Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 5

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 18

Textus Latinus

p. 329

QUAESTIO V.

Utrum donum sive donabilitas sit proprietas distinctiva Spiritus sancti.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum donabilitas sive donum sit proprietas distinctiva personae¹ Spiritus sancti. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Dicit enim² Augustinus quinto de Trinitate³: «Eo est donum, quo spiritus»; sed spiritus est proprietas distinctiva: ergo et donum.

2. Item, Augustinus quinto de Trinitate⁴, assignans differentiam processionis Filii et Spiritus sancti, hanc ponit, quod ille procedit per modum nati, sed iste per modum doni; ergo si haec differentia attenditur penes proprietates distinctivas, ut patet, quia nativitas est proprietas Filii: ergo et donabilitas sive donum est proprietas Spiritus sancti.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur⁵ ratione, quia omnis proprietas, secundum quam persona differt ab omnibus aliis, est personae proprietas distinctiva: sed donum inest soli personae⁶ Spiritus sancti et semper⁷: ergo est proprietas eius personalis⁸.

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4. Item, proprietates in divinis sunt relationes; sed Augustinus dicit in quinto de Trinitate⁹, quod «relatio, secundum quam refertur Spiritus sanctus¹⁰ ad Patrem et Filium, magis apparet in hoc nomine donum quam in hoc nomine spiritus»: ergo utraque est personalis.

Contra:

1. Nihil dicens respectum ad creaturas est proprietas distinctiva personae, quia, omni respectu ad creaturam circumscripto, tenet distinctio personalis; sed donum dicit respectum ad eum cui datur: ergo etc. Si dicebat¹¹, quod non est proprietas secundum comparationem, quam habet ad creaturas, sed ad dantem: pari ratione missio Spiritus sancti¹² erit proprietas distinctiva, cum dicat respectum ad mittentem.

2. Item, omnis proprietas distinctiva dicitur ab actu, non ab habitu. Unde Pater dicitur, quia generat, Filius, quia generatur, Spiritus vero sanctus, quia spiratur; sed donum non dicitur ab actu donandi, sed ab habitu, alioquin non diceretur ab aeterno¹³: ergo etc.

3. Item, nullius alterius personae proprietas distinctiva accipitur in relatione ad creaturas¹⁴ vel dicit respectum; sed donum dicit hoc: ergo non est proprietas distinctiva.

4. Item, si donum est proprietas distinctiva Spiritus sancti et eius notio, tunc ergo spiritus sanctus et amor non est proprietas: quodsi¹⁵ spiritus sanctus et amor est proprietas, ergo sunt septem notiones, quod est contra communem opinionem omnium. Si dicas, quod eadem notio¹⁶ importatur per haec tria nomina, ergo videntur nomina synonyma, ut Marcus, Tullius, quod aeque magnum inconveniens est: ergo etc.

CONCLUSIO.

Donum est proprietas distinctiva Spiritus sancti secundum¹⁷ respectum ad dantem, quin tamen excludatur ratio donabilitatis sive respectus secundum aptitudinem ad eum cui datur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod donum dupliciter est in divinis considerare: uno modo, prout dicit respectum solum ad donatorem; et hoc modo dicit Augustinus¹⁸, quod «eo dicitur donum, quo procedit»; et sic dicunt, quod donum est proprietas distinctiva Spiritus sancti. Alio modo accipitur¹⁹ donum, prout dicit respectum ad eum cui datur: et sic non dicit proprietatem distinctivam, sed consequens ad proprietatem distinctivam.

Sed illud non videtur posse stare. Nam donum semper aliquam comparationem dicit ad eum cui datur; intellecto enim, quod non sit donabilis alicui, impossibile est intelligere, quod sit donum.

Et propter hoc aliter dicendum, sicut prius tactum est²⁰, quod donum praeter respectum, quem importat ad dantem, importat respectum ad eum cui datur. Sed hoc potest esse tripliciter: vel secundum actum, ut quia datus²¹; vel secundum habitum, ut quia dandus; vel secundum aptitudinem, ut quia donabilis. Et iste respectus²² adeo coniunctus est primo, ut primus sine hoc non possit esse nec intelligi, immo de necessitate sequitur, si procedit per modum doni, quod sit donabilis: et ideo sequens respectus non aufert primo, quin sit proprietas distinctiva²³. Dicendum ergo, quod est proprietas distinctiva ratione primi respectus, secundo respectu non repugnante, sed consonante.

