Proemium, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Proemium
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.
QUAESTIO III.
Utrum hic liber sive theologia sit contemplationis gratia, an ut boni fiamus, sive utrum sit scientia speculativa, an practica.
Tertio quaeritur1 de causa finali. Et cum dictum sit, quod liber iste est ad revelandum abscondita, quaeritur, utrum opus hoc sit contemplationis gratia, vel ut boni fiamus. Et quod sit, ut boni fiamus, videtur sic.
1. Omnis doctrina, quae est de his, sine quorum cognitione non contingit recte vivere, est, ut boni fiamus: sed iste liber est ad cognitionem verae2 fidei, sine qua impossibile est placere Deo nec recte vivere, ut dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimo3: ergo iste liber est, ut boni fiamus.
2. Item, omnis doctrina, quae convenit cum virtute in obiecto, est, ut boni fiamus; haec per se manifesta est; sed haec doctrina convenit cum fide in obiecto, quia est de credibili, de quo etiam est fides sive in quo: ergo etc.
3. Item, doctrina particularis convenit cum totali in fine; sed finis totalis Scripturae sacrae non est tantum, ut fiamus boni, sed etiam ut fiamus beati; et beatitudo est optimum: ergo finis istius scientiae est, ut boni fiamus.
Contra: 1. Magister dicit in littera4, quod finis sive intentio sua «est theologicarum inquisitionum abdita pandere»; sed hoc pertinet ad eum, cuius finis est speculatio: ergo etc.
2. Item, scientia, quae est, ut boni fiamus, pertinet ad mores; sed cum theologia sit de fide5 et moribus, liber autem iste de his quae spectant ad fidem, non de his quae spectant ad mores: ergo opus hoc non est, ut boni fiamus.
3. Item, omnis scientia, quae est, ut boni fiamus, est practica; sed omnis talis est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro6; sed haec non est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro, sed a Deo: ergo est contemplationis gratia, non ut boni fiamus.
Conclusio
Scientia theologica est habitus affectivus et medius inter speculativum et practicum, et pro fine habet tum contemplationem, tum ut boni fiamus, et quidem principalius, ut boni fiamus.
Respondeo: Ad intelligentiam praedictorum notandum est, quod perfectibile a scientia est intellectus noster.1 Hunc autem contingit considerare tripliciter, scilicet in se, vel prout extenditur ad affectum, vel prout extenditur ad opus. Extenditur autem intellectus per modum dictantis et regulantis. Secundum hunc triplicem statum, quia2 errare potest, habet triplicem habitum directivum. Nam si consideremus intellectum in se, sic est proprie speculativus et perficitur ab habitu, qui est contemplationis gratia, qui3 dicitur scientia speculativa. Si autem consideremus ipsum ut natum extendi ad opus, sic perficitur ab habitu, qui est, ut boni fiamus; et hic est scientia practica sive moralis. Si autem medio modo consideretur ut natus4 extendi ad affectum, sic perficitur ab habitu medio inter pure speculativum et practicum, qui complectitur utrumque; et hic habitus dicitur sapientia, quae simul dicit cognitionem et affectum: Sapientia enim doctrinae est secundum nomen eius, Ecclesiastici sexto.5 Unde hic est contemplationis gratia, et ut boni fiamus, principaliter tamen, ut boni fiamus.
Talis est cognitio tradita in hoc libro. Nam cognitio haec iuvat fidem, et fides sic est in intellectu, ut, quantum est de sui ratione, nata sit movere affectum6. Et hoc patet. Nam haec cognitio, quod Christus pro nobis mortuus est, et consimiles, nisi sit homo peccator et durus, movet ad amorem; non sic ista: quod diameter est asymeter costae7.
Concedendum ergo, quod est, ut boni fiamus.
1. Quod obiicitur, quod8 est ad pandendum abscondita; dicendum, quod ibi non est status, quia illa revelatio ordinat ad affectum.
2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod non est de moribus nec de his quae sunt ab opere nostro; iam patet responsio ad illud9, quia ipse loquitur de illa quae proprie est, ut boni fiamus, ut de practica.
I. Haec quaestio communiter sic proponitur: utrum theologia sit speculativa, an practica? Attamen, stricte loquendo, inter hunc et illum loquendi modum est differentia. Nam proprie practica est notitia, quae per se est ordinabilis ad operationem; et in hoc sensu S. Doctor negat, theologiam esse practicam (ad 2. et 3.). Sed ut boni fiamus per directionem ad finem ultimum sive per inflammationem affectus, hoc inter speculativas scientias propriissime convenit theologiae.
