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Dist. 27, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Operans gratia dicitur, in quantum voluntatem hominis liberat; cooperans vero, in quantum eandem adiuvat. Gregorius enim in Moralibus1, distinguens gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem, dicit ita, quod gratia praeveniens attenditur quantum ad dona naturae; subsequens vero quantum ad dona gratiae: ergo si idem est gratia operans et cooperans2, videtur, quod operans non dicatur illa quae hominis voluntatem liberat. — Si forte tu dicas, quod alio modo accipitur ibi praeveniens et subsequens; tunc est quaestio de ratione istorum3 nominum, quare scilicet sic nominatur, ut dicatur quaedam praeveniens, quaedam subsequens, quaedam operans, quaedam cooperans. Videtur enim, quod omnis gratia sit cooperans, quia nulla operatio debetur formae alicui per se, nisi cum subiecto4. Videtur etiam, quod nulla debeat dici praeveniens; aut enim praeveniens dicitur per comparationem ad actum, aut per comparationem ad subiectum. Si per comparationem ad actum, sic omnis forma debet dici5 praeveniens, quia omnis forma praecedit actum suum. Si per comparationem ad subiectum, sic nulla debet dici praeveniens, cum nulla sit ante subiectum suum.

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Est igitur quaestio, cum gratia a diversis diversimode dicatur, et huiusmodi nomina diversimode exponantur, unde haec diversitas veniat.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum gratia una sit, multiplices tamen habet divisiones secundum diversas considerationes. Habet enim gratia comparari ad suum principium a quo, habet comparari ad suum subiectum in quo, habet nihilominus comparari ad suum oppositum contra quod, habet comparari ad suum effectum, ad quem ordinatur.

Per comparationem ad suum principium, sic dividitur gratia in gratiam praedestinationis, vocationis, iustificationis et magnificationis. Primo enim Deus gratiam praeparat, secundo offert, tertio confert et quarto complet. Et secundum hoc attenditur praedicta divisio, quae sumitur de eo quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos octavo6.

Secundum autem quod gratia comparatur ad suum subiectum, sic dividitur in gratiam cogitationis, voluntatis et perfectionis secundum triplicem potentiam eius substantiae, in qua est gratia, videlicet secundum intellectivam, affectivam et operativam. Et haec divisio ponitur a Bernardo in libro de Libero Arbitrio7.

Secundum autem quod comparatur ad suum oppositum, sic est illa divisio gratiae, quae est gratia protectionis, liberationis, extractionis8 et salvationis. Sumitur enim haec divisio, secundum quod gratia adiuvat contra multiplex malum, videlicet malum tentationis sive pugnae, malum persecutionis sive miseriae, malum culpae et malum sequelae. A primo protegit, a secundo liberat, a tertio extrahit et a quarto salvat. Et haec divisio sumitur pro eo quod dicitur Isaiae trigesimo primo9: Protegit Dominus exercituum Iudam et Ierusalem, protegens et liberans, transiens et salvans.

Secundum comparationem ad effectum, ad quem est, dividitur in praevenientem et subsequentem, sive operantem et cooperantem, quae sunt differentiae gratiae secundum effectus, quos habet in ipsam voluntatem. Dicitur enim gratia praeveniens, in quantum ipsam voluntatem facit bonam; et ideo praevenit, quia non est a libero arbitrio, sed potius infunditur ab ipso Deo. Cooperans vero sive subsequens dicitur, in quantum adiuvat liberum arbitrium respectu boni operis eliciendi.

Et notandum, quod secundum quod nomen gratiae diversimode accipitur, sic etiam et istae duae differentiae, praeveniens et subsequens. Accipitur enim gratia uno modo largissime, et sic comprehendit dona naturalia et dona gratuita; utraque enim desursum sunt. Et hoc modo gratia habet dividi in praevenientem et subsequentem, ita quod praeveniens vocantur dona naturalia, subsequens vero dona gratuita; et sic accipit Gregorius in Moralibus. — Alio modo accipitur gratia minus communiter, et sic comprehendit gratiam gratis datam et gratum facientem; et tunc dividere gratiam in praevenientem et subsequentem nihil aliud est quam dividere gratiam in gratis datam et gratum facientem. Et sic dividit Bernardus, cum di-

