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Dist. 9, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 9

Textus Latinus
p. 216

Quaestio III. Utrum latria sit virtus cardinalis, vel theologica.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum latria sit virtus cardinalis, an theologica. Et quod theologica, videtur.

1. (Ad oppositum.) Augustinus, decimi de Civitate Dei capitulo tertio1: « Sacrificamus Deo hostiam humilitatis et laudis in ara cordis igne fervidae caritatis ». Et post: « Hic est Dei cultus, haec vera religio, haec recta pietas et tantum Deo debita servitus »: ergo videtur, quod si haec omnia circumloquuntur latriam, nihil aliud est latria quam ipsa caritas: ergo latria est virtus theologica.

2. Item, Augustinus, decimo quarto de Trinitate2: « Sapientia vera est verus ac praecipuus Dei cultus, quae uno nomine Graece theosebia appellatur, quod nomen nostri pietatem dixerunt, cum pietas apud Graecos usitatius eusebia nuncupetur ». Sed latria, ut dicit Augustinus decimo de Civitate Dei, non est aliud quam theosebia, et theosebia non est aliud quam sapientia; sapientia autem se tenet ex parte virtutum theologicarum, non cardinalium: ergo et ipsa latria.

3. Item, latria est virtus, per quam Deus colitur eo cultu, qui est adoratio; sed virtus dictans nobis, Deum esse adorandum, est ipsa fides, vel etiam caritas: quia, sicut dicit Rabanus super Genesim3, « adorare est eum qui adorandus est tota mentis intentione quaerere »: ergo videtur, quod latria sit virtus theologica, scilicet fides, vel caritas.

4. Item, in latria est impletio primi praecepti;

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sed praecepta primae tabulae implentur virtutibus theologicis4, sicut patet de secundo, quod impletur per fidem, et de tertio, quod impletur per caritatem: ergo videtur, quod si primum impletur per latriam, quod sit virtus theologica.

5. Item, haec est differentia inter virtutes cardinales et theologicas, quod cardinales consistunt in medio circa superfluum et diminutum5, in theologicis autem non est reperire superfluum; sed circa latriam, qua est Deum colere, non est superfluum invenire: ergo videtur, quod latria non sit in genere virtutum cardinalium, sed theologicarum.

6. Item, virtus theologica dicitur, quia habet Deum pro obiecto; sed latria habet Deum pro obiecto — sicut enim fides credit primam veritatem, et caritas diligit summam bonitatem, sic latria reveretur et colit summam maiestatem — videtur igitur, quod latria sit virtus theologica.

Sed contra: 1. (Fundamenta.) « Religio est virtus, qua colitur ille qui est superioris naturae », sicut vult Augustinus decimo de Civitate Dei, et Tullius in secundo Rhetoricae6; sed religio est species iustitiae, ut dicit Tullius ibidem, et iustitia est virtus cardinalis: si ergo latria continetur sub specie religionis, latria est de genere virtutis cardinalis.

2. Item, sicut obedientia respicit debitum mandati, sic latria respicit debitum honoris divini, « est enim latria cultus Deo debitus7 »; sed obedientia, quia respicit debitum praecepti, est virtus cardinalis contenta sub debita iustitia, non theologica: ergo pari ratione et ipsa latria.

3. Item, nullius virtutis theologicae actus cadit sub coactione — credere enim non potest quis non volens8 — sed actus latriae cadit sub coactione, ut adorare et thura ponere: ergo latria non continetur sub genere virtutis theologicae.