II. In corp. tangitur quaestio inter scholasticos agitata, utrum theologia sit sapientia, quod communiter affirmatur, cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 1. — Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — S. Thom., I. Sent. Prolog. a. 1. q. 3; S. I. q. 1. a. 6. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4. ad 1. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 5. ad 3. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. Prolog. p. 2. q. 1. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 6. q. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. in fine.
III. In ipsa solutione quaestionis cum Seraphico Doctore et re et modo loquendi conveniunt Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Aegid. R., Thom. de Argentina. S. Thom. in Commentar. in Sent. loco infra cit. simpliciter dicit: Ergo (scientia sacra) non est practica, sed speculativa; in Summa vero: Comprehendit sub se utrumque, magis vero est speculativa quam practica. Haec ultima solutio parum distat a doctrina Seraphici, quod patet sic.
1. Uterque admittit praeter scientiam speculativam et practicam tertium membrum, quod simul utrumque continet. Licet Scotus (Prolog. q. 4.) de hac divisione male sentiat, tamen fere ab omnibus et rationabiliter admittitur et bene defenditur ab Aegid. Rom. loc. cit. Ita habitus theologicae scientiae, cum sit superioris ordinis, quia fundatur in principiis fidei, quae imperatur a voluntate et involvit inclinationem in Deum, videtur esse eminenter speculativus et aliquo modo practicus; habet enim virtutem et intellectum illuminandi et affectum inflammandi. Unde saltem in sensu largo haec scientia potest appellari practica, licet ex parte obiecti non immediate dirigat operationem, quia ex parte finis de sui ratione inclinat ad amorem Dei. Pro explicatione servire potest III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. in corp.
2. Si S. Thomas dicit, quod theologia sit magis speculativa quam practica, hoc verum est, si consideratur ex parte obiecti; et hanc rationem etiam S. Bonaventura satis innuit, cum in solut. ad 2. et 3. neget, quod haec scientia sit practica in sensu stricto. Si vero Seraphicus affirmat, quod sit «principaliter, ut boni fiamus», hoc iterum verissimum est, si spectatur eius finis, qui certe magis est, ut boni fiamus, quam ut tantum divina speculemur.
3. S. Bonaventura hic theologiam expresse non nominat scientiam affectivam; tamen tertium membrum divisionis, quod speculativum et practicum in se complectitur, non inepte cum B. Alberto aliisque antiquis hoc vocabulo distingui potest, attendendo finem principalem, qui est caritas in affectu. Nam a fine principali aliqua res nomen bene sortiri potest. — De duplici genere cognitionis, scil. speculationis et devotionis, cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.
IV. De tota quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 1. et 2. — Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4. — S. Thom., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 1. a. 4. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 3; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. Prolog. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., Prolog. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 8. q. 3. et seqq. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. prolog. q. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 6. — Biel, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 12.
---
QUESTION III.
Whether this book, or theology, is for the sake of contemplation, or that we may become good; that is, whether it is a speculative science or a practical one.
Thirdly it is asked1 about the final cause. And since it has been said that this book is for revealing things hidden, it is asked whether this work is for the sake of contemplation, or that we may become good. And that it is that we may become good, is shown thus.
1. Every teaching which is about those things without the knowledge of which one cannot live rightly, is that we may become good: but this book is directed to the knowledge of the true2 faith, without which it is impossible to please God, nor to live rightly, as is said to the Hebrews, chapter eleven3: therefore this book is that we may become good.
2. Likewise, every teaching which agrees with virtue in its object, is that we may become good; this is manifest of itself; but this teaching agrees with faith in its object, because it is about the credible, about which faith also is, or in which it is: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, a particular teaching agrees with the total one in its end; but the total end of sacred Scripture is not only that we may become good, but also that we may become blessed; and beatitude is the best: therefore the end of this science is that we may become good.
On the contrary: 1. The Master says in the text4 that his end or intention «is to lay open the hidden things of theological inquiries»; but this belongs to him whose end is speculation: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, a science which is that we may become good pertains to morals; but whereas theology is about faith5 and morals, this book is nevertheless about the things that pertain to faith, not about the things that pertain to morals: therefore this work is not that we may become good.
3. Likewise, every science which is that we may become good is practical; but every such science is about the things which are from our own working6; but this one is not about the things which are from our own working, but from God: therefore it is for the sake of contemplation, not that we may become good.
