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Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 22

Textus Latinus
p. 394

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum omnia divina nomina dicantur translative.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum omnia nomina divina dicantur translative, an etiam quaedam dicantur proprie. Et quod omnia dicantur translative, videtur.

1. In Regulis fidei1 dicitur: «Omne simplex proprie est, et improprie dicitur»; sed quod improprie dicitur, improprie nominatur: cum ergo Deus sit simplex, nominatur improprie; sed improprietas reducitur ad proprietatem: ergo nomina divina de Deo dicuntur improprie, de aliis proprie; sed quod dicitur de aliquo improprie, dicitur translative, si de alio proprie2: ergo etc.

2. Item, unumquodque, sicut contingit intelligere, contingit et significare: sed non contingit Deum intelligere3 nisi per proprietates et conditiones creaturarum, ergo nec nominare; sed quod nominatur secundum alienas proprietates semper translative nominatur: ergo etc.

3. Item, non est nisi duplex theologia, scilicet mystica et symbolica, secundum quod vult Dionysius4; sed utraque Deum nominat translative — nam mystica per creaturas spirituales et invisibiles, sed symbolica per corporales — ergo omnis nominatio Dei translativa est.

4. Item, omne nomen divinum est impositum propter nostram instructionem5; sed omnis nostra

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doctrina incipit a sensu: ergo omne nomen Dei accipitur secundum aliquod sensibile; sed in Deo nulla est proprietas sensibilis secundum veritatem, sed solum translative: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Apostolus dicit ad Ephesios tertio6, loquens de Deo: A quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur; sed si paternitas in terris nominatur a paternitate Dei: ergo Deus proprius et principalius dicitur Pater quam alia, non ergo translative. Hoc ipsum dicunt Dionysius7 et Damascenus, innitentes huic auctoritati Apostoli. Inquit enim Damascenus8: «Sciendum, quod non est a nobis translatum ad beatam Deitatem paternitatis et filiationis et processionis nomen, sicut ait divinus Apostolus: Ex quo omnis paternitas»: ergo etc.

2. Item, beatus Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in littera9, quod triplex est nominum divinorum differentia, et una ex illis sunt nomina translativa: non ergo omnia dicuntur translative.

3. Item, quaedam dicuntur de Deo, quae habent oppositum in omni creatura, ut aeternitas et immensitas; sed nomen translativum attenditur secundum aliquam similitudinem10: ergo talia nomina non sunt translativa.

4. Item, quaedam dicuntur de Deo, quorum significatum est proprie in solo Deo, ut hoc nomen bonum et qui est, Lucae decimo octavo11: Nemo bonus nisi solus Deus. Et Augustinus12 dicit, quod «solus Deus vere est, cuius comparatione cetera non sunt».

Conclusio. Non omnia nomina de Deo dicuntur translative: quando enim significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et oppositum in creatura, nullo modo transferuntur; quando significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et similitudo in creatura, transferuntur secundum impositionem, non secundum rem; quando denique significant rem, cuius veritas est in creatura et consimilis proprietas in Deo, proprie transferuntur.

Respondeo: Ad hoc voluerunt quidam dicere, quod quaedam sunt nomina, quae Deus sibi imposuit, quaedam, quae nos ei imposuimus. Si loquamur de nominibus, quae Deus sibi imposuit, cum ipse se proprie intelligat, huiusmodi nomina sunt propria; et talia dicuntur esse bonum et qui est. Unde Dionysius13 videtur velle, quod illud nomen bonum solum sit proprium et principale; Damascenus14 vero, quod illud nomen qui est solum est proprium et principale; et unus attendit in nomine perfectionem, alter absolutionem, uterque tamen proprietatem15. Si autem loquamur de nominibus, quae nos ei imposuimus, sic cum non cognoscamus Deum nisi per creaturas, non eum nominamus nisi per nomina creaturarum; et16 ideo solum translative, sive quia proprius et prius conveniunt creaturae, sive quia prius imposita sunt creaturae, quamvis non proprius conveniant creaturae. Et haec est

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translatio quaedam, quamvis, proprie loquendo, sit translatio, quando proprius conveniunt iis, a quibus transferuntur, ut ridere hominibus proprius quam pratis.

