Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 29, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus

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# Dubia circa litteram Magistri

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Peccat qui praepostere agit. Videtur enim esse falsum. Ponatur enim, quod aliquis exponat se morti pro salute alterius melioris se, et sustineat penuriam, ut alii meliori se provideat ad sufficientiam; praemittit sibi alium, et tamen non videtur contra caritatem facere, immo valde caritative procedere. — Item, esto quod faciam patri quidquid debeo, non obligor ad faciendum ei amplius: ergo si plus facio alii quam sibi, non praeiudico ei nec ordini caritatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quaedam est praeposteratio huius ordinis ex debita causa, quaedam praeter causam, quaedam contra debitam causam. Tunc est praeposteratio ex debita causa, quando quis bonum commune praeponit bono proprio in temporalibus; et haec quidem praeposteratio facit ad meriti cumulum, et licet videatur praeposteratio, multo magis est perfectior ordinatio^p652-4. — Alia est praeposteratio praeter causam debitam, uti si ex sola liberalitate voluntatis meae magis me exhibeam alicui extraneo quam domestico et consanguineo, et etiam patri meo, considerando in ipso aliquam strenuitatem^p652-5 magis quam Dei voluntatem, aut meriti dignitatem; et haec praeposteratio aufert meritum, quia in hoc non meretur. — Tertia vero est praeposteratio contra debitam causam, utpote si pater meus magis indigeat, et ego possim ei subvenire, et ipso neglecto, subveniam extraneo; et ista inducit peccatum, et de hac intelligitur auctoritas Magistri in littera^p652-6. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Ambrosius in littera: Multorum caritas inordinata est. Contra: caritas non potest esse informis, sed semper formata^p652-7; et caritas formata semper est ordinata: ergo implicantur opposita, cum dicitur caritas inordinata. — Item, videtur male dicere in hoc quod subdit: quod in primo est ponunt tertium, vel quartum. Si enim primo diligendus est Deus, et qui praeponunt aliquid Deo non habent caritatem; videtur, quod male dicat, quod aliqui habent caritatem inordinatam, ex eo quod ponunt Deum tertio, vel quarto loco.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen caritatis accipitur large et proprie: large ad quamcumque dilectionem, quae multum habet amatum carum; et ista potest esse ordinata, vel inordinata^p652-8; ipse autem obiicit de caritate proprie sumta.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de illis sex gradibus, quos ponit Magister ibi: Ante omnia Deum, deinde nos ipsos, post parentes, deinde filios, deinde domesticos, postmodum inimicos diligamus. Videtur enim in hac distinctione Magister, immo Ambrosius^p652-9, esse superfluus, primo, quia Augustinus non enumerat nisi quatuor gradus, hic autem enumerat sex: ergo videtur, si Augustinus non est diminutus, quod iste sit superfluus. Si tu dicas, quod sub uno illorum membrorum, videlicet sub dilectione proximi, continentur quatuor de illis membris; ostenditur tunc, quod sit

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diminutus, quia dilectio corporis nostri ibi non tangitur. — Item, sicut gradus sunt in dilectione proximorum, sic videtur esse in dilectione Dei: quia multum debemus diligere Deum creatorem, et amplius recreatorem, et maxime glorificatorem: ergo insufficienter assignat gradus dilectionis. — Item, multae aliae sunt conditiones, in quibus membra Christi invicem coniunguntur praeter praedictas, videlicet relatio uxoris ad virum, discipuli ad magistrum, domini ad servum, subditi ad praelatum, quas omnes omittit Ambrosius: ergo videtur insufficienter diligendorum ordinem assignare.

Quaeritur ergo de numero et sufficientia ipsorum graduum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dictum fuit^p653-1, ordo ab Augustino assignatus respicit ipsam caritatem secundum se; ideo attenditur secundum principales differentias boni, quae sunt bonum supra nos et intra nos et iuxta nos et infra nos. Ordo autem Ambrosii respicit ipsam caritatem, prout est in natura, quam dirigit et regit; et hic non tantum attenditur penes differentias boni, sed etiam penes rationem proprii et alieni, propinqui et remoti: et hic ordo multiplicatur in sex differentias.