4. Item, omnis virtus theologica vel est fides, vel spes, vel caritas; sed latria non est fides, pro eo quod non considerat summam veritatem secundum se; nec caritas, quia non considerat summam bonitatem, sed magis summam maiestatem; nec spes, hoc constat: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Latria, proprie dicta, est virtus cardinalis, in genere propinquo iustitiae et proximo religionis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod licet latria notificetur per cultum, sive per servitutem, ut dicatur latria esse9 servitus, sive cultus Deo debitus, et ista duo quasi pro eodem accipiantur; differunt tamen secundum propriam acceptionem. (Differunt cultus et servitus.) Cultus enim Dei respicit actum interiorem et exteriorem, et magis interiorem quam exteriorem; servitus vero proprie respicit actum exteriorem. Et ideo cum latria de ratione sui vocabuli idem sit quod servitus, secundum quod exponit Augustinus in libro de Trinitate10, latria proprie respicit actum exteriorem (Quid sit latria); theosebia vero, vel eusebia idem est quod cultus divinus, sive bonus cultus, et ideo proprie respicit actum interiorem. Et quoniam virtus, quae respicit actum exteriorem, versatur quodam modo circa actionem et est in genere virtutis cardinalis11; hinc est, quod latria est virtus cardinalis (Conclusio 1). Et quia considerat actum exteriorem sub ratione debiti et in comparatione ad alterum, et hoc est ipsius iustitiae; ideo latria continetur sub virtute cardinali, quae quidem est iustitia (Conclusio 2). — Rursus, quia species iustitiae, secundum quam ordinatur12 ad venerandam naturam superiorem, est ipsa religio, sicut dicit Tullius; hinc est, quod latria non solum est in genere virtutis tanquam in genere remoto, sed in genere virtutis cardinalis tanquam in genere subalterno; in genere vero iustitiae, sicut in genere propinquo: in genere vero religionis, sicut in genere proximo (Conclusio 3, generalis).

Et hoc est quod innuit Augustinus de Civitate (Confirmatur)

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Dei decimi capitulo primo13, ubi dicit, quod idem est apud Graecos latria, quod apud nos religio, excepto quod nomen religionis est in plus. Unde (Corollaria) ibidem dicit, quod cultus Deo debitus quatuor nominibus nuncupatur: duobus apud Graecos, et duobus apud nos. Apud Graecos namque dicitur latria et theosebia sive14 eusebia. Apud nos vero dicitur pietas et religio, ita quod ista duo nomina respondent illis duobus, licet quodam modo sint in plus quantum ad modum consuetum. — Differunt autem latria et theosebia secundum propriam acceptionem, licet aliquando accipiantur pro eodem, quia theosebia dicit cultum interiorem, qui proprie spectat ad virtutes theologicas, sed latria servitutem exteriorem, quae spectat ad iustitiam, scilicet virtutem cardinalem. — Concedendum est ergo, latriam esse virtutem cardinalem. Concedenda sunt etiam argumenta hoc probantia.

Ad argumenta pro parte theologica:

(Solutio oppositorum.) Ad 1, 2. Ad duas autem auctoritates Augustini patet responsio per iam dicta. Cum enim dicit Augustinus, quod cultus Deo debitus est ipsa dilectio, vel sapientia, loquitur de cultu interiori; cum autem dicimus, latriam esse cultum, intelligimus de cultu exteriori, nisi15 vocabulo abutimur. Et hoc patet per oppositum, quia non dicitur idololatra, qui credit, idolum esse Deum, vel amat ipsum sicut Deum, sed infidelis. Tunc autem dicitur idololatrare, cum exterius colit; et sic per oppositum intelligimus in proposito.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus, per quam adoratur Deus, est fides et caritas; dicendum, quod sicut est cultus interior et exterior, sic et adoratio interior et exterior. (Adoratio interna et externa.) « Adorare interius est tota mente in Deum tendere », sicut dicit Rabanus1b; adorare exterius est aliquam reverentiam corporaliter exhibere. Cum ergo dicitur, quod per fidem et caritatem adoratur Deus; dicendum, quod verum est de adoratione interiori, quae incipit in fide et terminatur in caritate, sed non habet veritatem de adoratione exteriori, quae ortum habet a virtute cardinali. Et si tu obiicias: tam fides quam caritas dictat tam interius quam exterius adorandum; (Notandum.) dicendum breviter, quod aliquis actus potest esse alicuius virtutis multipliciter: aut sicut imperantis, aut sicut elicientis. Licet autem exterior adoratio sit ipsius fidei et caritatis sicut imperantis, et maxime fidei, quae dictat Deum adorandum; alterius tamen est ut elicientis, scilicet latriae, quae, quoniam elicit actum sub ratione debiti, ideo continetur sub iustitia, quae est virtus cardinalis5b.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impletio primi praecepti spectat ad virtutem theologicam, sicut impletio secundi; dicendum, quod impletio secundi, videlicet: Non assumas tibi nomen Dei tui in vanum6b (Notandum), quantum ad actum exteriorem est virtutis cardinalis, quantum ad actum interiorem impletur virtute theologica, quae quidem est fides. Per hunc modum intelligendum est in primo praecepto; et quia per latriam impletur per actum exteriorem, ideo non necesse est, eam esse virtutem theologicam.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod circa actum latriae non consistit superfluum, vel diminutum; responderi potest, quod falsum est, quia, licet quantum ad actum interiorem non contingat excedere in colendo Deum; tamen quantum ad actum exteriorem et modum contingit reperire excessum, utpote sicut si aliquis sacerdos vellet decem Missas in uno die cantare ad laudem Dei, non servaret modum.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod latria habet obiectum Deum; (Notandum.) dicendum, quod si8b latria habeat obiectum Deum, aliquo modo tamen cum hoc respicit aliquod creatum. Unde sicut obedientia, qua quis obedit Deo, respicit ipsum Deum, ut cui obediendum est, ipsum autem mandatum et eius obligationem respicit sicut illud quod implendum est; sic et ipsa latria respicit Deum, ut9b cui honor exhibendus est; respicit etiam cultum exteriorem exhibendum; respicit etiam rationem exhibendi, videlicet rationem debiti; et haec est quasi ratio formalis ipsius et est quid creatum. Hinc est, quod cum virtus ponatur in specie, vel in genere formali ex parte obiecti, quod habet rationem formalis et motivi; quod10b latria est in genere virtutis cardinalis, sicut obedientia. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod virtus theologica est illa quae respicit obiectum increatum; dicendum, quod obiectum principale virtutis theologicae non est aliquid creatum, sed est bonum increatum sub conditionibus increatis, quae