Sed haec positio non videtur stare17. Cum enim18 nos cognoscamus Deum tripliciter, scilicet per effectum, per excellentiam et per ablationem, constat quod omnibus his modis contingit Deum nominare. Si per effectum, nulla est ibi translatio19; similiter, si per ablationem, quoniam translatio attenditur secundum aliquam similitudinem: «omnes enim transferentes secundum aliquam similitudinem transferunt20».

Et propterea aliter dicendum, quod quaedam sunt nomina, quae significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et oppositum in creatura, ut immensus et aeternus; et talia nullo modo transferuntur, nec secundum rem nec secundum impositionem. Quaedam21 significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et similitudo eius in creatura, ut potentia, sapientia et voluntas; et talia nomina transferuntur a creaturis ad Deum, non secundum rem, sed secundum impositionem; quia prius imposita sunt creaturis quam Deo, licet prius sint in Deo. Quaedam sunt nomina, quae significant rem, cuius veritas22 est in creatura et consimilis proprietas in Deo, ut lapis et leo — res enim significata est in creatura, sed similitudo proprietatis, ut stabilitas et fortitudo in Deo est — et ista sunt proprie translativa. Concedendum ergo, quod in divinis sunt aliqua nomina translativa, non omnia.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod simplex improprie dicitur; dicendum, quod dicere ibi non est nominare, sed23 enuntiare, quia simplici non est compositio in essendo, sed est compositio in enuntiando, et ideo improprie; non sic in nominando. — Vel dic, quod non omne dictum improprie est dictum translative.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solum per creaturas intelligitur; dicendum, quod quamvis intelligatur solum per creaturas, non tamen solum per similitudinem24, immo per negationem et dissimilitudinem est cognoscibilis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod symbolica et mystica theologia nominant Deum translative; dicendum, quod quamvis mystica nominet25 Deum translative quantum ad proprietates excellentiae, tamen non solum sic nominat, sed etiam per abnegationem; et ideo non solum translative.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis nostra doctrina incipit a sensu; dicendum, quod verum est; et26 omne nomen aliquid habet sensibile, scilicet vocem, ut audiatur; sed non oportet, quod habeat sensibilem significationem, quia verbum intelligentiae, quod est insensibile, induit vocem sensibilem.

Scholion

I. Nomen proprium hic non accipitur, quatenus in divinis distinguitur contra commune, sed quatenus distinguitur contra metaphoricum seu translativum. — S. Doctor cum Angelico reiicit sententiam in prima opinione notatam, quod omnia nomina, Deo a nobis imposita, non sint nisi metaphorica; hoc probat per inductionem, enumerando tres vias seu modos, quibus formamus nomina divina, scil. causalitatis, negationis, eminentiae. In via eminentiae translatio fit quidem secundum quandam similitudinem, quae tamen differt a similitudine metaphorica. — Quoad modum concipiendi perfectiones divinas Richard. a Med. (loco infra cit.) haec observat: «Quaedam sunt nomina, quae significant, vel potius per quae significare intendimus distincte et insinuare (quamvis ad sic significandum non attingamus) res, quae per prius sunt in Deo et per posterius in creatura; et talia nomina magis proprie dicuntur de Deo quam de creatura, non ratione huius, quod per nomen intelligimus [?]27, sed ratione huius, quod per nomen [?]; et sic de Deo non dicuntur translative». Deinde idem in solut. ad 1. dicit: «Quamvis Deum intelligamus per suos effectus, quae sunt quaedam similitudines Dei, tamen cognitio nostra non sistit in illis effectibus, sed ascendit ad cognoscendam Dei virtutem et divinitatem, quamvis in generali et obscure». — Dionysius autem Carth. (hic q. 2.) non omnino consentit solutioni S. Thomae, Bonav., Alberti aliorumque, praesertim quoad hoc, quod omnia nomina Deo imposita sint ex creaturis et quantum ad vocem translata a creaturis ad creatorem; in specie facit quasdam exceptiones contra reprobationem primae opinionis, quam habet S. Bonav. in responsione, asseritque, frequenter esse translationem, dum nominamus Deum tum per effectum, tum per ablationem, tum per eminentiam. Sed responderi potest, S. Bonaventuram minime negare, quaedam nomina non nisi Deo revelante ipsi imposita esse, sed ipse negat, hac ratione apte distingui posse nomina propria a metaphoricis. Item, non negat S. Bonav., immo expresse affirmat, quosdam effectus Dei et nomina hos effectus significantia non nisi metaphorice de Deo dici posse. Denique secundum mentem eiusdem Seraphici dici potest, etiam nomina, quae proprie Deo conveniunt quoad rem significatam (ut sapientia), tamen quoad modum significandi non proprie Deo attribui, quatenus non eo modo, quo nos ea in hac vita concipimus, sed per modum in infinitum eminentiorem et perfectiorem Deo conveniunt. Sed hoc non efficit, ut ista nomina sint translativa (metaphorica) nisi in sensu improprio. Nam, ut bene dicit Richard. (loc. cit. ad 4.), «nomen translatum non dicitur, nisi ubi est translatio ratione rei significatae».