Nam caritas aut respicit bonum simpliciter, quod est summum Bonum, et sic est primus gradus; aut respicit bonum proprium, et sic est gradus secundus^p653-2; aut respicit bonum alienum ut sibi coniunctum, et sic quadruplex est gradus, secundum quod quadruplex est differentia modi coniungendi. Aut enim est coniunctio in naturae conformitate, et sic est ultimus gradus, qui attenditur in dilectione inimicorum; aut in naturae conformitate et conversationis familiaritate, et sic est penultimus^p653-3, qui attenditur in dilectione domesticorum; aut in his et praeter haec in sanguinis propinquitate, et haec potest esse dupliciter: aut in ascendendo, et sic est filii ad patrem; aut in descendendo, et sic est patris ad filium, et penes haec accipiuntur duo gradus intermedii. — Et sic patet numerus et sufficientia illorum sex graduum, patet etiam dissolutio obiectorum.

Ad illud enim quod obiicitur de Augustino, iam patet responsio, quia aliter assignatur ordo diligendorum ab Augustino, aliter ab Ambrosio.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de dilectione corporis nostri, dicendum, quod haec reducitur ad dilectionem sui.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod gradus sunt in dilectione Dei; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia unus est Deus dilectus, et illae non sunt nisi rationes moventes ad Deum diligendum et inducentes nos secundum plus et minus, quae tamen non constituunt ex parte dilecti diversitatem graduum^p653-4.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de aliis conditionibus, secundum quas attenditur vinculum et coniunctio; dicendum, quod omnes possunt reduci ad istas. Nam uxor, cum sit caro viri^p653-5, et e converso, reducitur ad dilectionem sui; pater vero spiritualis reducitur ad dilectionem patris naturalis; ceteri consanguinei ad dilectionem filii; dominus et servus, magister et discipulus ad domesticos referuntur. Et sic patet, quod nihil superfluum, nihil etiam diminutum in praedictis gradibus continetur^p653-6.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de solutione illius quaestionis, quam Magister proponit ibi: Solet etiam quaeri: si parentes nostri mali sunt etc. Rationes enim videntur esse ad utramque partem. Ratione enim propinquitatis videtur, quod mali parentes praeferendi sint bonis extraneis, cum parentes ponantur in tertio gradu^p653-7; ratione vero bonitatis videtur contrarium. Et si tu respondeas, quod non est contrarietas, quia diversis respectibus possunt invicem sibi praeponi et habent se sicut excedentia et excessa; hoc non solvit, quia adhuc restat quaestio, quod illorum magis excellit, utrum bonitas, vel propinquitas. Et quod bonitas, videtur, cum caritas per se et primo respiciat bonitatem. Quod iterum propinquitas, videtur, quia penes illam attenditur et assignatur ordo caritatis^p653-8.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est amor complacentiae et amor beneficentiae. Amore complacentiae amat quis aliquem, quando eius facta acceptat et ipsum approbat et in bonitate eius complacet sibi. Amore vero beneficentiae amat quis aliquem, quando vult ei benefacere et diligit eum, non tantum quia^p653-9 sit bonus, sed ut sit bonus. Quantum ad primum amorem ponderat bonitas, quantum ad secundum ponderat propinquitas. Unde esto, quod pater meus sit malus, et alius extraneus sit bonus; magis debeo velle et desiderare et procurare, quod pater meus sit bonus et in caritate permaneat quam alius extraneus, licet ipsum et facta eius, quamdiu est in statu peccati, non debeam approbare^p653-10. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam responsio ad obiecta.