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quidem sunt summa bonitas et summa veritas1c. Hoc autem non est reperire in proposito; et ideo non tenet ratio illa.

Haec autem dicta sunt de latria, secundum quod proprie accipitur pro habitu dirigente ad cultum exteriorem, qui proprie dicitur servitus Dei et adoratio. (De latria non proprie dicta.) Et hoc modo non est idem latria et theosebia, ut a principio dictum est. Si autem latria dicatur cultus interior, cum ille consistat in credendo et diligendo et sperando Deum, sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio2c; sic non ponitur esse virtus cardinalis, sed theologica, non, inquam, ab aliis distincta, sed consequens ad omnes illas. Sed hoc modo non accipitur ita proprie, sicut modo praedicto, cum latria, proprie loquendo, sit species religionis, sicut dulia; et nomen eius impositum fuit a servitute, sicut dictum fuit a principio. (Notandum.) Utroque tamen modo contingit reperiri eam dici, et secundum hoc doctorum positiones diversificari, ut quidam ponunt3c eam speciem virtutis cardinalis, scilicet iustitiae, quidam vero tres theologicas circumplecti. Et utrumque vere potest dici sine contrarietate propter diversum modum accipiendi4c.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether latria is a cardinal virtue, or a theological one.

Thirdly it is asked whether latria is a cardinal virtue, or a theological one. And that it is theological seems [to be the case].

1. (To the opposite.) Augustine, On the City of God, book ten, chapter three1: "We sacrifice to God a victim of humility and of praise upon the altar of the heart, in the fire of fervent charity." And afterward: "This is the worship of God, this is true religion, this is right piety and the service owed to God alone": therefore it seems that, if all these phrases circumscribe latria, latria is nothing other than charity itself: therefore latria is a theological virtue.

2. Likewise, Augustine, On the Trinity, book fourteen2: "True wisdom is the true and chief worship of God, which by one name in Greek is called theosebia, which name our [writers] rendered piety, although among the Greeks piety is more usually called eusebia." But latria, as Augustine says in the tenth [book] On the City of God, is nothing other than theosebia, and theosebia is nothing other than wisdom; but wisdom belongs on the side of the theological virtues, not the cardinal ones: therefore latria too [does].

3. Likewise, latria is a virtue by which God is worshipped with that worship which is adoration; but the virtue dictating to us that God is to be adored is faith itself, or even charity: for, as Rabanus says on Genesis3, "to adore is to seek with the whole intention of the mind him who is to be adored": therefore it seems that latria is a theological virtue, namely faith, or charity.

4. Likewise, in latria there is the fulfillment of the first precept; but the precepts of the first tablet are fulfilled by the theological virtues4, as is clear concerning the second, which is fulfilled by faith, and concerning the third, which is fulfilled by charity: therefore it seems that, if the first is fulfilled by latria, it is a theological virtue.