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Ad 1. Ex hoc patet responsio ad primum, quia ille respectus talis est, quod non potest circumscribi secundum aptitudinem ob emanationem per modum liberalitatis. Et patet quod non est simile de missione, quia dicit respectum secundum actum, non secundum aptitudinem.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas distinctiva debet dicere actum; dicendum, quod donum dicit duplicem respectum²⁴, et ratione huius dicit comparationem ad duplicem actum. Ratione primi respectus dicit actum processionis, ratione secundi dicit actum communicationis. Primum actum importat in actu, secundum in habitu; et ratione primi est proprietas distinctiva, non ratione secundi.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in alia persona hoc non est; respondent²⁵ quidam, quod Spiritus sanctus est tertia persona; ideo nobis secundum rationem intelligendi immediatior, et ideo proprietas eius sumitur in comparatione ad nos, non sic in aliis.

Aliter potest solvi per interemptionem, quia, sicut donum respectum dicit ad creaturas, ita et alia²⁶ haec proprietas, quae est verbum, ut infra patebit²⁷.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de pluralitate notionum; dicendum, quod spiritus, amor et donum eandem proprietatem dicunt, ratione differentem. Eandem, inquam, notionem dicunt, quia dicunt comparationem ad idem et dicunt eandem emanationem, sed tamen differenter eam nominant. Nam spiritus dicit eam principaliter per comparationem ad vim producentem, quae est vis spirativa; amor principaliter quantum ad modum emanandi, quia ut nexus; donum vero quantum ad respectum²⁸ consequentem. Et similiter emanationem Verbi contingit tripliciter significare, scilicet per hoc nomen filius, imago et verbum. Quia enim²⁹ a vi naturae, filius; quia per modum expressum, imago; quia aliis expressivum, ideo verbum. Similiter, quia a vi spirativa, spiritus; quia per modum nexus, amor; quia nos natus connectere, donum. Et sic patet, quod una est notio aliter et aliter nominata secundum rationes consequentes³⁰, ideo non est ibi synonymia.

Scholion

I. Postquam in praeced. quaestione S. Doctor probavit, donum esse nomen personale Spiritus sancti, non essentiale, in hac duplicem resolvit quaestionem. Prima est, utrum donum non tantum significet proprietatem in Spiritu sancto, sed proprietatem distinctivam. Duplicis enim generis sunt proprietates in divinis: aliae sunt quidem personarum, sed non personales in stricto sensu, i. e. personarum distinctivae vel etiam constitutivae; sic est spiratio activa in Patre et Filio, quae neutram personam nec constituit nec distinguit, cum sit duabus personis communis. Aliae simul personam distinguunt et constituunt, ut Paternitas, Filiatio et Spiratio passiva. Unde dicit S. Bonaventura (infra d. 28. q. 3.): «Ad hoc, quod aliqua relatio sit personalis, oportet quod dicat illius personae primam et propriam habitudinem et per modum positionis et completionis»; cfr. etiam d. 26. q. 2. et 3. — Prima haec quaestio resolvitur cum sententia communi affirmative et probatur argumentis in fundam. Inter auctores est tamen differentia opinionis circa incidentem quaestionem, utrum haec proprietas sit non tantum distinctiva, sed etiam constitutiva. Hoc videtur affirmare Magister docendo, quod donum sit formaliter ipsa processio Spiritus sancti. Scotus vero (hic q. unica) hoc negat, cum iuxta ipsum donum primo et principaliter significet respectum ad creaturas et tantum ex consequenti aliquid notionale. Sed quod ex consequenti tantum ad aliquam rem pertinet, non potest esse eiusdem constitutivum, sed ad summum distinctivum. At S. Bonav. et Richard. a Med. (hic q. 2.) docent, donum significare per se relationem ad dantem, sed cum respectu superaddito donabilitatis, et ratione primi esse proprietatem distinctivam per se, et non tantum ex consequenti, ut vult Scotus: ergo etiam constitutivam.

