Dist. 6, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 6
ARTICULUS UNICUS. De charactere.
QUAESTIO I. Quid sit character secundum essentiam.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur primo, quod character sit habitus:
1. « Quia tria sunt in anima, scilicet potentiae, passiones et habitus1 »; sed character non est potentia, quia non est in omnibus; nec passio, quia secundum ipsum anima non patitur: ergo est habitus.
2. Item, constat, characterem esse aliquam qualitatem spiritualem animae; sed « nihil est in genere aliquo determinato, quod non sit in aliqua eius specie2 »: cum ergo qualitas spiritualis sit in prima specie qualitatis, et illa est habitus, vel dispositio: ergo character est habitus, vel dispositio. Sed non est dispositio, quia non est facile mobilis: ergo habitus.
3. Item, si character est habitus, aut est naturalis sive innatus, aut acquisitus, aut infusus. Non innatus, hoc constat: ergo acquisitus, vel infusus; sed omnis talis habitus, cum sit in anima per modum perfectionis, est scientia, vel virtus4; character autem nihil horum est: ergo non est habitus.
Contra: 1. Augustinus de Bono coniugali3: Habitus est, per quem aliquis aliquid agit; sed charactere non agit homo aliquid: ergo character non est habitus.
### Conclusio. Character est habitus large sumtus, scilicet quaedam qualitas spiritualis, animam non omnino perficiens, sed disponens ad ulteriorem perfectionem.
Respondeo: Ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod characteristicatio non est aliud quam consignatio, et character idem est quod signum; et hoc signum nihil addit supra potentias animae, quod sit quid absolutum, sicut nec signatio in circulo5; sed fundatur supra potentias animae nudas et est ibi secundum institutionem et actum consignantis, nulla facta mutatione; unde est pura relatio, ut paternitas. Et dicunt, quod verbum Philosophi6 intelligitur de illis quae dicunt aliquid absolutum. Et ponunt exemplum, quod character est in anima sicut consecratio in Ecclesia, in qua consecratione Ecclesiae non datur nova qualitas, sed solum ordinatio ab eo qui potest, ad sacra ibidem celebranda; sic dicunt, quod character est quoddam animae signaculum, in quo dicitur anima sanctificari, ut Deus in ea habitet ut in templo. Et hoc dicunt sensisse Dionysium
in libro de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia7, ubi dicit: Character est signum sanctum cognitionis vel communicationis fidei et sacrae ordinationis, datum accedenti ab hierarcha. — Sed illud non potest stare: quia character dicit aliquam assimilationem et configurationem ad Christum, sicut character bestiae ad diabolum, de quo Apocalypsis decimo quarto8; sed assimilatio fundatur super qualitatem: ergo si de novo fit similis Deo, et non fit mutatio ex parte alterius extremi secundum qualitatem; videtur, quod necesse sit dare animae aliquam qualitatem.
Propterea dixerunt aliqui, quod etsi character dicat relationem, dicit nihilominus qualitatem aliquam, super quam fundatur; et illa qualitas est sicut dispositio ad recipiendum lumen et calorem gratiae, sicut siccitas in ligno ad calorem, et pervietas in vitro ad lumen. Et ideo posuerunt characterem in secunda specie qualitatis9. — Sed illud non potest stare, quia illa est naturalis potentia, vel impotentia, quae consequitur naturam. Et praeterea, siccitas et pervietas sunt impotentiae resistendi: ergo character esset impotentia; quod stultum est dicere.
Propterea alii dixerunt, quod character non tantum est ad disponendum, sed etiam ad distinguendum; et est sicut quaedam qualitas animam fidelem decorans et ornans, per quam ab infideli distinguitur10; unde infert sensui spirituali passionem mulcebrem, et ideo est passibilis qualitas et in tertia specie qualitatis. — Sed illud non potest stare, quia non dicitur passibilis qualitas, quae infert passionem sensui interiori vel intellectui. Cum enim omnis veritas sit obiectum intellectus, tunc omnia essent in tertia specie qualitatis11; quod stultum est dicere: ergo similiter est de charactere.