5. Likewise, this is the difference between the cardinal and the theological virtues, that the cardinal ones consist in a mean concerning the excessive and the deficient5, whereas in the theological ones no excess is to be found; but concerning latria, which is to worship God, no excess is to be found: therefore it seems that latria is not in the genus of the cardinal virtues, but of the theological ones.

6. Likewise, a virtue is called theological because it has God for its object; but latria has God for its object — for just as faith believes the first truth, and charity loves the highest goodness, so latria reveres and worships the highest majesty — therefore it seems that latria is a theological virtue.

On the contrary: 1. (The grounds.) "Religion is the virtue by which he who is of a higher nature is worshipped," as Augustine holds in the tenth [book] On the City of God, and Tully in the second [book] of the Rhetoric6; but religion is a species of justice, as Tully says in the same place, and justice is a cardinal virtue: if therefore latria is contained under the species of religion, latria is of the genus of cardinal virtue.

2. Likewise, just as obedience regards the debt of a command, so latria regards the debt of divine honor, "for latria is the worship owed to God7"; but obedience, because it regards the debt of a precept, is a cardinal virtue contained under owed justice, not a theological one: therefore by parity of reasoning latria too [is].

3. Likewise, the act of no theological virtue falls under compulsion — for no one can believe unwillingly8 — but the act of latria falls under compulsion, such as to adore and to offer incense: therefore latria is not contained under the genus of theological virtue.

4. Likewise, every theological virtue is either faith, or hope, or charity; but latria is not faith, because it does not consider the highest truth in itself; nor charity, because it does not consider the highest goodness, but rather the highest majesty; nor hope, this is established: therefore etc.

Conclusion

Conclusion. Latria, properly speaking, is a cardinal virtue, in the proximate genus of justice and the nearest genus of religion.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, although latria is made known through worship, or through service — so that latria is said to be9 service, or the worship owed to God, and these two are taken as though for the same thing — nevertheless they differ according to their proper acceptation. (Worship and service differ.) For the worship of God regards the interior and the exterior act, and more the interior than the exterior; but service properly regards the exterior act. And therefore, since latria, by the very meaning of its word, is the same as service, according as Augustine explains in the book On the Trinity10, latria properly regards the exterior act (What latria is); but theosebia, or eusebia, is the same as divine worship, or good worship, and therefore properly regards the interior act. And since a virtue that regards the exterior act is concerned in a certain way with action and is in the genus of cardinal virtue11; hence it is that latria is a cardinal virtue (Conclusion 1). And because it considers the exterior act under the account of what is owed and in comparison to another, and this belongs to justice itself; therefore latria is contained under a cardinal virtue, which indeed is justice (Conclusion 2). — Again, because the species of justice according to which one is ordered12 to venerating a higher nature is religion itself, as Tully says; hence it is that latria is not only in the genus of virtue as in a remote genus, but in the genus of cardinal virtue as in a subaltern genus; in the genus of justice, as in a proximate genus; and in the genus of religion, as in the nearest genus (Conclusion 3, general).

And this is what Augustine intimates On the City of (Confirmed)

God, book ten, chapter one13, where he says that latria among the Greeks is the same as religion among us, except that the name "religion" is wider in extent. Hence (Corollaries) in the same place he says that the worship owed to God is named by four names: two among the Greeks, and two among us. For among the Greeks it is called latria and theosebia or14 eusebia. But among us it is called piety and religion, so that these two names correspond to those two, although in a certain way they are wider in extent as to customary usage. — But latria and theosebia differ according to their proper acceptation, although sometimes they are taken for the same thing, because theosebia signifies interior worship, which properly pertains to the theological virtues, but latria exterior service, which pertains to justice, namely the cardinal virtue. — It must therefore be conceded that latria is a cardinal virtue. The arguments proving this must also be conceded.