II. Plura de necessitate et regulis translationis vide infra d. 31. q. 4. — De nomine Dei: Qui est, magnifice loquitur S. Doctor in Itinerar. mentis in Deum c. 5. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 49. m. 4. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 8. q. 1. a. 1. et 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 11. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 3. a. 13. 14. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6.

III. Quoad conclusionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 2. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 13. a. 3. et 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 14. q. 36. et 59. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 32. q. 2, et a. 73. q. 2 seqq. — Dionys. Carth., [...].

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English Translation

QUESTION III.

Whether all divine names are said by transference.

Thirdly it is asked, whether all divine names are said by transference (translative), or whether some are also said properly. And that all are said by transference, it seems.

1. In the Rules of Faith1 it is said: «Everything simple properly is, and is improperly said»; but that which is said improperly is named improperly: since therefore God is simple, he is named improperly; but impropriety is reduced to propriety: therefore the divine names are said improperly of God, [and] properly of others; but what is said of one [thing] improperly is said by transference, if [it is said] of another properly2: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, each thing, just as it happens to be understood, also happens to be signified: but it does not happen that God be understood3 except through the properties and conditions of creatures, therefore neither [does it happen that he be] named [otherwise]; but what is named according to alien properties is always named by transference: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, there is only a twofold theology, namely mystical and symbolic, according to what Dionysius wills4; but each names God by transference — for the mystical [does so] through spiritual and invisible creatures, and the symbolic through bodily ones — therefore every naming of God is by transference.

4. Likewise, every divine name is imposed for the sake of our instruction5; but all our

doctrine begins from sense: therefore every name of God is taken according to some sensible [thing]; but in God there is no sensible property in truth, but only by transference: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. The Apostle says to the Ephesians 36, speaking of God: From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named; but if paternity on earth is named from the paternity of God: therefore God is more properly and more principally called Father than other [things], therefore not by transference. This same [thing] Dionysius7 and the Damascene say, leaning on this authority of the Apostle. For the Damascene says8: «It must be known that the name of paternity and of filiation and of procession has not been transferred by us to the blessed Deity, as the divine Apostle says: From whom all paternity»: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, blessed Ambrose says, and it is found in the text [of the Sentences]9, that the difference of the divine names is threefold, and one [class] from these is the names by transference: therefore not all are said by transference.

3. Likewise, certain [things] are said of God which have an opposite in every creature, such as eternity and immensity; but a name of transference is taken according to some likeness10: therefore such names are not by transference.

4. Likewise, certain [things] are said of God, the signified of which is properly in God alone, like this name good and who is, Luke 1811: No one is good but God alone. And Augustine12 says that «God alone truly is, in comparison with whom the rest are not».

Conclusion. Not all names are said of God by transference: for when they signify a thing whose truth is in God and whose opposite is in creatures, in no way are they transferred; when they signify a thing whose truth is in God and whose likeness is in creatures, they are transferred according to imposition, not according to the thing; finally, when they signify a thing whose truth is in creatures and whose corresponding property is in God, they are properly transferred.

