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Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio I. De differentia utriusque Legis penes radicem.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de differentia, quae assignatur penes radicem. Assignatur autem haec differentia penes radicem secundum Augustinum, quod Lex vetus radicabatur in timore, et Lex nova in amore. Unde Augustinus2 dicit, quod «brevis est differentia Legis et Evangelii: timor et amor». Et cum ex multis locis Scripturae possit ista differentia trahi, maxime accipitur ex Epistola ad Romanos octavo3, ubi dicit Apostolus: Non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed spiritum adoptionis.

Sed contra hoc obiicitur multipliciter:

1. Primo contra distinctionem ipsarum radicum. «Omnis enim timor, sicut dicit Augustinus4, ex amore procedit»: ergo si amor est radix timoris, unum ad alterum habet reduci: ergo non habent ad invicem distingui1.

2. Item, cum sint aliae affectiones animae, videlicet gaudium et dolor et spes5; videtur, quod si penes has affectiones duplex Lex distinguitur, quod pari ratione penes alias distingui deberet: ergo videtur, quod si penes alias non distinguitur, nec penes istas.

3. Item, si istae duae Leges distinguuntur penes istas duas radices; cum lex naturae sit ab istis duabus distincta, videtur, quod necessaria esset6 tertia radix praeter istas duas. Aut si lex naturae non habet diversam radicem observantiae a Lege

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Moysi, videtur, quod nec penes hoc differat Lex Moysi a Lege Evangelii.

4. Item, Deuteronomii sexto7 dicitur: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota mente tua etc.; et ad Philippenses secundo dicitur in Lege nova: Cum metu et tremore salutem vestram operamini. Si ergo amor praecipitur in veteri, et timor in Lege nova; videtur, quod secundum hoc non attendatur istarum Legum differentia.

5. Item, in utraque Lege fiunt promissiones et comminationes; sed promissiones attrahunt ad amorem, comminationes vero incutiunt8 timorem: igitur timor et amor conveniunt utrique: ergo penes haec non distinguuntur ab invicem.

6. Item, graviores comminationes fiunt in Lege nova quam in Lege veteri; quia ibi puniebatur homo poena temporali, hic autem comminatur Deus poenam aeternam9: si ergo maior comminatio est inductiva maioris timoris, videtur, quod timor magis deberet Legi novae quam veteri appropriari: videtur igitur, quod penes has duas radices non recte assignetur differentia Legis veteris et novae, tum per comparationem ipsarum radicum ad invicem, tum per comparationem ad ipsas Leges.

Conclusio.

Lex vetus recte dicitur lex timoris, et Lex nova lex amoris.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum comparamus has Leges ad invicem, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum statum communem, vel habito respectu ad statum specialis personae. Si habito respectu ad statum specialis personae, sic penes haec duo non est differentia. Nam multi in Lege evangelica ducuntur spiritu timoris, multi etiam in Lege veteri ducebantur spiritu amoris. — Si vero comparemus has Leges ad invicem, habito respectu ad statum communem; sic, quia Lex Moysaica respiciebat statum imperfectionis, quia neminem ad perfectum adduxit Lex, secundum quod dicit Apostolus ad Hebraeos10; Evangelium vero respicit statum perfectionis, secundum quod dicitur Matthaei quinto: Estote perfecti, sicut Pater vester caelestis perfectus est;

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et imperfectorum est duci spiritu timoris, perfectorum vero spiritu amoris: hinc est, quod secundum statum communem penes haec duo habet harum duarum Legum differentia assignari.