Propterea alii dixerunt, quod character, quantum est de suo nomine, importat configurationem — unde ubi nos habemus, ad Hebraeos primo12, figura substantiae, alia translatio dicit character substantiae — et ideo character est in quarta specie, quae « est forma et circa aliquid constans figura ». — Et si tu obiicias, quod figura est in quantitate et quantitas in corpore; dicunt, quod sicut duplex est quantitas, scilicet spiritualis et corporalis sive molis13; sic duplex est figura. — Sed istud non videtur posse stare, quia figura est clausio terminorum, secundum quod est quarta species. Sed in spiritualibus configuratio non est similis terminorum clausioni, sed est similitudinis impressio sive assimilatio. Item, si figura ponatur in spiritualibus, non est nisi translative; sicut ergo quantitas virtutis non ponitur in genere quantitatis naturae14, sic nec figura in specie figurae. Et iterum, quomodo secundum qualitatem virtutis actu dicitur clausio terminorum? Et iterum, super quid fundatur illa clausio? Si super virtutem datam, vel innatam, oportet ad aliam speciem recurrere: ergo cum figura spiritualis non habeat convenientiam cum illa, videtur, quod character non dicat figuram sive configurationem in quarta specie.
Propterea alii se extendentes dicunt, quod non est in aliqua specie qualitatis a Philosopho assignata, quia ipse non assignat nisi solum species qualitatis innatae, vel acquisitae, non infusae; et
hoc etiam ipse Philosophus innuit, cum dicit15: « Fortassis et alii apparebunt qualitatis modi ». Et dicunt, characterem sub alia specie contineri, ut scilicet una species qualitatis sit qualitas infusa. — Sed illud videtur quaerere fugam, quia nos virtutes theologicas et alias virtutes, quae sunt infusae, in prima specie qualitatis16 collocamus; quare ergo non similiter characterem?
Et ideo dicendum, quod character, cum sit in anima et sit qualitas spiritualis, quod est habitus, non passio nec potentia. — Sed notandum, quod habitus accipitur dupliciter: uno modo proprie, prout distinguitur contra dispositionem per perfectum et imperfectum; alio modo communiter, prout utrumque comprehendit, scilicet omnem qualitatem animam disponentem, sive facile mobilem sive difficile, sive perfectam sive imperfectam17. Et sic accipitur, cum dicitur: tria sunt in anima: potentia, passio et habitus; nam dispositio est in anima et non est potentia nec passio.
Dicendum igitur, quod si accipiatur habitus large, sic character est habitus; si autem stricte sic, quia character est perpetuus, ideo habitus; sed quia non perficit, sed disponit ad ulteriorem perfectionem, scilicet gratiae, quantum ad hoc est dispositio. — Similiter est in oculo corporali, quia ibi est lumen connaturale, inseparabile, sed insufficiens ad videndum, nisi veniat spiritus visibilis a nervo optico18. Similiter in intellectu est lumen connaturale, inseparabile, non sufficiens ad dirigendam cognitionem, nisi superveniat habitus scientiae. — Secundum rem igitur character est quaedam qualitas animam non omnino perficiens, sed disponens ad ulteriorem perfectionem, scilicet gratiae. Unde potest esse, quod sit quoddam lumen spirituale semiplenum et quidam calor gratis datus; et illud lumen dicitur signaculum animae vel signari in anima, secundum illud quod dicitur in Psalmo19: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine; signatum, inquam, per naturam, sed specialius per Sacramenta divina, specialissime per dona Spiritus sancti gratuita.
Duo igitur obiecta solvuntur, quia intelliguntur de habitu perfecto, qui plene rationem habitus habet. Nam ille habilitat ad opus aliquod de se, et sic vel habilitat cognitivam, et est scientia; vel motivam, et est virtus; non autem est verum de habitu, qui est imperfectus, disponens ad aliud, sicut lumen naturale ad scientiam et lumen oculi ad habitum videndi. Sic intelligendum est in charactere: nihilominus et aliquem actum habet, sicut patebit in sequenti problemate.