I respond: To this some have wished to say that certain names there are which God imposed on himself, [and] certain [names] which we have imposed on him. If we speak of the names which God imposed on himself, since he properly understands himself, names of this sort are proper; and such are said to be good and who is. Whence Dionysius13 seems to wish that that name good alone be proper and principal; the Damascene14 indeed [wishes] that that name who is alone is proper and principal; and the one attends in the name to perfection, the other to absolution (absolutio), each however to propriety15. But if we speak of the names which we have imposed on him, then since we do not know God except through creatures, we do not name him except through the names of creatures; and16 therefore [we name him] only by transference, either because [these names] more properly and earlier befit creatures, or because they were earlier imposed on creatures, although they do not more properly befit creatures. And this is

a certain transference, although, properly speaking, it is [only] transference when [the names] more properly befit those [things] from which they are transferred, as to laugh [befits] men more properly than meadows.

But this position does not seem to stand17. For since18 we know God in three ways, namely through effect, through excellence, and through removal (ablatio), it is established that in all these modes it happens that God be named. If [we name him] through effect, there is no transference there19; likewise, if [we name him] through removal, since transference is taken according to some likeness: «for all who transfer transfer according to some likeness20».

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that certain names there are which signify a thing whose truth is in God and whose opposite is in the creature, like immense and eternal; and such [names] are in no way transferred, neither according to the thing nor according to imposition. Certain [names]21 signify a thing whose truth is in God and whose likeness is in the creature, like power, wisdom, and will; and such names are transferred from creatures to God, not according to the thing, but according to imposition; since they were imposed on creatures earlier than on God, although they are earlier in God. There are certain names which signify a thing whose truth22 is in the creature and whose corresponding property is in God, like stone and lion — for the thing signified is in the creature, but the likeness of the property, like stability and fortitude, is in God — and these are properly [names] of transference. It must therefore be granted that in divine matters there are some names of transference, [but] not all.

1. To that which is objected, that simple is said improperly; it must be said that to say there is not to name, but23 to enunciate, since for the simple there is no composition in being, but there is composition in enunciating, and therefore [it is said] improperly; not so in naming. — Or say that not every utterance [made] improperly is an utterance by transference.

2. To that which is objected, that [God] is understood only through creatures; it must be said that, although he is understood only through creatures, yet [he is] not [understood] only through likeness24; rather, he is knowable through negation and unlikeness.

3. To that which is objected, that symbolic and mystical theology name God by transference; it must be said that, although the mystical [theology] names25 God by transference as regards the properties of excellence, yet it does not name only thus, but also through abnegation; and therefore not only by transference.

4. To that which is objected, that all our doctrine begins from sense; it must be said that it is true; and26 every name has something sensible, namely a vocal sound, that it may be heard; but it is not necessary that it have a sensible signification, since the word of the understanding (verbum intelligentiae), which is insensible, puts on a sensible vocal sound.

Scholion

I. Proper name (nomen proprium) is not here taken insofar as in divine matters it is distinguished against common, but insofar as it is distinguished against metaphorical or of transference. — The holy Doctor with the Angelic [Doctor] rejects the opinion noted in the first opinion, that all names imposed on God by us are nothing but metaphorical; he proves this by induction, enumerating three ways or modes by which we form divine names, namely of causality, of negation, of eminence. In the way of eminence transference is indeed made according to a certain likeness, which however differs from a metaphorical likeness. — As to the mode of conceiving the divine perfections, Richard of Mediavilla (in the place cited below) observes the following: «There are certain names which signify, or rather through which we intend to signify distinctly and to convey (although we do not attain to signifying thus) things which are prior in God and posterior in the creature; and such names are said more properly of God than of the creature, not by reason of this, that through the name we understand [?]27, but by reason of this, that through the name [?]; and so they are not said of God by transference». Then the same [author] in the solution to [argument] 1 says: «Although we understand God through his effects, which are certain likenesses of God, yet our cognition does not stop in those effects, but ascends to knowing God's power and divinity, although in general and obscurely». — Dionysius the Carthusian, however (here, q. 2), does not entirely consent to the solution of St. Thomas, of Bonaventure, of Albert and others, especially as to this, that all names imposed on God are [taken] from creatures and as to the vocal sound transferred from creatures to the creator; in particular he makes certain exceptions against the rejection of the first opinion which St. Bonaventure holds in [his] response, and asserts that there is frequently transference when we name God either through effect, or through removal, or through eminence. But it can be replied that St. Bonaventure in no way denies that some names have been imposed on [God] only by God's revelation, but he denies that proper names can fittingly be distinguished from metaphorical ones by this account. Likewise, St. Bonaventure does not deny — rather, he expressly affirms — that certain effects of God and the names signifying these effects can be said of God only metaphorically. Finally, according to the mind of the same Seraphic [Doctor] it can be said that even the names which properly befit God as to the thing signified (such as wisdom) are nevertheless not properly attributed to God as to the mode of signifying, insofar as they befit God not in the way in which we conceive them in this life, but in a mode infinitely more eminent and more perfect. But this does not bring it about that those names should be [names] of transference (metaphorical) except in an improper sense. For, as Richard rightly says (loc. cit., to [argument] 4), «a name is not called transferred except where there is transference by reason of the thing signified».