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cit, quod quaedam est gratia, quae seminat cogitatum, et hanc vocat gratiam praevenientem; quaedam, quae perficit bonum, et hanc dicit gratiam subsequentem. Ait enim sic in libro de Libero Arbitrio10: « Haec tria in nobis operatur Deus, scilicet cogitare, velle et perficere. Primum sine nobis operatur, secundum nobiscum, et tertium per nos ». — Accipitur et gratia stricte, et sic comprehendit gratiam gratum facientem et gloriam; et tunc dividere gratiam in praevenientem et subsequentem non est aliud, quam dividere gratiam et gloriam. Et sic dividit Augustinus in libro de Natura et gratia11, cum ait: « Gratia praevenit, ut pie vivamus; subsequitur, ut cum illo semper vivamus. Nunc praevenit, ut vocemur; tunc subsequitur, ut glorificemur ». — Accipitur etiam gratia magis stricte, et tunc nominat solum gratiam gratum facientem; et tunc dividere eam per12 praevenientem et subsequentem hoc est secundum duplicem effectum gratiae, qui potest distingui tripliciter: vel ita, quod unus effectus sit contra malum, et alter ad bonum; vel ita, quod uterque sit ad bonum, sed unus competat gratiae, secundum quod informat, alter, secundum quod movet; vel ita, quod uterque attribuatur gratiae moventi, sed unus in ingressu, et alter in profectu. Et sic tripliciter exponitur ab Augustino in libro de Natura et gratia13. Uno modo sic: gratia praeveniens hominis voluntatem liberat et praeparat; subsequens vero, in quantum eandem adiuvat. Secundo modo sic: gratia praeveniens « praevenit voluntatem, ut sanemur; et subsequitur, ut sanati vegetemur ». Tertio modo sic: gratia praevenit voluntatem, ut velit; et subsequitur, ne frustra velit. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit secundo capitulo: Praemittendum est, tria esse genera bonorum. Alia namque sunt magna, alia minima, alia media. Videtur enim ista divisio boni esse insufficiens, quoniam multae sunt aliae bonorum differentiae. Est enim bonum fortunae et bonum naturae et bonum gratiae et gloriae. Si tu dicas, quod istae differentiae reducuntur ad has; quaeritur tunc, sub qua istarum contineatur bonum, quod Deus est, sive ipsa anima. Si tu dicas, quod sub magnis bonis; contra: magna bona sunt, ut dicit14, quibus non contingit male uti; sed Deo potest quis male uti, sicut cum diligit propter aliud: ergo non continetur sub magnis bonis. Item arguitur ex hoc: si Deo contingit male uti, videlicet cum refertur ad aliud; et Deus est optimus inter omnia bona: ergo omnibus bonis contingit male uti: ergo nulla sunt bona magna. Falsum igitur dicit, cum dicit, quod magna bona sunt, quibus non contingit male uti. — Item, videtur male exemplificare de virtutibus; nam aliquis potest de virtutibus superbire, potest etiam virtutes propter laudem humanam amare; et hoc est abuti: ergo videtur, quod virtutibus possit abuti: ergo sub magnis bonis non possunt contineri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus, cum dividit bonum per istas tres differentias, scilicet per bonum maximum et medium15 et infimum, non generaliter accipit divisionem boni, sed eius boni, quod est bonum alicui, et hoc est bonum, per quod contingit aliquo modo in finem ordinari; et ideo dividit hic bonum utile. Et propter hoc, cum triplex sit differentia boni utilis, per quod quis ordinatur in finem, triplicem boni ponit differentiam. Aliquid enim sic est utile ad finem, ut tamen sine illo possit ad finem perveniri, sicut sunt bona corporalia. Aliquid autem est ita utile ad finem, ut tamen16 sine illo non possit ad finem perveniri; per ipsum tamen potest quis a fine deordinari, sicut est liberum arbitrium, quo contingit male uti. Aliquid est ita utile, quod sine ipso ad finem non potest perveniri, nec per ipsum contingit aliquo modo a fine deordinari, sicut est virtus gratuita. Et quoniam in primo bono minima est utilitas, in secundo vero maior, in tertio maxima; hinc est, quod dividit bonum per has tres differentias, scilicet per bona minima, media et magna. — Et patet divisionis sufficientia et responsio ad illud quod obiicitur de summo bono, quod Deus est.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod virtutibus contingit male uti; dicendum, quod uti aliquo est multis modis, sicut dictum fuit in primo libro17, videlicet sicut instrumento et habitu directivo, vel sicut obiecto. Primo modo nullo modo contingit male uti virtute, quia virtus, quantum est de se, semper ad bonum dirigit, nec unquam per virtutem aliquid ordinatur ad malum.

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quia « virtus est bonus usus voluntatis », ut dicit Augustinus18. Secundo modo contingit male uti virtutibus, nec est aliquid ita bonum, circa quod non possit se liberum arbitrium deordinare, inordinate amando illud.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de illa ratione virtutis, quam ponit in littera: Virtus est bona qualitas mentis etc. Videtur enim haec notificatio primo redargui posse a modo praedicandi. « Nihil enim, quod praedicatur de altero in abstractione, praedicari habet de altero in concretione », sicut dicit Philosophus19: si ergo virtus est bonitas, nullo modo virtus dicenda est esse bona. — Item redarguitur praedicta definitio a defectu convertibilitatis in praedicando20, quia tota haec ratio convenire potest gratiae et donis et aliis habitibus animae. — Item redargui potest a falsitate in hoc quod dicit: quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur; hoc enim est contra Augustinum, qui dicit21, quod « qui creavit te sine te, non iustificat te sine te ». Et Bernardus etiam dicit, quod ad opus nostrae salutis duo concurrunt, scilicet Deus et liberum arbitrium.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum unius rei una sit definitio22, et differenter definiatur a diversis ipsa virtus: quomodo illae definitiones distinguuntur?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod virtus accipitur communiter, proprie et magis proprie. — Secundum quod communiter accipitur, sic comprehendit virtutem moralem et naturalem; et sic dupliciter habet definiri: aut in comparatione ad actum, aut in comparatione ad actum et finem ultimum. Primo modo definitur a Philosopho de Caelo et mundo23 cum dicit: « Virtus est ultimum potentiae de re ». Secundo modo definitur ab eodem in septimo Physicorum24: « Virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum ». Istae enim duae sunt notificationes virtutis in sua generalitate, prout comprehendit virtutem moralem et naturalem.

