Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 9, Art. 2, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 9

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio IV. Utrum latria sit virtus distincta a dulia.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum latria sit virtus distincta a dulia. Et quod non, videtur.

1. (Ad oppositum.) Super illud Psalmi¹: Domine Deus meus, in te speravi; Glossa: « Domine omnium per potentiam, cui debetur dulia; Deus omnium per creationem, cui debetur latria »: ergo si Domino Deo non debetur nisi unica species adorationis, videlicet latria: ergo latria et dulia non sunt diversae species virtutis.

2. Item, eadem est species virtutis, qua creditur omne credendum, scilicet ipsa fides²: ergo eadem est species virtutis, qua colitur omne colendum; sed huiusmodi sunt latria et dulia: ergo etc.

3. Item, eadem est species virtutis, qua amatur omne amandum, videlicet ipsa caritas³: ergo eadem ratione eadem est species virtutis, qua adoratur omne adorandum; sed huiusmodi est latria et dulia: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia non sic est una ratio adorabilium, sicut amabilium; obiicitur contra: quia, sicut proximus non est amandus, nisi in quantum imago Dei, sic etiam non est adorandus, nisi in quantum est Dei imago: ergo sicut est unus amor sui et suae imaginis secundum speciem, sic et unus honor.

4. Item, « magis et minus non diversificant speciem⁴ »; sed latria et dulia differunt, sicut maior honor et minor honor: ergo videtur, quod non sint diversae species virtutis.

Sed contra: 1. (Fundamenta.) Super illud Psalmi⁵: Adorate scabellum pedum eius etc.; « Latria est adoratio, quae soli Deo debetur; dulia est adoratio, quae etiam creaturae exhibetur. Quae duas habet species: unam, quae omnibus indifferenter, alteram, quae exhibetur soli humanitati Christi ». Si ergo dulia habet duas species adorationis, quae creaturae debetur, multo fortius latria et dulia, quae sunt species virtutis diversae.

2. Item, « habitus diversificantur per actus, et actus per obiecta⁶ »: ergo si latria est cultus, qui debetur Deo ut Deo, et dulia, qui debetur creaturae, ut creatura est; videtur, quod latria sit species virtutis distincta a dulia.

3. Item, sapientia et scientia sunt diversa dona, secundum quae dirigimur ad temporalia et aeterna⁷: si ergo latria est cultus debitus aeternae maiestati, et dulia honor et reverentia debita creaturae temporali; videtur, quod sint diversi habitus in genere virtutis.

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4. Item, si per eum⁸ modum fiat honor creaturae, quo fit Creatori; iam non erit actus virtutis, sed potius vitii — si quis enim sacrificaret homini, crimen idololatriae committeret et vituperaretur potius de idololatria, quam commendaretur de actu latriae, vel duliae — ergo si diversitas modorum in actibus virtutum introducit diversitatem in habitibus, videtur, quod latria et dulia differant specifica differentia.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Latria et dulia secundum propriam significationem sunt species virtutis diversae.

Respondeo: Dicendum ad praedictorum intelligentiam, quod si nomen latriae secundum Augustinum, decimo de Civitate Dei⁹, importet cultum debitum maiestati divinae, nomen tamen duliae (Dulia dicitur tripliciter.) tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo dicitur dulia secundum quandam analogiam; alio modo secundum antonomasiam¹⁰; et tertio modo secundum significationem propriam. Cum autem dicitur (Dulia secundum analogiam.) secundum analogiam, tunc importat cultum debitum naturae superiori, sive creaturae, sive Creatori, secundum aliquam rationem, secundum quam Creator communicat creaturae, utpote secundum rationem dominii; et hoc modo accipitur in Glossa super illud Psalmi¹¹: In ecclesiis benedicite Deo Domino, Glossa: « Deo, cui debetur latria; Domino, cui debetur dulia ». — Cum autem accipitur (Dulia secundum antonomasiam.) secundum antonomasiam, sic dicit debitam reverentiam creaturae unitae vel assumptae; per quem modum accipitur super illud Psalmi¹²: Adorate scabellum pedum eius, ubi dicitur, quod dulia maior debetur solum humanitati Christi. — Cum autem accipitur dulia secundum (Dulia proprie.) significationem propriam, sic dicitur dulia honor vel reverentia debita rationali creaturae et exhibita¹³; et illo modo consuevit dulia accipi secundum communem usum.