I. Contra errorem a Wikleff et posterioribus haereticis sparsum, quod nullatenus per quaedam Sacramenta imprimatur character, antiqua Ecclesiae doctrina, explicata a Concil. Florent., postea definita est a Concil. Trident. (Sess. VII. de Sacram. in genere can. 9.) sic: « Si quis dixerit, in tribus Sacramentis, baptismo scilicet, confirmatione et ordine, non imprimi characterem in anima, hoc est signum quoddam spirituale et indelebile, unde ea iterari non possunt, a. s. ». — Totam de charactere doctrinam miro modo exhibet Breviloq. p. VI. c. 6. — Quid autem proprie sit character, in scholis antiquitus dubium esse videbatur. Primam opinionem hic relatam secutus est Guliel. Parisiensis (De Sacram. c. 3.), qui dicit, eundem esse sanctitatem quandam, « cuius exemplum et figura est sanctitas basilicarum consecratarum et vasorum ». Cui fere consentit Durand. (IV. Sent. d. 4. q. I.), qui, postquam multa contra positiones S. Thomae arguit, concludit, quod « character non est aliqua natura absoluta, sed est sola relatio rationis, per quam ex institutione vel pactione divina deputatur aliquis ad sacras actiones ». De hac autem opinione, quod character non sit aliqua entitas realis, iam Thom. de Argentina
recte pronuntiavit, quod « a nullo Catholico videtur esse tenenda »; de quo post Concilia Florent. et Trident. non potest esse dubium. — Scot., qui « propter solam auctoritatem Ecclesiae » ponendum esse dicit, characterem imprimi (hic q. 9. n. 14.), resolvit, eum esse quidem reale aliquid (hic q. 10. n. 13.), et vel realem relationem, vel aliquid absolutum; tamen ibi non determinat, quid duorum proprie sit; praestantiores tamen et plures eius discipuli docent, eum magis propendere in formam absolutam, quae plures involvat respectus, quatenus est signum et configurativum et distinctivum. Quod autem character sit aliquid reale et absolutum, et quidem in genere qualitatis, est sententia communissima; licet doctores non conveniant, in qua sit specie qualitatum ab Aristotele positarum (cfr. pag. 136. nota 3). S. Thom. (S. III. q. 63. a. 2; cfr. IV. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. a. 1. 2.) docet, eundem non esse proprie in genere vel specie, sed reduci ad secundam speciem qualitatis, scilicet potentiam, cum importet quandam potentiam spiritualem, ordinatam ad ea quae sunt divini cultus; hanc autem potentiam esse instrumentalem et quiddam fluens et incompletum (sicut est virtus physica, quae secundum ipsum est in Sacramentis; cfr. supra d. 1.) — Alex. Hal., quem sequuntur S. Bonav. et B. Albert., eum reducit ad primam speciem qualitatis, (scilicet habitum); Scotus ad primam simul et secundam. Petr. a Tar. dubius inter opinionem S. Thomae et Bonaventurae haeret; quod etiam de Richardo a Med. dici potest. — In 2. quaest. ad 1. 2. docetur, characterem non sua sola natura, ut quidam putant, sed ex institutione Dei esse signum traditae potestatis.
De hac 1. quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., p. IV. q. 8. m. 8. a. 1. § 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., IV. Sent. d. 5. q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., IV. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. I. — Dionys. Carth., omnes de charactere quaestiones in fine d. 6. q. 4. simul tractat.
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SOLE ARTICLE. On the character.
QUESTION I. What the character is according to its essence.
Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown first that the character is a habit:
1. « Because there are three things in the soul, namely powers, passions, and habits1 »; but the character is not a power, since it is not in all [souls]; nor a passion, since according to it the soul does not undergo anything: therefore it is a habit.