To the arguments for the theological side:

(Solution of the opposing arguments.) To 1, 2. To the two authorities of Augustine the response is clear from what has already been said. For when Augustine says that the worship owed to God is love itself, or wisdom, he is speaking of interior worship; but when we say that latria is worship, we understand it of exterior worship, unless15 we are misusing the word. And this is clear by the opposite, because one who believes an idol to be God, or loves it as God, is not called an idolater, but an unbeliever. But one is said to commit idolatry when he worships exteriorly; and so by the opposite we understand it in the matter at hand.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the virtue by which God is adored is faith and charity; it must be said that just as there is interior and exterior worship, so also there is interior and exterior adoration. (Interior and exterior adoration.) "To adore interiorly is to tend toward God with the whole mind," as Rabanus says1b; to adore exteriorly is to render some reverence bodily. When therefore it is said that God is adored by faith and charity; it must be said that this is true of interior adoration, which begins in faith and is terminated in charity, but it does not hold true of exterior adoration, which has its origin from a cardinal virtue. And if you object: both faith and charity dictate adoring both interiorly and exteriorly; (Note.) it must be said briefly that an act can belong to some virtue in many ways: either as commanding, or as eliciting. Now although exterior adoration belongs to faith and charity as commanding, and especially to faith, which dictates that God is to be adored; yet it belongs to another as eliciting, namely to latria, which, since it elicits an act under the account of what is owed, is therefore contained under justice, which is a cardinal virtue5b.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the fulfillment of the first precept pertains to a theological virtue, just as the fulfillment of the second; it must be said that the fulfillment of the second, namely: Thou shalt not take to thyself the name of the Lord thy God in vain6b (Note), as to the exterior act belongs to a cardinal virtue, and as to the interior act is fulfilled by a theological virtue, which indeed is faith. In this way it is to be understood in the first precept; and because by latria [it] is fulfilled through the exterior act, therefore it is not necessary that it be a theological virtue.

To 5. To that which is objected, that concerning the act of latria there is no excess, or defect; it can be answered that this is false, because, although as to the interior act it does not happen that one exceed in worshipping God, nevertheless as to the exterior act and manner it does happen that excess is found, as for instance if some priest wished to sing ten Masses in one day to the praise of God, he would not observe due measure.

To 6. To that which is objected, that latria has God for its object; (Note.) it must be said that, even if8b latria has God for its object, nevertheless in some way along with this it regards something created. Hence just as obedience, by which one obeys God, regards God himself, as the one to be obeyed, but regards the command itself and its obligation as that which is to be fulfilled; so also latria itself regards God, as9b the one to whom honor is to be shown; it also regards the exterior worship to be shown; it also regards the account of showing [it], namely the account of what is owed; and this is, as it were, its formal account and is something created. Hence it is that, since a virtue is placed in a species, or in a formal genus, on the part of the object which has the character of the formal and motive element; [it follows] that10b latria is in the genus of cardinal virtue, like obedience. — As for what is objected, that a theological virtue is that which regards an uncreated object; it must be said that the principal object of a theological virtue is not something created, but is the uncreated good under uncreated conditions, which

indeed are the highest goodness and the highest truth1c. But this is not to be found in the matter at hand; and therefore that argument does not hold.