Et hoc modo est quaestio, utrum latria et dulia sint diversae species virtutis; et ad hoc (Conclusio.) communiter respondetur, quod sic. — Et ratio huius est, (Ratio.) quia latria et dulia considerant exteriores cultus, qui

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formalem habent differentiam, secundum quod creaturae et Creatori exhibentur. Alius enim est modus adorandi Creatorem, et alius adorandi creaturam, et alia ratio motiva; et ideo alia virtus directiva in hac et in illa. Et ideo concedendum est, quod latria et dulia sunt diversae virtutes. — Concedendae sunt etiam rationes ad hoc inductae.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:

1. (Solutio oppositorum.) Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de Glossa, dicendum, quod dulia accipitur ibi secundum generalem significationem et analogiam, secundum quam communis est ad latriam et ad duliam proprie dictam. — Et si tu quaeras, (Quaestio incidens solvitur.) quare magis dicit, latriam deberi Deo, et duliam Domino, cum idem sit Deus et Dominus; dicendum, quod dominus communicatur creaturae et de Creatore et de creatura dicitur analogice. Deus autem non ita communicatur; sed si dicatur de Creatore et creatura, dicitur aequivoce. Et propterea dicit, latriam deberi Deo, et duliam Domino¹⁴, ut non significetur, quod alia specie adorationis adorandus sit, in quantum Deus, et alia, in quantum Dominus, sed ut innotescat differentia horum vocabulorum, et simul cum differentia innuit convenientiam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una est virtus, qua creduntur omnia credenda; dicendum, (Notandum.) quod verum est de credendis, quae habent unam rationem moventem ad credendum se, utpote veritatem summam, cuiusmodi sunt articuli fidei¹⁵. Sed si credenda haberent rationes diversas, utpote cum credo homini, quia verax est, et Deo, quia verax est; haec fides et illa non sunt necessario eiusdem rationis nec speciei. Una enim est fides, quae est virtus theologica; alia, quae magis spectat ad genus virtutis cardinalis, quae quidem magis proprie appellanda est fidelitas quam fides. Et quia latria et dulia diversas considerant rationes honorandi in Creatore et creatura; hinc est, quod potius, si bene attendatur, sunt diversae virtutes¹⁶ quam una.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem caritate diliguntur omnia diligibilia¹⁷; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia caritas habet unum obiectum principale, videlicet summum bonum, quod quidem amat, sive diligendo Deum in se, sive optando bonum proximo, qui est Dei imago. Latria autem et dulia alium et alium respiciunt cultum et modum; et ideo non est simile de dilectione et adoratione, nec de ratione imaginis hinc et inde. Et illud melius manifestabitur infra, cum agetur de caritate.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis et minus non diversificant speciem; dicendum, quod illud habet instantiam, et non habet veritatem quantum ad speciem in genere moris. Praeterea, non habet veritatem, nisi quando non est alia differentia quam per magis et minus; sic autem non est in proposito; quia latria et dulia non differunt solum quantum ad intensionem et remissionem, sed etiam quantum ad alium et alium colendi modum. — De quo, inquam, modo plura possent adhuc quaeri; sed ista sufficiant, ne nimis elongemus nos ab intentione Magistri; in omnibus enim praedictis satis potest sumi ratio discutiendi ex his quae dicuntur in littera.