2. Likewise, it is established that the character is some spiritual quality of the soul; but « nothing is in any determinate genus that is not in some species of it2 »: since therefore a spiritual quality is in the first species of quality, and that is a habit or a disposition: therefore the character is a habit or a disposition. But it is not a disposition, since it is not easily movable: therefore a habit.
3. Likewise, if the character is a habit, it is either natural or innate, or acquired, or infused. That it is not innate, this is established: therefore [it is] acquired or infused; but every such habit, since it is in the soul by way of perfection, is knowledge or virtue4; but the character is none of these: therefore it is not a habit.
On the contrary: 1. Augustine, On the Good of Marriage3: A habit is that by which someone does something; but by the character a man does not do anything: therefore the character is not a habit.
### Conclusion. The character is a habit taken broadly, namely a certain spiritual quality, not perfecting the soul entirely, but disposing it toward a further perfection.
I respond: To this some have said that the imprinting-of-a-character is nothing other than a consigning, and the character is the same as a sign; and this sign adds nothing over the powers of the soul that would be something absolute, just as neither does the marking on a circle5; but it is founded upon the bare powers of the soul and is there according to the institution and act of the one consigning, with no change made; whence it is a pure relation, like paternity. And they say that the saying of the Philosopher6 is to be understood of those things which signify something absolute. And they offer the example that the character is in the soul as the consecration in a church, in which consecration of a church no new quality is given, but only an ordination by him who has the power, for celebrating sacred things therein; thus they say that the character is a certain seal of the soul, in which the soul is said to be sanctified, so that God may dwell in it as in a temple. And they say that Dionysius held this
in the book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy7, where he says: The character is a holy sign of the knowledge or communication of faith and of sacred ordination, given to one approaching from the hierarch. — But that cannot stand: because the character implies some assimilation and configuration to Christ, as the character of the beast [implies configuration] to the devil, concerning which Apocalypse fourteen8; but assimilation is founded upon a quality: therefore if [a soul] becomes anew similar to God, and no change is made on the part of the other extreme according to quality; it seems that it is necessary to give to the soul some quality.
Therefore some have said that, although the character implies a relation, it nevertheless implies some quality upon which it is founded; and that quality is like a disposition for receiving the light and warmth of grace, as dryness in wood for warmth, and transparency in glass for light. And therefore they placed the character in the second species of quality9. — But that cannot stand, because that [second species] is a natural power, or impotence, which follows upon nature. And besides, dryness and transparency are impotences of resisting: therefore the character would be an impotence; which is foolish to say.
Therefore others have said that the character is not only for disposing, but also for distinguishing; and it is like a certain quality adorning and ornamenting the faithful soul, by which it is distinguished from the unfaithful10; whence it brings to the spiritual sense a soothing passion, and therefore is a passible quality and in the third species of quality. — But that cannot stand, because that is not called a passible quality which brings a passion to the interior sense or to the intellect. For since every truth is the object of the intellect, then all things would be in the third species of quality11; which is foolish to say: therefore it is likewise concerning the character.
Therefore others have said that the character, as far as concerns its name, implies configuration — whence where we have, to the Hebrews chapter one12, the figure of the substance, another translation says the character of the substance — and therefore the character is in the fourth species, which « is form and figure constant about something ». — And if you object that figure is in quantity and quantity is in body; they say that just as quantity is twofold, namely spiritual and corporeal or of mass13; so figure is twofold. — But that does not seem able to stand, because figure is the enclosure of boundaries, insofar as it is the fourth species. But in spiritual things configuration is not similar to an enclosure of boundaries, but is an impression of likeness or an assimilation. Likewise, if figure be placed in spiritual things, it is only transferredly; therefore just as the quantity of virtue is not placed in the genus of quantity of nature14, so neither is figure in the species of figure. And again, in what manner is an enclosure of boundaries said according to the quality of virtue in act? And again, upon what is that enclosure founded? If upon a given or innate virtue, it is necessary to have recourse to another species: therefore since spiritual figure has no agreement with that [fourth species], it seems that the character does not imply figure or configuration in the fourth species.
