it follows that the fortitude of this one is less prudent; and through this they are not equal even in fortitude, because the fortitude of that one is more prudent. And thus you will find concerning the rest of the virtues, if you run through them all with the same consideration». — From these things it becomes clear that all the virtues are not only connected, but also equal in the soul of man. When therefore someone is said to preeminent in some virtue, as Abraham in faith6, Job in patience; it is to be understood according to outward uses, or in comparison with other men, because he either most displays the habit of humility, or the work of faith, or chiefly carries out [the work] of some one of the rest of the virtues. Hence he is also said to be strong above others, or to excel singularly among other men, according to this mode, namely according to the account of outward acts. — Elsewhere7 Augustine says that in someone one virtue is more, another less, and that one is, and not the other. For he says thus: «By your most lucid disputation it has sufficiently appeared that it did not please our authors, nay, Truth itself, that all sins are equal, even if this be true of the virtues»: «because, although it is true that he who has one has all the virtues, and he who has not one has none, yet not even thus are sins equal, because where there is no virtue, nothing is right; nor yet on that account is the more crooked not more crooked, the more distorted not more distorted. But if, as I think to be more true and more agreeable to the sacred Letters, the intentions of the soul are so [related], as the members of the body — not that they should be seen by their places8, but that they should be felt by the affections — and one is illumined more, another less, another wholly lacks light; assuredly as each one is affected by the illumination of pious charity, in one act more, in another less, in some nothing, so it can be said that he has one [virtue] and has not another, and one more, another less. For we can rightly say that charity is greater in this man than in that9; and some [charity] in this man, none in that, as far as pertains to the charity which is piety; and that in one man there is greater chastity than patience, and greater today than yesterday, if he advances; and that he does not yet have continence, and has no small mercy. And that I may generally and briefly comprehend the notion which I have concerning virtue: virtue is the charity by which that which is to be loved is loved; this is in some greater, in some lesser, in some none; but it is fullest, so that it can no longer be increased, so long as this man lives, in no one». — Here it seems to be in-

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sinuated that someone can for this reason be said to have one virtue more than another, because through charity he is more affected in the act of one virtue than of another, and on account of the difference of acts the virtues themselves can be said to be had more or less10, and one not to be had; while nevertheless he has all of them at once and equally as regards the habit or essence of each in the mind. But in act he has one more, another less, and also has not another, as a just man, using marriage, does not have continence in act, which nevertheless he has in habit. — «Why therefore are sins not said to be equal? Perhaps because he acts more against charity who sins more grievously, less who sins more lightly. For no one sins except by acting against that which is the fullness of the Law; therefore it is rightly said: Whoever shall offend in one, is made guilty of all, that is, he acts against charity, on which all things depend11».

Chapter III. How the whole Law depends on charity.

Since there are two precepts of charity, on which, as was set forth before12, the whole Law depends and the Prophets; it is to be noted how this may be, since in the Law and the Prophets there were many ceremonial commandments, which, if they had pertained to the sanctification of charity, would seem not yet to have to cease. But because they were instituted not by the grace of justification, which charity makes, but as a figure of what was to come and imposed as a burden; therefore, the truth shining forth, they ceased like a shadow. Nevertheless the ceremonial [precepts] themselves too, according to the spiritual understanding which they contain, and all the moral [precepts] are referred to charity. For all things pertain to the ten commandments written on the tablets, where the sum of all is summarized, from which the rest emanate, just as in the sermon of the Lord eight virtues are set forth, to which the rest are referred13; and as the rest are referred to the ten commandments of the decalogue, so those ten themselves [are referred] to the two commandments of charity. All things therefore pertain to the two commandments of charity, because they are fulfilled through charity and ought to be referred to charity as to their end. Hence Augustine14: «Charity possesses the whole greatness and breadth of the divine Eloquences, the charity by which we love God and our neighbor, which is the root of all good things. Hence Truth says: On these two commandments the whole Law depends and the Prophets. If therefore you have not leisure to search through all the sacred Pages, to unroll all the wrappings of discourses; hold charity, on which all things depend», because it is the perfection and end of all. For then both the precepts and the counsels are rightly done, when they are referred to loving God and the neighbor for the sake of God. «But what is done from fear of punishment, or from some carnal intention, so that it is not referred to charity, is not yet done as it ought to be done, although it may seem to be done15». «For he is an enemy of justice who does not sin from fear of punishment; but a friend, who does not sin from love of it». — «The sum of all therefore is this, that it be understood that the fullness of the Law and of all the divine Scriptures is the love of God and of the neighbor».