Alio modo consideratur virtus proprie, prout comprehendit moralem tantum, extenditur tamen ad politicam et gratuitam. Et sic dupliciter habet considerari: aut per comparationem ad ipsum actum, aut per comparationem ad principium directivum. Si per comparationem ad actum, sic definitur a Philosopho in Ethicis25: « Virtus est habitus, qui perficit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit ». Per comparationem autem ad principium directivum sic definitur ab eodem Philosopho ibidem26: « Virtus est habitus voluntarius in medio consistens, recta ratione determinatus, prout sapiens determinabit ». Et secundum hoc etiam definitur a Tullio27 per alia verba: « Virtus est habitus mentis, in modum naturae rationi consentiens ». Secundum hanc duplicem comparationem definitur ab Augustino virtus moralis per alia verba, idem significantia, in libro de Spiritu et anima28 sic: « Virtus est habitus mentis bene compositae »; in libro de Quantitate animae29: « Virtus est aequalitas vitae, rationi undique consentiens ». Hae duae notificationes, si quis attendat, realiter idem sunt cum praedictis, et tam istae quam illae sunt illius virtutis, quae per assuetudinem habet acquiri.

Tertio modo potest considerari virtus magis proprie, prout accipitur pro virtute gratuita; et sic qua-

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drupliciter potest comparari, videlicet ad finem, ad subiectum, ad actum et ad suum principium; secundum quadruplex genus causae, videlicet finalis, materialis, formalis et efficientis. In comparatione ad finem sic definitur ab Augustino in Soliloquiis30: « Virtus est ratio recta ad suum finem perveniens ». In comparatione vero ad subiectum, quod informat, quod est ipsa voluntas, sic definitur ab eodem de Civitate Dei31: « Virtus est bona voluntas ». In comparatione vero ad actum proprium sive complementum sic datur illa de Moribus Ecclesiae32: « Virtus est ordo amoris sive amor ordinatus ». In comparatione vero ad suum principium effectivum datur illa quae ponitur a Magistro in littera33: « Virtus est bona qualitas mentis » etc. In qua definitione hoc quod dicitur qualitas mentis, ponitur pro genere, et subiunguntur tres differentiae. Per hoc quod dicitur: qua recte vivitur, separatur a bonis corporalibus. Per hoc quod dicitur: qua nemo male utitur, separatur a proprietatibus spiritualibus et naturalibus. Per hoc autem quod subiungitur: quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, separatur a proprietatibus spiritualibus et consuetudinibus, quae etsi sint boni usus potentiarum animae, non sunt tamen per infusionem, sed per acquisitionem. — Et sic patet intellectus huius definitionis et distinctio ab aliis.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non debet dici bona, cum sit bonitas; dicendum, quod in primis intentionibus est praedicatio reflexa propter simplicitatem. Haec autem non habet locum in his quae sunt determinati generis, de quibus Philosophus loquitur; non enim dicitur: albedo est colorata.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est convertibilis; dicendum, quod hic non definitur virtus, prout distinguitur contra dona et alios habitus gratuitos, sed prout nomine virtutis clauditur omnis qualitas animae gratuita. — Posset tamen dici, quod per appropriationem recte vivere est virtutum, expedite donorum, sed perfecte beatitudinum, sicut alibi manifestabitur.

Ad ultimum dicendum, quod sine nobis non privat ex parte liberi arbitrii dispositionem susceptivam ipsius virtutis, sed potestatem effectivam.

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English Translation
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first the question is raised about what he says: Grace is called operating insofar as it frees the will of man; and cooperating insofar as it assists that same will. For Gregory, in the Morals1, distinguishing prevenient and subsequent grace, says thus, that prevenient grace is regarded with respect to the gifts of nature; but subsequent grace with respect to the gifts of grace: therefore if operating and cooperating grace are the same2, it seems that operating grace would not be called that which frees the will of man. — But if perhaps you say that prevenient and subsequent are taken there in another way; then there is a question about the meaning of these names3, namely why it is so named, that one is called prevenient, another subsequent, another operating, another cooperating. For it seems that all grace is cooperating, because no operation is due to any form of itself, except together with a subject4. It also seems that none ought to be called prevenient; for either prevenient is said by comparison to the act, or by comparison to the subject. If by comparison to the act, then every form ought to be called5 prevenient, because every form precedes its own act. If by comparison to the subject, then none ought to be called prevenient, since none is before its own subject.

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There is therefore a question, since grace is spoken of in diverse ways by diverse authors, and such names are expounded in diverse ways, whence this diversity comes.

I respond: It must be said that, although grace is one, it nevertheless has manifold divisions according to diverse considerations. For grace can be compared to its principle from which, it can be compared to its subject in which, it can likewise be compared to its opposite against which, and it can be compared to its effect, toward which it is ordered.

By comparison to its principle, grace is thus divided into the grace of predestination, of vocation, of justification, and of magnification. For first God prepares grace, secondly he offers it, thirdly he confers it, and fourthly he completes it. And according to this is regarded the aforesaid division, which is taken from what the Apostle says in Romans, chapter eight6.

But insofar as grace is compared to its subject, it is thus divided into the grace of thought, of will, and of perfection, according to the threefold power of that substance in which grace is, namely according to the intellective, the affective, and the operative. And this division is set down by Bernard in the book On Free Choice7.

But insofar as it is compared to its opposite, there is that division of grace which is the grace of protection, of liberation, of extraction8, and of salvation. For this division is taken according as grace assists against manifold evil, namely the evil of temptation or struggle, the evil of persecution or misery, the evil of fault, and the evil of consequence. From the first it protects, from the second it frees, from the third it draws out, and from the fourth it saves. And this division is taken from what is said in Isaiah, chapter thirty-one9: The Lord of hosts protects Judah and Jerusalem, protecting and freeing, passing over and saving.