Therefore others, extending themselves further, say that it is not in any species of quality assigned by the Philosopher, because he does not assign except only the species of quality that is innate or acquired, not infused; and
this too the Philosopher himself intimates, when he says15: « Perhaps other modes of quality also will appear ». And they say that the character is contained under another species, namely so that one species of quality be infused quality. — But that seems to seek an escape, because we place the theological virtues and other virtues, which are infused, in the first species of quality16; why therefore not likewise the character?
And therefore it must be said that the character, since it is in the soul and is a spiritual quality, is a habit (quod est habitus), not a passion nor a power. — But it must be noted that habit is taken in two ways: in one way properly, insofar as it is distinguished against disposition by the perfect and the imperfect; in another way commonly, insofar as it comprehends both, namely every quality disposing the soul, whether easily movable or with difficulty, whether perfect or imperfect17. And it is taken thus, when it is said: there are three things in the soul: power, passion, and habit; for a disposition is in the soul and is not a power nor a passion.
It must be said therefore that if habit be taken broadly, then the character is a habit; but if [taken] strictly thus, then, because the character is perpetual, therefore [it is] a habit; but because it does not perfect, but disposes toward a further perfection, namely of grace, with respect to this it is a disposition. — It is likewise in the bodily eye, because there is there a connatural, inseparable light, but insufficient for seeing, unless the visible spirit come from the optic nerve18. Likewise in the intellect there is a connatural, inseparable light, not sufficient for directing cognition, unless the habit of knowledge supervene. — According to the thing, therefore, the character is a certain quality not perfecting the soul entirely, but disposing it toward a further perfection, namely of grace. Whence it can be that it is a certain spiritual light half-full and a certain warmth freely given; and that light is called the seal of the soul or to be signed in the soul, according to that which is said in the Psalm19: The light of thy countenance is signed upon us, O Lord; signed, I say, through nature, but more specially through the divine Sacraments, most specially through the gratuitous gifts of the Holy Spirit.
The two objections, therefore, are resolved, because they are understood of a perfect habit, which fully has the account of a habit. For that one enables [the soul] toward some work of itself, and thus either it enables the cognitive [power], and is knowledge; or the motive [power], and is virtue; but it is not true of a habit which is imperfect, disposing toward something else, as natural light [disposes] toward knowledge and the light of the eye toward the habit of seeing. So it must be understood in the case of the character: nonetheless it does have some act, as will be evident in the following problem.
I. Against the error spread by Wycliffe and later heretics, that in no way is a character imprinted through certain Sacraments, the ancient doctrine of the Church, explained at the Council of Florence, was afterward defined at the Council of Trent (Session VII, on the Sacraments in general, canon 9) thus: « If anyone shall say that in the three Sacraments, namely baptism, confirmation, and order, a character is not imprinted in the soul, that is a certain spiritual and indelible sign, whence they cannot be repeated, let him be anathema ». — The whole doctrine concerning the character the Breviloquium, p. VI, c. 6, sets forth in a wonderful manner. — But what the character properly is, in the schools of old seemed to be a matter of doubt. The first opinion related here was followed by William of Paris (On the Sacraments c. 3), who says that it is a certain holiness, « of which an exemplar and figure is the holiness of consecrated basilicas and vessels ». With him Durandus nearly agrees (IV Sent., d. 4, q. I), who, after arguing much against the positions of St. Thomas, concludes that « the character is not any absolute nature, but is solely a relation of reason, by which, from divine institution or compact, someone is deputed to sacred actions ». But concerning this opinion, that the character is not any real entity, already Thomas of Strasbourg
rightly declared that « it seems to be held by no Catholic »; concerning which, after the Councils of Florence and Trent, there can be no doubt. — Scotus, who says that it must be posited « on account of the sole authority of the Church » that a character is imprinted (here q. 9, n. 14), resolves that it is indeed something real (here q. 10, n. 13), and either a real relation or something absolute; yet there he does not determine which of the two it properly is; the more eminent and the majority of his disciples, however, teach that he inclines rather to an absolute form, which involves several respects, insofar as it is a sign and configurative and distinctive. But that the character is something real and absolute, and indeed in the genus of quality, is the most common opinion; although the doctors do not agree on which species of the qualities posited by Aristotle it is in (cfr. p. 136, note 3). St. Thomas (Summa III, q. 63, a. 2; cfr. IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 1. 2) teaches that it is not properly in a genus or species, but is reduced to the second species of quality, namely power, since it implies a certain spiritual power, ordered toward the things that pertain to divine worship; and that this power is instrumental and something flowing and incomplete (as is physical virtue, which according to him is in the Sacraments; cfr. above d. 1). — Alexander of Hales, whom St. Bonaventure and B. Albert follow, reduces it to the first species of quality (namely habit); Scotus to the first and the second at once. Peter of Tarentaise hesitates in doubt between the opinion of St. Thomas and of Bonaventure; which can also be said of Richard of Mediavilla. — In the 2nd question, ad 1. 2, it is taught that the character is a sign of a transmitted power, not by its own nature alone, as some suppose, but from the institution of God.