Conclusion
Theological science is an affective habit and a middle one between the speculative and the practical, and it has for its end both contemplation and that we may become good — and indeed, more principally, that we may become good.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that what is perfectible by a science is our intellect.1 Now this can be considered in three ways, namely in itself, or as it is extended to the affections, or as it is extended to work. And the intellect is extended after the manner of one dictating and regulating. According to this threefold state, because2 it can err, it has a threefold directive habit. For if we consider the intellect in itself, it is in that way properly speculative and is perfected by a habit which is for the sake of contemplation, which3 is called speculative science. But if we consider it as apt to be extended to work, it is in that way perfected by a habit which is that we may become good; and this is practical or moral science. But if it is considered in the middle way, as apt4 to be extended to the affections, it is in that way perfected by a habit midway between the purely speculative and the practical, which embraces both; and this habit is called wisdom, which says at once cognition and affection: for the wisdom of doctrine is according to her name, Ecclesiasticus, chapter six.5 Hence this one is for the sake of contemplation, and that we may become good — principally, however, that we may become good.
Such is the knowledge handed down in this book. For this knowledge helps faith, and faith is in the intellect in such a way that, so far as its own account goes, it is apt to move the affections6. And this is clear. For this knowledge, that Christ died for us, and the like, unless a man be a sinner and hardened, moves him to love; not so this one: that the diameter is asymmeter to the side7.
It must therefore be granted that it is that we may become good.
1. As to what is objected, that it8 is for laying open things hidden; it must be said that there is no resting-point there, because that revelation orders one to the affections.
2. 3. As to what is objected, that it is not about morals nor about the things which are from our own working; the answer to that9 is already clear, because he is speaking of that science which is properly that we may become good, that is, of practical science.
I. This question is commonly put thus: whether theology is speculative or practical? Yet, strictly speaking, there is a difference between the one manner of speaking and the other. For properly practical is that knowledge which of itself is orderable to operation; and in this sense the holy Doctor denies that theology is practical (in the replies to 2 and 3). But that we may become good through direction to the last end, or through the enkindling of the affections — this belongs most properly to theology among the speculative sciences.
II. In the body of the article there is touched a question debated among the scholastics, whether theology is wisdom, which is commonly affirmed; see Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I q. 1 m. 1. — Scotus, I Sent. Prologue q. 3. — St. Thomas, I Sent. Prologue a. 1 q. 3; Summa I q. 1 a. 6. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 1 a. 4 ad 1. — Richard of Middleton, I Sent. Prologue q. 5 ad 3. — Giles of Rome, I Sent. Prologue p. 2 q. 1. — Peter of Tarantasia, I Sent. Prologue q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 6 q. 2. — Durandus, I Sent. Prologue q. 1, at the end.
III. In the solution of the question itself both in substance and in manner of speaking there agree with the Seraphic Doctor: Alexander of Hales, Blessed Albert, Peter of Tarantasia, Giles of Rome, Thomas of Strasbourg. St. Thomas, in the Commentary on the Sentences at the place cited below, says simply: Therefore (sacred science) is not practical, but speculative; but in the Summa: It comprehends both under itself, yet it is more speculative than practical. This last solution stands little apart from the Seraphic Doctor's teaching, which is clear thus.
1. Each of them admits, besides speculative and practical science, a third member which contains both at once. Although Scotus (Prologue q. 4) thinks ill of this division, nevertheless it is admitted by almost all, and reasonably, and is well defended by Giles of Rome at the place cited. Thus the habit of theological science, since it is of a higher order — because it is founded on the principles of faith, which is commanded by the will and involves an inclination toward God — seems to be eminently speculative and in some way practical; for it has the power both of illuminating the intellect and of enkindling the affections. Hence at least in a broad sense this science can be called practical, although on the side of its object it does not immediately direct operation, because on the side of its end it of its own account inclines to the love of God. For an explanation III Sent. d. 23 a. 1 q. 2 in the body can serve.
2. If St. Thomas says that theology is more speculative than practical, this is true if it is considered on the side of the object; and St. Bonaventure sufficiently hints at this reason too, when in the replies to 2 and 3 he denies that this science is practical in the strict sense. But if the Seraphic Doctor affirms that it is «principally, that we may become good», this again is most true if his end is regarded, which is certainly more that we may become good than that we should only speculate upon divine things.
3. St. Bonaventure does not here expressly name theology an affective science; nevertheless the third member of the division, which embraces in itself the speculative and the practical, can not ineptly be marked off by this word, with Blessed Albert and the other ancients, by attending to the principal end, which is charity in the affections. For from its principal end a thing can well take its name. — On the twofold kind of cognition, namely of speculation and of devotion, see III Sent. d. 35 q. 1.