De altera quaestione agitur in ipsa responsione, quae est haec: si donum est proprietas Spiritus sancti, et si in dono sunt duo respectus, et ad dantem et ad eum cui datur: iterum quaeritur, utrum sit proprietas distinctiva solummodo secundum primum respectum, qui importat originem, an etiam aliquo modo secundum respectum ad creaturas. Hic respectus ad creaturas triplici modo potest intelligi, nempe vel secundum actum (ut datum), vel secundum habitum (ut dandum), vel secundum aptitudinem (ut donabile). Si respectus ad creaturas primo et secundo modo intelligitur, ipse manifeste non potest esse proprietas personarum distinctiva. Si tertio modo, tunc controvertitur, et ponuntur illae sententiae, quae in Resp.[?] exponuntur. Prima opinio hanc Spiritus sancti aptitudinem, ut creaturis donetur, omnino excludit a proprietate eius distinctiva, hac praesertim innixa ratione, quod haec donabilitas sit aliquid proprietatem distinctivam consequens. Secunda opinio, quam approbat S. Bonav. cum Richardo, asserit, donabilitatem non posse penitus excludi a proprietate distinctiva Spiritus sancti, licet donum sit primario proprietas distinctiva propter respectum ad dantem. Quoad rationem adductam concedit Sanctus (ad 1.), donabilitatem dicere respectum consequentem; sed[?] putat, hunc respectum esse ita coniunctum alteri ad dantem, ut donum sine donabilitate nequeat intelligi, sive aliis verbis, esse quidem consequens, sed ut aliquid intrinsece proprium, simili modo ut ratio risibilis propria est homini.

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— Eandem [sententiam] S. Bonaventura explicat infra d. 27. p. II. q. 2., ubi quoad nomen Verbi loquitur. Ceteri antiqui[?] hinc discedunt, et explicationem indicunt[?]. Quia[?] II. CIV. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 64. m. 1. — S. Thom., I. q. 38. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1.³¹

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English Translation

p. 329

QUESTION V.

Whether gift, or donability, is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit.

Fifthly it is asked, whether donability or gift is the distinctive property of the person¹ of the Holy Spirit. And that it is, it seems.

1. For Augustine says², in On the Trinity V³: «He is Gift by that by which He is Spirit»; but spirit is a distinctive property: therefore also gift.

2. Likewise, Augustine in On the Trinity V⁴, assigning the difference between the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, sets down this, that the former proceeds in the manner of one born, but the latter in the manner of gift; therefore if this difference is reckoned in terms of distinctive properties, as is plain, since nativity is the property of the Son: therefore also donability or gift is the property of the Holy Spirit.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow]⁵ by reason, because every property according to which a person differs from all others is the distinctive property of that person: but gift belongs to the person⁶ of the Holy Spirit alone and always⁷: therefore it is His personal property⁸.

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4. Likewise, properties in divine [matters] are relations; but Augustine says, in On the Trinity V⁹, that «the relation according to which the Holy Spirit¹⁰ is referred to the Father and the Son appears more in this name gift than in this name spirit»: therefore each is personal.

On the contrary:

1. Nothing expressing a relation to creatures is a distinctive property of a person, because, every relation to creature being set aside, the personal distinction [still] holds; but gift expresses a relation to him to whom it is given: therefore etc. If he were saying¹¹, that it is not a property according to the comparison which it has to creatures, but to the giver: by parity of reason the mission of the Holy Spirit¹² would be a distinctive property, since it expresses a relation to the sender.

2. Likewise, every distinctive property is named from an act, not from a habit. Hence the Father is so called because He generates, the Son because He is generated, the Holy Spirit indeed because He is breathed; but gift is not named from the act of giving, but from a habit, otherwise He would not be called [Gift] from eternity¹³: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the distinctive property of no other person is taken in relation to creatures¹⁴ or expresses a relation; but gift expresses this: therefore it is not a distinctive property.