Concerning this 1st question, besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, p. IV, q. 8, m. 8, a. 1, § 1. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, IV Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, IV Sent., d. 5, a. 2, q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian treats all the questions concerning the character together at the end of d. 6, q. 4.
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- 1Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5.According to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 5.
- 2Ut docet Aristot., II. Topic. c. 2. (c. 4.) et IV. c. 1. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 299, nota 6. — Multa, quae sequuntur, supponunt doctrinam Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali, qui quatuor species qualitatis distinguit, scil. habitum et dispositionem, potentiam et impotentiam, passionem et patibilem qualitatem, figuram et formam. Differt habitus a dispositione, quod haec quidem facile mobilis sit, ille vero diuturnior et difficilius mobilis... Aliud vero genus qualitatis est, secundum quod... quaecumque secundum potentiam naturalem vel impotentiam dicuntur... Tertium vero genus qualitatis est passibiles qualitates et passiones; sunt autem huiusmodi, ut dulcedo et amaritudo et austeritas et omnia his cognata, amplius et calor et frigus et albedo et nigredo... Passibiles vero qualitates dicuntur, non quod ea quae illas susceperint qualitates, aliquid patiantur, neque enim mel, quoniam aliquid passum sit, dicitur dulce... sed quoniam secundum sensus unaquaeque dictarum qualitatum passionis effectiva est, passibiles qualitates dicuntur; dulcedo enim passionem quandam secundum gustum efficit... Quartum vero genus qualitatis est figura, et circa unumquodque constans forma. In fine arg. codd. M R U supplent est.As Aristotle teaches, Topics II, c. 2 (c. 4) and IV, c. 1. Cfr. vol. II, p. 299, note 6. — Many things that follow presuppose Aristotle's doctrine, Categories, chapter On Quality, where he distinguishes four species of quality, namely habit and disposition, power and impotence, passion and passible quality, figure and form. Habit differs from disposition in that the latter is indeed easily movable, while the former is more lasting and moved with more difficulty... But another genus of quality is that according to which... whatever things are said according to natural power or impotence... But the third genus of quality is passible qualities and passions; and such are, as sweetness and bitterness and sourness and all things akin to these, further also heat and cold and whiteness and blackness... But they are called passible qualities, not because the things that have received those qualities undergo anything, for honey is not called sweet because it has undergone something... but because each of the said qualities is effective of a passion according to the senses, they are called passible qualities; for sweetness produces a certain passion according to taste... But the fourth genus of quality is figure, and the form constant about each thing. At the end of the argument codices M R U supply est.
- 3Cap. 21. n. 25, ubi habitum definit: « quo aliquid agitur, cum opus est; cum autem non agitur, potest agi, sed non opus est. » Cfr. tom. III. pag. 796, nota 4.Chapter 21, n. 25, where he defines habit: « that by which something is done, when there is need; but when it is not done, it can be done, but there is no need. » Cfr. vol. III, p. 796, note 4.