Now these things have been said of latria according as it is properly taken for the habit directing toward exterior worship, which is properly called the service of God and adoration. (On latria not properly so called.) And in this way latria and theosebia are not the same, as was said from the beginning. But if latria is said [to be] interior worship, since that consists in believing and loving and hoping in God, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion2c; so it is not held to be a cardinal virtue, but a theological one — not, I say, distinct from the others, but consequent upon all of them. But in this way it is not taken so properly as in the aforesaid way, since latria, properly speaking, is a species of religion, like dulia; and its name was imposed from service, as was said from the beginning. (Note.) Yet in both ways it happens that it is found to be spoken of, and according to this the positions of the doctors are diversified, so that some place3c it [as] a species of cardinal virtue, namely of justice, while others [hold it to] embrace the three theological [virtues]. And both can truly be said without contradiction on account of the different manner of taking [the term]4c.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Num. 2. (alias c. 4.) [X. de Civ. Dei]. — Vat. addit ibi ab Augustino; cfr. supra pag. 99, nota 7.
    [On the City of God, bk. X] no. 2 (otherwise c. 4). — The Vatican edition adds there, by Augustine; cf. above, p. 99, note 7.
  2. Cap. I. n. I. — De altero Augusl. testimonio, quod habetur X. de Civ. Dei, c. I. n. 3, vide supra pag. 213, nota 9; de tertio Enchirid. c. I. n. I. et XIV. de Trin. c. I. n. I.
    [On the Trinity, bk. XIV] c. 1, n. 1. — On the other testimony of Augustine, which is found in On the City of God X, c. 1, n. 3, see above, p. 213, note 9; on the third [testimony, from the] Enchiridion c. 1, n. 1, and On the Trinity XIV, c. 1, n. 1.
  3. Libr. III. Comment. in Gen. (23, 7.) c. 4. Rabanus dicit tantum, latriam esse servitutem, quae soli Deo debeatur. Sed VIII. Enarrat. in Epist. ad Rom. c. 15, Origenem secutus (X. Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. 15, 30. n. 15), de oratione (quae spectat ad adorationem) ait: « Et ideo agon magnus est orationis, ut obsistentibus inimicis et orantis sensum in diversa rapientibus, fixa semper ad Deum mens stabili intentione contendat, ut merito possit etiam ipse dicere: Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi » (II. Tim. 4, 7.). Et XXIII. in I. Epist. ad Tim. c. 2. ait: « Oramus, cum... spondemus, nos... tota cordis intentione Domino servituros ». Tum propter ipsam obiectionem hic propositam, tum propter solutionem, quae infra habetur, adiungenda duximus quae idem Rabanus in I. Comment. in libr. Iudic. c. 7. profert, ubi observato, quod nos vocati simus non ad hoc, ut serviamus peccato et iterum flectamus genua diabolo, sed ut flectamus genua in nomine Iesu (Phil. 2, 10.) et ad Patrem Domini nostri Iesu Christi (Eph. 3, 14.), sic prosequitur: « Sed et quid mihi prodest, si genua corporis mei ad orationem veniens flectam Deo, et genua cordis mei flectam diabolo? Si enim non stetero firmus adversum astutias diaboli, flexi genua mea diabolo... Non igitur putemus, quod videamur simulacra non colere, propterea haec non etiam ad nostrorum aliquos pertinere. Unusquisque quod prae ceteris colit, quod super omnia miratur et diligit, hoc ei Deus est. Denique hoc est quod ante omnia et super omnia per mandatum suum Deus deposcit ab homine: Diliges, inquit, Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, et ex tota anima tua, et ex totis viribus tuis (Deuter. 6, 5.), praeoccupare quodam modo erga se cupiens totos humanae mentis affectus, et sciens, quia quod ex toto dilexerit quis et ex tota anima atque ex totis viribus, hoc ei Deus est. Cfr. I. Enarrat. in Epist. ad Rom. c. 1, 9; VIII. c. 14.
    Bk. III, Commentary on Genesis (23, 7), c. 4. Rabanus says only that latria is the service owed to God alone. But in Enarrationes on the Epistle to the Romans VIII, c. 15, following Origen (Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans X, 15, 30, n. 15), he says of prayer (which pertains to adoration): "And therefore the contest of prayer is great, so that, with enemies resisting and snatching the sense of the one praying off into diverse things, the mind, fixed ever upon God with steadfast intention, may strive, so that it may deservedly say even itself: I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course" (2 Tim. 4, 7). And in Commentary on 1 Timothy XXIII, c. 2, he says: "We pray, when... we promise that we... will serve the Lord with the whole intention of the heart." Both on account of the very objection here proposed, and on account of the solution which is given below, we have judged it proper to add what the same Rabanus brings forward in