4. Likewise, if gift is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit and His notion, then therefore holy spirit and love is not a property: but if¹⁵ holy spirit and love is a property, then there are seven notions, which is contrary to the common opinion of all. If you say that the same notion¹⁶ is conveyed by these three names, then the names appear synonymous, like Marcus, Tullius, which is an equally great absurdity: therefore etc.

CONCLUSION.

Gift is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit according to¹⁷ the relation to the giver, without however the account of donability or relation according to aptitude toward him to whom it is given being excluded.

I respond: It must be said that on this matter some have said that gift in divine [matters] is to be considered in two ways: in one way, insofar as it expresses a relation to the giver alone; and in this way Augustine says¹⁸ that «He is therefore called gift because He proceeds»; and so they say that gift is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit. In another way gift is taken¹⁹ insofar as it expresses a relation to him to whom it is given: and thus it does not express a distinctive property, but [something] consequent upon a distinctive property.

But that does not seem able to stand. For gift always expresses some comparison to him to whom it is given; for, given the understanding that He is not donatable to anyone, it is impossible to understand that He is gift.

And on account of this it must be said otherwise, as was touched upon before²⁰, that gift, beyond the relation which it conveys to the giver, conveys a relation to him to whom it is given. But this can be in three ways: either according to act, as because [He has been] given²¹; or according to habit, as because [He is] to be given; or according to aptitude, as because [He is] donatable. And this [last] relation²² is so joined to the first that the first cannot exist nor be understood without it; rather, of necessity it follows, if He proceeds in the manner of gift, that He is donatable: and therefore the consequent relation does not take from the first that it be a distinctive property²³. It must be said, therefore, that it is a distinctive property by reason of the first relation, the second relation not opposing but consonant.

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To 1. From this is plain the response to the first, because that relation is such that it cannot be set aside as to aptitude, on account of the emanation by way of liberality. And it is plain that the case is not similar concerning mission, because it expresses a relation according to act, not according to aptitude.

To 2. To that which is objected, that a distinctive property must express an act; it must be said, that gift expresses a twofold relation²⁴, and by reason of this expresses a comparison to a twofold act. By reason of the first relation it expresses the act of procession, by reason of the second it expresses the act of communication. The first act it conveys in act, the second in habit; and by reason of the first it is a distinctive property, not by reason of the second.

To 3. To that which is objected, that in another person this is not [the case]; some respond²⁵, that the Holy Spirit is the third person; therefore [He is] more immediate to us according to the manner of understanding, and therefore His property is taken in comparison to us, not so in the others.

It can otherwise be solved by interemption [refutation], because, just as gift expresses a relation to creatures, so also²⁶ this other property, which is Word, as will appear below²⁷.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning the plurality of notions; it must be said, that spirit, love and gift express the same property, differing in account. They express the same notion, I say, because they express a comparison to the same [thing] and express the same emanation, but yet they name it differently. For spirit expresses it principally through comparison to the producing power, which is the spirative power; love principally as to the manner of emanating, because [it is] as a bond; but gift as to the consequent relation²⁸. And similarly the emanation of the Word it happens to signify in three ways, namely through this name son, image, and word. For because²⁹ from the power of nature, son; because in an expressed manner, image; because expressive of others, therefore word. Similarly, because from the spirative power, spirit; because in the manner of a bond, love; because born to connect us, gift. And so it is plain, that one is the notion otherwise and otherwise named according to the consequent accounts³⁰, therefore there is no synonymity here.