Scholion

I. Conclusio ab omnibus recepta innititur duobus principiis per se manifestis, scilicet quod honor alicui debetur ratione excellentiae, quae in ipso est, et quod excellentia, quae in Deo est, non est eiusdem rationis cum excellentia creaturae rationalis. — Difficultas sumta ex Glossa in Psalmum 7. (arg. 1. ad oppos.) etiam a S. Thoma aliisque solvitur eodem modo, sicut a S. Bonav., cuius solutionis fundamentum est, quod in Deo sit aliqua excellentia, quae communicari possit creaturae, scilicet excellentia dominii. Haec competere potest Deo et creaturae, sed ita, ut sit diversae rationis in creatura, et per consequens etiam importet aliam duliam, quae non nisi secundum analogiam conveniat cum ea, quae fundatur super dominium essentialiter Deo proprium, et quae proprie est latria. Quod autem aliae excellentiae Dei essentiales sint incommunicabiles, per se patet. — Ipsam duliam plures species habere distinctas, praesertim hyperduliam, docet S. Thom. cum aliis, nonnullis contradicentibus.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 30. m. I. a. I. § 2. — Scot. rem tangit in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. I; S. II. II. q. 103. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. I. quaestiunc. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. I. — Aegid. R., hic q. 4. a. I. — Durand., hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether latria is a virtue distinct from dulia.

Fourthly it is asked whether latria is a virtue distinct from dulia. And that it is not, it seems.

1. (For the opposite.) On that verse of the Psalm¹: O Lord my God, in thee have I hoped; the Gloss: « Lord of all by power, to whom dulia is owed; God of all by creation, to whom latria is owed »: therefore if to the Lord God only a single species of adoration is owed, namely latria: therefore latria and dulia are not diverse species of virtue.

2. Likewise, it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be believed is believed, namely faith itself²: therefore it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be venerated is venerated; but latria and dulia are of this kind: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be loved is loved, namely charity itself³: therefore by the same reasoning it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be adored is adored; but latria and dulia are of this kind: therefore etc. If you should say that the case is not alike, because there is not one account of things adorable as of things lovable; it is objected on the contrary: that, just as one's neighbor is not to be loved except insofar as he is the image of God, so too he is not to be adored except insofar as he is the image of God: therefore, just as there is one love of oneself and of one's image according to species, so too there is one honor.

4. Likewise, « more and less do not diversify the species⁴ »; but latria and dulia differ as greater honor and lesser honor: therefore it seems that they are not diverse species of virtue.

On the contrary: 1. (Foundations.) On that verse of the Psalm⁵: Adore his footstool etc.; « Latria is the adoration which is owed to God alone; dulia is the adoration which is offered even to a creature. This has two species: one which is offered to all indifferently, the other which is offered to the humanity of Christ alone ». If therefore dulia, which is owed to a creature, has two species of adoration, much more strongly are latria and dulia diverse species of virtue.

2. Likewise, « habits are diversified by acts, and acts by objects⁶ »: therefore if latria is the worship owed to God as God, and dulia the worship owed to a creature as it is a creature; it seems that latria is a species of virtue distinct from dulia.

3. Likewise, wisdom and knowledge are diverse gifts, according to which we are directed to temporal and eternal things⁷: if therefore latria is the worship owed to the eternal majesty, and dulia the honor and reverence owed to a temporal creature; it seems that they are diverse habits in the genus of virtue.

4. Likewise, if honor were rendered to a creature by the same⁸ mode by which it is rendered to the Creator; it would then no longer be an act of virtue, but rather of vice — for if anyone sacrificed to a man, he would commit the crime of idolatry and would be reproached for idolatry rather than commended for an act of latria or of dulia — therefore if a diversity of modes in the acts of the virtues introduces a diversity in the habits, it seems that latria and dulia differ by a specific difference.

Conclusion

Conclusion. Latria and dulia, according to their proper signification, are diverse species of virtue.