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Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Perfecta caritas haec est, ut quis paratus sit pro fratribus mori. Obiicitur enim contra hoc: quia, si haec est perfecta caritas, ut sit paratus pro fratribus mori; cum homo^p654-1 in imperfecta caritate consistens non sit paratus mori pro Deo, videtur, quod perfectus amplius diligat proximum, quam imperfectus Deum. Sed in contrarium huius est: quia caritas quantumcumque parva diligit Deum propter se et super omnia; hoc autem perfectus nunquam facit proximo.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum caritas sit nobilissimum opus Dei, et Dei perfecta sint opera^p654-2; videtur, quod omnis caritas sit perfecta: male ergo hic distinguitur per perfectum et imperfectum.

Iuxta hoc etiam posset quaeri, quomodo caritas imperfecta habeat perfici et augeri; sed hoc fuit determinatum in primo libro, distinctione decima septima, et secundo, distinctione vigesima septima^p654-3.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod signum perfectae caritatis et effectus est promptitudo moriendi pro fratre; ista tamen promptitudo non inest caritati solummodo ex dilectione fratris, sed ex dilectione fratris relata ad dilectionem Dei, quem perfectus propter se et super omnia diligit et ob cuius amorem etiam pro ipso fratre vult mori. Ideo, quamvis hoc non reperiatur in viro imperfecto respectu Dei, non tamen sequitur, quod minus diligat Deum, quam perfectus proximum, sed quod minor est dilectio unius respectu Dei quam alterius^p654-4.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas semper est perfecta; dicendum, quod perfectum dicitur dupliciter: vel in se, vel in ordine^p654-5. Loquendo de perfectione in se, caritas in sui principio est imperfecta, sed per crementum perficitur. Loquendo autem de perfectione ordinis, qua quidem perfectione omnia opera Dei dicuntur esse perfecta; sic caritas, in quocumque statu sit, perfectionem habet, quia ordinata est in suum finem et potest^p654-6 elicere debitam operationem. — Aliter distinguitur perfectio sufficientiae et excellentiae, sive perfectio secundum naturam et secundum tempus, sicut in secundo libro, distinctione quarta^p654-7 est explanatum.

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod caritas, cum ad perfectionem venerit, dicit: Cupio dissolvi et esse cum Christo. Contra hoc est, quia beatus Martinus^p654-8, qui valde perfectam habebat caritatem, in morte dicebat: « Domine, si adhuc populo tuo sum necessarius, non recuso laborem ». — Item, hoc ipsum videtur per rationem, quia maioris perfectionis signum est appetere laborare et affligi pro aliquo, quam appetere quiescere cum eo: ergo videtur, quod ad perfectam caritatem non pertineat dicere: Cupio dissolvi et esse cum Christo, sed magis: cupio laborare pro Christo^p654-9.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod desiderium quiescendi cum Christo potest venire ex duplici causa: vel propter taedium malorum praesentium, vel propter contemptum terrenorum et abundantem praegustationem caelestium. Primo modo est signum imperfectionis, non perfectionis, quia sic recusat laborare; secundo modo signum est perfectionis, quia non recusat laborare, sed spiritus tanto amoris Christi desiderio stringitur, quod vix potest inter se et Deum interpositionem corporalis parietis sustinere; unde hoc signum est, quod amat Deum perfecte. — Alia vero, quae dicuntur in littera, satis sunt plana, et quaedam ex eis^p654-10 satis declarabuntur in distinctione proxima.

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English Translation

# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

Dub. I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning that which he says: He sins who acts in reverse order. For it seems to be false. For suppose that someone exposes himself to death for the salvation of another better than himself, and endures want, in order that he may provide for another better than himself unto sufficiency; he puts another before himself, and yet he does not seem to act against charity, nay rather to proceed very charitably. — Likewise, granted that I do for my father whatever I owe, I am not obliged to do more for him: therefore if I do more for another than for him, I neither do him an injury nor [an injury to] the order of charity.

