Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 21
ARTICULUS I. De dictionibus exclusivis additis termino substantiali.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum vere dicatur: solus Deus est Pater.
Quod autem vere addatur huic termino Deus a parte subiecti, ostenditur hoc modo: Deus habet aliquid proprium; sed proprium est quod inest soli1: ergo etc. Et quia constat, quod exclusio vere additur termino substantiali respectu praedicati essentialis, unde bene dicitur: solus Deus creat; quaeritur, utrum vere addatur ei respectu praedicati proprii sive2 termini relativi, utrum scilicet vere dicatur: solus Deus est Pater. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per suam expositionem, quae est: solus Deus est Pater, id est3 non alius quam Deus est Pater: ergo solus Deus est Pater. Et quod sit ista eius expositio, hoc habetur et a communi usu et a Philosopho4, qui dicit, quod «solus idem est quod non cum alio».
2. Item, hoc videtur a convertibili, quoniam istae duae convertuntur: nihil praeter Petrum currit, ergo solus Petrus currit: ergo et istae duae: nihil praeter Deum est Pater, et solus Deus est Pater. Sed prima est vera, quia haec est falsa: nihil est Pater, et non habet instantiam nisi in Deo5: ergo etc.
3. Item, a quocumque removetur6 quod est in plus, removetur quod est in minus7; sed esse Deum est in plus quam esse Patrem: ergo a quocumque removetur Deus, et Pater. Sed quaecumque sic se habent, quod a quocumque removetur unum, et alterum, unum praecise praedicatur de altero, nec habet instantiam: ergo Pater praecise praedicatur de Deo; sed si praecise, ergo cum exclusione: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Terminus accidentalis implicat rem suam circa suum subiectum — ut patet, cum dicitur: homo albus currit, circa hunc terminum homo implicatur albedo — ergo similiter cum dicitur: solus Deus est Pater, circa Deum implicatur solitudo. Sed Hilarius8 dicit, quod «Deus non est solitarius confitendus»: ergo etc. Et ratio ista concludit, quod non possit vere addi nec cum praedicato proprio nec communi.
2. Item, ostenditur, quod non possit vere addi respectu praedicati communis, ut cum dicitur: solus Deus creat. Hoc enim nomen Deus de se habet suppositionem quasi indefinitam respectu personarum9, ergo reddit locutionem veram pro aliquo; sed pro quolibet est falsa — haec enim est falsa: solus
Pater est — ergo cum omne praedicatum essentiale conveniat totius, et non uni soli, nullo modo potest addi dictio exclusiva respectu talis praedicati subiecto communi.
3. Item, quod non respectu proprii, videtur, quia si haec est vera: solus Deus est Pater: ergo a simplici conversa et haec: solus Pater est Deus; sed ista est falsa: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod non convertitur simpliciter; contra: habet intellectum universalis negativae et particularis affirmativae, et utraque convertitur simpliciter: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Terminus solus in divinis non dicitur categorematice, ut idem sensus sit ac solitarius; bene autem dicitur syncategorematice respectu praedicati cum substantialis, tum personalis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod haec dictio solus potest esse categorema, vel syncategorema10. Secundum quod est categorema, sic est nomen adiectivum, absolute11 ponens rem suam circa suum substantivum, et res sua est solitudo. Unde tantum valet sic solus quantum12 solitarius. Et quia solitudo nullo modo recipitur in divinis quantum ad substantiam, quia est in multis personis, hoc nomen solus non recipitur in divinis cum terminis13 substantialibus, sicut ostendit prima ratio.