By comparison to the effect toward which it is, it is divided into prevenient and subsequent, or operating and cooperating, which are differences of grace according to the effects which it has upon the will itself. For grace is called prevenient insofar as it makes the will itself good; and so it prevents, because it is not from free choice, but rather is infused by God himself. But it is called cooperating or subsequent insofar as it assists free choice with respect to eliciting a good work.

And it is to be noted that, according as the name of grace is taken in diverse ways, so also are these two differences, prevenient and subsequent. For grace is taken in one way most broadly, and so it comprehends natural gifts and gratuitous gifts; for both are from above. And in this way grace can be divided into prevenient and subsequent, such that the natural gifts are called prevenient, but the gratuitous gifts subsequent; and so Gregory takes it in the Morals. — In another way grace is taken less commonly, and so it comprehends grace freely given and grace making pleasing; and then to divide grace into prevenient and subsequent is nothing other than to divide grace into freely given and making-pleasing. And so Bernard divides it, when he

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says that there is a certain grace which sows the thought, and this he calls prevenient grace; and a certain grace which perfects the good, and this he calls subsequent grace. For he says thus in the book On Free Choice10: « These three God works in us, namely to think, to will, and to accomplish. The first he works without us, the second with us, and the third through us ». — And grace is also taken strictly, and so it comprehends grace making pleasing and glory; and then to divide grace into prevenient and subsequent is nothing other than to divide grace and glory. And so Augustine divides it in the book On Nature and Grace11, when he says: « Grace prevents, that we may live piously; it follows after, that we may always live with him. Now it prevents, that we may be called; then it follows after, that we may be glorified ». — And grace is also taken more strictly, and then it names grace making pleasing alone; and then to divide it by12 prevenient and subsequent is according to the twofold effect of grace, which can be distinguished in three ways: either so that one effect is against evil, and the other toward good; or so that both are toward good, but one belongs to grace insofar as it informs, the other insofar as it moves; or so that both are attributed to grace as moving, but one at the entrance, and the other in the advance. And so it is expounded in three ways by Augustine in the book On Nature and Grace13. In one way thus: prevenient grace frees and prepares the will of man; but subsequent grace insofar as it assists that same will. In the second way thus: prevenient grace « prevents the will, that we may be healed; and follows after, that being healed we may be quickened ». In the third way thus: grace prevents the will, that it may will; and follows after, lest it will in vain. — And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Doubt II.

Likewise the question is raised about what he says in the second chapter: It must be premised that there are three kinds of goods. For some are great, some least, and some intermediate. For it seems that this division of good is insufficient, since there are many other differences of goods. For there is the good of fortune and the good of nature and the good of grace and of glory. If you say that these differences are reduced to these; then it is asked under which of these is contained the good which God is, or the soul itself. If you say, under the great goods; on the contrary: those are great goods, as he says14, which cannot be ill used; but one can ill use God, as when he loves him for the sake of something else: therefore he is not contained under the great goods. Likewise it is argued from this: if God can be ill used, namely when he is referred to something else; and God is the best among all goods: therefore all goods can be ill used: therefore there are no great goods. Therefore he says something false, when he says that there are great goods which cannot be ill used. — Likewise, he seems to exemplify badly concerning the virtues; for someone can be proud of the virtues, and can also love the virtues for the sake of human praise; and this is to abuse them: therefore it seems that the virtues can be abused: therefore they cannot be contained under the great goods.

I respond: It must be said that Augustine, when he divides good by these three differences, namely by the greatest good, the intermediate15, and the lowest, does not take the division of good generally, but of that good which is good for someone, and this is the good through which one can in some way be ordered to an end; and therefore he here divides useful good. And on account of this, since there is a threefold difference of useful good, through which one is ordered to an end, he sets down a threefold difference of good. For something is so useful to an end that nevertheless without it one can attain the end, as are bodily goods. But something is so useful to an end that nevertheless16 without it one cannot attain the end; yet through it one can be turned away from the end, as is free choice, which can be ill used. Something is so useful that without it the end cannot be attained, nor through it can one in any way be turned away from the end, as is gratuitous virtue. And since in the first good there is least usefulness, in the second greater, and in the third greatest; hence it is that he divides good by these three differences, namely by least, intermediate, and great goods. — And the sufficiency of the division and the response to that which is objected concerning the highest good, which God is, are clear.

But to that which is objected, that the virtues can be ill used; it must be said that to use something is in many ways, as was said in the first book17, namely as an instrument and a directive habit, or as an object. In the first way it is in no way possible to ill use a virtue, because virtue, so far as is from itself, always directs toward good, nor is anything ever ordered toward evil through virtue.

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because « virtue is the good use of the will », as Augustine says18. In the second way it is possible to ill use the virtues, nor is there anything so good, concerning which free choice cannot turn itself away, by loving it inordinately.

Doubt III.

Likewise the question is raised about that account of virtue which he sets down in the text: Virtue is a good quality of the mind etc. For it seems that this notification can first be refuted from the manner of predicating. « For nothing which is predicated of another in the abstract has to be predicated of another in the concrete », as the Philosopher says19: if therefore virtue is goodness, in no way is virtue to be said to be good. — Likewise the aforesaid definition is refuted from a defect of convertibility in predicating20, because this whole account can belong to grace and to gifts and to other habits of the soul. — Likewise it can be refuted from falsity in this which it says: which God works in us without us; for this is against Augustine, who says21 that « he who created you without you does not justify you without you ». And Bernard too says that to the work of our salvation two things concur, namely God and free choice.