Signum autem huius differentiae deprehenditur in modo ferendi hanc duplicem Legem: quia Lex vetus data fuit cum clamore magno et timore, secundum quod dicitur Exodi decimo nono11, ita quod populus non audebat appropinquare; Lex autem Evangelii data est cum magna benignitate et dulcedine, quoniam ipse Rex regum, in medio discipulorum sedens, docebat eos dicens: Beati pauperes spiritu etc., secundum quod scribitur Matthaei quinto12. Et hic diversus modus ferendi Legem insinuat nobis diversitatem huius duplicis radicis in observando, quae his duabus Legibus competebat propter diversam qualitatem personarum et status earum, ob quam oportebat diversimode manuduci. Unde sicut videmus in disciplinalibus, quod ad homines persuadibiles utendum est syllogismo ostensivo, qui ducit directe ad verum; ad homines vero contentiosos utendum est syllogismo per impossibile, qui ducit ad manifeste falsum, ut per illud reducat ad verum13: sic, quia in tempore Legis veteris erant homines durae cervicis et ad malum proni, Dominus proposuit comminationes et taxavit etiam graves poenas, ut per hoc incuteret eis timorem, per quem a malo revocarentur et ad bonum stimularentur; sed postmodum, apparente benignitate et humanitate Salvatoris nostri Dei14, coeperunt homines esse persuadibiles: et ideo proposuit eis Dominus magnas et multas promissiones, per quarum amorem et desiderium alliceret eos ad faciendum bonum. Et propterea Lex vetus dicitur lex timoris, Lex Evangelii dicitur lex amoris, secundum testimonium Apostoli et beati Augustini.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod timor radicatur in amore; dicendum, quod duplex est amor, scilicet quo amatur Deus in quantum bonus, et quo amatur in quantum beneficus. Ex primo amore oritur timor filialis, qui timet patrem offendere, propter hoc quod eum diligit. Ex secundo oritur timor poenae, quo quis timet beneficia perdere et mala poenae incurrere15. Primus amor et timor convenit Legi evangelicae, secundus vero amor et timor convenit Legi Moysaicae; et quoniam primus amor competit statui perfectionis, in quo regnat amor, secundus vero statui imperfectionis, in quo regnat timor: hinc est, quod licet utrobique sit amor et timor, Lex Evangelii dicitur magis observari ex amore quam ex timore, Lex vero Moysi e contrario.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliae sunt animae affectiones; dicendum, quod etsi aliae sint, tamen istae duae sufficiunt, pro eo quod omnes aliae ad istas duas possunt reduci. Omnis enim affectio aut est respectu boni, aut respectu mali; et si respectu boni, reducitur ad amorem; si respectu mali, reducitur ad timorem. Unde istae duae affectiones dicuntur tenere principatum inter alias, quia maxime habent rationem motivi, una inclinando ad bonum, altera in retrahendo a malo; et propterea magis competit eis ratio radicis quam affectionibus aliis16. Et si tu obiicias, quod tunc non deberet esse nisi una radix, quia timor reducitur ad amorem; dicendum, quod duae dicuntur secundum immediatam comparationem ad suum motivum et ad actus immediatos, qui ab eis habent ortum. Unde ubi est radix timoris, verum est, quod est radix amoris; sed alicuius est radix immediata ipse timor, cuius non est amor ita immediate17.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de lege naturae, quod deberet habere tertiam radicem; dicendum, quod lex naturae partim conveniebat cum lege gratiae, partim cum lege scripta: quantum ad libertatem cum lege gratiae conveniebat, quantum vero ad imperfectionem et obscuritatem cum lege scripta: et ideo secundum diversas conditiones reduci habet ad ista duo motiva, nec oportuit, quod habeat radicem tertiam18.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in utraque Lege praecipitur timor et amor; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen Lex vetus principaliter habet19 oculum ad timorem, Lex vero nova principaliter ad amorem; illud autem tenet in lege rationem radicis, quod principaliter movet in mandatis eius observandis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod utrobique fiebant comminationes et promissiones; dicendum, quod in Lege veteri fiebant promissiones temporales, secundum quod dicitur Isaiae primo20: Si volueritis et audieritis me, bona terrae comedetis; in Lege autem nova promissiones aeternae, quibus Dominus promittit semetipsum nobis in praemium. — Similiter et de comminationibus intelligendum est. Et quoniam illae comminationes et promissiones primae competebant statui imperfectionis; ideo abundantius generabant affectum timoris quam amoris; sed e contra est de promissionibus et comminationibus Legis novae. Ideo ratio illa non valet.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maiores comminationes fiunt in Lege nova; responderi potest dupliciter: primo, quia homo carnalis et sensualis21 magis exterretur, cum comminatur sibi poena in praesenti quam in futuro. Sicut multi latrones magis timent furari propter patibulum et suspendium quam propter infernale supplicium. Unde etsi maior sit comminatio, non tamen ita movet, quia non est adeo nota22. — Alio modo potest dici, quod in Lege nova non tantum est magna comminatio poenae, sed etiam abundans collatio gratiae23, quae quidem parit amorem et confidentiam. In Lege vero veteri comminatio poenae erat, nec erat tanta collatio gratiae; ideo magis eos spiritus timoris agitabat, non propter comminationem maioris supplicii solum, sed propter comminationem supplicii et defectum adiutorii, quod consistit in desiderio boni et gratia Spiritus sancti.

