Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 18
QUAESTIO III.
Utrum convenientius de Spiritu sancto dicatur donum quam datum.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum convenientius dicatur de Spiritu sancto donum quam datum. Et quod tam convenienter dicatur datum ut1 donum, videtur:
1. Quia Iacobi primo2: Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est; ergo a Spiritu sancto ita sunt data, sicut et dona3: ergo sicut ad ipsum transfertur ratio doni, ita et dati.
2. Item, mobilis et moti est eadem ratio4: ergo similiter dati et donabilis: ergo si donum dicitur in ratione donabilis, datum vero in ratione actualiter dati, ergo eadem est ratio doni et dati, ergo etc.
3. Item, in quolibet genere perfectior est actus quam potentia5: ergo cum datum dicat in actu, donum in potentia, perfectius exprimitur aliquid cum dicitur datum quam donum; sed quod maioris est perfectionis magis proprie convenit Deo: ergo etc.
4. Item, quando aliqua duo dicuntur de aliquo, quorum unum est ratio dicendi alterum de eodem, illud convenientius dicitur, quod est ratio dicendi6; sed datum et donum dicuntur de Spiritu sancto, et, ut vult Augustinus7, «eo donum dicitur, quia datur»: ergo magis proprie dicitur datum.
Contra: 1. Datum convenit Spiritui sancto solum
ex tempore, sed donum aeternaliter: ergo magis proprie dicitur donum.
2. Item, si nunquam actu daretur, donum esset et spiritus esset: ergo videtur, quod magis proprie convenit ei donum8.
3. Item, Glossa super illud Iacobi primo9: Omne datum optimum etc. dicit, quod «datum dicitur quoad naturalia, donum quoad gratuita». Si ergo gratuita aptius appropriantur Spiritui sancto, qui sanctificat, quam naturalia: ergo melius in divinis dicitur de Spiritu sancto donum quam datum.
4. Item, «donum est datio irreddibilis»10; sed quidquid Deus dat, irreddibiliter dat, quia cum det, nihil potest recipere: ergo in divinis datum rationem habet doni et induit eius rationem: ergo convenientius ibi dicitur donum quam datum.
CONCLUSIO.
Spiritus sanctus convenientius dicitur donum quam datum, quod duplici ratione probatur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis in divinis utrumque dicatur, et datum et donum, tamen convenientius dicitur donum. Et huius duplex est ratio. Una quidem est, quia datum, cum sit vel11 participium vel nomen verbale, concernit tempus; donum autem a tempore subtrahit; et ideo, quia omnia divina12 supra tempus sunt, convenientius dicitur in divinis donum quam datum. Alia ratio est, quia donum supra rationem dati addit conditionem liberalitatis sive irreddibilitatis, quae est conditio magnae nobilitatis; et ideo maxime competit13 divinis. Et haec est ratio, quare donum appropriatur gratuitis donis, non tantum ipsi Spiritui sancto, qui est principium gratuitorum donorum.
Ad 1. Et ex hoc patet responsio ad illud de auctoritate beati Iacobi.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod14 mobilis et moti eadem est ratio; dicendum, quod non est simile de mobili et moto, et de dono et dato: quia motum esse addit supra mobile actum15 et dicit totum, quod dicit mobile. Sed datum non dicit totum, quod dicit donum, quantum est de generali intellectu16 nominis, nisi approprietur; «donum enim est datio irreddibilis», et hoc melius patebit in quarto problemate.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus est perfectio potentiae; dicendum, quod aliquid est in potentia ad actum dupliciter: aut propter imperfectionem agentis, aut propter defectum suscipientis. Si sit potentia primo modo, tunc actus est perfectio potentiae; si autem secundo modo, non est perfectio17. Unde si dicatur, quod sol actu lucens, potest domum illuminare, quae non est aperta, et domum apertam illuminat, nulla omnino maior notatur perfectio18 quam ante. Sic intelligendum est de donabilitate et actuali donatione.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod19 datum est ratio dicendi donum, quia ideo donum, quia datur; dicendum, quod non est tota ratio, sicut dicitur in littera20, sed solum in comparatione ad eum cui datur. — Vel potest dici quantum a parte nostri intellectus: ideo donum dicitur, quia datur; sed tamen a parte veritatis21 rei est e converso, quia ideo datur, quia donum est.
I. Solutio ad ult. servire potest ad magis illustrandam solutionem ad 3. Nos quidem res creatas ex donato seu actu donationis nominamus donum, sed hoc non valet de infinito et aeterno dono, quod est Spiritus sanctus, qui minime unquam est in potentia, ut sit donum, et dum donatur, non reducitur ad actum doni, sed tantum donati. Donatum autem, cum donatio fiat in tempore, est ratio tantum extrinseca doni aeterni.
II. In conclusione omnes conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 64. m. 2. ad 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 38. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. I. ad. 2. — Henr. Gand., de hac et duabus seqq. S. a. 61. q. 3. n. 19. 20, et q. 8. n. 9[?]. seqq.
---
QUESTION III.
Whether it is more fittingly said of the Holy Spirit gift than given.
