Dist. 21, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 21
Quaestio III. Utrum sciens aliquid per confessionem et per aliam viam teneatur celare.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum sciens aliquid per confessionem et per aliam viam teneatur celare. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Primo per quandam decretalem Innocentii, de Poenitentiis et remissionibus1: « Qui peccatum sibi in poenitentia detectum praesumserit revelare, non solum a sacerdotali officio deponendum decernimus, verum etiam ad agendum poenitentiam in arctum monasterium detrudendum »: ergo si aliquis novit aliquod peccatum per confessionem, qualitercumque illud noverit aliter, non videtur, quod possit illud idem propter confessionem detegere.
2. Item, confessionis sigillum, ut supra2 probatum est, nullo pacto est infringendum; sed tunc infringitur, quando confessio revelatur; impossibile autem est hoc peccatum auditum in confessione revelare3, quin reveletur confessio; sed confessio nullo modo est revelanda: ergo nec illud peccatum. Et potest fieri talis syllogismus: nulla confessio est revelanda; hoc peccatum est confessio, vel pars confessionis, quod dupliciter novit: ergo etc.
3. Item, talis, qui scit per confessionem et per aliam viam, novit ut homo et ut Deus; sed in quantum novit ut Deus, tenetur tacere; in quantum ut homo, potest dicere ei qui potest prodesse: ergo istae duae oppositas habent conditiones. Quandocumque autem opposita sunt circa idem, necesse est, quod alterum vel utrumque cadat a sui proprietate4: si ergo maius dominatur supra minus et dominando vincit, et cognitio, qua cognoscit per modum Dei, simpliciter maior est; ergo videtur, quod illam tenetur sequi et ita celare.
4. Item, sigillum confessionis ita arcte institutum est propter scandalum, et ne mali sacerdotes malignari possint, et fideles per hoc a confessione retrahi; sed si ita esset, quod posset aliquis revelare quod per aliam viam novit, quilibet sub hoc praetextu posset omnia vel pro magna parte reve-
lare, dicens, se aliter nosse, et sic nullus malus posset convinci nec in malitia deprehendi.
5. Item, sigillum confessionis ita annexum est confessioni, ut, quicumque confessiones audit, hoc ipso, quod audit, se obliget ad secreti habitionem; sed si tu scires aliquid et postmodum promitteres referenti illud, quod nunquam illud diceres, tenereris omnino celare: tunc ergo videtur similiter, quod tenetur celare illud quod aliter quam per confessionem noverat.
Contra hoc arguitur sic, et suppono hic quinque, quae sunt per se nota. Prima suppositio est, quod nihil statuendum est neque servandum, in quo fiat praeiudicium veritati5. — Secunda est, quod « fraus et dolus nemini debet patrocinari ». — Tertia est haec, quod nullus pro aliquo tenetur mentiri. — Quarta est haec, quod nullus scienter reddit se impotentem ad id, ad quod tenetur, sine peccato mortali. — Quinta est haec, quod nihil debet statui nec servari, unde innocens possit rationabiliter accusari et condemnari, et alii de ipso scandalizari.
1. Ex prima arguo sic. Nihil servandum est, in quo fiat praeiudicium veritati; sed aliquis sacerdos potest in causa6 testificari, utpote qui cum alio vidit furem vel aliquod simile, cuius testificatione subtracta, latebit veritas, et regnabit falsitas: si ergo talis confessionem de culpa audiat et hoc ipso testificari non velit, fit praeiudicium veritati: ergo si hoc non debet fieri, non obligatur ad retinendum.
2. Ex secunda sic. « Fraus et dolus nemini debet patrocinari »; sed aliquis peccator sciens, se esse reum et accusatione dignum, hoc solo7 confitetur, ut os sacerdotis claudat: si ergo claudit ac per hoc remanet impunitus, fraus et dolus sibi patrocinatur: ergo si hoc est inconveniens, patet etc.