IV. On the whole question: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I q. 1 m. 1 and 2. — Scotus, I Sent. Prologue q. 4. — St. Thomas, I Sent. Prologue q. 1 a. 3; Summa I q. 1 a. 4. — Blessed Albert, Summa p. I tr. 1 q. 3 m. 3; I Sent. d. 1 a. 4. — Peter of Tarantasia, I Sent. Prologue a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, Prologue q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 8 q. 3 and following. — Denis the Carthusian, I Sent. Prologue q. 2. — Durandus, I Sent. Prologue q. 6. — Biel, I Sent. Prologue q. 12.
---
- 1Vat. proprio marte omittit Tertio quaeritur.The Vatican edition, on its own authority, omits Tertio quaeritur.
- 2Ita plures codd. ut A I K T X etc. cum ed. 1 contra Vat., quae habet nostrae; praeferimus lectionem codd., utpote quae est S. Doctori familiarior et planius exprimit praerequisitum ad recte vivendum.So several codices, as A I K T X etc., with edition 1, against the Vatican edition, which has nostrae; we prefer the reading of the codices, inasmuch as it is more familiar to the holy Doctor and expresses more plainly what is prerequisite to living rightly.
- 3Vers. 6.Verse 6.
- 4In Prolog. vide infra.In the Prologue; see below.
- 5Substituimus particulam et pro non de. Dubium quidem non leve hac in re ingerebatur nobis eo, quod, cum Scholaticorum tempore theologia communiter dicta contineretur compendiose in libro Sententiarum, sicuti de isto libro statim subiicitur, quod sit de his quae spectant ad fidem, non de his quae spectant ad mores, ita etiam de theologia dicendum sit, quod sit de fide, non de moribus. Sed consentientibus omnibus mss. et ed. 1, lectionem Vat. mutavimus; qua mutatione supposita, theologia largiori sensu accipienda est, quatenus diversas complectitur disciplinas. — Mox plures codd. inter quos et cod. T cum ed. 1 post iste addunt est.We have substituted the particle et for non de. A doubt indeed by no means slight pressed upon us in this matter, in that, since in the time of the Scholastics theology as commonly so called was contained in compendious form in the book of the Sentences, just as of this book it is at once subjoined that it is about the things which pertain to faith, not about the things which pertain to morals, so also of theology it would have to be said that it is about faith, not about morals. But since all the manuscripts and edition 1 agree, we have altered the reading of the Vatican edition; and on the supposition of that alteration, theology is to be taken in the broader sense, inasmuch as it embraces various disciplines. — Presently several codices, among them codex T, with edition 1, add est after iste.
- 6Duabus his propositionibus consimiles habet Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 2: Quoniam praesens tractatio (Ethicae) non est speculationis causa, quemadmodum aliae; non enim fit, ut cognoscamus, quid sit virtus, sed ut boni efficiamur. Et II. Metaph. text. 3. (I. brevior. c. 1.): Speculativae etenim (scientiae) finis veritas, practicae autem opus. — Secundam huius argumenti propositionem cod. K ita exhibet: et omnis scientia practica est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro, non a Deo: sed ista scientia non est etc.Aristotle has propositions very like these two, Ethics II, c. 2: Since the present treatise (of the Ethics) is not for the sake of speculation, as the others are; for it does not take place that we may know what virtue is, but that we may be made good. And Metaphysics II, text 3 (I of the shorter version, c. 1): For the end of the speculative (sciences) is truth, but of the practical, work. — The second proposition of this argument codex K presents thus: et omnis scientia practica est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro, non a Deo: sed ista scientia non est etc.
- 1Hoc est, intellectus est subiectum aptum perfici a scientia. — Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, ponendo perfectibilis transponit verba a scientia post noster.That is, the intellect is the subject apt to be perfected by science. — The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1, by putting perfectibilis, transposes the words a scientia after noster.
- 2Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, transponendo quia cum praefixa particula et, in principio huius propositionis aliqualiter respectum considerationis immutat. — Mox cod. X perfectivum pro directivum, et plures codd. ut C F G L R S etc. corrupte ductivum.The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1, by transposing quia together with the particle et prefixed to it, somewhat alters the respect of the consideration at the beginning of this proposition. — Presently codex X has perfectivum for directivum, and several codices, as C F G L R S etc., corruptly ductivum.