Scholion

I. In hac ultima distinctione Magister primo agit de duobus ultimis Decalogi praeceptis, quibus prohibetur actus interior concupiscentiae, id est, qui est separatus ab actu exteriori; de quibus breviter agit auctor noster in dubiis I. 2. Observat autem S. Thom. (hic a. I.), quod interius peccatum moechiae et furti ideo prae aliis prohibeatur, «quia etiam per se concupiscentia horum sine progressu ad actum habet quandam delectationem», scilicet per solam apprehensionem; quod in peccatis, quorum obiectum est nocumentum aliquod, ut homicidium, non ita contingit (cfr. supra d. 37. a. 2. q. I. ad 7.). — Notatu valde dignum est hic dub. 3, ubi S. Bonav. denuo tractat celeberrimam controversiam de modo, quo Sacramenta causant gratiam, de qua ex professo iam egit IV. Sent. p. I. a. I. q. 4. Dicit enim hic in fine: «Idcirco hic repetii, non propter hoc, ut nova superadderentur, sed ut ostenderetur, quod a communi positione non dissonat, cui pro viribus meis in omnibus praecedentibus libris adhaesi tanquam viae securiori» etc. Revera sapientissime ita de utraque opinione disserit, ut secundam opinionem explicando faciat prope accedere ad primam, quam sequitur S. Thomas.

II. In conclusione huius quaestionis omnes consentiunt. Circa solutionem ad 5. S. Thom. (hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 1; cfr. S. I. II. q. 99. a. 6.) specialiter quaerit: «Utrum Lex vetus promittebat tantum temporalia, vel etiam aeterna»; et resolvit, quod aeterna «non promittebantur nisi sub quibusdam figuris». — Idem tamen in solut. ad I. addit, quod resolutio illa non comprehendat «aliquos viros perfectos, qui ad Legem novam pertinebant», quae postea a Concilio Trident. (Sess. VI. c. 7.) consecrata est. — Ea quae S. Bonav. in istis tribus quaest. de Lege veteri passim dicit, illustrantur his verbis Petri a Tar. (in fine III. Sent.): «Secundum Gulielmum, episcopum Parisiensem, septem erant partes veteris Legis. Prima pars erant testimonia veritatis; secunda, mandata honestatis; tertia, iudicia aequitatis; quarta, exempla sanctitatis; quinta, promissa remunerationis; sexta, comminationes punitionis; septima, caerimoniae divini cultus et honoris. Hanc domum Sapientiae, septem his aedificatam columnis (Prov. 9, 1.), adveniens Christus vacuam, ut dictum est, sua Maiestate implevit, qui est benedictus in saecula». — De ipsa I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. III. q. 29. m. I. a. 3. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 8. — S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. II. q. 107. a. I. ad 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 5. — De hac et 2. seqq. qq. Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2; Biel, hic q. unica.