I respond: It must be said, for the understanding of the foregoing, that although the name latria, according to Augustine in On the City of God, book ten⁹, signifies the worship owed to the divine majesty, the name dulia nevertheless (Dulia is said in three ways.) is said in three ways. In one way dulia is said according to a certain analogy; in another way according to antonomasia¹⁰; and in a third way according to its proper signification. When it is said (Dulia according to analogy.) according to analogy, it then signifies the worship owed to a superior nature, whether creature or Creator, according to some account by which the Creator communicates with a creature, namely according to the account of lordship; and in this way it is taken in the Gloss on that verse of the Psalm¹¹: In the churches bless God the Lord, the Gloss: « God, to whom latria is owed; Lord, to whom dulia is owed ». — When, however, it is taken (Dulia according to antonomasia.) according to antonomasia, then it signifies the due reverence to a united or assumed creature; in which manner it is taken on that verse of the Psalm¹²: Adore his footstool, where it is said that a greater dulia is owed to the humanity of Christ alone. — When, however, dulia is taken according to (Dulia properly.) its proper signification, then dulia is said to be the honor or reverence owed to a rational creature and offered to it¹³; and in that way dulia is wont to be taken according to common usage.

And in this way the question is whether latria and dulia are diverse species of virtue; and to this it is (Conclusion.) commonly answered that they are. — And the reason for this is (Reason.) that latria and dulia regard exterior worships, which

have a formal difference, according as they are offered to a creature and to the Creator. For there is one mode of adoring the Creator, and another of adoring a creature, and another motive account; and therefore another directive virtue in the one and in the other. And therefore it must be conceded that latria and dulia are diverse virtues. — The reasons adduced for this are also to be conceded.

To the arguments for the negative side:

1. (Solution of the opposing arguments.) To that which is objected on the contrary from the Gloss, it must be said that dulia is there taken according to its general signification and analogy, according to which it is common to latria and to dulia properly so called. — And if you ask (An incidental question is resolved.) why it says rather that latria is owed to God and dulia to the Lord, since God and Lord are the same; it must be said that "lord" is communicated to a creature and is said of the Creator and of a creature analogically. God, however, is not so communicated; but if it be said of the Creator and a creature, it is said equivocally. And for this reason it says that latria is owed to God, and dulia to the Lord¹⁴, not so as to signify that He is to be adored by one species of adoration insofar as He is God, and by another insofar as He is Lord, but so that the difference of these terms may be known, and at the same time, along with the difference, it suggests their agreement.

2. To that which is objected, that there is one virtue by which all things to be believed are believed; it must be said (Note.) that this is true of things to be believed which have one account moving to belief in itself, namely the highest truth, of which kind are the articles of faith¹⁵. But if the things to be believed had diverse accounts — as when I believe a man because he is truthful, and God because He is truthful — these faiths are not necessarily of the same account nor species. For one is the faith which is a theological virtue; another, which pertains rather to the genus of cardinal virtue, which indeed is more properly to be called fidelity than faith. And since latria and dulia consider diverse accounts of honoring in the Creator and in a creature; hence it is that rather, if one attends well, they are diverse virtues¹⁶ than one.

3. To that which is objected, that all things lovable are loved by the same charity¹⁷; it must be said that this is because charity has one principal object, namely the highest good, which indeed it loves, whether by loving God in Himself or by wishing good to a neighbor, who is the image of God. Latria and dulia, however, regard one worship and mode and another; and therefore the case is not alike concerning love and adoration, nor concerning the account of the image on the one side and the other. And that will be better made manifest below, when charity is treated.

4. To that which is objected, that more and less do not diversify the species; it must be said that this has an exception, and does not hold true as regards species in the genus of morals. Moreover, it does not hold true except when there is no other difference than by more and less; but it is not so in the present case; for latria and dulia do not differ only as to intensity and remission, but also as to one mode of worship and another. — Concerning which mode, I say, many more things could still be asked; but let these suffice, lest we stray too far from the intention of the Master; for in all the foregoing the ground of discussion can sufficiently be drawn from the things said in the text.