3. Ex tertia sic. Nullus pro aliquo tenetur mentiri; sed iste qui novit aliter quam per confessionem, non potest dicere: nescio, quin mentiatur, quia novit ut homo et ut Deus: si ergo iuravit veritatem dicere, tenetur quod novit ut homo revelare, cum ad hoc posset iuramentum ipsum arctare.
4. Ex quarta sic. Esto quod aliquis teneatur accusare proximum apud praelatum tum ex mandato divino, tum ex mandato praelati sui; iste vidit eum peccantem et audivit confitentem: si ergo tenebatur ex visu dicere et ex audito confessionis reddidit se impotentem, ergo quando audivit eius confessionem, peccavit mortaliter; quod nullo modo videtur probabile.
5. Ex quinta sic. Nihil debet servari, unde innocens possit rationabiliter condemnari; sed ita est in proposito, si tenetur celare quod alias novit: ergo etc. Probatio: ponatur casus, quod quatuor vadant per viam; unus peccat in conspectu omnium, unde accusandus est coram praelato et puniendus; confitetur uni de tribus; duo alii accusant illum qui peccavit et testificantur contra eum et ad maius robur testimonii advocant tertium; tertio praecipitur, quod dicat, et illi eum accusant, nisi dicat8, tanquam fautor sit in aliena culpa, et praelatus rationabiliter punit ipsum ad duorum testimonium de inobedientia: si ergo hoc totum iniquum est, videtur, quod non tenetur celare. Si tu dicas mihi, quod sacerdos debet confitenti protestari, quod non accipit sub sigillo confessionis; contra: quaero, quando; aut antequam confiteatur, aut postquam confessus est. Sed ante non tenetur, quia nescit, quid sibi velit dicere; si postquam confessio audita est, hoc nihil est, quia ex quo confessio fuit, sigillum habuit: ergo per suam protestationem non potest illud infringere. Et iterum, quilibet sacerdos posset dicere confitenti: nolo illud sub sigillo accipere. Praeterea, esto quod obliviscatur illud dicere et habeat in corde, quamvis non in ore; videtur, quod idem debeat accidere.
Conclusio
Peccatum quod scitur per confessionem et per aliam viam, revelari potest sine fractione sigilli, secluso tamen scandalo.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod triplex est hic modus dicendi.
Primus est hic. Dicunt quidam, quod ex quo aliquis scit aliquid per confessionem, qualitercumque sciat et quandocumque sciat, illud vere non potest revelare9; quia non potest tale quid revelari, cum sit pars confessionis, quin fiat sigillo confessionis praeiudicium, quod maxime et praecipue servandum est integrum. Ad obiecta respondent, sicut tactum10 est, quod si videatur generari praeiudicium, vel sequi malum, non debet recipere sub sigillo confessionis, sed cum protestatione, quod nolit tenere secretum. — Etsi ista opinio pia videatur, pro eo quod multum tribuit sigillo confessionis, tamen posset ducere in magnum periculum, scilicet quod fieret veritati et in-
nocentiae et obedientiae praeiudicium, et fraudi praestaretur patrocinium, sicut ostensum est. Et constat, quod sigillum confessionis institutum est ad vitandum scandalum; « veritas autem propter scandalum dimittenda non est11 ». Et iterum, illa protestatio non facit, ut possit revelare quod alias tenetur celare. Et iterum, si aliquis audivit confessionem alicuius, et ille de illo peccato sit infamis; nunquid fractor sigilli dicitur, si de hac materia cum aliquibus loquitur? Hoc videtur nimis durum et impium.
Et ideo est secunda positio, quae videtur esse temperantior, quod confessio claudit os respectu cognitionis praecedentis, non respectu sequentis. Et ratio huius est: quia ille qui prius novit et illud in confessione recipit, os sibi claudit respectu praecedentis; sed non respectu sequentis. — Sed haec positio minus est rationabilis quam prima, quamvis videatur magis sobria: primum, quia ex hac positione ita generatur veritati praeiudicium12, sicut ex prima. Ulterius dicit, quod sigillum confessionis potest omnem cognitionem antecedentem claudere, et post cognitio superveniens potest illud aperire. Si enim confessio ideo claudit prius scitum, quia revelare scitum est frangere sigillum; cum illud contineatur sub sigillo, quomodo cognitio sequens dabit potentiam loquendi vel manifestandi illud quod sub sigillo erat clausum? Aut si revelare quod post scitur, in quantum post scitur, non praeiudicat confessionis sigillo; quare revelare prius scitum, cum unum et idem possit sciri per visum, deinde per confessionem, tertio per aliorum revelationem13?
Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi magis consonus veritati et rationi, quod illud quod scitur duplici via, duplici cognitione scitur. Et sicut duplici cognitione scitur, ita potest homo oblivisci unum modum sciendi et memorari alterum, sicut patet, quia aliquando obliviscitur homo, se vidisse, et recordatur, se audisse; vel obliviscitur, se audisse per relationem, et meminit, se audisse in confessione. Et sicut duplex est scientia sive modus sciendi, sic duplex est modus revelandi; nec unus praeiudicat alteri, ut si quis dicat: ego vidi, vel: ego in confessione didici; nec unus modus alteri praeiudicat, et sine sigilli fractione et praeiudicio et absque praeiudicio veritatis potest quod scitum est per confessionem et per alium modum revelari, ita tamen quod modus sciendi per confessionem semper maneat in occulto. Quia tamen posset ex hoc scandalum generari, maxime apud poenitentem et apud alios, credo, quod de bono et aequo magis debet celare14 quam unus alius. Et ideo propter vitandum scandalum poenitentis debet ei protestari in confessione, quod non debet illud celare, non quia illa protestatio acquirat ius revelandi, sed quia proximo aufert rationem scandali. Debet etiam permittere, se cogi ad dicendum; cogitur autem, sive quia veritati generatur praeiudicium, sive per mandatum; et ex tunc potest dicere absque omni remorsu. Cum magna enim maturitate revelandum est alienum peccatum, etiam ubi non est annexum confessionis sigillum. — Et haec positio rationabilior et securior videtur, et iurisperiti15 in hanc magis consentiunt.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de decretali, dicendum, quod loquitur de revelatione peccati eatenus, qua per confessionem scitum est; unde gravem imponit poenam, in qua poena dicitur, quod debet intrudi16 « in monasterium arctum »; et hoc intelligitur, non quia cogat ad emittendum votum, sed quia pro tanto crimine compellit ad perpetuo puniendum.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla confessio est revelanda; sed hoc peccatum etc.; dicendum, quod ibi est sophisma secundum accidens17, pro eo quod isti peccato, in quantum revelandum, extranea est confessio. Cum enim dupliciter sciatur, secundum unum modum revelari potest et debet, secundum alium vero minime; et ideo primum, quod proponit, est falsum: non potest hoc peccatum revelari, quin reveletur confessio.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod istae cognitiones habent oppositionem et gradum; dicendum, quod verum est, quod gradum habent; sed tamen non habent oppositionem, pro eo quod secundum diversas vias sunt; unde idem potest esse scitum et creditum18; sic in proposito est intelligendum.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malis auferenda est occasio malignandi; dicendum, quod nunquam omnino potest malis claudi aditus malefaciendi; nec adeo debet claudi, quod ex hoc claudatur bo-
nis via recte agendi; nec debet claudi aditus uni malo, ut aperiatur alteri: et ideo ratio illa non concludit, quod illud quod dupliciter est cognitum, necessario oporteat celari.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod promittit habere secretum, cum audit; verum est, ipsam confessionem, et illud eatenus, qua sic scitur; aliter non promittit, et si etiam promitteret, ubi veritas vel obedientia praeciperet19, revelari potest, et promissio vel iuramentum nullum esset — unde si vidissem proximum peccantem tali peccato, quod tenear dicere superiori, immo solvor, immo iuravi: et sic non solum est, ut tollatur contemptus.
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Question III. Whether one who knows something both through confession and through another way is bound to conceal it.