In keeping with this the question is raised, since of one thing there is one definition22, and virtue itself is defined differently by different authors: how are those definitions distinguished?

I respond: It must be said that virtue is taken commonly, properly, and more properly. — According as it is taken commonly, so it comprehends moral and natural virtue; and so it has to be defined in two ways: either in comparison to the act, or in comparison to the act and the ultimate end. In the first way it is defined by the Philosopher in On the Heavens and the World23 when he says: « Virtue is the ultimate of a power with respect to a thing ». In the second way it is defined by the same in the seventh book of the Physics24: « Virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best ». For these two are notifications of virtue in its generality, insofar as it comprehends moral and natural virtue.

In another way virtue is considered properly, insofar as it comprehends moral virtue only, yet it is extended to the political and the gratuitous. And so it has to be considered in two ways: either by comparison to the act itself, or by comparison to the directive principle. If by comparison to the act, so it is defined by the Philosopher in the Ethics25: « Virtue is a habit which perfects the one having it and renders his work good ». But by comparison to the directive principle it is thus defined by the same Philosopher in the same place26: « Virtue is a voluntary habit consisting in the mean, determined by right reason, as the wise man will determine ». And according to this it is also defined by Tully27 in other words: « Virtue is a habit of mind consenting to reason after the manner of nature ». According to this twofold comparison moral virtue is defined by Augustine in other words, signifying the same thing, in the book On the Spirit and the Soul28 thus: « Virtue is a habit of a well-composed mind »; in the book On the Quantity of the Soul29: « Virtue is an equality of life, consenting to reason on every side ». These two notifications, if one attends, are really the same as the aforesaid, and both these and those belong to that virtue which is acquired through habituation.

In the third way virtue can be considered more properly, insofar as it is taken for gratuitous virtue; and so

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it can be compared in four ways, namely to the end, to the subject, to the act, and to its principle; according to the fourfold kind of cause, namely final, material, formal, and efficient. In comparison to the end it is thus defined by Augustine in the Soliloquies30: « Virtue is right reason attaining to its end ». But in comparison to the subject, which it informs, which is the will itself, it is thus defined by the same in On the City of God31: « Virtue is a good will ». But in comparison to the proper act or completion, that one is given from On the Morals of the Church32: « Virtue is the order of love, or ordered love ». But in comparison to its effective principle is given that one which is set down by the Master in the text33: « Virtue is a good quality of the mind » etc. In which definition, that which is said, quality of the mind, is set down for the genus, and three differences are subjoined. By this which is said, by which one lives rightly, it is separated from bodily goods. By this which is said, which no one uses ill, it is separated from spiritual and natural properties. But by this which is subjoined, which God works in us without us, it is separated from spiritual properties and from acquired habits, which, though they be good uses of the powers of the soul, are nevertheless not through infusion, but through acquisition. — And so the understanding of this definition and its distinction from others is clear.

To that which is objected, that it ought not to be called good, since it is goodness; it must be said that in first intentions there is a reflexive predication on account of simplicity. But this has no place in those things which are of a determinate genus, of which the Philosopher speaks; for it is not said: whiteness is white.

To that which is objected, that it is not convertible; it must be said that virtue is not here defined insofar as it is distinguished against gifts and other gratuitous habits, but insofar as under the name of virtue is enclosed every gratuitous quality of the soul. — Yet it could be said that by appropriation to live rightly belongs to the virtues, readily to the gifts, but perfectly to the beatitudes, as will be shown elsewhere.