Si autem accipiatur14 in quantum est syncategorema, sic privat associationem et importat aliquam negationem. Et sic, cum aliquod praedicatum et substantiale et personale praecise dicatur15 de nomine substantiali, sic vere dicitur in divinis et respectu praedicati16 substantialis, ut cum dicitur: solus Deus creat, et respectu personalis, ut cum dicitur: solus Deus est Pater.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de albo, quod ponit rem suam circa substantivum; dicendum, quod non est simile, secundum quod hoc nomen solus tenetur syncategorematice; quia albus est dispositio subiecti absoluta, unde absolute ponit rem suam circa terminum, sed solus ratione negationis non absolute; et ideo non ponit solitudinem, sed praecisionem.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod terminus substantialis debet reddere locutionem veram pro aliqua persona; dicendum, quod terminus, cui additur exclusio, respectum habet ad praedicatum, et respectum habet ad exclusionem; et licet respectu praedicati possit habere suppositionem personalem, ut cum dicitur: solus homo currit; tamen regula est apud sophistas17, quod per comparationem ad dictionem exclusivam talis terminus habet suppositionem simplicem, unde nullo modo licet descendere. Et hoc est quod dicitur in libro de Regulis fidei18, quod dictio exclusiva facit exclusionem quantum ad genus rei, non quantum ad rem generis, quia ratione formae communis, quae est genus rei, non ratione suppositi, quod est res generis.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod conversa est falsa; dicendum, quod illa non est sua conversa; quia ista: solus Deus est Pater, habet intellectum affirmativae, scilicet Deus est Pater, et haec convertitur simpliciter; et habet rationem19 negativae huius: nullus alius a Deo est Pater, et haec similiter convertitur simpliciter; sed haec non est sua conversa: nullus alius a Patre est Deus, sed haec: nihil quod est Pater, est aliud a Deo. Idem enim, quod subiiciebatur in prima, debet praedicari in secunda; et sic patet illud.
I. Quaestiones huius distinctionis satis sunt intricatae, sed a theologis illius aetatis post Magistrum Sententiarum in scholis communiter cum magna subtilitate dialectica tractabantur. Serviunt ad maiorem verborum proprietatem quoad adorandum Trinitatis mysterium observandam. Supponit Seraphicus in hac et seqq. qq. plura, quae in antiqua logica de dictionibus exclusivis, de eorum speciebus et de quinque regulis in expositione earum observandis magis subtiliter quam utiliter tradebantur. Sufficiat notare haec pauca.
1. Dictio exclusiva est illa, in qua vel subiectum vel praedicatum afficitur particulis exclusivis, ut tantum, solum, dumtaxat etc. Si signum exclusivum afficit subiectum, tunc propositio significat, praedicatum convenire tantum illi subiecto, non autem aliis subiectis, v. g. tantum homo est risibilis. Si vero particula exclusiva afficit praedicatum, tunc significat, illud tantummodo praedicatum, ceteris exclusis, huic subiecto convenire, v. g. superbus non amat nisi se ipsum.
2. Omnis propositio exclusiva affirmativa exponitur per duas propositiones, quarum una affirmat praedicatum de subiecto, altera vero excludit vel omne aliud suppositum a consortio praedicati, vel aliud praedicatum a subiecto. Ita propositio: solus Deus est Pater, sic exponitur: Deus est Pater, et nihil, quod non est Deus, est Pater. Cfr. hic solut. ad 3.
3. Circa alios terminos exclusivos, ut tantum, dumtaxat, non est difficultas, quia non habent alium sensum nisi exclusivum. Terminus vero solus habet sensum aequivocum. Potest enim intelligi vel categorematice, i. e. ut per se significat aliquid, et tunc solus idem est ac solitarius; vel syncategorematice, quando ut adiectivum adiunctum est alicui substantivo. In primo sensu non facit propositionem exclusivam nec ullo modo admittitur in divinis. In secundo sensu facit propositionem exclusivam et addi potest termino essentiali (ut Deus), qui ponitur ut subiectum respectu praedicati sive essentialis sive personalis, quod soli Deo competit.
4. Conversio propositionis est inversio extremorum propositionis, ita ut, retenta ipsius propositionis veritate, ex praedicato fiat subiectum et ex subiecto praedicatum. Huius conver-
sionis triplex distinguitur species, scil. simplex, per accidens et per contrapositionem. Variae in logica dantur regulae, ut rite fiat haec conversio.