III. Seq. (2.) quaestio ab aliis, ut a S. Thoma, sub hac formula proponitur: «Utrum Lex vetus iustificaret». — Communi consensu explicatur locutio de Lege occidente hoc sensu, quod dicatur occidens «non quidem effective, sed occasionaliter ex sua imperfectione» (S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 98. a. I. ad 2.); quod bene explicat S. Bonav. (hic in corp. et ad 2. 3.). — In assignandis causis iustificationis auctor noster iam praevenit doctrinam, quae postea a Concilio Trident. (Sess. VI. c. 7.) consecrata est. — De hac (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 28. m. 5. a. I. — S. Thom., hic a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Durand., hic q. 3.

IV. Ultimam quaestionem eodem modo alii Scholastici solvunt; de qua agunt: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. I. a. 1. 2. — Scot., loc. cit. n. 2. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. I. quaestiunc. 3; S. I. II. q. 107. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. ad 3.

English Translation
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Question I. On the difference of the two Laws with respect to the root.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked concerning the difference which is assigned with respect to the root. Now this difference is assigned with respect to the root according to Augustine, namely that the old Law was rooted in fear, and the new Law in love. Hence Augustine2 says that «the difference between the Law and the Gospel is brief: fear and love». And although this difference may be drawn from many places of Scripture, it is taken chiefly from the Epistle to the Romans, chapter eight3, where the Apostle says: You have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption.

But against this it is objected in many ways:

1. First, against the distinction of the roots themselves. For «every fear, as Augustine says4, proceeds from love»: therefore if love is the root of fear, the one must be reduced to the other: therefore they are not distinguished from one another1.

2. Likewise, since there are other affections of the soul, namely joy and grief and hope5; it seems that, if a twofold Law is distinguished with respect to these affections, then by parity of reasoning it ought to be distinguished with respect to the others: therefore it seems that, if it is not distinguished with respect to the others, neither is it with respect to these.

3. Likewise, if these two Laws are distinguished with respect to these two roots; since the law of nature is distinct from these two, it seems that a third root besides these two would be necessary6. Or if the law of nature does not have a root of observance different from the Law of

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Moses, it seems that the Law of Moses does not differ from the Law of the Gospel with respect to this either.

4. Likewise, in Deuteronomy chapter six7 it is said: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart and with your whole mind etc.; and to the Philippians, chapter two, it is said in the new Law: Work out your salvation with fear and trembling. If therefore love is commanded in the old, and fear in the new Law; it seems that on this account the difference of these Laws is not to be regarded.

5. Likewise, in each Law promises and threats are made; but promises draw toward love, whereas threats strike8 fear: therefore fear and love belong to both: therefore they are not distinguished from one another with respect to these.

6. Likewise, graver threats are made in the new Law than in the old; for there a man was punished with a temporal penalty, but here God threatens an eternal penalty9: if therefore a greater threat is inductive of greater fear, it seems that fear ought rather to be appropriated to the new Law than to the old: it seems therefore that with respect to these two roots the difference of the old and the new Law is not rightly assigned, both by the comparison of the roots themselves to one another, and by the comparison to the Laws themselves.

Conclusion.

The old Law is rightly called the law of fear, and the new Law the law of love.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that when we compare these Laws to one another, this can be done in two ways: either according to the common state, or having regard to the state of a special person. If having regard to the state of a special person, then with respect to these two there is no difference. For many in the evangelical Law are led by the spirit of fear, and many also in the old Law were led by the spirit of love. — But if we compare these Laws to one another, having regard to the common state; then, because the Mosaic Law had regard to the state of imperfection, since the Law brought no one to perfection, according to what the Apostle says to the Hebrews10; whereas the Gospel has regard to the state of perfection, according to what is said in Matthew, chapter five: Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect;

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and it belongs to the imperfect to be led by the spirit of fear, but to the perfect by the spirit of love: hence it is that, according to the common state, the difference of these two Laws is to be assigned with respect to these two.