Thirdly it is asked whether one who knows something through confession and through another way is bound to conceal it. And that he is, seems [shown]:
1. First, by a certain decretal of Innocent, On Penances and Remissions1: « Whoever shall have presumed to reveal a sin disclosed to him in penance, we decree that he be not only deposed from the sacerdotal office, but also thrust into a strict monastery to do penance »: therefore if anyone knows some sin through confession, in whatever way he otherwise knew it, it does not seem that he can disclose that same thing on account of the confession.
2. Likewise, the seal of confession, as was proved above2, is in no way to be broken; but it is broken when the confession is revealed; but it is impossible to reveal3 this sin heard in confession without the confession being revealed; but a confession is in no way to be revealed: therefore neither [is] that sin. And such a syllogism can be made: no confession is to be revealed; this sin is a confession, or a part of a confession, which he knows in two ways: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, such a one, who knows through confession and through another way, knows as a man and as God; but insofar as he knows as God, he is bound to be silent; insofar as [he knows] as a man, he can tell him who can be helped: therefore these two have opposed conditions. But whenever opposites are about the same thing, it is necessary that one or both fall away from its property4: if therefore the greater dominates over the lesser and by dominating conquers, and the cognition by which he knows after the mode of God is simply greater; therefore it seems that he is bound to follow that one and so to conceal.
4. Likewise, the seal of confession is so strictly instituted on account of scandal, and lest evil priests be able to act malignantly, and the faithful thereby be drawn back from confession; but if it were so, that someone could reveal what he knows through another way, anyone under this pretext could reveal everything or for the most part,
saying that he knows it otherwise, and so no evil-doer could be convicted nor caught in his malice.
5. Likewise, the seal of confession is so annexed to confession that whoever hears confessions, by this very [fact] that he hears, binds himself to the keeping of the secret; but if you knew something and afterwards promised to the one reporting it that you would never tell it, you would be bound altogether to conceal [it]: then therefore it seems likewise that he is bound to conceal that which he knew otherwise than through confession.
On the contrary it is argued thus, and I here suppose five things which are known of themselves. The first supposition is that nothing is to be established nor observed in which prejudice is done to the truth5. — The second is that « fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one ». — The third is this, that no one is bound to lie for the sake of anyone. — The fourth is this, that no one knowingly renders himself incapable of that to which he is bound, without mortal sin. — The fifth is this, that nothing ought to be established nor observed whereby an innocent person can reasonably be accused and condemned, and others be scandalized concerning him.
1. From the first I argue thus. Nothing is to be observed in which prejudice is done to the truth; but some priest can testify in a case6, as one who together with another saw a thief or some such thing, by the withdrawal of whose testimony the truth will lie hidden and falsehood will reign: if therefore such a one hears a confession of the fault and on this very account is unwilling to testify, prejudice is done to the truth: therefore if this ought not to be done, he is not obliged to keeping silent.
2. From the second thus. « Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one »; but some sinner, knowing himself to be guilty and worthy of accusation, confesses for this alone7, that he may shut the priest's mouth: if therefore he shuts [it] and thereby remains unpunished, fraud and deceit patronize him: therefore if this is unfitting, it is evident etc.
3. From the third thus. No one is bound to lie for the sake of anyone; but this man who knows otherwise than through confession cannot say: I do not know, without lying, because he knows as a man and as God: if therefore he swore to tell the truth, he is bound to reveal what he knows as a man, since to this the oath itself could constrain him.
4. From the fourth thus. Suppose that someone is bound to accuse his neighbor before the prelate, both by divine command and by the command of his prelate; this man saw him sinning and heard him confessing: if therefore he was bound from sight to tell and from the hearing of the confession rendered himself incapable, then when he heard his confession he sinned mortally; which in no way seems probable.