- 4Duplex hic habitus respondet duplici potentiae animae; scil. rationi et voluntati. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. I.This twofold habit corresponds to the twofold power of the soul, namely to reason and to will. Cfr. II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. I.
- 5Vide supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in fine corp. — Superius pro characteristicatio ed. 1 cum pluribus codd. characteris institutio, Vat. characterificatio.See above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, at the end of the body. — Above, for characteristicatio, edition 1 with several codices [has] characteris institutio, the Vatican [edition] characterificatio.
- 6Hic in fundam. 2. allatum. — Paulo ante pro consignantis Vat. consignandi.Adduced here in fundamentum 2. — A little before, for consignantis, the Vatican [edition has] consignandi.
- 7Cap. 2. p. II. § 4. Edd. in fine definitionis accedenti ad hierarchiam. B. Albert., hic a. 4, ait: « Dicunt autem quidam, beatum Dionysium in Ecclesiastica Hierarchia cap. 2. ita definire: Character est signum sanctum communionis fidei et sacrae ordinationis datum accedenti ab hierarcha. Licet autem ita dicant, tamen in nulla Dionysii translatione invenitur haec definitio, nec per verbum nec per sensum. Et hoc scit bene, quicumque litteram Dionysii inspicit ». Quod diffusius prosequitur ibid.Chapter 2, part II, § 4. The editions [read] at the end of the definition to one approaching to the hierarchy. B. Albert, here a. 4, says: « But some say that the blessed Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 2, defines [it] thus: The character is a holy sign of the communion of faith and of sacred ordination given to one approaching from the hierarch. But although they say so, nevertheless this definition is found in no translation of Dionysius, neither by word nor by sense. And whoever inspects the letter of Dionysius knows this well ». Which he pursues more diffusely in the same place.
- 8Vers. 9. et 11. — De assimilatione sive similitudine cfr. quaest. seq. et supra pag. 29, nota 7. — Inferius pro non fit cod. F non fuit. Subinde pro aliquam qualitatem, quod habent codd. O T X (F a secunda manu), in aliis et edd. aliam qualitatem.Verses 9 and 11. — On assimilation or likeness cfr. the following question and above p. 29, note 7. — Below, for non fit codex F [has] non fuit. Thereupon, for aliquam qualitatem, which codices O T X have (F by a second hand), in the others and the editions aliam qualitatem.
- 9Cfr. quaest. seq.Cfr. the following question.
- 10B. Albert., hic a. 4. et S. Thom., d. 4. q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, hanc magistralem definitionem characteris afferunt: Character est distinctio a charactere aeterno impressa animae rationali secundum imaginem, consignans trinitatem creatam Trinitati creanti et recreanti, et distinguens a non consignatis secundum statum fidei. Cfr. quaest. seq., ubi allegatur Damasc.B. Albert, here a. 4, and St. Thomas, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2, adduce this magisterial definition of the character: The character is a distinction impressed from the eternal Character upon the rational soul according to the image, consigning the created trinity to the Trinity creating and re-creating, and distinguishing [it] from the non-consigned according to the state of faith. Cfr. the following question, where Damascene is alleged.
- 11De passione mulcebri vide tom. III. pag. 651, nota 3. Sub hoc respectu passionem laetitiae definit Cassiodor. in Ps. 31,16: Laetari est enim tacitae mentis suavitate mulceri, exsultare est concitati animi fervore gaudere.On the soothing passion see vol. III, p. 651, note 3. Under this respect Cassiodorus defines the passion of gladness, on Ps. 31:16: For to rejoice [laetari] is to be soothed by the sweetness of a silent mind, to exult [exsultare] is to delight in the fervor of an aroused spirit.
- 12Vers. 3. Petr. Lombard., in hunc locum: Et est figura vel character substantiae eius. — Seq. testimonium est Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali, superius iam a nobis relatum.Verse 3. Peter Lombard, on this passage: And it is the figure or character of his substance. — The following testimony is Aristotle's, Categories, chapter On Quality, already related by us above.