II. Ad explicandam solut. ad 2. servire possunt verba S. Thomae (S. I. q. 31. a. 3. ad 3.): «Ut sophistae dicunt, dictio exclusiva immobilitat terminum, cui adiungitur, ut non possit fieri sub eo descensus pro aliquo suppositorum. Non enim sequitur: solus homo est animal rationale, mortale, ergo solus Socrates». — In eadem solutione remanet difficultas, quam movet Brulifor hic, quod in una eademque propositione idem terminus iuxta duplicem respectum, scil. ad exclusionem et ad praedicatum, non possit habere suppositionem simplicem (seu excludentem descensum ad supposita) et suppositionem personalem. Ad hoc dicendum est, quod propositio exclusiva virtualiter continet duas propositiones, ut supra dictum est, et quod S. Bonaventura non dicit, ipsam actu habere suppositionem simplicem et personalem, sed quod possit habere suppositionem personalem, nempe ratione materiae. Quoad terminos suppositionem simplicem et personalem etc. cfr. d. 1. q. I. Scholion.
III. In conclusione omnes conveniunt. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. 3. a. 2. in fine. — Scot., de hac et tribus seqq. in utroque scripto hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. q. 31. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; de hac et seqq. qq. S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 40. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unic. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. collater. 1. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seqq. S. a. 75. q. 8. per totam. — Durand., de hac et tribus seqq. hic q. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et tribus seqq. hic q. unic. — Biel, de hac et tribus seqq. qq. hic q. unic.
---
ARTICLE I. On exclusive words added to a substantial term.
Question I. Whether it is truly said: God alone is the Father.
That [an exclusive word] is truly added to this term God on the side of the subject is shown in this way: God has something proper [to Himself]; but the proper is what belongs to one alone1: therefore etc. And since it is established that an exclusion is truly added to a substantial term in respect of an essential predicate — whence it is well said: God alone creates — it is asked whether it is truly added to it in respect of a proper predicate, that is2, of a relative term: namely, whether it is truly said: God alone is the Father. And that it is so seems to be the case:
1. By its own exposition, which is: God alone is the Father, that is3, no other than God is the Father: therefore God alone is the Father. And that this is its exposition is had both from common usage and from the Philosopher4, who says that «alone is the same as not with another».
2. Likewise, this is seen from the convertible: since these two are converted: nothing besides Peter runs, therefore Peter alone runs: therefore also these two: nothing besides God is the Father, and God alone is the Father. But the first is true, since this is false: nothing is the Father, and it has no instance except in God5: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, from whatever there is removed6 that which is in the more, there is removed that which is in the less7; but to be God is in the more than to be the Father: therefore from whatever God is removed, the Father also is removed. But whatever things so stand, that from whatever the one is removed, the other also is removed, the one is precisely predicated of the other, nor has any [counter-]instance: therefore Father is precisely predicated of God; but if precisely, therefore with exclusion: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. An accidental term implies its own thing concerning its subject — as is plain when it is said: the white man runs, concerning this term man whiteness is implied — therefore likewise when it is said: God alone is the Father, concerning God solitude is implied. But Hilary8 says that «God is not to be confessed as solitary»: therefore etc. And this reason concludes that it cannot be truly added either with a proper or with a common predicate.
2. Likewise, it is shown that it cannot be truly added in respect of a common predicate, as when it is said: God alone creates. For this name God of itself has, as it were, an indefinite supposition with respect to the persons9; therefore it makes the locution true for some [one]; but for any one whatever it is false — for this is false: the Father alone
is — therefore, since every essential predicate belongs to the whole [Trinity], and not to one alone, in no way can an exclusive word be added in respect of such a predicate to a common subject.
3. Likewise, that [it cannot be truly added] in respect of a proper [predicate], it seems, since if this is true: God alone is the Father, then by simple conversion this also: the Father alone is God; but that is false: therefore etc. If you say that it is not converted simply; on the contrary: it has the sense of a universal negative and of a particular affirmative, and each is converted simply: therefore etc.
Conclusion. The term solus in divine matters is not said categorematically, so as to have the same sense as solitarius; but it is well said syncategorematically with respect to a predicate, both substantial and personal.
I respond: It must be said that this word solus can be a categorema or a syncategorema10. Insofar as it is a categorema, it is then an adjectival noun, absolutely11 positing its own thing concerning its substantive, and its thing is solitude. Hence solus taken thus has the same value as12 solitarius. And since solitude is in no way received in divine matters as to substance, since it [the substance] is in many persons, this name solus is not received in divine matters with substantial terms13, as the first reason shows.