I respond: It must be said that there is a certain reversal of this order from a due cause, a certain [reversal] beside a cause, a certain [reversal] against a due cause. There is a reversal from a due cause when one prefers the common good to his own good in temporal things; and this reversal indeed makes for the heaping-up of merit, and although it may seem a reversal, it is much more a more perfect ordering^p652-4. — Another is a reversal beside the due cause, as if from the mere liberality of my own will I show myself more to some stranger than to one of the household and a blood-relation, and even to my father, considering in him some strenuousness^p652-5 rather than the will of God, or the dignity of merit; and this reversal takes away merit, because in this he does not merit. — But the third is a reversal against a due cause, namely if my father be more in need, and I am able to come to his aid, and, neglecting him, I come to the aid of a stranger; and this brings about sin, and of this is understood the authority of the Master in the littera^p652-6. — And by this the response to the objections is evident.

Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which Ambrose says in the littera: The charity of many is disordered. On the contrary: charity cannot be unformed, but is always formed^p652-7; and formed charity is always ordered: therefore opposites are implied when charity is called disordered. — Likewise, he seems to speak badly in that which he subjoins: that in the first place they put the third, or the fourth. For if God is first to be loved, and those who put anything before God do not have charity; it seems that he speaks badly [in saying] that some have disordered charity from the fact that they put God in the third, or fourth place.

I respond: It must be said that the name of charity is taken broadly and properly: broadly for any love whatsoever which holds a beloved [object] greatly dear; and this can be ordered, or disordered^p652-8; but he objects concerning charity taken properly.

Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning those six grades, which the Master sets down there: Before all things let us love God, then ourselves, after [that] our parents, then our children, then those of the household, lastly our enemies. For in this distinction the Master, nay rather Ambrose^p652-9, seems to be superfluous, first, because Augustine enumerates only four grades, but here he enumerates six: therefore it seems, if Augustine is not deficient, that this one is superfluous. If you say that under one of those members, namely under the love of neighbor, four of those members are contained; it is shown then that it is

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deficient, because the love of our own body is not touched upon there. — Likewise, as there are grades in the love of neighbors, so it seems there are in the love of God: because we ought to love God the creator much, and the recreator more, and the glorifier most: therefore he insufficiently assigns the grades of love. — Likewise, there are many other conditions in which the members of Christ are joined to one another besides the aforesaid, namely the relation of wife to husband, of disciple to master, of lord to servant, of subject to prelate, all of which Ambrose omits: therefore he seems to assign the order of those-to-be-loved insufficiently.

It is asked therefore concerning the number and sufficiency of these grades.

I respond: It must be said that, as was said^p653-1, the order assigned by Augustine regards charity itself in itself; therefore it is attended to according to the principal differences of good, which are the good above us and within us and beside us and below us. But the order of Ambrose regards charity itself, as it is in nature, which it directs and rules; and here it is attended to not only in respect to the differences of good, but also in respect to the account of one's own and another's, of near and far: and here the order is multiplied into six differences.

For charity either regards good simply, which is the highest Good, and thus it is the first grade; or it regards one's own good, and thus it is the second^p653-2 grade; or it regards another's good as joined to oneself, and thus the grade is fourfold, according as the difference of the mode of joining is fourfold. For either there is a joining in the conformity of nature, and thus it is the last grade, which is attended to in the love of enemies; or in the conformity of nature and the familiarity of common life, and thus it is the next-to-last^p653-3, which is attended to in the love of those of the household; or in these and beyond these in the nearness of blood, and this can be in two ways: either in ascending, and thus it is [the love] of son toward father; or in descending, and thus it is [the love] of father toward son, and in respect to these two intermediate grades are taken. — And thus the number and sufficiency of those six grades is evident, the dissolution of the objections is also evident.

For to that which is objected concerning Augustine, the response is already evident, because the order of those-to-be-loved is assigned in one way by Augustine, in another by Ambrose.