5. From the fifth thus. Nothing ought to be observed whereby an innocent person can reasonably be condemned; but so it is in the matter at hand, if he is bound to conceal what he knows otherwise: therefore etc. Proof: let the case be put that four go along the way; one sins in the sight of all, whence he is to be accused before the prelate and punished; he confesses to one of three; the two others accuse the one who sinned and testify against him and for the greater strength of testimony summon the third; the third is commanded to speak, and they accuse him unless he speaks8, as though he were an abettor in another's fault, and the prelate reasonably punishes him on the testimony of two for disobedience: if therefore this whole is iniquitous, it seems that he is not bound to conceal. If you say to me that the priest ought to protest to the one confessing that he does not receive [it] under the seal of confession; on the contrary: I ask, when; either before he confesses, or after he has confessed. But before he is not bound, because he does not know what [the man] wishes to say to him; if after the confession has been heard, this is nothing, because from the [moment] the confession was [made], it had the seal: therefore by his protestation he cannot break it. And again, any priest could say to the one confessing: I do not wish to receive that under the seal. Furthermore, suppose that he forgets to tell that and holds [it] in his heart, although not in his mouth; it seems that the same ought to happen.
Conclusion
A sin which is known through confession and through another way can be revealed without breaking the seal, scandal nevertheless being set aside.
I respond: It must be said that there is here a threefold manner of speaking.
The first is this. Some say that, from [the moment] someone knows something through confession, in whatever way he knows it and whenever he knows it, he truly cannot reveal9 it; because such a thing cannot be revealed, since it is a part of the confession, without prejudice being done to the seal of confession, which most of all and chiefly is to be kept intact. To the objections they reply, as has been touched on10, that if prejudice seems to be generated, or evil to follow, he ought not to receive [it] under the seal of confession, but with a protestation that he does not wish to keep the secret. — Although this opinion seems pious, in that it attributes much to the seal of confession, nevertheless it could lead into great danger, namely that prejudice would be done to the truth and to in-
nocence and to obedience, and patronage would be furnished to fraud, as has been shown. And it is established that the seal of confession was instituted for avoiding scandal; « but truth ought not to be set aside on account of scandal11 ». And again, that protestation does not bring it about that he can reveal what he is otherwise bound to conceal. And again, if someone has heard the confession of another, and that man is of ill repute concerning that sin; is he called a breaker of the seal if he speaks of this matter with some persons? This seems too harsh and impious.
And therefore there is a second position, which seems to be more temperate, that confession shuts the mouth with respect to preceding cognition, not with respect to subsequent. And the reason for this is: because he who first knows and receives that in confession, shuts his mouth with respect to the preceding; but not with respect to the subsequent. — But this position is less reasonable than the first, although it seems more sober: first, because from this position prejudice is generated to the truth12 just as from the first. Further it says that the seal of confession can shut every antecedent cognition, and a subsequently supervening cognition can open it. For if confession therefore shuts what was first known, because to reveal what is known is to break the seal; since that is contained under the seal, how will subsequent cognition give the power of speaking or manifesting that which was shut under the seal? Or if to reveal what is known afterwards, insofar as it is known afterwards, does not prejudice the seal of confession; why [does it prejudice it] to reveal what was first known, since one and the same thing can be known by sight, then through confession, thirdly through others' revelation13?
And therefore there is a third manner of speaking more consonant with truth and reason, that what is known by a twofold way is known by a twofold cognition. And just as it is known by a twofold cognition, so a man can forget one mode of knowing and remember the other, as is evident, because a man sometimes forgets that he saw, and recollects that he heard; or forgets that he heard through a report, and remembers that he heard in confession. And just as knowledge or the mode of knowing is twofold, so the mode of revealing is twofold; nor does the one prejudice the other, as if someone say: I saw, or: I learned in confession; nor does the one mode prejudice the other, and without breaking of the seal and without prejudice and without prejudice to the truth, that which is known through confession and through another mode can be revealed, in such a way nevertheless that the mode of knowing through confession always remains hidden. Yet because scandal could arise from this, especially with the penitent and with others, I believe that out of [a sense of] the good and the equitable he ought rather to conceal14 than anyone else. And therefore, for the avoiding of scandal to the penitent, he ought to protest to him in confession that he ought not to conceal that — not because that protestation acquires a right of revealing, but because it removes from the neighbor the ground of scandal. He ought also to permit himself to be compelled to speak; and he is compelled either because prejudice is generated to the truth, or by command; and from then on he can speak without any remorse. For another's sin is to be revealed with great maturity, even where the seal of confession is not annexed. — And this position seems more reasonable and safer, and the jurists15 more agree with this one.