To the last it must be said that without us does not deprive, on the side of free choice, the receptive disposition of virtue itself, but the effective power.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Gregorius, quod quidem nos sciamus, termino gratiae praevenientis et subsequentis in duplici sensu utitur, scil. ad significandam misericordiam, qua Deus nobis sua dona, sive naturalia sive supernaturalia, tribuit et custodit (IX. Moral. c. 53. n. 79. seqq.), et ad significandam pietatem, qua Deus « prius agit in nobis aliquid sine nobis, ut, subsequente quoque nostro libero arbitrio, bonum, quod iam appetimus, agat nobiscum » (XVI. Moral. c. 23. n. 30, XVIII. c. 40. n. 63, XXII. c. 9. n. 20. et XXXIII. c. 21. n. 38. seqq.). Forsitan modus dividendi gratiam, de quo hic S. Bonav. loquitur, insinuatur his verbis, quae leguntur loc. cit. VIII. c. 28. n. 47: Hominem Deus magnificat, quia largitate rationis dilat, infusione gratiae visitat (cfr. et loc. cit. XXXV. c. 17. n. 43.). Explicite tamen haec divisio gratiae habetur apud Richard. a S. Vict. (ab Alex. Hal. etiam cit. S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 2.), qui in libro de Statu interioris hominis, tr. I. c. 20. ait: Sed alia potuit [primus homo] ex natura, et alia potuit ex gratia. Alia namque bona naturae, et alia sunt dona gratiae. Verumtamen et haec et illa constat esse ex gratia; nam ex gratia utique est ipsa natura. Prima itaque bona ex gratia praeveniente, secunda autem bona ex gratia subsequenti. Recte ergo et praeveniens et subsequens potest dici gratia; sed illa prima, ista secunda etc.
    Gregory, so far at least as we know, uses the term prevenient and subsequent grace in a twofold sense, namely to signify the mercy by which God bestows and guards his gifts upon us, whether natural or supernatural (IX. Morals c. 53, n. 79 ff.), and to signify the loving-kindness by which God « first works something in us without us, so that, with our free choice also following after, he may work with us the good which we now desire » (XVI. Morals c. 23, n. 30; XVIII, c. 40, n. 63; XXII, c. 9, n. 20; and XXXIII, c. 21, n. 38 ff.). Perhaps the manner of dividing grace, of which St. Bonaventure here speaks, is hinted at in these words read in the cited place VIII, c. 28, n. 47: God magnifies man, because he enlarges him by the bounty of reason, and visits him by the infusion of grace (cf. also the cited place XXXV, c. 17, n. 43). Explicitly, however, this division of grace is found in Richard of St. Victor (also cited by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 3, a. 2), who in the book On the State of the Interior Man, tr. I, c. 20, says: But one thing [the first man] could do from nature, and another he could do from grace. For some goods are of nature, and others are gifts of grace. Yet it is established that both these and those are from grace; for the nature itself is certainly from grace. The first goods therefore are from prevenient grace, but the second goods from subsequent grace. Rightly therefore can grace be called both prevenient and subsequent; but the former the first, the latter the second etc.
  2. Ut argumentatio valeat, supplendum est: ac praeveniens et subsequens.
    That the argument may hold, this must be supplied: and prevenient and subsequent.
  3. Codd. I V X Z dd et alii addunt duorum.
    Codices I V X Z dd and others add of the two.
  4. Scil., quia actiones sunt suppositorum.
    Namely, because actions belong to supposits.
  5. Cod. aa potest dici; edd., excepta I, dicitur.
    Codex aa reads can be called; the editions, except I, read is called.
  6. Vers. 30: Quos autem praedestinavit etc.
    Verse 30: But whom he predestined etc.
  7. Cap. 14. n. 47: Ipsa liberum excitat arbitrium, cum seminat cogitatum; sanat, cum immutat affectum; roborat, ut perducat ad actum; servat, ne sentiat defectum. Sic autem ista cum libero arbitrio operatur, ut tantum illud in primo praeveniat, in ceteris comitetur etc.
    Chapter 14, n. 47: It itself rouses free choice, when it sows the thought; it heals, when it changes the affection; it strengthens, that it may lead through to the act; it preserves, lest it feel any defect. And it works thus with free choice, that it goes before it only in the first, and accompanies it in the rest etc.
  8. Secuti codd. Y (F a secunda manu), hic adiecimus extractionis, quod deest in aliis edd. et codd. Sed quia in sequente explicatione quatuor membra divisionis enumerantur, et hoc membrum indicatur verbis a tertio [malo culpae] extrahit, probabilius nobis visum est, hic illud membrum iam in antiquis exemplaribus excidisse.
    Following codices Y (F by a second hand), we have here added of extraction, which is wanting in the other editions and codices. But since in the following explanation the four members of the division are enumerated, and this member is indicated by the words from the third [the evil of fault] it draws out, it seemed to us more probable that this member had here already dropped out in the ancient copies.
  9. Vers. 8: Sicut aves volantes, sic proteget Dominus exercituum Ierusalem, protegens etc. — Pro Iudam nonnulli codd. cum edd., excepta I (quae hoc verbum prorsus omittit), Iudaeam.
    Verse 8: As birds flying, so will the Lord of hosts protect Jerusalem, protecting etc. — For Judah several codices with the editions, except I (which omits this word entirely), read Judaea.
  10. Cap. 11. n. 46: Si ergo Deus tria haec, hoc est bonum cogitare, velle, perficere operatur in nobis: primum profecto sine nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium per nos facit. Siquidem immittendo bonam cogitationem nos praevenit; immutando etiam malam voluntatem, sibi per consensum iungit etc. Cfr. supra pag. 669, nota 6.
    Chapter 11, n. 46: If therefore God works in us these three, that is, to think, to will, and to accomplish the good: the first indeed he does without us, the second with us, the third through us. For by sending in the good thought he prevents us; and by also changing the evil will, he joins it to himself through consent etc. Cf. above p. 669, note 6.
  11. Cap. 31. n. 35: Praevenit, ut vocemur; subsequetur, ut glorificemur: praevenit, ut pie vivamus; subsequetur, ut cum illo semper vivamus.