Scholion

I. After in the preceding question the Holy Doctor proved that gift is a personal name of the Holy Spirit, not essential, in this [question] he resolves a twofold question. The first is whether gift not only signifies a property in the Holy Spirit, but a distinctive property. For there are properties of two kinds in divine [matters]: some are indeed of the persons, but not personal in the strict sense — i.e., distinctive of persons or even constitutive; such is active spiration in the Father and the Son, which neither constitutes nor distinguishes either person, since it is common to two persons. Others distinguish and constitute the person at once, such as Paternity, Filiation and passive Spiration. Hence St. Bonaventure says (below d. 28, q. 3): «For some relation to be personal, it must express the first and proper habitude of that person and in the manner of position and completion»; cf. also d. 26, qq. 2 and 3. — This first question is resolved, with the common opinion, in the affirmative, and is proven by the arguments in the fundamenta. Among the authors, however, there is a difference of opinion regarding the incidental question, whether this property is not only distinctive but also constitutive. The Master seems to affirm this by teaching that gift is formally the very procession of the Holy Spirit. But Scotus (here, the single question) denies this, since according to him gift primarily and principally signifies a relation to creatures and only consequently something notional. But what pertains only consequently to some thing cannot be the constitutive of the same, but at most distinctive. But St. Bonaventure and Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 2) teach that gift signifies per se the relation to the giver, but with the added relation of donability, and that by reason of the first it is a distinctive property per se, and not only consequently, as Scotus holds: therefore also constitutive.

The other question is treated in the response itself, which is this: if gift is the property of the Holy Spirit, and if in gift there are two relations, both to the giver and to him to whom it is given: it is again asked whether it is a distinctive property only according to the first relation, which conveys origin, or also in some way according to the relation to creatures. This relation to creatures can be understood in three ways, namely either according to act (as given), or according to habit (as to-be-given), or according to aptitude (as donatable). If the relation to creatures is understood in the first and second ways, it manifestly cannot be a property distinctive of persons. If in the third way, then it is controverted, and there are set down those opinions which are expounded in the Response[?]. The first opinion excludes this aptitude of the Holy Spirit — namely, that He be given to creatures — entirely from His distinctive property, relying especially on this reason, that this donability is something consequent upon the distinctive property. The second opinion, which St. Bonaventure approves, with Richard, asserts that donability cannot be wholly excluded from the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit, although gift is primarily a distinctive property on account of the relation to the giver. As to the reason adduced, the Saint concedes (to 1) that donability expresses a consequent relation; but[?] he holds that this relation is so joined to the other one toward the giver that gift cannot be understood without donability, or in other words, that it is indeed consequent, but as something intrinsically proper, in a manner similar to that in which the account risible is proper to man.

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— St. Bonaventure explains the same [opinion] below d. 27, p. II, q. 2, where he speaks regarding the name Word. The other ancients[?] depart from this, and indicate[?] [a different] explanation. Because[?] II. CIV. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 64, m. 1. — St. Thomas, I, q. 38. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1.³¹