Commentary on the Book of Judges I, c. 7, where, having observed that we have been called not to this — that we should serve sin and again bend the knee to the devil — but that we should bend the knee in the name of Jesus (Phil. 2, 10) and to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ (Eph. 3, 14), he continues thus: "But what does it profit me, if, coming to prayer, I bend the knees of my body to God, and bend the knees of my heart to the devil? For if I do not stand firm against the wiles of the devil, I have bent my knees to the devil... Let us not therefore think that, because we seem not to worship images, these things do not also pertain to some of us. Whatever each one worships above the rest, whatever he admires and loves above all things, that is his god. Finally, this is what God before all and above all things demands of man by his command: Thou shalt love, he says, the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with all thy strength (Deut. 6, 5), desiring in a certain way to lay claim beforehand to all the affections of the human mind, and knowing that whatever a man has loved with his whole [heart] and with his whole soul and with all his strength, that is his god. Cf. Enarrationes on the Epistle to the Romans I, c. 1, 9; VIII, c. 14.
  4. 1. et XIX. in Epist. ad Phil. c. 3, 3. — Hadrian. I. in Epist. ad Carolum Magnum pro Nicaena synodo pluries allegat Epist. 52. (alias 54.) Gregor. M. ad Secundinum, in cuius fine agitur de adoratione imaginum: Unde valde nobis tua postulatio placuit, quia illum toto corde, tota intentione quaeris, cuius imaginem prae oculis habere desideras... illum adoramus, quem per imaginem aut natum, aut passum... recordamur. — Pro adorare est eum edd. cum nonnullis codd. adorare est Deum.
    [Cf.] 1 and XIX, on the Epistle to the Philippians c. 3, 3. — Hadrian I, in the Letter to Charlemagne on behalf of the Council of Nicaea, repeatedly cites Letter 52 (otherwise 54) of Gregory the Great to Secundinus, at the end of which the adoration of images is treated: "Hence your request greatly pleased us, because you seek with whole heart, with whole intention, him whose image you desire to have before your eyes... we adore him whom, through the image, we remember as born, or as having suffered." — For to adore is him the editions, with some codices, read to adore is God.
  5. Ut docet Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. cfr. infra d. 26. a. I. q. 3. — Mox pro qua est edd. quae est.
    As Aristotle teaches, Ethics II, c. 6; cf. below, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3. — Shortly after, for which is (qua est) the editions [read] which is (quae est).
  6. Cap. 54: Iustitia est habitus animi, communi utilitate conservata, suam cuique tribuens dignitatem... Natura ius est, quod non opinio genuit, sed quaedam innata vis inseruit, ut religionem, pietatem... Religio est quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caerimoniamque affert. — Idem dicit Augusl., loc. cit. c. I. n. I. et 3. et c. 3. n. 2, Deum verum respici.
    [Rhetoric II] c. 54: "Justice is a habit of mind, the common good being preserved, assigning to each his own dignity... Natural right is that which not opinion has begotten, but a certain innate force has implanted, such as religion, piety... Religion is that which brings care and ceremony toward a certain higher nature which they call divine." — Augustine says the same, in the place cited, c. 1, n. 1 and 3, and c. 3, n. 2, that the true God is regarded.
  7. Secundum Augusl., X. de Civ. Dei, c. I. n. 2. Libr. II. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 21. n. 35. idem s. Doctor dicit, primos parentes Deo serviisse « pietate obedientiae, qua una colitur Deus ». — Pro mandati Vat. substituit mandatum. Mox pro quia codd. lv U exhibent quae, et subinde voci praecepti solus cod. U praemittit mandati vel.
    According to Augustine, On the City of God X, c. 1, n. 2. In On the Merits and Remission of Sins II, c. 21, n. 35, the same holy Doctor says that the first parents served God "by the piety of obedience, by which alone God is worshipped." — For of a command (mandati) the Vatican edition substitutes a command (mandatum). Shortly after, for because (quia) the codices lv U present which (quae), and then to the word precept codex U alone prefixes of a command (mandati) or.
  8. Augusl., I. Retract. c. 23. n. 3: Utrumque [credere et velle] nostrum [est], quia non fit, nisi volentibus nobis. — Pro non volens codd. U (K o secunda manu) nisi volens, cod. bb nolens.
    Augustine, Retractations I, c. 23, n. 3: "Each [to believe and to will] is ours, because it does not happen unless we are willing." — For not willing the codices U (K, by a second hand) [read] unless willing, codex bb unwilling.
  9. Multi codd. est. Post Respondeo codd. A T bb addunt dicendum.