1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the decretal, it must be said that it speaks of the revelation of a sin insofar as it is known through confession; whence it imposes a grave penalty, in which penalty it is said that he ought to be thrust16 « into a strict monastery »; and this is understood, not because it compels [him] to emit a vow, but because for so great a crime it compels [him] to be punished perpetually.
2. To that which is objected, that no confession is to be revealed; but this sin etc.; it must be said that there is there a fallacy of accident17, in that to this sin, insofar as it is to be revealed, the confession is extraneous. For since it is known in two ways, according to one mode it can and ought to be revealed, but according to the other not at all; and therefore the first thing it proposes is false: this sin cannot be revealed without the confession being revealed.
3. To that which is objected, that these cognitions have opposition and degree; it must be said that it is true that they have degree; but nevertheless they do not have opposition, in that they are according to diverse ways; whence the same thing can be known and believed18; so it is to be understood in the matter at hand.
4. To that which is objected, that occasion of acting malignantly is to be taken away from the wicked; it must be said that the approach of doing evil can never be entirely shut off from the wicked; nor ought it to be so shut off that thereby the way of acting rightly be shut off from
the good; nor ought the approach to be shut off from one evil, so that it be opened to another: and therefore that argument does not conclude that what is known in two ways must necessarily be concealed.
5. To that which is objected, that he promises to keep the secret when he hears [it]; it is true [that he promises] the confession itself, and that insofar as it is thus known; otherwise he does not promise, and even if he did promise, where truth or obedience should command19, it can be revealed, and the promise or oath would be null — whence if I had seen my neighbor sinning in such a sin, [it is the case] that I am bound to tell the superior, nay I am loosed [from the promise], nay I have sworn: and so it is not only that contempt may be removed.
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- 1Extra lib. V. tit. 38. in fine, C. Omnis utriusque sexus (12.): Qui peccatum in poenitentiali iudicio sibi detectum... ad agendum perpetuam poenitentiam etc. — In fine argg. substituendum duximus propter pro per.Decretals, book V, title 38, at the end, c. Omnis utriusque sexus (12): Whoever [reveals] a sin disclosed to him in the penitential judgment... to do perpetual penance, etc. — At the end of the arguments we have judged that propter should be substituted for per.
- 2Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. — Ultima regula probatur supra a. 1. q. 3.See the scholion to the preceding question. — The last rule is proved above, a. 1, q. 3.
- 3Quaest. I. — Inferius pro revelare edd. cum pluribus codd. revelari.[See] Question I. — Below, for revelare the editions with several codices [read] revelari.
- 4Quia, ut ait Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.), simul non contingit eidem inesse contraria.Because, as Aristotle says, On Interpretation II, c. 4 (c. 14), contraries cannot be present in the same [subject] at the same time.
- 5Cfr. supra pag. 86, nota 6. in fine. — Secunda suppositio habetur in C. Ex tenore (10.), X. de Rescriptis (lib. I. tit. 3.); cfr. tom. III. pag. 413, nota 2. alii loci allegati. — Superius pro hic plures codd. haec. Inferius in fine quintae suppositionis pro de ipso edd. de peccato.Cf. above, p. 86, note 6, at the end. — The second supposition is found in c. Ex tenore (10), X, On Rescripts (book I, title 3); cf. vol. III, p. 413, note 2, [where] other passages are cited. — Above, for hic several codices [read] haec. Below, at the end of the fifth supposition, for de ipso the editions [read] de peccato.
- 6Codd. R S T in casu. Inferius pro non velit cod. H non obligatur, et pro ad retinendum (reticendum?) edd. ad tacendum.Codices R S T [read] in casu. Below, for non velit codex H [reads] non obligatur, and for ad retinendum (reticendum?) the editions [read] ad tacendum.