Thirdly it is asked, whether it is more fittingly said of the Holy Spirit gift than given. And that given is said as fittingly as1 gift, it seems:
1. Because in James 12: Every best gift and every perfect donation is from above; therefore from the Holy Spirit things have been given just as also they are gifts3: therefore just as the account of gift is transferred to him, so also that of given.
2. Likewise, of the movable and the moved there is the same account4: therefore similarly of given and donatable: therefore if gift is said in the account of donatable, but given in the account of what is actually given, then the account of gift and of given is the same, therefore etc.
3. Likewise, in any genus actuality is more perfect than potency5: therefore since given expresses [something] in act, gift in potency, something is more perfectly expressed when it is called given than gift; but what is of greater perfection more properly belongs to God: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, when any two things are said of something, of which one is the reason for saying the other of the same, that one is more fittingly said which is the reason for saying6; but given and gift are said of the Holy Spirit, and, as Augustine wills7, «He is called gift because he is given»: therefore given is more properly said.
On the contrary: 1. Given belongs to the Holy Spirit only from time, but gift eternally: therefore gift is more properly said.
2. Likewise, if he were never actually given, gift he would still be and spirit he would be: therefore it seems that gift more properly belongs to him8.
3. Likewise, the Gloss on that text of James 19: Every best gift etc. says, that «given is said with respect to natural [things], gift with respect to gratuitous [things]». If therefore gratuitous [things] are more aptly appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies, than natural [things]: therefore in divine [matters] it is better said of the Holy Spirit gift than given.
4. Likewise, «a gift is a donation that is not to be returned»10; but whatever God gives, he gives irretrievably, because when he gives, he can receive nothing: therefore in divine [matters] given has the account of gift and takes on its account: therefore there it is more fittingly called gift than given.
CONCLUSION.
The Holy Spirit is more fittingly called gift than given, which is proven by a twofold reason.
I respond: It must be said that although in divine [matters] each is said, both given and gift, nevertheless gift is more fittingly said. And of this there is a twofold reason. One indeed is, because given, since it is either11 a participle or a verbal noun, concerns time; but gift withdraws from time; and therefore, since all divine [things]12 are above time, gift is more fittingly said in divine [matters] than given. Another reason is, because gift adds beyond the account of given the condition of liberality or irretrievability, which is a condition of great nobility; and therefore it most belongs13 to divine [matters]. And this is the reason why gift is appropriated to gratuitous gifts, not only to the Holy Spirit himself, who is the principle of gratuitous gifts.
To 1. And from this is clear the response to that [argument] from the authority of blessed James.
To 2. To that which is objected, that14 of the movable and the moved the account is the same; it must be said, that the case of the movable and the moved is not similar to that of gift and given: because to be moved adds beyond the movable an act15 and expresses the whole that the movable expresses. But given does not express the whole that gift expresses, as far as concerns the general meaning16 of the term, unless it be appropriated; «for a gift is a donation that is not to be returned», and this will appear better in the fourth problem.
To 3. To that which is objected, that act is the perfection of potency; it must be said, that something is in potency to act in two ways: either on account of the imperfection of the agent, or on account of the defect of the recipient. If it be in potency in the first way, then act is the perfection of potency; but if in the second way, it is not a perfection17. Hence if it be said that the sun, actually shining, can illuminate a house which is not open, and illuminates a house which is opened, no greater perfection at all18 is noted than before. Thus it must be understood concerning donatability and actual donation.
To 4. To that which is objected, that19 given is the reason for saying gift, because [it is] therefore gift, because it is given; it must be said, that this is not the whole reason, as it is said in the [Master's] text20, but only in comparison to him to whom it is given. — Or it can be said, as far as concerns our intellect: it is therefore called gift because it is given; but yet on the side of the truth21 of the matter it is the reverse, because it is therefore given because it is gift.
I. The solution to the last [objection] can serve to illustrate further the solution to the third. We indeed name created things gift from the given or from the act of donation, but this does not hold of the infinite and eternal Gift, who is the Holy Spirit, who is by no means ever in potency to be a Gift, and while he is given, he is not reduced to the act of gift, but only of given. Given, however, since donation comes about in time, is only an extrinsic account of the eternal Gift.
II. In the conclusion all agree. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 64, m. 2, ad 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; Summa I, q. 38, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, little question 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1, ad 2. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the two following, Summa a. 61, q. 3, nn. 19, 20, and q. 8, n. 9[?] ff.
---
- Cod. A quam loco ut.Codex A [reads] quam in place of ut.
- Vers. 17. — Paulo infra post sancto ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ita, quod Vat. cum cod. cc minus bene omittit.Verse 17. — A little below, after sancto, from older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied ita, which the Vatican edition with codex cc less well omits.
- Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. dono. Mox post sic cod. M addit donum.The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] dono. Soon after, after sic, codex M adds donum.