Now a sign of this difference is detected in the manner of bearing this twofold Law: for the old Law was given with great clamor and fear, according to what is said in Exodus, chapter nineteen11, so that the people did not dare to approach; but the Law of the Gospel was given with great kindness and sweetness, since the King of kings himself, sitting in the midst of his disciples, taught them, saying: Blessed are the poor in spirit etc., according to what is written in Matthew, chapter five12. And this diverse manner of bearing the Law intimates to us the diversity of this twofold root in observing, which belonged to these two Laws on account of the diverse quality of the persons and of their state, on account of which it was necessary that they be led by the hand in diverse ways. Hence, just as we see in disciplinary matters, that toward persuadable men one must use the ostensive syllogism, which leads directly to the true; but toward contentious men one must use the syllogism through the impossible, which leads to the manifestly false, so that through it he may lead back to the true13: so, because in the time of the old Law men were of stiff neck and prone to evil, the Lord set forth threats and also fixed heavy penalties, that through this he might strike fear into them, by which they might be called back from evil and stirred to good; but afterward, when the kindness and humanity of our Savior God14 appeared, men began to be persuadable: and therefore the Lord set forth for them great and many promises, that through love and desire of them he might allure them to do good. And therefore the old Law is called the law of fear, the Law of the Gospel is called the law of love, according to the testimony of the Apostle and of blessed Augustine.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that fear is rooted in love; it must be said that love is twofold, namely that by which God is loved insofar as he is good, and that by which he is loved insofar as he is beneficent. From the first love arises filial fear, which fears to offend the father, on account of the fact that it loves him. From the second arises the fear of punishment, by which one fears to lose benefits and to incur the evils of punishment15. The first love and fear belong to the evangelical Law, but the second love and fear belong to the Mosaic Law; and since the first love belongs to the state of perfection, in which love reigns, but the second to the state of imperfection, in which fear reigns: hence it is that, although in both there is love and fear, the Law of the Gospel is said to be observed more out of love than out of fear, but the Law of Moses the contrary.

2. To that which is objected, that there are other affections of the soul; it must be said that, even though there are others, nevertheless these two suffice, for the reason that all the others can be reduced to these two. For every affection is either with respect to good, or with respect to evil; and if with respect to good, it is reduced to love; if with respect to evil, it is reduced to fear. Hence these two affections are said to hold the principate among the others, because they most of all have the character of a motive, the one by inclining to good, the other by drawing back from evil; and therefore the character of a root belongs to them more than to the other affections16. And if you object that then there ought to be but one root, since fear is reduced to love; it must be said that they are called two according to immediate comparison to their motive and to the immediate acts which take their origin from them. Hence where there is the root of fear, it is true that there is the root of love; but for something the immediate root is fear itself, of which love is not so immediately [the root]17.

3. To that which is objected concerning the law of nature, that it ought to have a third root; it must be said that the law of nature partly agreed with the law of grace, partly with the written law: as to liberty it agreed with the law of grace, but as to imperfection and obscurity with the written law: and therefore according to its diverse conditions it must be reduced to these two motives, nor was it necessary that it have a third root18.

4. To that which is objected, that in each Law fear and love are commanded; it must be said that this is true; but nevertheless the old Law principally has19 an eye to fear, the new Law principally to love; and that holds in a law the character of a root, which principally moves in the observing of its commands.

5. To that which is objected, that in both threats and promises were made; it must be said that in the old Law temporal promises were made, according to what is said in Isaiah, chapter one20: If you are willing and will hear me, you shall eat the good things of the land; but in the new Law eternal promises, by which the Lord promises his very self to us as a reward. — Likewise it is to be understood also concerning the threats. And since those threats and promises first belonged to the state of imperfection; therefore they more abundantly generated the affection of fear than of love; but the contrary is the case with the promises and threats of the new Law. Therefore that argument is not valid.