- 7Cod. U supplet intuitu.Codex U supplies intuitu [with a view].
- 8Cod. K (I a secunda manu) quod, si non dicat. Mox pro punit cod. U possit punire, codd. R T X possit reprehendere.Codex K (I in a second hand) [reads] quod, si non dicat. Soon, for punit codex U [reads] possit punire, codices R T X possit reprehendere.
- 9Ex codd. K V W Z substituimus revelare pro revelari. Post pauca verbo revelari cod. U praemittit per se.From codices K V W Z we have substituted revelare for revelari. A little after, to the word revelari codex U prefixes per se.
- 10Hic in ultimo fundam. — Edd. et plures codd. addunt supra.Here in the last fundamentum. — The editions and several codices add supra.
- 11Ut dicit regula iuris supra pag. 86, nota 6. in fine allegata. — Inferius pro confessionem cod. U peccatum.As the rule of law says, cited above, p. 86, note 6, at the end. — Below, for confessionem codex U [reads] peccatum.
- 12Codd. P Q et post [i.e. postea]. Mox pro claudit edd. clauditur.Codices P Q [read] et post [i.e. afterwards]. Soon, for claudit the editions [read] clauditur.
- 13Cod. aa supplet praeiudicat confessionis sigillo. Ante tertio Vat. ponit didicit, ed. 1 quia didicit; pro tertio, quod plures codd. omittunt, cod. H et sic, codd. V W et ideo.Codex aa supplies praeiudicat confessionis sigillo. Before tertio the Vatican [edition] puts didicit, edition 1 quia didicit; for tertio, which several codices omit, codex H [reads] et sic, codices V W et ideo.
- 14Supple: sacerdos. Codd. V W autem legunt, terminis transpositis, celare unus quam alius, cod. K unus et alius (unus alius in nostra lectione idem est ac quilibet alius). Inferius pro quod non debet [scil. sacerdos] non pauci codd. quando [cod. G quin] non debet.Supply: the priest. The codices V W, however, read, with the terms transposed, celare unus quam alius, codex K unus et alius (unus alius in our reading is the same as quilibet alius). Below, for quod non debet [namely, the priest] not a few codices [read] quando [codex G quin] non debet.
- 15Cod. F viri periti.Codex F [reads] viri periti [men skilled in law].
- 16Codd. A G aa trudi, codd. E K bb tradi. Mox pro intelligitur codd. R S T U dicitur.Codices A G aa [read] trudi, codices E K bb tradi. Soon, for intelligitur codices R S T U [read] dicitur.
- 17Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Fallaciis, exponens hanc fallaciam ait: Accidens, ut hic sumitur, idem est quod extraneum in parte idem et in parte diversum, ut hic: homo est species; Socrates est homo: ergo Socrates est species. Homo enim est in parte idem cum specie, scil. quando sumitur pro re universali, in parte diversum a specie, scil. quando sumitur pro suppositis [i. e. individuis]. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 870, nota 8. verba Aristot. — Superius pro nulla codd. F G I K, pro nullo edd., nullo modo, plures codd. nullo.Peter of Spain, Summulae, treatise On Fallacies, expounding this fallacy says: Accident, as it is taken here, is the same as the extraneous which is in part the same and in part diverse, as here: man is a species; Socrates is a man: therefore Socrates is a species. For man is in part the same as the species, namely when taken for the universal thing, in part diverse from the species, namely when taken for the supposits [i.e. individuals]. Cf. vol. II, p. 870, note 8, the words of Aristotle. — Above, for nulla codices F G I K, for nullo the editions, nullo modo, several codices nullo.
- 18Vide III. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 3.See III Sentences, d. 24, a. 2, q. 3.
- 19Codd. M O V W Z (L primitus, X a secunda manu) et ed. 1 addunt: quod per aliam viam sciret, quia illud solum... nullum esse. Post sic scitur cod. U addit per confessionem.Codices M O V W Z (L originally, X in a second hand) and edition 1 add: that he knew it through another way, because that alone... is null. After sic scitur codex U adds per confessionem. ---