    Chapter 31, n. 35: It prevents, that we may be called; it will follow after, that we may be glorified: it prevents, that we may live piously; it will follow after, that we may always live with him.
  12. Cod. cc et ed. 1 in.
    Codex cc and edition 1 read into.
  13. Prima definitio insinuatur c. 12. n. 13, c. 26. n. 29, c. 34. n. 39, c. 63. n. 73; secunda ad verbum habetur c. 31. n. 35; tertia sententialiter c. 27. n. 31. De prima et tertia cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 2. seqq., ubi plures alii textus Augustini afferuntur, quae ad complendas has definitiones iuvant. — In prima definitionum hic allatarum pro eandem adiuvat, quam lect. ex codd. F I K L O X bb cc et ed. 1 restituimus, Vat. eadem adiuvat. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 2. seq.; B. Albert., d. 26. a. 6; Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 26. a. 7; Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. a. 2. 3. 4.
    The first definition is hinted at c. 12, n. 13; c. 26, n. 29; c. 34, n. 39; c. 63, n. 73; the second is had word for word c. 31, n. 35; the third in substance c. 27, n. 31. On the first and third cf. above the text of the Master, d. XXVI, c. 2 ff., where several other texts of Augustine are adduced, which help to complete these definitions. — In the first of the definitions here adduced, for assists that same will, which reading we have restored from codices F I K L O X bb cc and edition 1, the Vatican reads the same assists. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 3, a. 2 f.; B. Albert, d. 26, a. 6; Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent. d. 26, a. 7; Giles of Rome, II Sent. d. 26, q. 2, a. 2, 3, 4.
  14. Cap. 19. n. 22. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 3; S. I. II. q. 14. a. 3; I. q. 21. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
    Chapter 19, n. 22. — St. Thomas, here, the single question a. 3; Summa I-II, q. 14, a. 3; I, q. 21, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here, a. 2, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 2.
  15. Pro medium, quam lect. auctoritate codd. V aa bb, contextu hoc exigente, in textum recepimus, Vat. minimum. Immediate ante pro maximum codd. I V aa bb magnum.
    For intermediate, which reading we have received into the text on the authority of codices V aa bb, the context requiring this, the Vatican reads least. Immediately before, for greatest, codices I V aa bb read great.
  16. Cod. V omittit tamen.
    Codex V omits nevertheless.
  17. Dist. I. a. I. q. 2.
    Distinction I, art. I, q. 2.
  18. Libr. I. Retract. c. 9. n. 6. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 102. m. 2; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
    Book I of the Retractations, c. 9, n. 6. See here the text of the Master, c. 4. — On this doubt cf. B. Albert, Summa p. II, tr. 16, q. 102, m. 2; St. Thomas, here, concerning the text.
  19. Hoc axioma deductum esse videtur ex II. Topic. c. 2, ubi modus assignatur, quo genus false praedicatur de suis inferioribus, quod fit, quando de ipsis praedicatur ut accidens. Praedicatur autem ut accidens aut explicite, « ut si quis albo dicat accidere colorem esse, non enim albo colorem esse accidit, sed genus eius color est »; aut implicite, per denominativam praedicationem, quae propria est accidenti, « ut si quis albedinem colorari [i. e. coloratam a colore] dixerit, vel ambulationem moveri; a nullo enim genere [quod praedicatur de suis inferioribus in abstractione v. g. color] denominative praedicatio [in qua praedicatum dicitur concrete v. g. coloratum] de specie dicitur, sed omnia univoce genera de speciebus praedicantur; nam et nomen et rationem generum suscipiunt species. Qui igitur coloratum dixit album, neque genus assignavit, quoniam denominative dixit, neque ut proprium vel ut definitionem; nam definitio et proprium nulli alii inest, sunt autem colorata et pleraque aliorum, ut lignum, lapis, homo, equus; manifestum igitur, quoniam ut accidens assignavit ». Cfr. tom. I. pag. 478, nota 1.
    This axiom seems to be derived from II Topics c. 2, where is assigned the way in which a genus is falsely predicated of its inferiors, which happens when it is predicated of them as an accident. Now it is predicated as an accident either explicitly, « as if one should say that to be a color is accidental to the white, for to be a color is not accidental to the white, but its genus is color »; or implicitly, by a denominative predication, which is proper to an accident, « as if one should say that whiteness is colored [i.e. made colored by color], or that walking is moved; for from no genus [which is predicated of its inferiors in the abstract, e.g. color] is a denominative predication [in which the predicate is said concretely, e.g. colored] said of a species, but all genera are predicated univocally of their species; for the species receive both the name and the account of the genera. He therefore who called the colored white, neither assigned the genus, since he spoke denominatively, nor as a property or as a definition; for definition and property are in no other, but colored things and very many other things are, such as wood, stone, man, horse; it is manifest therefore that he assigned it as an accident ». Cf. vol. I, p. 478, note 1.
  20. Quae secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 2. (c. 3.) requiritur, ut definitio sit bona. — Pro a defectu codd. AY quantum ad defectum.
    Which, according to Aristotle, VI Topics c. 2 (c. 3), is required that a definition be good. — For from a defect codices AY read as to a defect.
  21. Serm. 169. (alias 13. de Verb. Apost.) c. 11. n. 13: Qui ergo fecit te etc. — Dictum Bernardi, quod hic respicitur, habetur in eius libro de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 14. n. 46. et sic sonat: A Deo ergo sine dubio nostrae fit salutis exordium, nec per nos utique, nec nobiscum; verum consensus et opus, etsi non ex nobis, non iam tamen sine nobis. Cfr. supra pag. 669, nota 6, ubi reperies alia verba, quae ibid. sequuntur.
    Sermon 169 (otherwise 13, On the Words of the Apostle) c. 11, n. 13: He therefore who made you etc. — The saying of Bernard which is here regarded is had in his book On Grace and Free Choice c. 14, n. 46, and runs thus: From God therefore without doubt comes the beginning of our salvation, neither indeed through us, nor with us; but the consent and the work, although not from us, are nevertheless not now without us. Cf. above p. 669, note 6, where you will find other words which there follow.