To that which is objected concerning the love of our own body, it must be said that this is reduced to the love of oneself.

But to that which is objected, that there are grades in the love of God; it must be said that it is false, because there is one God [who is] loved, and those [grades] are nothing but accounts moving toward the loving of God and leading us according to more and less, which nevertheless do not constitute on the part of the [object] loved a diversity of grades^p653-4.

To that which is objected concerning the other conditions according to which the bond and conjunction is attended to; it must be said that all can be reduced to these. For the wife, since she is the flesh of the husband^p653-5, and conversely, is reduced to the love of oneself; but the spiritual father is reduced to the love of the natural father; the other blood-relations to the love of the son; lord and servant, master and disciple are referred to those of the household. And thus it is evident that nothing superfluous, nothing also deficient, is contained in the aforesaid grades^p653-6.

Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning the solution of that question which the Master proposes there: It is also wont to be asked: if our parents are evil etc. For there seem to be reasons on either side. For by reason of nearness it seems that evil parents are to be preferred to good strangers, since parents are placed in the third grade^p653-7; but by reason of goodness the contrary seems [the case]. And if you should respond that there is no contrariety, because by diverse respects they can be preferred to one another and stand as exceeding and exceeded; this does not solve [it], because the question still remains, which of them more excels, whether goodness, or nearness. And that [it is] goodness, seems [the case], since charity through itself and first regards goodness. That again [it is] nearness, seems [the case], because in respect to it the order of charity is attended to and assigned^p653-8.

I respond: It must be said that there is a love of complacency and a love of beneficence. By the love of complacency one loves someone when he accepts his deeds and approves him and takes complacency in his goodness. But by the love of beneficence one loves someone when he wishes to do him good and loves him, not only because^p653-9 he is good, but that he may be good. As regards the first love, goodness weighs; as regards the second, nearness weighs. Whence granted that my father be evil, and some other stranger be good; I ought more to will and desire and procure that my father be good and remain in charity than [that] some other stranger [should], although I ought not to approve him and his deeds so long as he is in the state of sin^p653-10. — And by this the response to the proposed question is evident, the response to the objections is also evident.

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Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: This is perfect charity, that one be ready to die for the brethren. For it is objected against this: that, if this is perfect charity, that one be ready to die for the brethren; since a man^p654-1 established in imperfect charity is not ready to die for God, it seems that the perfect [man] loves his neighbor more than the imperfect [man loves] God. But against this is: that charity, however small, loves God for His own sake and above all things; but this the perfect [man] never does toward his neighbor.

Alongside this it is asked: since charity is the noblest work of God, and the works of God are perfect^p654-2; it seems that all charity is perfect: badly therefore is it here distinguished by perfect and imperfect.

Alongside this also it could be asked how imperfect charity has [the capacity] to be perfected and increased; but this was determined in the first book, distinction seventeen, and in the second, distinction twenty-seven^p654-3.

I respond: It must be said that the sign of perfect charity and [its] effect is the readiness of dying for a brother; yet this readiness is not in charity from the love of a brother alone, but from the love of a brother referred to the love of God, whom the perfect [man] loves for His own sake and above all things and for love of whom he wishes to die even for the brother himself. Therefore, although this is not found in an imperfect man in respect to God, it nevertheless does not follow that he loves God less than the perfect [man] loves his neighbor, but that the love of the one is less in respect to God than [the love] of the other^p654-4.

To that which is objected, that charity is always perfect; it must be said that perfect is said in two ways: either in itself, or in order^p654-5. Speaking of perfection in itself, charity in its beginning is imperfect, but is perfected by increase. But speaking of the perfection of order, by which perfection indeed all the works of God are said to be perfect; thus charity, in whatever state it be, has perfection, because it is ordered to its end and can^p654-6 elicit the due operation. — Otherwise perfection is distinguished into [that] of sufficiency and [that] of excellence, or perfection according to nature and according to time, as was explained in the second book, distinction four^p654-7.

Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that charity, when it shall have come to perfection, says: I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ. Against this is, that blessed Martin^p654-8, who had very perfect charity, said at death: « Lord, if I am still necessary to your people, I do not refuse the labor ». — Likewise, this same thing seems [evident] by reason, because it is a sign of greater perfection to desire to labor and be afflicted for someone than to desire to rest with him: therefore it seems that it does not pertain to perfect charity to say: I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, but rather: I desire to labor for Christ^p654-9.

I respond: It must be said that the desire of resting with Christ can come from a twofold cause: either on account of weariness of present evils, or on account of contempt of earthly things and an abundant foretaste of heavenly things. In the first way it is a sign of imperfection, not of perfection, because thus he refuses to labor; in the second way it is a sign of perfection, because he does not refuse to labor, but the spirit is bound by so great a longing of the love of Christ that it can scarcely endure the interposition of the bodily wall between itself and God; whence this is a sign that he loves God perfectly. — But the other things which are said in the littera are plain enough, and certain of them^p654-10 will be sufficiently explained in the next distinction.

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Apparatus Criticus

Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2: Nam si etiam et uni homini et civitati bonum idem sit, bonum tamen civitatis et acquirere et conservare maius quid ac divinius videtur. Ac contentus quidem esse etiam unusquisque potest, si uni soli; pulcrius tamen ac divinius, si genti ac civitatibus bonum efficiatur. — Pro multo magis multi codd. multo maior, edd. tamen multo maior, cod. R multo maior et perfectior ordinatur.
Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 2: For even if the same good be both for one man and for a city, yet to acquire and conserve the good of a city seems something greater and more divine. And indeed each individual can also be content if [it be done] for one alone; yet it is more beautiful and more divine if the good be brought about for a nation and for cities. — For multo magis many codices [read] multo maior, but the editions [read] multo maior, codex R multo maior et perfectior ordinatur.
Cod. U supereminentem proprietatem. Paulo inferius pro non meretur edd. non mereor.
Codex U [reads] supereminentem proprietatem. A little below, for non meretur the editions [read] non mereor.
Hic c. 1. — Paulo superius pro et ego possim ei subvenire edd. et ego possum ei magis subvenire. — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 3, et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
Here c. 1. — A little above, for et ego possim ei subvenire the editions [read] et ego possum ei magis subvenire. — Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 3, and Peter of Tarentaise, here near the littera.
Supple: est. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. nec non q. 1. huius dist. — Post sed cod. K repetit caritas.
Supply: est [is]. Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, and also q. 1 of this distinction. — After sed codex K repeats caritas.
Cfr. supra pag. 616, nota 6. — Vide de hoc dubio S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
Cf. above, page 616, note 6. — See on this doubt St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here near the littera.
Cui Magister haec verba tribuit. — De sententia Augustini, prolata l. de Doctr. christ. c. 23. n. 22, vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et dist. praeced. lit. Magistri, c. 1, nec non Comment. q. 6, ubi etiam in solut. ad 4. obiectio occurrit, quae hic adtexitur.
To whom the Master attributes these words. — Concerning the opinion of Augustine, set forth in the book On Christian Doctrine, c. 23, n. 22, see here the littera of the Master, c. 1, and the littera of the Master of the preceding distinction, c. 1, and also the Commentary, q. 6, where also in the solution to the fourth [objection] occurs the objection which is here woven in.
Quaest. 5. seq. et d. 28. q. 6.
Question 5 ff. and d. 28, q. 6.