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. VI. Comment. in Isai. 16, 12. et XV. 56, 1. — De caritate ut matre virtutum cfr. supra pag. 603, nota 7.
    Book VI, Commentary on Isaiah 16:12, and book XV [on Isaiah] 56:1. — On charity as the mother of the virtues, cf. above page 603, note 7.
  2. In Evang. Ioan. tr. 83. n. 3. Seq. loc. est Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 3. n. 11. quae est etiam Epist. 1. 12. n. 11. inter Epist. Hieronymi. Locus Scripturae est Rom. 13, 10. — Pro magis inest vitium codd. ACE magis est vitium; originale maius (ita et cod. D) ut vitium.
    On the Gospel of John, tract 83, n. 3. The following passage is Epistle 167 (otherwise 29), c. 3, n. 11, which is also Epistle 1, 12, n. 11 among the Epistles of Jerome. The scriptural passage is Romans 13:10. — For magis inest vitium (the more is vice in [him]) codices ACE [read] magis est vitium; the original maius (so also codex D) ut vitium.
  3. Cfr. Iac. 5, 11; II. Reg. 6, 22; de Moyse cfr. Num. 12, 3. Huic opinioni favet locus Hieronymi, I. Dialogus adv. Pelagian. n. 18. 19, ubi etiam ait, virtutes esse connexas participatione, non proprietate. Pro emicuit codd. ABE eminuit, codd. DC enituit.
    Cf. James 5:11; 2 Kings 6:22; on Moses cf. Numbers 12:3. This opinion is favored by a passage of Jerome, book I, Dialogue against the Pelagians, nn. 18–19, where he also says that the virtues are connected by participation, not by property. For emicuit (shone forth) codices ABE [read] eminuit, codices DC enituit.
  4. Epist. II. Cor. 1, 11; cfr. Lyranus in hunc locum. — Superius pro memorat codd. AD et Erf. commemorat. Pro simul et pares edd., exceptis 1, 8, similes et pares.
    The Epistle 2 Corinthians 1:11; cf. Lyra on this passage. — Above, for memorat (mentions) codices AD and Erf. [read] commemorat. For simul et pares (together and equal) the editions, except 1, 8, [read] similes et pares (alike and equal).
  5. Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 4. n. 6. — In quo textu pro aequales sunt, quia edd. 1, 8 aequales sint, quia, refragante etiam originali, deinde eaedem pro non modo habent non solum.
    Book VI, On the Trinity, c. 4, n. 6. — In which text, for aequales sunt, quia (are equal, because) editions 1, 8 [read] aequales sint, quia (be equal, because), the original also resisting; then the same [editions], for non modo (not only) have non solum (not only).
  6. Cfr. Hebr. 11, 8-12, 17-20; Rom. 4, 3. seqq.
    Cf. Hebrews 11:8–12, 17–20; Romans 4:3 ff.
  7. Edd., exceptis 1, 8, perperam praefigunt ut et connectunt quae sequuntur cum antecedente propositione. Locus Augusti. est in cit. Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 7, sed multis hic omissis. Seq. locus ibid. c. 4. n. 14. 15.
    The editions, except 1, 8, wrongly prefix ut and connect what follows with the preceding proposition. The passage of Augustine is in the cited Epistle 167 (otherwise 29), c. 2, n. 7, but with many things here omitted. The following passage [is] in the same place, c. 4, nn. 14–15.
  8. Codd. CE et edd. 1, 8 cum Vat. oculis, refragante etiam originali, quod deinde pro alius ter habet aliud (scil. membrum). Infra post aliam minus edd. 1, 3, 6, 8 cum originali addidunt habere virtutem.
    Codices CE and editions 1, 8 with the Vatican [edition read] oculis (by their eyes), the original also resisting, which then for alius (one) three times has aliud (another thing — namely, member). Below, after aliam minus (another less) editions 1, 3, 6, 8 with the original added habere virtutem (to have the virtue).
  9. Vat. et edd., excepta 1, praefigunt et ideo, refragantibus codd. et originali. Deinde solae edd. post uno homine addunt quidem.
    The Vatican [edition] and the editions, except 1, prefix et ideo (and therefore), the codices and the original resisting. Then the editions alone, after uno homine (in one man), add quidem (indeed).
  10. Edd., exceptis 1, 8, dicitur. Potest et, refragantibus codd.
    The editions, except 1, 8, [read] dicitur. Potest et (is said. And it can), the codices resisting.
  11. Loc. cit. c. 5. n. 17, ubi respicitur Iac. 2, 10. Vulgata: offendat; codd. BE et edd. 1, 8 offendit.
    The cited place, c. 5, n. 17, where reference is made to James 2:10. The Vulgate: offendat; codices BE and editions 1, 8 [read] offendit.
  12. Dist. XXVII. c. 3. — Pro praetaxatum edd. 1, 8 praetactum. Deinde Vat. cum pluribus edd. debuisse cessare pro debere cessare. Respiciuntur loci Scripturae, Matth. 22, 40; deinde I. Cor. 10, 11; Colos. 2, 17; Act. 15, 28; Hebr. 10, 1.
    Distinction XXVII, c. 3. — For praetaxatum (set forth before) editions 1, 8 [read] praetactum (touched before). Then the Vatican [edition] with most editions [reads] debuisse cessare (ought to have ceased) for debere cessare (have to cease). Scriptural passages are referred to: Matthew 22:40; then 1 Corinthians 10:11; Colossians 2:17; Acts 15:28; Hebrews 10:1.
  13. Hic respiciuntur Exod. 20, 1; Matth. 5, 3. seqq. Cfr. Glossa Lyrani ad I. Tim. 1, 5. — Inferius ante Omnia ergo edd., excepta 2, propositionem claudunt adiiciendo pertinent, refragantibus codd., qui etiam omittunt ad ante finem.
    Here reference is made to Exodus 20:1; Matthew 5:3 ff. Cf. the Gloss of Lyra on 1 Timothy 1:5. — Below, before Omnia ergo (All things therefore) the editions, except 2, close the proposition by adding pertinent (pertain), the codices resisting, which also omit ad before finem (the end).
  14. Serm. 350. (alias 39. de Tempore) n. 2. Locus Scripturae est Matth. 22, 40.
    Sermon 350 (otherwise 39, on the Season), n. 2. The scriptural passage is Matthew 22:40.
  15. August., Enchirid. c. 121. n. 32. Seq. locus est eiusdem Epist. 145. (alias 144.) n. 4. Tertius I. de Doctr. christ. c. 35. n. 39.
    Augustine, Enchiridion c. 121, n. 32. The following passage is the same author's Epistle 145 (otherwise 144), n. 4. The third [is] book I, On Christian Doctrine, c. 35, n. 39. ---
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