6. To that which is objected, that greater threats are made in the new Law; it can be answered in two ways: first, because a carnal and sensual21 man is more terrified when a penalty is threatened to him in the present than in the future. Just as many thieves fear more to steal on account of the gallows and hanging than on account of infernal punishment. Hence, even though the threat be greater, it nevertheless does not move so much, because it is not so well known22. — In another way it can be said that in the new Law there is not only a great threat of punishment, but also an abundant bestowal of grace23, which indeed brings forth love and confidence. But in the old Law there was a threat of punishment, nor was there so great a bestowal of grace; therefore the spirit of fear agitated them more, not on account of the threat of a greater punishment alone, but on account of the threat of punishment and the lack of help, which consists in the desire of good and the grace of the Holy Spirit.

Scholion

I. In this last distinction the Master first treats of the two last precepts of the Decalogue, by which the interior act of concupiscence is forbidden, that is, the act which is separated from the exterior act; concerning which our author treats briefly in dubia I and 2. Now St. Thomas observes (here, a. I.) that the interior sin of adultery and theft is for this reason forbidden before the others, «because even of itself the concupiscence of these, without progress to the act, has a certain delight», namely by mere apprehension; which in sins whose object is some harm, as homicide, does not so happen (cf. above, d. 37, a. 2, q. I, ad 7.). — Very worthy of note here is dub. 3, where St. Bonaventure again treats the most celebrated controversy concerning the manner in which the Sacraments cause grace, of which he already treated expressly in IV Sent., p. I, a. I, q. 4. For he says here at the end: «I have repeated this here, not in order that new things might be added, but in order that it might be shown that it does not dissonate from the common position, to which to the best of my powers I have adhered in all the preceding books as to the safer way» etc. Indeed he most wisely so discourses concerning each opinion that, in explaining the second opinion, he makes it approach close to the first, which St. Thomas follows.

II. In the conclusion of this question all agree. Concerning the solution to 5, St. Thomas (here, a. 4, little-question 1; cf. S. I-II, q. 99, a. 6.) specially asks: «Whether the old Law promised only temporal things, or also eternal»; and he resolves that eternal things «were not promised except under certain figures». — Yet the same author in the solution to 1 adds that that resolution does not comprehend «certain perfect men who belonged to the new Law», which was afterward consecrated by the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, c. 7.). — The things which St. Bonaventure says throughout in these three questions concerning the old Law are illustrated by these words of Peter of Tarentaise (at the end of III Sent.): «According to William, bishop of Paris, there were seven parts of the old Law. The first part was the testimonies of truth; the second, the commands of honesty; the third, the judgments of equity; the fourth, the examples of sanctity; the fifth, the promises of remuneration; the sixth, the threats of punishment; the seventh, the ceremonies of divine worship and honor. This house of Wisdom, built with these seven columns (Prov. 9, 1.), Christ, coming, filled with his Majesty, finding it empty, as has been said—who is blessed forever». — Concerning the first question itself: Alex. of Hales, Sum. p. III, q. 29, m. I, a. 3. — Scotus, here q. unica, n. 8. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. little-question 2; S. I-II, q. 107, a. I, ad 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 5. — Concerning this and the 2 following questions: Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2; Biel, here q. unica.

III. The following (2nd) question is proposed by others, as by St. Thomas, under this formula: «Whether the old Law justified». — By common consensus the expression concerning the killing Law is explained in this sense, that it is called killing «not indeed effectively, but occasionally on account of its imperfection» (S. Thomas, S. I-II, q. 98, a. I, ad 2.); which St. Bonaventure well explains (here, in the body and ad 2 and 3.). — In assigning the causes of justification our author already anticipates the doctrine which was afterward consecrated by the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, c. 7.). — Concerning this (2nd) question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. q. 28, m. 5, a. I. — St. Thomas, here a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 3, 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. I. — Durandus, here q. 3.