    Many codices [read] is. After I respond the codices A T bb add it must be said.
  10. Libr. I. c. 6. n. 13. Cfr. XV. contra Faustum, c. 9. et supra pag. 200, nota 2.
    [On the Trinity] bk. I, c. 6, n. 13. Cf. Against Faustus XV, c. 9, and above, p. 200, note 2.
  11. Vide supra q. I. fundam. et infra d. 33. q. I. ad 1. Ibid. dub. I. agitur de iustitia. Augusl., de Natura et gratia, contra Pelag. c. 62. n. 72 ex Pelagii libro affert hanc Hilarii sententiam: Deum autem colere iustitiae proprium officium est.
    See above, q. 1, the grounds, and below, d. 33, q. 1, to 1. In the same place, dub. 1, justice is treated. Augustine, On Nature and Grace, against the Pelagians c. 62, n. 72, brings forward from Pelagius's book this sentence of Hilary: "But to worship God is the proper office of justice."
  12. Edd. secundum quod. Subinde post ordinatur cod. Q supplet homo.
    The editions [read] according as. Then after is ordered codex Q supplies man.
  13. Num. 3: Nam et ipsa religio quamvis distinctius non quemlibet, sed Dei cultum significare videatur... tamen, quia Latina loquendi consuetudine non imperitorum, verum etiam doctissimorum et cognationibus humanis atque affinitatibus et quibusque necessitudinibus dicitur exhibenda religio, non eo vocabulo vitatur ambiguum, cum de cultu deitatis vertitur quaestio etc.
    [X. de Civ. Dei, c. 1] n. 3: "For although religion itself seems more distinctly to signify not just any [worship], but the worship of God... nevertheless, because in the Latin manner of speaking, not of the unlearned, but indeed of the most learned, religion is said to be owed to human kinships and affinities and to any close ties whatever, the ambiguity is not avoided by that word when the question turns on the worship of the deity," etc.
  14. Pro sive codd. G L N T V X sicut.
    For or (sive) the codices G L N T V X [read] just as (sicut).
  15. Pro nisi codd. A I K L N T aa et edd. 1, 2 ubi, Vat. nec; nostram lectionem habent codd. E G I l U V X Z bb. Mox pro qui credit edd. et nonnulli codd. quia credit.
    For unless (nisi) the codices A I K L N T aa and editions 1, 2 [read] where (ubi), the Vatican edition nor (nec); our reading is held by the codices E G I l U V X Z bb. Shortly after, for who believes the editions and some codices [read] because he believes.
  16. Vide supra pag. 216, nota 5. Hugo a S. Vict. Instit. in Decal. Legis dominicae, c. 1. ait: Deum autem adorare est ei totam mentem per humilitatem ac devotionem substernere et ipsum principium ac finem omnis boni credere. — Pro tota mente cod. K tota intentione. Pro Rabanus cod. G Augustinus.
    See above, p. 216, note 5. Hugh of St. Victor, Instruction on the Decalogue of the Lord's Law, c. 1, says: "But to adore God is to subject the whole mind to him through humility and devotion, and to believe him the beginning and the end of all good." — For with the whole mind codex K [reads] with the whole intention. For Rabanus codex G [reads] Augustine.
  17. Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 2, ubi principia huius distinctionis proponuntur.
    Cf. below, d. 33, q. 2, where the principles of this distinction are set forth.
  18. Exod. 20, 7. — Paulo inferius pro per latriam edd. cum cod. cc latria.
    Exod. 20, 7. — A little below, for by latria the editions, with codex cc, [read] latria.
  19. Edd. cum paucis codd. etsi.
    The editions, with a few codices, [read] even though (etsi).
  20. Cod. A prout.
    Codex A [reads] according as (prout).
  21. A Vat. abest quod; plurimi codd. habent et quod. Proxime ante cod. K omittit et ante motivi.
    From the Vatican edition that (quod) is absent; very many codices have and that (et quod). Just before, codex K omits and before motive.
  22. Cfr. infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 1. q. 3; d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro Hoc autem cod. T Hoc modo, cod. A Hoc tantum.
    Cf. below, d. 24, a. 1, q. 2; d. 26, a. 1, q. 3; d. 27, a. 1, q. 1. — Then for Hoc autem (but this) codex T [reads] Hoc modo (in this way), codex A Hoc only.
  23. Cap. 2. n. 1. seq. Vide q. praeced. arg. 1. ad oppos. — Paulo ante codd. F K U sperando in Deum. Paulo inferius pro inquam codd. A G H K N Z in quantum, et pro omnes illas codd. K M O omnes alias.
    [Enchiridion] c. 2, n. 1 and following. See the preceding question, argument 1 to the opposite. — A little before, the codices F K U [read] hoping in God. A little below, for I say (inquam) the codices A G H K N Z [read] insofar as (in quantum), and for all those (omnes illas) the codices K M O [read] all others (omnes alias).
  24. Edd. ponant. Cod. bb unde [cod. Z inde] quidam ponunt.
    The editions [read] ponant. Codex bb [reads] whence (unde) [codex Z thence (inde)] quidam ponunt.
  25. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
Dist. 9, Art. 2, Q. 2Dist. 9, Art. 2, Q. 4