If, however, it is taken14 insofar as it is a syncategorema, in this way it deprives [of] association and imports some negation. And thus, since some predicate, both substantial and personal, is precisely said15 of a substantial name, in this way it is truly said in divine matters both with respect to a substantial predicate16, as when it is said: God alone creates, and with respect to a personal one, as when it is said: God alone is the Father.
1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the white, that it posits its own thing concerning the substantive; it must be said that it is not similar, insofar as this name solus is taken syncategorematically; since whiteness is an absolute disposition of the subject, whence it absolutely posits its own thing concerning the term, but solus by reason of negation [does so] not absolutely; and therefore it does not posit solitude, but precision.
2. To that which is objected secondly, that a substantial term ought to render the locution true for some person; it must be said that the term to which an exclusion is added has a relation to the predicate, and has a relation to the exclusion; and although in respect of the predicate it can have personal supposition, as when it is said: only a man runs; nevertheless the rule among the sophists17 is that, by comparison to the exclusive word, such a term has simple supposition, whence in no way is it permitted to descend [to instances]. And this is what is said in the book On the Rules of Faith18, that an exclusive word makes exclusion as to the genus of the thing, not as to the thing of the genus, since [it operates] by reason of the common form, which is the genus of the thing, not by reason of the supposit, which is the thing of the genus.
3. To that which is objected last, that the converse is false; it must be said that that is not its converse; since this: God alone is the Father, has the sense of an affirmative, namely God is the Father, and this is converted simply; and it has the character19 of this negative: no other than God is the Father, and this likewise is converted simply; but this is not its converse: no other than the Father is God, but rather this: nothing which is the Father is other than God. For the same [term], which was placed as subject in the first, ought to be predicated in the second; and so that is plain.
I. The questions of this distinction are sufficiently intricate, but were commonly treated in the schools by the theologians of that age after the Master of the Sentences with great dialectical subtlety. They serve to observe a greater propriety of words in adoring the mystery of the Trinity. The Seraphic [Doctor] presupposes in this and the following questions many things which in the ancient logic concerning exclusive words, concerning their species, and concerning the five rules to be observed in their exposition, were handed down with more subtlety than utility. Let it suffice to note these few [points].
1. An exclusive word is that in which either the subject or the predicate is affected by exclusive particles, such as tantum, solum, dumtaxat, etc. If the exclusive sign affects the subject, then the proposition signifies that the predicate belongs only to that subject, and not to other subjects, e.g. only man is risible. But if the exclusive particle affects the predicate, then it signifies that that predicate alone, the rest excluded, belongs to this subject, e.g. the proud man loves nothing but himself.
2. Every affirmative exclusive proposition is expounded by two propositions, one of which affirms the predicate of the subject, and the other excludes either every other supposit from the consort of the predicate, or another predicate from the subject. So the proposition: God alone is the Father, is thus expounded: God is the Father, and nothing which is not God is the Father. Cf. here the solution to [objection] 3.
3. Concerning the other exclusive terms, such as tantum, dumtaxat, there is no difficulty, since they have no other sense than the exclusive. But the term solus has an equivocal sense. For it can be understood either categorematically, i.e. as it signifies something per se, and then solus is the same as solitarius; or syncategorematically, when as an adjective it is adjoined to some substantive. In the first sense it does not make an exclusive proposition, nor is it in any way admitted in divine matters. In the second sense it makes an exclusive proposition, and can be added to an essential term (such as Deus), which is placed as subject in respect of a predicate either essential or personal, which befits God alone.
4. Conversion of a proposition is the inversion of the extremes of the proposition, in such a way that, the truth of the proposition itself being retained, from the predicate becomes the subject and from the subject the predicate. Three species of this conversion are distinguished, namely simple, per accidens, and by contraposition. Various rules are given in logic, that this conversion may be rightly made.