Scholion

I. The conclusion, received by all, rests on two self-evident principles, namely that honor is owed to someone by reason of the excellence which is in him, and that the excellence which is in God is not of the same account as the excellence of a rational creature. — The difficulty drawn from the Gloss on Psalm 7 (arg. 1 for the opposite) is also resolved by St. Thomas and others in the same way as by St. Bonaventure, the foundation of whose solution is that in God there is some excellence which can be communicated to a creature, namely the excellence of lordship. This can belong to God and to a creature, but in such a way that it is of a diverse account in the creature, and consequently also implies another dulia, which agrees only according to analogy with that which is founded upon the lordship essentially proper to God, and which is properly latria. That the other essential excellences of God are incommunicable is self-evident. — That dulia itself has several distinct species, especially hyperdulia, St. Thomas teaches along with others, some contradicting.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, pt. III, q. 30, m. I, a. I, § 2. — Scotus touches the matter in each of his Writings, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. I; Summa II–II, q. 103, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. I, quaestiuncula I. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3, q. I. — Giles of Rome, here q. 4, a. I. — Durandus, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus

Psalm. 7, 1. — Glossa, quae apud Lyranum est interlinearis, apud Petrum Lombardum, in hunc loc., sic sonat: « Domine omnium per potentiam, cui debetur dulia, qui es omnium per recreationem Deus, cui debetur latria ». August., II. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 94, ad illud Exod. 23, 33: Si servieris diis eorum etc. observat: Hic Graecus δουλεύσῃς habet, non λατρεύσῃς. Unde intelligitur, quia et δουλεία debetur Deo tanquam Domino, λατρεία vero nonnisi Deo tanquam Deo.
Psalm 7:1. — The Gloss, which in Lyra is interlinear, in Peter Lombard, on this passage, reads thus: « Lord of all by power, to whom dulia is owed, thou who art God of all by re-creation, to whom latria is owed ». Augustine, Questions on the Pentateuch II, q. 94, on that verse of Exod. 23:33: If thou shalt serve their gods etc., observes: Here the Greek has δουλεύσῃς, not λατρεύσῃς. Whence it is understood that δουλεία too is owed to God as Lord, but λατρεία only to God as God.
Ut ostenditur infra d. 23. a. I. q. 3. — In hoc et in seq. arg. plures codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 pro omne constanter exhibent esse.
As is shown below at d. 23, a. I, q. 3. — In this and in the following argument several codices, as well as editions 1 and 2, consistently read esse for omne.
Vide infra d. 27. a. I. q. 2.
See below at d. 27, a. I, q. 2.
Haec propositio supponitur ab Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 21–35. (c. 4.) et II. de General. et corrupt. text. 37. (c. 6.). Cfr. etiam tom. II. pag. 659, nota 7. — Mox pro non sint multi codd. non sunt.
This proposition is presupposed by Aristotle, Physics VII, text 21–35 (c. 4) and On Generation and Corruption II, text 37 (c. 6). Cf. also vol. II, p. 659, note 7. — Shortly after, for non sint many codices have non sunt.
Psalm. 98, 5. — De Glossa allegata vide supra pag. 200, nota 4. — In textu origin. Glossae, nec non in codd. A Q pro quae soli Deo legitur quae soli Creatori, et in eodem textu contradicentibus originali, edd. et nonnullis codd. pro unam... alteram [edd. aliam], plurimi codd. una... altera; minus congrue. Circa finem arg. Vat. cum nonnullis codd. et edd. 1, 2 pro debetur substituit debentur, et dein sola post et dulia, quae interserit Creatori et creaturae debentur.
Psalm 98:5. — On the Gloss cited, see above, p. 200, note 4. — In the original text of the Gloss, and in codices A Q, for quae soli Deo is read quae soli Creatori, and in the same text, against the original, the editions and some codices, for unam... alteram [editions aliam], most codices una... altera; less fittingly. Toward the end of the argument the Vatican edition, with some codices and editions 1 and 2, substitutes debentur for debetur, and then alone, after et dulia, inserts Creatori et creaturae debentur.