- 13Secundum August., de Quantitate animae, c. 3. n. 4. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. I. in corp.According to Augustine, On the Quantity of the Soul, c. 3, n. 4. Cfr. I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. I, in the body.
- 14Boeth. haec verba Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto: « Propriae autem quantitates hae solae dicuntur, quas diximus, alia vero omnia secundum accidens », exponens ait: Haec enim omnia quae dicta sunt, id est linea, superficies, corpus, numerus, oratio, tempus, per se et secundum propriam naturam quantitates dicuntur; si qua vero alia dicuntur secundum aliquam quantitatem, non per se, sed secundum accidens nominantur etc. — Vat. cum aliquot codd. quantitatis vere.Boethius, expounding these words of Aristotle, Categories, chapter On Quantity: « But these alone are called proper quantities, which we have named, while all others [are quantities] according to accident », says: For all these things which have been named, that is line, surface, body, number, speech, time, are called quantities through themselves and according to their proper nature; but if any others are said according to some quantity, they are named not through themselves, but according to accident etc. — The Vatican [edition], with several codices, [reads] quantitatis vere.
- 15De Praedicam. c. de Quali: Fortasse quidem igitur alius quispiam modus apparuerit qualitatis, sed fere qui maxime dicuntur, hi sunt. — Inferius pro una species codd. A E G K M U S [supra ?] alia species.Categories, chapter On Quality: Perhaps then some other mode of quality may appear, but the ones that are spoken of most are nearly these. — Below, for una species codices A E G K M U S [read] alia species.
- 16Scil. habitus. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3, nec non III. Sent. d. 23. seqq., ubi de virtutibus theologicis, et d. 33, in qua de cardinalibus agitur.Namely habit. Cfr. II Sent., d. 27, dub. 3, and also III Sent., d. 23 ff., where [it treats] of the theological virtues, and d. 33, in which it treats of the cardinal [virtues].
- 17Sub primo respectu de habitu agit Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali (cfr. supra), sub secundo autem in V. Metaph. text. 25. (IV. c. 20.) dicens: Alio modo habitus dicitur dispositio, secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se, aut ad aliud, ut sanitas quidam habitus est; dispositio etenim talis est. Item habitus dicitur, si particula talis dispositionis sit; quare partium quoque virtus quidam habitus est.Under the first respect Aristotle treats of habit, Categories, chapter On Quality (cfr. above), but under the second in Metaphysics V, text 25 (IV, c. 20), saying: In another way habit is called a disposition, according to which the disposed thing is well or ill disposed, either in itself or in relation to something else, as health is a certain habit; for such is a disposition. Likewise it is called a habit if it be a part of such a disposition; wherefore the virtue of the parts also is a certain habit.
- 18In libr. de Differentia animae et spiritus, auctore Costa-Ben-Lucae (ed. a Barach, Innsbruck 1878), datur in cap. 1. haec definitio spiritus: « Spiritus est quoddam corpus subtile, quod in humano corpore oritur ex corde et fertur... in venis pulsus ad vivificandum corpus... Et similiter oritur ex cerebro et nervis, et operatur sensum et motum »; quae in cap. 2. fusius explicantur. — Inferius pro rem codd. R S hoc.In the book On the Difference between Soul and Spirit, by Costa ben Luca (ed. by Barach, Innsbruck 1878), this definition of spirit is given in chapter 1: « Spirit is a certain subtle body, which in the human body arises from the heart and is carried... in the veins of the pulse to vivify the body... And it likewise arises from the brain and the nerves, and produces sensation and motion »; which are explained more fully in chapter 2. — Below, for rem codices R S [read] hoc.
- 19Psalm. 4, 7. — Inferius verbis per naturam cod. X praemittit specialiter, Alex. Hal., loc. cit., generaliter.Psalm 4:7. — Below, to the words per naturam, codex X prefixes specialiter, Alexander of Hales, in the cited place, generaliter.