II. For explaining the solution to [objection] 2, the words of St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 31, a. 3, ad 3) can serve: «As the sophists say, an exclusive word immobilizes the term to which it is adjoined, so that no descent under it can be made for any of the supposits. For it does not follow: only man is a rational, mortal animal, therefore only Socrates». — In the same solution there remains a difficulty which Brulefer raises here, that in one and the same proposition the same term, according to a twofold relation, namely to the exclusion and to the predicate, cannot have simple supposition (that is, [supposition] excluding descent to supposits) and personal supposition. To this it must be said that an exclusive proposition virtually contains two propositions, as was said above, and that St. Bonaventure does not say that it actually has simple and personal supposition, but that it can have personal supposition, namely by reason of [its] matter. As to the terms simple and personal supposition, etc., cf. d. 1, q. I, Scholion.
III. In the conclusion all agree. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 66, m. 3, a. 2, at the end. — Scotus, on this and the three following [questions] in both writings, here q. unic. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 1, quaestiunc. 2; Summa I, q. 31, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3; on this and the following questions, Summa p. I, tr. 9, q. 40, m. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unic., a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1st principium, q. 3, collateral 1. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following, Summa a. 75, q. 8, throughout. — Durandus, on this and the three following, here q. 1, 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the three following, here q. unic. — Biel, on this and the three following questions, here q. unic.
---
- Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio.Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter On the Proper.
- Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus sive pro sicut.From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted sive ("or") for sicut ("just as").
- Plures codd. ut ACFORU ee omittunt in hac propositione verba id est, loco quorum codd. SY post non ponunt enim. Cod. W omittit in principio propositionis particulam solus, et loco id est habet et, lectio non spernenda, quam cod. T a posteriore manu correctus cum lectione aliorum mss. ita coniungit: solus Deus est Pater, id est, Deus est Pater et non alius quam Deus est Pater. Vide infra resp. ad 3. obiect., ubi expositio eadem datur.Several codices such as ACFORU ee omit in this proposition the words id est ("that is"), in place of which codices SY, after non, place enim ("for"). Cod. W omits at the beginning of the proposition the particle solus, and in place of id est has et ("and") — a reading not to be despised, which cod. T, corrected by a later hand, joins with the reading of the other manuscripts thus: solus Deus est Pater, id est, Deus est Pater et non alius quam Deus est Pater. See below at the response to objection 3, where the same exposition is given.
- Libr. II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.). — Paulo supra ex multis codd. ut AGHIKRXY aa ee Π et ed. 1 post habetur adiecimus et.Book II of the Sophistical Refutations, c. 3 (c. 22). — A little above, on the authority of many codices such as AGHIKRXY aa ee Π and ed. 1, we have added et ("and") after habetur.
- In codd. VX additur enim[?]; mox in codd. SY pro a ponitur ex.In codices VX [the word enim (?)] is added; further on, in codices SY, in place of a, ex is put.
- Cfr. supra d. 19. p. I. q. 4. arg. 1. ad opp. — In hac propositione auctoritate antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus post removetur in Vat. additum hoc.Cf. above d. 19, p. I, q. 4, arg. 1 to the opposite. — In this proposition, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have expunged hoc ("this"), added in the Vatican [edition] after removetur.
- Aristot., II. Prior. c. 26. (c. 28.) propositio propositioni contraria. — Sensus igitur verborum et non habet instantiam nisi in Deo est: propositio huic falsae propositioni: nihil est Pater, contraria et vera est: nonnisi seu solus Deus est Pater; quod sic patet, si haec: nihil est Pater est falsa, ergo haec erit vera: aliquid est Pater; ergo vel creatura vel Deus; non creatura seu nihil extra Deum, ut constat; ergo solus Deus. — Paulo ante Vat. praeter fidem multorum mss. ut AFGHSTXY etc. et ed. 1 ergo solus Deus Pater loco et: solus Deus est Pater.Aristotle, Prior Analytics II, c. 26 (c. 28): "a proposition contrary to a proposition." — The sense, therefore, of the words and it has no instance except in God is this: the proposition contrary to this false proposition: nothing is the Father, and [which is] true, is: none but — that is, only — God is the Father; which is plain thus: if this: nothing is the Father is false, therefore this will be true: something is the Father; therefore either a creature or God; not a creature, that is, nothing outside God, as is plain; therefore God alone. — A little before, the Vatican [edition], against the authority of many manuscripts such as AFGHSTXY etc. and ed. 1, [reads] ergo solus Deus Pater in place of et: solus Deus est Pater.