Cfr. tom. II. pag. 361, nota 3; pag. 638, nota 5. et pag. 653, nota 6. — Mox post debetur Deo codd. A P Q bb subiiciunt ut Deo, quod in textum recepimus. Subinde post et dulia Vat. cum aliquot codd. repetit cultus, et pro qui debetur bene multi codd. habent quae debetur.
Cf. vol. II, p. 361, note 3; p. 638, note 5; and p. 653, note 6. — Shortly after, following debetur Deo, codices A P Q bb add ut Deo, which we have received into the text. Then after et dulia the Vatican edition with several codices repeats cultus, and for qui debetur a good many codices have quae debetur.
Cfr. infra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. I. et d. 35. q. I. seq.
Cf. below at d. 34, pt. I, a. 2, q. I, and d. 35, q. I and following.
Cod. K eundem.
Codex K reads eundem.
Cap. I. n. 2. seq. — Post praedictorum intelligentiam cod. U adiicit est notandum, et subinde pro quod si edd. cum pluribus codd. exhibent quod etsi. Deinde pro tripliciter codd. A G H I L T U V X Z bb substituunt multipliciter, et pro dicitur codd. A F U bb accipitur.
On the City of God book X, c. I, n. 2 and following. — After praedictorum intelligentiam codex U adds est notandum, and then for quod si the editions, with several codices, give quod etsi. Next, for tripliciter codices A G H I L T U V X Z bb substitute multipliciter, and for dicitur codices A F U bb read accipitur.
Voce antonomasiae, quae e Graeco (ἀντονομασία i. e. pronominatio) in linguam Latinam est introducta, significatur ille tropus rhetoricus, in quo nomen, quod multis commune est, uni propter excellentiam tanquam proprium adaptatur.
By the word antonomasia, which has been introduced into the Latin language from the Greek (ἀντονομασία, i.e. pronomination), is signified that rhetorical trope in which a name common to many is adapted to one, on account of his excellence, as though it were proper to him.
Psalm. 67, 27. — Glossa est interlinearis et habetur apud Petrum Lombardum et Lyranum in hunc loc. Cfr. verba Augustini, supra pag. 219, nota 5. allata.
Psalm 67:27. — The Gloss is interlinear and is found in Peter Lombard and Lyra on this passage. Cf. the words of Augustine cited above, p. 219, note 5.
Psalm. 98, 5. Vide hic fundam. I. — Mox pro dulia maior codd. A G H I (I C a prima manu) N T V et edd. 1, 2 hyperdulia maior. Cfr. supra pag. 206, nota 3.
Psalm 98:5. See here the first foundation. — Shortly after, for dulia maior codices A G H I (I C from the first hand) N T V and editions 1, 2 have hyperdulia maior. Cf. above, p. 206, note 3.
Alan. ab Insulis in Distinct. dictionum theolog., ubi de Dulia agit, ait: Stricte [dulia accepta] dicitur servitus, quae tantum debetur rationabili creaturae, ut episcopis, praelatis et aliis, et secundum hoc dicitur a δοῦλον, quod est servitus. Et haec est quasi positiva, quam maioribus debemus, quae consistit in dilectione, in servitio, in obedientia et huiusmodi. — Paulo inferius pro communiter, quam lectionem in cod. A invenimus, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 convenienter, Vat. consequenter.
Alan of Lille in On the Distinctions of Theological Terms, where he treats of Dulia, says: Strictly [dulia taken] is called the servitude which is owed only to a rational creature, as to bishops, prelates and others, and according to this it is named from δοῦλον, which is servitude. And this is, as it were, positive, which we owe to our superiors, consisting in love, in service, in obedience and the like. — A little below, for communiter, which reading we found in codex A, other codices and editions 1, 2 have convenienter, the Vatican edition consequenter.
Pro Domino, quod cum Vat. etiam cod. K (a secunda manu) habet, plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 perperam creaturae.
For Domino, which, with the Vatican edition, codex K (from a second hand) also has, most codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly read creaturae.
Cfr. infra d. 23. a. I. q. 3.
Cf. below at d. 23, a. I, q. 3.
Pro virtutes codd. N U X Z species.
For virtutes codices N U X Z read species.
Cod. W diligenda. Paulo inferius pro optando bonum proximo cod. X operando bonum pro proximo.
Codex W reads diligenda. A little below, for optando bonum proximo codex X has operando bonum pro proximo.

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