II. For more on the necessity and rules of transference, see below, d. 31, q. 4. — Concerning the name of God Who Is, the holy Doctor speaks magnificently in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, c. 5. Cf. Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 49, m. 4, a. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 and 3; S. I, q. 13, a. 11. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 3, a. 13, 14. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 6.

III. As to the conclusion: Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 48, m. 2, a. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; S. I, q. 13, a. 3 and 6. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following [question], here a. 1; S. p. I, tr. 14, q. 36 and 59, m. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 4. — Aegid. R. (Giles of Rome), here 1 princ., q. 3. — Henr. of Ghent, S. a. 32, q. 2, and a. 73, q. 2 ff. — Dionys. the Carthusian, [...].

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Alanus ab Insulis, Theologicae Regulae, reg. 20. — Codd. aa bb post fidei addunt vel theologiae.
    Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 20. — Codices aa, bb after fidei add vel theologiae ("or of theology").
  2. In cod. aa additur dicatur; codd. vero P Q ultima verba legunt sed de aliquo proprie et transponunt post improprie.
    In codex aa is added dicatur; but codices P, Q read the last words [as] sed de aliquo proprie and transpose [them] after improprie.
  3. Vat. cum cod. cc, sed aliis codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, intelligi. Paulo ante pauci codd. ut PQV verbis contingit et apte praefigunt sic; cod. T autem loco contingit et significare ponit ita et nominare, lectio, si formam argumenti spectes, praeferenda.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc, but with the other codices and edition 1 resisting, [reads] intelligi. A little before, a few codices such as P, Q, V prefix sic to the words contingit and apte; codex T however in place of contingit et significare puts ita et nominare — a reading which, if you look to the form of the argument, is to be preferred.
  4. Epist. 9. Cfr. etiam de Div. Nom. c. 1. versus finem et de Mystica Theolog. c. 1. — Paulo infra post spirituales ed. 1 omittit et, ac dein in aliquibus codd. ut V W X particula sed deest; in fine argumenti plurimi mss. cum edd. 2, 3, 6 exhibent minus congrue translative pro translativa; tandem cod. O ibidem ponit dicitur et codd. PQ dicitur esse loco est.
    [Dionysius,] Letter 9. Cf. also On the Divine Names c. 1, near the end, and On Mystical Theology c. 1. — A little below, after spirituales, edition 1 omits et; and then in some codices such as V, W, X the particle sed is wanting; at the end of the argument very many manuscripts together with editions 2, 3, 6 exhibit, less fittingly, translative in place of translativa; finally codex O in the same place puts dicitur, and codices P, Q [put] dicitur esse in place of est.
  5. Respicitur illud Rom. 15, 4: Quaecumque scripta sunt, ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt.
    Reference is made to that [text of] Romans 15:4: Whatever things were written, were written for our instruction.
  6. Vers. 15, in quo textu Vat. cum Vulgata Ex quo pro A quo, et dein Vulgata caelis pro caelo contra codd. et ed. 1 exhibet. — Paulo infra cod. V alius loco alia.
    Verse 15, in which text the Vatican edition with the Vulgate exhibits Ex quo in place of A quo, and then the Vulgate [exhibits] caelis in place of caelo, against the codices and edition 1. — A little below, codex V [reads] alius in place of alia.
  7. De Div. Nom. c. 1. § 4: Unde in omni fere theologica actione thearchiam videmus divinitus laudatam, ut monadem quidem et unum propter simplicitatem et unitatem... ut trinitatem vero propter subsistentem ter superessentialis fecunditatis expressionem, ex qua omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra est et nominatur.
    [Dionysius,] On the Divine Names, c. 1, § 4: Whence in nearly every theological action we see the Thearchy divinely praised, as monad indeed and as one on account of simplicity and unity... but as trinity on account of the subsistent thrice-superessential expression of fecundity, from which all paternity in heaven and on earth is and is named.