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Apparatus Criticus

Cod. I addit enim. Mox cod. W istud loco importat. — Vat. propriam.
Codex I adds enim. Soon after, codex W [reads] istud in place of importat. — The Vatican edition [reads] propriam.
Vat. propriam.
The Vatican edition [reads] propriam.
In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest responsio.
In most manuscripts and edition 1, responsio is missing.
Vat. cum mss. et ed. 1 omittit personae.
The Vatican edition with the manuscripts and edition 1 omits personae.
Aliqui codd. ut T aa etc. et ed. 1 enuntiabitur Filii generationem, qui et paulo infra ponunt communicabitur loco communicatur; Vat. communicabitur Filio in operatione, alii codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 communicabitur Filii generationi. In hac responsionis fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus emanat pro emanavit. Dein aliqui codd. ut I S et ed. 1 differentia insinuatur. — Paulo infra in multis mss. tantum loco solum.
Some codices such as T, aa etc. and edition 1 [read] enuntiabitur Filii generationem, and a little below put communicabitur in place of communicatur; the Vatican [reads] communicabitur Filio in operatione, other codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] communicabitur Filii generationi. In this response, on the testimony of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted emanat for emanavit. Then some codices such as I, S and edition 1 [read] differentia insinuatur. — A little below in many manuscripts tantum in place of solum.
Cap. 11, 12 et IV. c. 20. n. 29, Vide hic lit. Magistri c. 2, ex quo haec verba sumpta sunt.
Chs. 11, 12, and IV, c. 20, n. 29; see here the text of the Master, c. 2, from which these words are taken.
Cap. 11, et 14, et 16; cfr. hic lit. Magistri c. 3, in princ. — Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 decimo loco quinto.
Cc. 11, and 14, and 16; cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3, in the beginning. — Some codices with edition 1 [read] decimo in place of quinto.
Aliqui codd. ut S Z hic creaturas, quod etiam multo plures codd. cum ed. 1 paulo infra loco creaturam exhibent.
Some codices such as S, Z here [read] creaturas, which also many more codices with edition 1 a little below exhibit in place of creaturam.
Codd. sunt inter se divisi; alii ut F G K M V Z omittunt illa, alii cum Vat. et ed. 1 ponunt haec pro hic illa, alii ut S. Bonac. — Tom. 1.
The codices are divided among themselves; some such as F, G, K, M, V, Z omit illa; others with the Vatican and edition 1 put haec for hic illa; others as Tom. I of S. Bonaventure.
Cod. V ostenditur. Paulo infra cod. A differt[?].
Codex V [reads] ostenditur. A little below codex A differs[?].
In hoc argumento secundum illud enuntiari, quod proprietas rei est distinctivum ipsius, et vice versa, promiscue adhibemus termini proprietas, secundum quam persona differt ab omnibus aliis, et inest soli personae et semper (cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio), ac proprietas personae distinctiva et proprietas personalis, ideoque a parte rei ipsum argumentum ex pluribus contractum exhibetur. Vel dic, quod loco minoris iuxta formam syllogisticam ponendae; sed donum est proprietas, secundum quam persona Spiritus sancti differt ab omnibus aliis, ponitur ratio ipsius.
In this argument, according to that statement, that the property of a thing is the distinctive of itself, and vice versa, we apply indiscriminately the terms property, according to which a person differs from all others, and belongs to the person alone and always (cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, c. on the Proper), and distinctive property of a person and personal property; and therefore on the side of the thing itself the argument is presented as contracted from several. Or say that, in the place of the minor [premise] which would be set down in syllogistic form — but gift is the property according to which the person of the Holy Spirit differs from all others — there is set down its reason.
Cap. 11. n. 12.
C. 11, n. 12.
Cod. A addit sanctus; cod. O autem ergo hoc nomen donum magis dicit proprietatem distinctivam quam hoc nomen spiritus sanctus.
Codex A adds sanctus; codex O however [reads] therefore this name gift more expresses the distinctive property than this name holy spirit.
In Vat. deest Spiritus sancti, quod tamen in mss. et ed. 1 invenitur.
In the Vatican [edition] Spiritus sancti is missing, which however is found in the manuscripts and edition 1.
Ed. 1 aeternaliter pro ab aeterno.
Edition 1 [reads] aeternaliter for ab aeterno.
Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 creaturam. Mox post respectum supple cum cod. B (in margine) ad creaturas. In fine argumenti codd. L O addunt Spiritus sancti, certe subaudiendum.
The Vatican, against the testimony of the older manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] creaturam. Soon after respectum supply with codex B (in the margin) ad creaturas. At the end of the argument codices L, O add Spiritus sancti, certainly to be understood.
Ita plurimi codd. cum ed. 1; Vat. quia.
Thus most codices with edition 1; Vatican [reads] quia.
Ex pluribus mss. ut T H M Q T Z supplevimus notio, pro quo cod. O habet proprietas, alii autem codd. cum ed. 1, verbis incongrue transpositis, quod eadem importantur nomina per haec tria. Paulo infra post Marcus ope mss. et sex primarum edd. expunximus et.