IV. The last question other Scholastics solve in the same manner; concerning which there treat: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. I, a. 1, 2. — Scotus, loc. cit. n. 2 seqq. — St. Thomas, here a. I, little-question 3; S. I-II, q. 107, a. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. ad 3.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Codd. R W Y aa subnectunt et interiora.
    Codices R W Y aa append and the interior [things].
  2. Contra Adimant. c. 17. n. 2: Nam haec est brevissima et apertissima differentia duorum Testamentorum, timor et amor; illud ad veterem, hoc ad novum hominem pertinet etc. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 680, nota 2. — Permulti codd. post brevis omittunt est.
    Against Adimantus, c. 17, n. 2: For this is the briefest and clearest difference of the two Testaments, fear and love; the former pertains to the old man, the latter to the new etc. Cf. vol. II, p. 680, note 2. — Very many codices omit est after brevis.
  3. Vers. 15.
    Verse 15.
  4. Libr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2. Verba vide supra pag. 338, nota 3. — In fine arg. pro ad invicem edd. ab invicem.
    Book XIV of the City of God, c. 7, n. 2. See the words above, p. 338, note 3. — At the end of the argument, for ad invicem (to one another) the editions read ab invicem (from one another).
  5. Cfr. supra pag. 555, nota 7, et pag. 556, nota 5.
    Cf. above, p. 555, note 7, and p. 556, note 5.
  6. Cod. U sit.
    Codex U reads sit (subjunctive).
  7. Vers. 5. — Seq. textus Scripturae est Phil. 2, 12, ubi pro salutem vestram Vulgata vestram salutem.
    Verse 5. — The following text of Scripture is Phil. 2, 12, where for salutem vestram the Vulgate reads vestram salutem.
  8. Edd. indicunt, nonnulli codd. perperam incurrunt. Paulo inferius pro conveniunt codd. K O communis.
    The editions read indicunt (announce), some codices wrongly incurrunt (incur). A little below, for conveniunt codices K O read communis.
  9. Cfr. Matth. 25, 41; Hebr. 10, 29. — In fine arg. post aeternam cod. A addit etiam.
    Cf. Matthew 25, 41; Hebrews 10, 29. — At the end of the argument, after aeternam codex A adds etiam.
  10. Cap. 7, 19: Nihil enim ad perfectum etc. — Seq. textus Scripturae est Matth. 5, 48: Estote ergo vos perfecti, sicut et Pater etc. — De seq. proposit. cfr. supra litt. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. I sqq., et ibid. Comment. p. II. per totum.
    Chapter 7, 19: For [the Law brought] nothing to perfection etc. — The following text of Scripture is Matth. 5, 48: Be therefore perfect, as also your Father etc. — Concerning the following proposition, cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XXXIV, c. I sqq., and there in the Commentary, p. II, throughout.
  11. Vers. 16. seqq., codd. allegant c. 20.
    Verse 16 seqq.; the codices cite c. 20.
  12. Vers. 3. — Paulo ante respicitur I. Tim. 6, 15: Rex regum et dominus dominantium. — Superius pro et dulcedine cod. r et dilectione.
    Verse 3. — A little before, reference is made to 1 Tim. 6, 15: King of kings and lord of lords. — Above, for et dulcedine codex r reads et dilectione (and love).
  13. Cfr. Aristot., II. Prior. c. 14; I. Elench. c. 10. (c. 11.), et II. c. 2. (c. 17.). — In seq. proposit. respicitur Act. 7, 51: Dura cervice... vos semper Spiritui S. resistitis, sicut patres vestri etc. — Aliquanto superius pro persuadibiles Vat. persuasibiles; idem recurrit aliquanto infra.