- B. Albert., hic a. 2. eandem propos. ita exhibet: Mobilis et moti una ratio substantiae est, non differens nisi per actum et potentiam. — Paulo post nonnulli codd. ut T V dicit pro dicitur. Dein Vat. cum cod. cc minus apte et praeter fidem aliorum codd. cum ed. 1 actualitatis pro actualiter.Bl. Albert, here a. 2, presents the same proposition thus: Of the movable and the moved there is one account of substance, not differing except by act and potency. — A little after, several codices such as T, V [read] dicit for dicitur. Then the Vatican edition with codex cc, less aptly and contrary to the testimony of the other codices with edition 1, [reads] actualitatis for actualiter.
- Cfr. Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 15. (VIII. c. 8.), ubi probatur, actum esse priorem substantia (i. e. perfectione) quam potentia.Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 15 (VIII, c. 8), where it is proven that act is prior in substance (i.e., in perfection) to potency.
- Simile est dictum Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2: Propter quod est unumquodque, et illud magis. Et II. Metaph. text. 4. (I. brev. c. 1.): Unumquodque vero idipsum maxime aliorum est, secundum quod aliis univocatio inest. — Mox fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus dicuntur loco dicitur.A similar saying of Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 2: That on account of which each thing is, that itself [is so] more. And Metaphysics II, text 4 (I, abbrev., c. 1): But each thing is itself most of all of the others, according as univocity is in them. — Soon after, on the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted dicuntur in place of dicitur.
- Libr. XV. de Trin. c. 19. n. 36; vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.Book XV, On the Trinity, c. 19, n. 36; see here the text of the Master, c. 2.
- In cod. I additur hic aliud argumentum: Item (donum) dicit comparationem personae ad personam, datum vero personae ad creaturam; sed magis proprie comparatur persona ad personam quam persona ad creaturam: ergo convenientius dicitur donum de Spiritu sancto quam donum (datum).In codex I there is added here another argument: Likewise, gift expresses a relation of person to person, but given of person to creature; but more properly is a person related to a person than a person to a creature: therefore it is more fittingly said gift of the Holy Spirit than gift (given).
- Vers. 17, apud Lyranum: Datum refertur ad naturam, donum ad gratiam.Verse 17, in Lyra: Given refers to nature, gift to grace.
- Aristot., IV. Top. c. 1. Vide supra q. 2. arg. 4. ad opp. — Mox cod. S cum dat loco cum det.Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 1. See above, q. 2, arg. 4 to the contrary. — Soon after, codex S [reads] cum dat in place of cum det.
- Ex multis mss. ut AFGISTX etc. et ed. 1 adiecimus vel. Haec ratio explicatur verbis B. Alberti, hic a. 2: Datum, quod est participium et consignificat tempus, similiter datio et donatio nomina sunt verbalia et ita actus temporales consignificantia, licet non consignificent tempus.From many manuscripts such as AFGISTX etc. and edition 1 we have added vel. This reason is explained in the words of Bl. Albert, here a. 2: Given, which is a participle and co-signifies time, likewise donation and donating are verbal nouns and thus co-signify temporal acts, although they do not co-signify time.
- Multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 dona pro divina, et ed. 1 dona loco omnia, sed minus apte, ut per se patet; error codicum forsan ex abbreviatione verbi divina ortus est. S. Thomas a. 2. allerens ait: Inde est, quod donum competit magis divinis, quae sine tempore sunt, quam datum. — Paulo ante codd. L O cum ed. 1 abstrahit loco subtrahit, quae lectio communi loquendi modo magis congruit.Many codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] dona for divina, and edition 1 [reads] dona in place of omnia, but less aptly, as is clear of itself; the error of the codices perhaps arose from an abbreviation of the word divina. St. Thomas, alleging a. 2, says: Hence it is that gift belongs more to divine [things], which are without time, than given. — A little before, codices L, O with edition 1 [read] abstrahit in place of subtrahit, which reading is more congruent with the common manner of speaking.
- Nonnulli codd. ut I W convenit.Several codices such as I, W [read] convenit.
- In pluribus mss. ut A T V et ed. 1 deest quod. Paulo infra plurimi mss. cum sex primis edd. donato pro dato, quod minus congruit subnexis.In several manuscripts such as A, T, V and edition 1, quod is missing. A little below, most manuscripts with the first six editions [read] donato for dato, which agrees less with what follows.
- Multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt actum, pluresque ut ACSVW aa bb dein cum edd. 3, 6 ponunt motum loco mobile; cod. cc vero cum ed. 2. habet mobile motum.Many codices with edition 1 omit actum, and several such as ACSVW, aa, bb, then with editions 3, 6 put motum in place of mobile; codex cc, however, with edition 2 has mobile motum.
- Cod. V intentione. Paulo infra cod. Z sed pro et.Codex V [reads] intentione. A little below, codex Z [reads] sed for et.
- In cod. V additur potentiae.In codex V potentiae is added.
- Aliqui codd. ut LOZ addunt bene in sole.Some codices such as L, O, Z rightly add in sole.
- Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus quod.From most manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied quod.
- Cap. 2.Chapter 2.
- Vat. praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 omittit veritatis.The Vatican edition, against the testimony of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, omits veritatis.