  22. Ut docet Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.).
    As Aristotle teaches, VI Topics c. 3 (c. 4).
  23. Libr. 1. text. 116. (c. 11.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 564, nota 7. Averroes in hunc locum ait: Manifestum est, quod potentia [virtus] eius non est definienda nisi per ultimum istius actionis.
    Book I, text 116 (c. 11). Cf. vol. I, p. 564, note 7. Averroes on this passage says: It is manifest that its power [virtue] is not to be defined except by the ultimate of that action.
  24. Text. 17. (c. 3.). Haec definitio est secundum translationem antiqui textus Graeci, quem textum simul cum translatione Latina nec non cum recentiore textu Graeco videsis in nova (Leon.) ed. oper. S. Thom. (tom. II. pag. 338). — Codd. et edd. falso allegant VII. Ethicorum, in quo libro agitur de continentia et virtute heroica, de voluptate et dolore, et in quo haec definitio non occurrit. At habetur II. Ethic. c. 6; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 20. (c. 22.); II. Moral. Eudem. c. 6. (c. 5.), quibus locis transfertur in virtutem moralem; dicit enim auctor, virtutem esse habitum disponentem ad optimum i. e. ad medium inter excessum et defectum secundum rectam rationem.
    Text 17 (c. 3). This definition is according to the translation of the ancient Greek text, which text together with the Latin translation as well as with the more recent Greek text you may see in the new (Leonine) edition of the works of St. Thomas (vol. II, p. 338). — The codices and editions falsely allege VII Ethics, in which book there is treatment of continence and heroic virtue, of pleasure and pain, and in which this definition does not occur. But it is had in II Ethics c. 6; I of the Great Morals c. 20 (c. 22); II of the Eudemian Morals c. 6 (c. 5), in which places it is transferred to moral virtue; for the author says that virtue is a habit disposing toward the best, i.e. toward the mean between excess and defect according to right reason.
  25. Libr. II. c. 6.
    Book II, c. 6.
  26. Loc. cit., ubi ad verbum sic ait: Virtus igitur est habitus electivus, in mediocritate quantum ad nos consistens, quae quidem mediocritas ratione praefinita sit atque ita, ut prudens praefiniret. — Pro in medio codd. B D E F I M X Y W aa et alii in medietate.
    The cited place, where it says thus word for word: Virtue therefore is an elective habit, consisting in a mean as regards us, which mean is defined by reason and so as a prudent man would define it. — For in the mean codices B D E F I M X Y W aa and others read in the middle.
  27. Libr. II. Rhet. c. 34: Virtus est animi habitus, naturae modo, rationi consentaneus. In Vat. legitur: Virtus est habitus mentis, naturae moderationi consentaneus.
    Book II of the Rhetoric c. 34: Virtue is a habit of the soul, in the manner of nature, consonant with reason. In the Vatican is read: Virtue is a habit of mind, consonant with the moderation of nature.
  28. Cap. 4.
    Chapter 4.
  29. Cap. 16. n. 27, ubi textus origin. et Vat. consentientis pro consentiens. — De hac et aliis definitionibus virtutis, quae hic occurrunt, vide III. Sent. d. 33. q. 2. seqq.
    Chapter 16, n. 27, where the original text and the Vatican read consenting (gen.) for consenting. — On this and the other definitions of virtue which occur here, see III Sent. d. 33, q. 2 ff.
  30. Libr. I. c. 6. n. 13: Et haec est vere perfecta virtus, ratio perveniens ad finem suum. — Paulo superius verbis secundum quadruplex genus ed. 1 praemittit sic definitur ab eodem.
    Book I, c. 6, n. 13: And this is truly perfect virtue, reason attaining to its end. — A little above, before the words according to the fourfold kind, edition 1 prefixes it is thus defined by the same.
  31. Libr. XIV. c. 6. seq., ubi explicans diversos voluntatis motus dicit, quod « si perversa est [voluntas], perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt ». Recti aut perversi erunt hi motus, prout obiecta bona aut mala appetunt. Qui appetit et amat bonum, secundum Deum et non secundum hominem vivit (a. v. virtuosus est); qui amat malum, malus est et vitiosus. Qui amat Deum et proximum et se ipsum propter Deum, a propter hunc amorem dicitur voluntatis bonae. Cfr. ibid. c. 8. n. 2.
    Book XIV, c. 6 f., where, explaining the diverse motions of the will, he says that « if it [the will] is perverse, it will have these motions perverse; but if it is right, they will be not only blameless, but even praiseworthy ». These motions will be right or perverse according as they desire good or evil objects. He who desires and loves the good lives according to God and not according to man (and so is virtuous); he who loves evil is evil and vicious. He who loves God and his neighbor and himself for the sake of God is, on account of this love, called of a good will. Cf. ibid. c. 8, n. 2.
  32. Libr. I. c. 15. n. 25. Vide supra pag. 558, nota 6. — Cod. X et paulo superius et paulo inferius verbis datur illa addit Augustini.
    Book I, c. 15, n. 25. See above p. 558, note 6. — Codex X, both a little above and a little below, adds of Augustine to the words that one is given.
  33. Libr. III. Sent. d. 34. p. I. a. I. q. 1. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 62. m. 2. seqq.; B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 103; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. seq.; S. I. II. q. 33. a. 1. seqq.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2; Richard. a Med., hic circa litt. et a. 1. q. 1; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1. seqq. et q. 1. a. 1.
    Book III Sent. d. 34, p. I, a. I, q. 1. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 62, m. 2 ff.; B. Albert, here, a. 1; Summa p. II, tr. 16, q. 103; St. Thomas, here, q. 1, a. 1 f.; Summa I-II, q. 33, a. 1 ff.; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 1, a. 2; Richard of Middleton, here, concerning the text and a. 1, q. 1; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 1 ff. and q. 1, a. 1. ---
← Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 3