    Cf. Aristotle, Prior [Analytics] II, c. 14; Elenchi I, c. 10 (c. 11), and II, c. 2 (c. 17). — In the following proposition reference is made to Acts 7, 51: Stiff-necked... you always resist the Holy Spirit, as your fathers etc. — Somewhat above, for persuadibiles the Vatican reads persuasibiles; the same recurs somewhat below.
  14. Tit. 3, 4: Cum autem benignitas et humanitas apparuit Salvatoris nostri Dei etc. — Ioan. 6, 45: Est scriptum in Prophetis: Et erunt omnes docibiles Dei.
    Titus 3, 4: But when the kindness and humanity of our Savior God appeared etc. — John 6, 45: It is written in the Prophets: And they shall all be teachable by God.
  15. Cfr. supra d. 34. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. — Superius pro qui timet cod. A cum timet. Paulo inferius ex cod. A (cod. aa a secunda manu) supplevimus primus amor competit statui perfectionis, in quo regnat amor; alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 legunt falso et quoniam primus amor [Vat. recte secundus amor] convenit statui imperfectionis etc.
    Cf. above, d. 34, p. II, a. 2, q. 3. — Above, for qui timet codex A reads cum timet. A little below, from codex A (codex aa by a second hand) we have supplied the first love belongs to the state of perfection, in which love reigns; the other codices and editions 1, 2 read wrongly and since the first love [Vat. rightly the second love] belongs to the state of imperfection etc.
  16. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 79, 17. n. 13: Itaque, fratres mei, ad omne recte factum amor et timor ducit; ad omne peccatum amor et timor ducit. Ut facias bene, amas Deum et times Deum; ut autem facias male, amas mundum et times mundum etc.
    Augustine, Enarrat. in Ps. 79, 17, n. 13: And so, my brethren, love and fear lead to every right deed; love and fear lead to every sin. That you may do well, you love God and fear God; but that you may do ill, you love the world and fear the world etc.
  17. Vide supra d. 26. a. 2. q. I. 3. et 4.
    See above, d. 26, a. 2, q. I, 3 and 4.
  18. Cfr. d. 37. a. I. q. 3. — Pro nec oportuit codd. A N nec oportet, et pro habeat codd. F U habuerit.
    Cf. d. 37, a. I, q. 3. — For nec oportuit codices A N read nec oportet, and for habeat codices F U read habuerit.
  19. Edd. sed cum Lex vetus principaliter habeat.
    The editions read sed cum Lex vetus principaliter habeat (but since the old Law principally has).
  20. Vers. 19. — Paulo ante verbo promissiones cod. M praemittit comminationes et. Inferius pro quibus edd. in qua. Subinde cod. A proprie pro primae.
    Verse 19. — A little before, codex M prefixes comminationes et (threats and) to the word promissiones. Below, for quibus the editions read in qua. Thereupon codex A reads proprie for primae.
  21. Codd. N Z sensualis, quod etiam, attenta abbreviatione, in plurimis aliis codd. legi potest, edd. minus bene sensibilis.
    Codices N Z read sensualis, which also, given the abbreviation, can be read in very many other codices; the editions less well read sensibilis.
  22. Cfr. supra d. 34. p. II. a. I. q. I. ad 5.
    Cf. above, d. 34, p. II, a. I, q. I, ad 5.
  23. Rom. 5, 20: Lex autem subintravit, ut abundaret delictum. Ubi autem abundavit delictum, superabundavit gratia etc. — Pro magna comminatio poenae edd. comminatio poenae magnae. Finem solut. cod. D exhibet sic: et gratia et Spiritus S. collatione.
    Rom. 5, 20: But the Law entered in, that sin might abound. But where sin abounded, grace did more abound etc. — For magna comminatio poenae the editions read comminatio poenae magnae. Codex D gives the end of the solution thus: and by the bestowal of grace and of the Holy Spirit.
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