From several manuscripts such as T, H, M, Q, T, Z we have supplied notio, in place of which codex O has proprietas, but other codices with edition 1, with the words incongruously transposed, [read] quod eadem importantur nomina per haec tria. A little below, after Marcus, by aid of the manuscripts and the first six editions we have expunged et.
Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 20. n. 29, et V. c. 11. n. 12. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
Book IV, On the Trinity, c. 20, n. 29, and Book V, c. 11, n. 12. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
Vat. cum aliquibus mss. dicitur.
The Vatican with some manuscripts [reads] dicitur.
Hic q. 2.
Here q. 2.
Subintellige hic et in sequentibus distinctionis membris: Spiritus sanctus. — Vat., referendo participia ad donum, praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 ponit datum, dandum, donabile.
Understand here and in the following members of the distinction: the Holy Spirit. — The Vatican, referring the participles to donum, contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, puts datum, dandum, donabile.
Id est tertius modus secundi respectus. — Mox post primo ed. 1 explicative addit scilicet qui est ad dantem, et cod. T in margine qui est per respectum ad dantem. Mox plures codd. ut M I K UU V post primus perperam adiungunt ita quod. Item plures mss. ut C F G H K S V Z habent nec pro non, et paulo infra cod. V qui loco si.
That is, the third mode of the second relation. — Soon after primo edition 1 explicatively adds namely the one which is toward the giver, and codex T in the margin which is by relation to the giver. Soon after, several codices such as M, I, K, UU, V after primus wrongly add ita quod. Likewise several manuscripts such as C, F, G, H, K, S, V, Z have nec for non, and a little below codex V [reads] qui in place of si.
In cod. R additur ratione primi respectus. Mox aliqui codd. ut H P Q Y Unde dicendum pro Dicendum ergo. Paulo infra mendum Vat. ponentis respectui pro respectu correximus fide mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
In codex R is added by reason of the first relation. Soon after some codices such as H, P, Q, Y [read] Unde dicendum for Dicendum ergo. A little below we have corrected the error of the Vatican which puts respectui for respectu, on the testimony of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6.
In cod. T adiungitur scilicet ad dantem et ad recipientem.
In codex T is added namely to the giver and to the receiver.
Vat., reluctantibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, respondet. Paulo infra post immediatior cod. I addit est.
The Vatican, contrary to the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, [reads] respondet. A little below after immediatior codex I adds est.
Dist. 27. p. II. q. 2.
Distinction 27, p. II, q. 2.
Ed. 1 adiungit communem. Mox ex plurimis codd. posuimus significare pro significari.
Edition 1 adds communem. Soon after, from most codices we have put significare for significari.
Vat. cum cod. cc omittit enim, quod in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 exstat. Dein Vat. post modum falso et praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. expressivum loco expressum. Cfr. verba S. Doctoris ex d. 27. p. II. q. 3: Nam sapientia vel notitia dicit primum in intelligendo; deinde filius, qui dicit ipsam emanationem sive conceptionem; deinde imago, quae dicit modum expressum emanandi; et tertio loco verbum, quod dicit haec omnia et superaddit rationem exprimendi et manifestandi. — Paulo infra post Similiter ex aliquibus mss. ut X Z et ed. 1 adiecimus quia, quod in multis mss. et Vat. minus bene deest.
The Vatican with codex cc omits enim, which exists in the older manuscripts and edition 1. Then the Vatican, after modum, falsely and contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] expressivum in place of expressum. Cf. the words of the Holy Doctor from d. 27, p. II, q. 3: For wisdom or knowledge expresses the first in understanding; then son, which expresses the very emanation or conception; then image, which expresses the expressed manner of emanating; and in the third place word, which expresses all these and superadds the account of expressing and manifesting. — A little below after Similiter from some manuscripts such as X, Z and edition 1 we have added quia, which in many manuscripts and the Vatican is less aptly missing.
Cod. Y differentes, sed minus distincte, ut patet ex verbis d. 27. p. II. q. 3. modo citatis.
Codex Y [reads] differentes, but less distinctly, as is plain from the words of d. 27, p. II, q. 3, just cited.
Bibliographic continuation of Scholion II at the head of p. 332; the OCR of this fragment is heavily garbled (apparent reference to Bonaventure d. 27. p. II. q. 2., Alex. Hal. S. p. I. q. 64. m. 1., S. Thom. I. q. 38., B. Albert hic a. 3., Petr. a Tar. hic q. 2., Richard. a Med. hic q. 1.). No dedicated footer note on p. 332 belongs to the q. 5 section; the page footers serve q. 6.
This footnote marks the bibliographic continuation of Scholion II at the top of p. 332. The Quaracchi printed text is here heavily garbled in the IA djvu OCR; readings are reconstructed conjecturally and the citations preserved as best they can be made out.

← Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 4 Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 6→