- 3Vat. minus bene quae. Simile recurrit in sequenti propositione, in qua Vat. habet haec pro hic; utrobique tamen contra maiorem partem mss. ut A C F G H K M P Q S T U W Z cc ee ff et ed. 1.The Vatican edition less well quae. The like recurs in the following proposition, in which the Vatican edition has haec for hic; in both places, however, against the greater part of the manuscripts, as A C F G H K M P Q S T U W Z cc ee ff, and edition 1.
- 4Codd. K et Z, sicuti in praecedentibus, consideremus ut natum. — Mox ex mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3, 6 castigavimus mendum Vat. legentis effectum pro affectum.Codices K and Z, as in what precedes, consideremus ut natum. — Presently, from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, we have corrected the error of the Vatican edition, which reads effectum for affectum.
- 5Vers. 23, ubi Vulgata transponit est post nomen. — Sensus est: sapientia secundum etymologiam tempore S. Doctoris communiter receptam idem est ac sapida scientia, sive scientia, quae dat saporem. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 1; S. Bonav., III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. — Paulo supra ante simul Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 quia loco quae. — In principio sequentis propositionis sub demonstrativo hic subaudi habitus; ed. 1 habet haec, quod refertur ad sapientia. — Mox cod. K cum ed. 1 satis bene principalius loco principaliter.Verse 23, where the Vulgate transposes est after nomen. — The sense is: wisdom, according to the etymology commonly received in the time of the holy Doctor, is the same as savoury science, or science which gives savour. See Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I q. 1 m. 1; St. Bonaventure, III Sent. d. 35 q. 1. — A little above, before simul, the Vatican edition, against almost all the codices and edition 1, has quia in place of quae. — At the beginning of the following proposition, under the demonstrative hic understand habitus; edition 1 has haec, which is referred to sapientia. — Presently codex K, with edition 1, quite well principalius in place of principaliter.
- 6Codd. I et T et fides licet sit in intellectu, tamen quantum est de sui ratione, nata est movere affectum; lectio non spernenda. — Mox cod. X pro Et hoc ponit Quod sic. Dein ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 hic restituimus particulam quod, quae deest in Vat., sed modo loquendi Scholasticorum magis congruit; e contra paulo infra post amorem expunximus fide mss. et ed. 1 in Vat. addita verba et devotionem.Codices I and T et fides licet sit in intellectu, tamen quantum est de sui ratione, nata est movere affectum; a reading not to be despised. — Presently codex X puts Quod sic for Et hoc. Then, from almost all the manuscripts and edition 1, we have here restored the particle quod, which is wanting in the Vatican edition but agrees better with the Scholastics' manner of speaking; on the other hand, a little below, after amorem, we have struck out, on the faith of the manuscripts and of edition 1, the words et devotionem added in the Vatican edition.
- 7Id est, diameter quadrati est incommensurabilis lateri, quae sententia occurrit in IV. Phys. Aristot., ubi iuxta antiquam versionem impressam Venetiis 1489 studio Bernardino de Tridino, textu 120. (ed. Paris. c. 12.) sic legitur: Quoniam neque quod non est, erit in tempore, ut quaecumque non contingunt aliter esse, sicut diametrum esse lateri symetrum. Et ibidem iuxta translationem arabico-latinam: Illud quod impossibile est, ut sit aliter, ut diametrum esse symetrum costae (τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι τῇ πλευρᾷ σύμμετρον.). Pro quo textu in Vat. habetur circulus vincit diametrum, sed obstant codd. et ed. 1.That is, the diameter of a square is incommensurable with its side — a saying which occurs in Aristotle's Physics IV, where, according to the ancient version printed at Venice in 1489 by the care of Bernardino da Trino, at text 120 (Paris edition, c. 12), it reads thus: Since neither will that which is not be in time, as whatever things cannot be otherwise, as that the diameter should be commensurable with the side. And in the same place, according to the Arabic-Latin translation: That which is impossible to be otherwise, as that the diameter should be commensurable with the side (τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι τῇ πλευρᾷ σύμμετρον.). In place of this text the Vatican edition has circulus vincit diametrum, but the codices and edition 1 stand against it.
- 8Subaudi hic et in principio sequentis responsionis: liber iste, vel, scientia praesentis libri.Understand here, and at the beginning of the following reply: this book, or, the science of the present book.
- 9Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd., perturbata propositionis constructione, habet duo ultima pro illud. Immediate post plures codd. ut C F H L O Q etc. minus bene quod loco quia. — Mox post illa supple cum Vat. scientia.The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, with the construction of the proposition disturbed, has duo ultima for illud. Immediately after, several codices, as C F H L O Q etc., less well quod in place of quia. — Presently, after illa, supply with the Vatican edition scientia. ---