  8. Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 8: Quin illud quoque nosse interest, paternitatis, filiationis et processionis vocabula non a nobis ad beatam Deitatem esse translata, verum contra illinc nobis communicata, quemadmodum Apostolus ait: Propterea flecto genua mea ad Patrem, ex quo omnis paternitas.
    [John of Damascus,] On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, c. 8: Indeed it is also of importance to know this: that the words of paternity, of filiation and of procession have not been transferred by us to the blessed Deity, but rather, on the contrary, communicated to us from there, as the Apostle says: For this reason I bend my knees to the Father, from whom all paternity.
  9. Hic, c. 1. — Mox cod. V illarum pro ex illis.
    Here [in the Sentences], c. 1. — Soon after, codex V [reads] illarum in place of ex illis.
  10. Cfr. supra pag. 1 nota 8.
    Cf. above, p. 1, note 8.
  11. Vers. 19. Quia ista verba sic leguntur apud Lucam, ipsum in textu citavimus, licet in mss. et edd. habeatur Matthaei, 19, 14, ubi sic legitur: Unus est bonus, Deus.
    Verse 19. Since these words are read thus in Luke, we have cited him in the text, although in the manuscripts and editions [the citation] is of Matthew 19:14, where it is read thus: One is good, [namely] God.
  12. Libr. VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 11: «Ego sum qui sum; et dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos; tanquam in eius comparatione qui vere est, quia incommutabilis est, ea quae mutabilia facta sunt, non sint». Ceterum cfr. de hoc supra d. VIII. c. 1. lit. Magistri, ubi idem recurrit et Hieronymo attribuitur.
    [Augustine,] On the City of God, Bk. VIII, c. 11: «I am who am; and you shall say to the sons of Israel: He who is has sent me to you; as if in comparison with him who truly is, because he is unchangeable, those things which were made changeable are not». For the rest, cf. on this above, d. VIII, c. 1, in the text of the Master, where the same [text] recurs and is attributed to Jerome.
  13. De Div. Nom. c. 3. § 1: Ac primum, si videtur, perfectum et quod omnes Dei emanationes manifestat, boni nomen expendamus (versio Corderii). Cfr. et c. 4.
    [Dionysius,] On the Divine Names, c. 3, § 1: And first, if it seems good, let us weigh the name of "the Good", [as] perfect and as that which manifests all the emanations of God (Corderius's version). Cf. also c. 4.
  14. Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 9, ubi et rationem addit: Nam totum esse velut immensum quoddam ac nullis terminis definitum essentiae pelagus complexu suo ipse continet. — Ex fere omnibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus particulam vero.
    [John of Damascus,] On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, c. 9, where he also adds the reason: For he himself contains in his embrace the whole [of] being as a kind of immense and boundless sea of essence. — From almost all the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied the particle vero.
  15. Aliis verbis, Dionysius in nomine bonum attendit divinum esse, quatenus in se completissime existens est causa omnia comprehendens sive omnium principium et finis. Nam bonum ex natura sua est diffusivum sui tenetque rationem finis; perfectum autem est illud quod omnia praehabens potest facere sibi simile (cfr. loc. cit. c. 4. et 13.). Damascenus vero in nomine Qui est considerat divinum esse secundum se et absolute, quatenus est infinitum pelagus essentialitatis. Uterque tamen in his nominibus tale designat, quod Deo vere et proprie convenit. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 49. m. 4. a. 2.
    In other words, Dionysius in the name good attends to the divine being insofar as, most completely existing in itself, it is the cause comprehending all things, that is, the principle and end of all. For the good by its nature is diffusive of itself and holds the account of an end; while the perfect is that which, pre-having all things, can make [something] similar to itself (cf. loc. cit. c. 4 and 13). The Damascene, on the other hand, in the name Who Is considers the divine being according to itself and absolutely, insofar as it is the infinite sea of essentiality. Each, however, designates by these names that which truly and properly befits God. Cf. Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 49, m. 4, a. 2.