- Libr. IV. de Trin. n. 18: Nobis quoque nec solitarius tantum nec diversus est confitendus.Book IV On the Trinity, n. 18: To us also [God] is to be confessed neither as merely solitary nor as diverse.
- Cfr. supra d. 1. q. I. — Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc, sed contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1, solum uni pro uni soli.Cf. above d. 1, q. I. — A little below, the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc, but against the other codices and ed. 1, [reads] solum uni in place of uni soli.
- Plures codd. ut BDQS cum ed. 1 hic et in sequentibus categorematica vel syncategorematica, prout scil. solus se ipso sine additione alterius termini vel tantum iunctus alteri aliquid determinate significat.Several codices such as BDQS with ed. 1 [read] here and in what follows categorematica or syncategorematica, that is, insofar as solus by itself without the addition of another term, or only joined to another, signifies something determinately.
- Paulo infra Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 absolutum pro absolute.A little below, the Vatican [edition], against nearly all codices and ed. 1, [reads] absolutum in place of absolute.
- Vat. cum cod. cc interponit hic. Mox post primum quantum in cod. 1 repetitur valet.The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc interposes hic ("here"). Soon after, after the first quantum, in cod. 1 valet ("is worth") is repeated.
- Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus cum terminis, quae verba minus bene absunt a Vat. et cod. cc. Paulo ante cod. bb post quia est repetit substantia, et cod. V post personis addit vero.From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied cum terminis ("with terms"), which words, less well, are absent from the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc. A little before, cod. bb, after quia est, repeats substantia, and cod. V, after personis, adds vero ("indeed").
- Cod. X arripitur.Cod. X [reads] arripitur ("is seized").
- Cod. T praedicatur.Cod. T [reads] praedicatur ("is predicated").
- In cod. V repetitur praedicati. Mox post Pater cod. X adiicit: ut est ille qui est solus Deus est Pater.In cod. V the word praedicati ("of the predicate") is repeated. Soon after, after Pater, cod. X adds: ut est ille qui est solus Deus est Pater ("as it is that one who is: God alone is the Father").
- De hoc[?] loquuntur etiam supra d. 1. q. I. in Scholio, ubi et plura invenies de suppositione praedicati et simplici ac de [...][?] — Intellige in sensu bono, scil. homines, qui eruditi et doctores sunt in logica; in eodem sensu occurrit apud S. Thomam, S. p. I. q. 31. a. 3. ad 3. — Regula, quam adducit S. Doctor, invenitur in Summula Petri Hispani, Tract. de Suppositionibus, in subdivisione suppositionis simplicis, ubi hoc adducit exemplum: «Omne animal praeter hominem est irrationale; ibi iste terminus hominem, simplicem habet suppositionem, quia non licet fieri descensum sub ipso; unde non sequitur: omne animal praeter hominem est irrationale, ergo omne animal praeter hunc hominem est irrationale» etc. — Paulo infra ed. 1 confusam immobilem loco simplicem; vide Petrum Hispanum confusam confusam[?], cui opponitur confusa mobilis seu distributiva.On this[?] [the editors] also speak above at d. 1, q. I in the Scholion, where you will find more concerning the supposition of the predicate and simple [supposition] and concerning [...][?]. — Understand [sophistae] in a good sense, namely men who are learned and doctors in logic; it occurs in the same sense in St. Thomas, Summa p. I, q. 31, a. 3, ad 3. — The rule which the Holy Doctor adduces is found in the Summulae of Peter of Spain, Tract On Suppositions, in the subdivision of simple supposition, where he adduces this example: «Every animal besides man is irrational; there that term hominem has simple supposition, since no descent can be made under it; whence it does not follow: every animal besides man is irrational, therefore every animal besides this man is irrational» etc. — A little below, ed. 1 [reads] confusam immobilem in place of simplicem; see Peter of Spain, confusam confusam[?], to which is opposed confusa mobilis, that is, distributiva.
- Alanus ab Insulis, in libro: Theologicae regulae, reg. 29.Alan of Lille, in the book Theological Rules, rule 29.
- Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 habet etiam intellectum pro et habet rationem.The Vatican [edition], against the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, has etiam intellectum ("also the understanding") in place of et habet rationem ("and has the character").