Vat. et sic sumus nos. Post pauca cod. A voci coniunctio bene praefigit ibi.
The Vatican [edition reads] et sic sumus nos. After a little, codex A rightly prefixes ibi to the word coniunctio.
Ibid. hic addunt modus et paulo inferius pro praeter haec substituunt propter haec.
In the same place they here add modus and a little below substitute propter haec for praeter haec.
Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 3. seq. et q. 5. in corp.
Cf. above, q. 1, to the 3rd [objection] ff., and q. 5 in the body.
Vide Gen. 2, 24; Matth. 19, 5. seq.; I. Cor. 6, 16. — Proxime ante pro cum sit cod. K est sicut. Non ita multo post edd. omittunt et servus.
See Genesis 2:24; Matthew 19:5 f.; 1 Corinthians 6:16. — Just before, for cum sit codex K [reads] est sicut. Not much after, the editions omit et servus.
Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 2.
Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 2.
Vide dub. praeced.
See the preceding doubt.
Ut ostensum est in dub. praeced. — Paulo superius pro excellit codd. A V excellat.
As was shown in the preceding doubt. — A little above, for excellit codices A V [read] excellat.
Respiciuntur verba Augustini supra d. 28. q. 2. fundam. a. allata. — Cod. V sed etiam ut sit bonus. Mox cod. bb (K a secunda manu) bis praeponderat pro ponderat.
The words of Augustine adduced above, d. 28, q. 2, fundament a, are referred to. — Codex V [reads] sed etiam ut sit bonus. Soon codex bb (K by a second hand) [reads] twice praeponderat for ponderat.
Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 1.
Cf. above, q. 1, to the 1st [objection].
Pro homo cod. A ergo. Aliquanto inferius pro quia caritas codd. G K exhibent quod caritas, et subinde post quantumcumque cod. K subdit est. Deinde codd. B M voci proximo praemittunt pro.
For homo codex A [reads] ergo. Somewhat below, for quia caritas codices G K exhibit quod caritas, and thereupon after quantumcumque codex K adds est. Then codices B M prefix pro to the word proximo.
Deut. 32, 4. — Post pauca pro distinguitur Vat. distinguit.
Deuteronomy 32:4. — After a little, for distinguitur the Vatican [edition reads] distinguit.
Art. 2. q. 2. (Codd. et edd. allegant d. 26.), et I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. seq.
Article 2, q. 2 (the codices and editions cite d. 26), and I Sentences, d. 17, p. II, q. 1 f.
Cfr. d. 30. q. 2.
Cf. d. 30, q. 2.
Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.).
See Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 21 (IV, c. 16).
Cod. K quia cum ordinata est in suum finem, potest elicere etc.
Codex K [reads] quia cum ordinata est in suum finem, potest elicere etc.
Lit. Magistri, in fine, et Comment. dub. 3. (ubi exponitur, quid differat inter perfectionem secundum naturam et perfectionem secundum tempus). Cfr. ibid. d. 31. (ubi quid perfectum sit secundum sufficientiam, quid secundum superabundantiam, docetur). Edd. allegant d. 3. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
The littera of the Master, at the end, and the Commentary, doubt 3 (where it is set forth what differs between perfection according to nature and perfection according to time). Cf. the same place, d. 31 (where it is taught what is perfect according to sufficiency, what according to superabundance). The editions cite d. 3. — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here near the littera.
Vide Antiph. 2. ad Laudes in festo S. Martini (11. Nov.). Cfr. etiam Alcuin., Serm. de translat. S. Martini, n. 14, et Bernard., Serm. in festo S. Martini, n. 17, ubi in notula sermoni apposita allegatur Sulpit., Epist. 3. ad Bassul.
See the second Antiphon at Lauds on the feast of St. Martin (November 11). Cf. also Alcuin, Sermon on the translation of St. Martin, n. 14, and Bernard, Sermon on the feast of St. Martin, n. 17, where in a little note appended to the sermon there is cited Sulpicius, Epistle 3 to Bassula.
Cod. Z pro proximo. Paulo superius cod. K omittit cum Christo.
Codex Z [reads] pro proximo. A little above, codex K omits cum Christo.
Exempli gratia, de dilectione inimicorum et de perfectione caritatis. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
For example, concerning the love of enemies and concerning the perfection of charity. — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here near the littera.

← Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 6