  16. In Vat. et cod. cc deest et ab aliis codd. et ed. 1 exhibitum. Paulo supra post cum et dein post creaturas fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus nos. Mox cod. T non quia pro quamvis non. Unus alterque codex ut Y in hac et in sequenti propositione per prius loco proprius.
    In the Vatican edition and codex cc, et — exhibited by the other codices and edition 1 — is wanting. A little above, after cum and then after creaturas, on the witness of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged nos. Soon after, codex T [reads] non quia in place of quamvis non. One or another codex such as Y in this and in the following proposition [reads] per prius in place of proprius.
  17. Pauci mss. ut I X cum ed. 1 verbo stare bene praemittunt posse.
    A few manuscripts such as I, X with edition 1 rightly prefix posse to the word stare.
  18. In cod. O additur secundum Dionysium, cuius verba vide supra pag. 77, nota 10.
    In codex O is added secundum Dionysium ("according to Dionysius"), whose words see above p. 77, note 10.
  19. Vat. addit Pariformiter si per excellentiam, quae tamen verba omittuntur in mss. et ed. 1; rationem huius omissionis vide paulo infra in solutione ad 3.
    The Vatican edition adds Pariformiter si per excellentiam ("Likewise if [we name him] through excellence"), which words however are omitted in the manuscripts and edition 1; for the reason for this omission see a little below in the solution to [argument] 3.
  20. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 2, de quo vide supra pag. 1 nota 8.
    Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 2, on which see above, p. 1, note 8.
  21. Ed. 1 adiungit sunt nomina, quae.
    Edition 1 appends sunt nomina, quae ("there are names which").
  22. Codd. KV proprietas; paulo infra post fortitudo in cod. A additur proprie, et dein multi codd. ut ACFGHKLS etc. ponunt ita pro ista, inter quos est cod. T, qui, pluribus omissis, breviter legit et ita sunt aliqua nomina translativa, non omnia.
    Codices K, V [read] proprietas; a little below, after fortitudo, in codex A is added proprie, and then many codices such as A, C, F, G, H, K, L, S etc. put ita in place of ista, among which is codex T, which, with several [things] omitted, reads briefly et ita sunt aliqua nomina translativa, non omnia ("and so there are some names of transference, [but] not all").
  23. Cod. T nisi pro sed. — Notandum, quod [dicere?] respicit terminum, enuntiare autem propositionem, quae semper est aliquid complexum sive compositum.
    Codex T [reads] nisi in place of sed. — It is to be noted that [to say] regards a term, while to enunciate [regards] a proposition, which is always something complex or composite.
  24. In cod. O adiicitur creaturae.
    In codex O is added creaturae ("of the creature").
  25. Cod. V, post mystica addito et symbolica, consequenter habet nominent et paulo infra nominant. Mox in aliquibus mss. ut A T etc. et ed. 1 deest Deum. Dein cod. S negationem pro abnegationem.
    Codex V, with et symbolica added after mystica, consequently has nominent and a little below nominant. Soon after, in some manuscripts such as A, T etc. and edition 1, Deum is wanting. Then codex S [reads] negationem in place of abnegationem.
  26. Vat. cum cod. cc, mutata interpunctione, quod loco et ac mox secundum pro scilicet, sed minus distincte et contra alios codd. cum ed. 1. Paulo infra cod. W intelligibile pro intelligentiae.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc, with the punctuation altered, [reads] quod in place of et and soon secundum in place of scilicet, but less distinctly and against the other codices together with edition 1. A little below, codex W [reads] intelligibile in place of intelligentiae.
  27. [OCR lacuna in scholion: two short clauses in Richard of Mediavilla's quotation are missing in the source djvu, which truncates the column at intelligimus di- and resumes at sed ratione huius, quod per nomen. The intervening text could not be recovered from OCR.]
    [OCR lacuna — see Latin note. Logged in `manual-review/tier2-ambiguities-d22-a1-q3.md`.]
← Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 4→