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Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 22

Textus Latinus
p. 397

QUAESTIO IV. Utrum omnia nomina dicta de Deo secundum substantiam dicantur.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum omnia nomina dicta de Deo dicantur secundum substantiam. Et quod non, immo aliter, ostenditur:

1. Auctoritate Augustini quinto de Trinitate1: «Illud praecipue teneamus, quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas, substantialiter dici: quod autem ad aliquid, non substantialiter, sed relative»; sed Pater et Filius dicitur ad aliquid: ergo etc.

2. Item, Boethius in libro de Trinitate2: «Deus est sine quantitate magnus, sine qualitate bonus, sed non est sine relatione relatus»: ergo relatio vere et proprie manet in Deo, ergo et modus dicendi relative.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia in divinitate sunt aliqua nomina incommunicabilia, ut patet in omnibus3 personalibus; sed substantia est communicabilis, cum sit una in tribus: ergo talia nomina non indicant substantiam: ergo in divinis est alius modus dicendi quam secundum substantiam.

4. Item, in divinis est alio et alio modo se habere, quia aliter se habet ad Patrem Filius quam Spiritus sanctus; sed non est aliud et aliud esse sive subsistere: ergo cum hoc contingat intelligere et intellectum dicere, necesse est, quod sit ibi alius modus dicendi et intelligendi quam secundum substantiam: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Omne quod dicitur, aut dicitur secundum substantiam, aut secundum accidens, quia substantia et accidens sufficienter dividunt ens4; sed in divinis nihil dicitur secundum accidens: ergo secundum substantiam.

2. Item, omne quod dicitur, aut dicitur per se, aut non per se. Si per se, tunc secundum substantiam; si non per se, tunc ergo per aliud et in alio; sed omnia quae dicuntur de Deo, dicuntur per se: ergo omnia dicuntur secundum substantiam.

3. Item, dici secundum substantiam et5 secundum relationem aut dicit diversitatem a parte rei, aut a parte modi intelligendi sive modi dicendi. Si a parte rei: ergo in Deo est diversitas et compositio; si a parte modi dicendi: tunc cum diversus sit modus dicendi in hoc quod est bonus et in hoc quod est magnus et in hoc quod est Deus — quia si quaeratur: quantus est Deus? respondetur6 magnus, non respondetur bonus; similiter si quaeratur: qualis est Deus? respondetur bonus, non magnus — ergo non tantum essent duo modi, sed etiam multo plures quam duo.

4. Item, quod7 respondetur ad quaestionem factam per quid dicitur secundum substantiam et quantum ad rem et quantum ad modum; sed nomina relativa respondentur ad quaestionem factam per quid de Deo: ergo dicuntur secundum substantiam. Probatio minoris: Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana8: Si quaeratur, quid est Deus, convenienter respondetur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus.

5. Item, cum quaedam sint in divinis, quae

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non dicuntur secundum substantiam nec9 secundum relationem, ut hoc nomen incarnatus, hoc nomen ingenitus, videtur quod ista divisio non complectatur omnia nomina divina.

Conclusio. Non omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo secundum substantiam, sed quaedam etiam per modum quantitatis vel qualitatis et insuper quaedam secundum relationem.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod est dici diversimode secundum triplicem differentiam.

Uno modo dici diversimode attenditur secundum diversum modum essendi, qui est per se et per accidens; et hoc quidem modo non est dici diversimode in divinis, quia ista diversitas modi ponit diversitatem essentialem10 in re dicta; et quantum ad hoc unus solus modus dicendi est in Deo. Nam omnia quae dicuntur de Deo, sunt ipse Deus et eius substantia.

Alio modo dici diversimode est secundum diversum modum intelligendi, qui quidem attenditur secundum aliam et aliam rationem sive medium11 cognoscendi; et sic non tantum est dici diversimode in nominibus divinis, immo omnimode, quia Deus non tantum cognoscitur per diversa, immo per omnia rerum genera; et sic nomina dicta de Deo, quaedam dicuntur per modum substantiae, ut Deus; quaedam per modum quantitatis, ut magnus12; quaedam per modum qualitatis, ut bonus; et sic de aliis omnibus.

Tertio modo dici diversimode est secundum diversum modum se habendi; quod13 quidem attenditur quantum ad absolutum et ad comparatum sive relatum; et hic quidem modus diversitatis minor est quam primus, et maior quam secundus. Minor quam primus, quia secundum primum attenditur diversitas essentialis et compositio; maior quam secundus, quia secundum illum nulla14 omnino attenditur in re distinctio. Secundum autem istum modum attenditur in eo unitas et pluralitas: unitas secundum absolutum, pluralitas secundum respectum. Et quantum ad hunc modum sunt solum duo modi dicendi, scilicet secundum substantiam, ut illa quae dicuntur ad se15, et secundum relationem, ut illa quae dicuntur ad aliquid. Quia vero haec non dicunt alium modum essendi, ideo haec praedicantur de illis et sunt unum; et quia dicunt alium modum se habendi, ideo secundum illa unitas, secundum haec pluralitas16. Ex his patent obiecta.

1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod omne quod dicitur, dicitur secundum substantiam vel secundum accidens; dicendum, quod in divinis habet instantiam, ubi relatio non est accidens, nec tamen dicitur secundum substantiam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod omne quod dicitur in divinis, est ens per se; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen non sequitur: dicitur ut ens per se, ergo secundum substantiam, quia non dicitur: nomen dici secundum substantiam, ut substantia dicitur per se, sed ut dicitur ad se17.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, qualis sit haec diversitas, aut secundum rem, aut secundum modum intelligendi; dicendum, quod secundum modum se18 habendi, qui non tantum est in nostro intellectu, sed etiam in re.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur quarto, quod nomina relativa respondentur ad interrogationem factam de substantia; dicendum, quod substantia dicitur dupliciter: aut ens per se, aut ad se19. Si ut ens per se, sic omnia et relativa et absoluta dicunt in Deo substantiam; et quia hoc modo substantia respondetur ad quaestionem factam per quid, ideo omnia possunt responderi. Si autem dicatur substantia ut ens absolutum, non comparatum, sic dicitur secundum substantiam, quod dicitur ad se. Et sic non20

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accipit Augustinus; et sic Pater et Filius, et nomina relativa secundum substantiam non dicuntur.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod multa dicuntur de Deo, quae non dicuntur secundum substantiam nec secundum relationem; dicendum, quod dici relative in divinis potest esse dupliciter. Quaedam enim nomina dicuntur relative ex principali nominis intellectu, quaedam ex consequenti.

Et prima differentia dividitur in tres: quia quaedam significant relationem et dicuntur relative, ut Pater; quaedam significant relationem, ut paternitas, quae non dicitur ad alterum, sed est ipsum quo alterum refertur; quaedam dicuntur relative, quia privant relationem, ut ingenitus, improcessibilis; tamen ista non est privatio pura, ut infra videbitur.

Quae autem important relationem ex consequenti intellectu, similiter sunt secundum triplicem differentiam. Quaedam enim dicuntur dici relative, quia ponuntur pro relativis, ut cum dicitur: Deus generat Deum, id est Pater Filium. Quaedam dicuntur relative, quia claudunt in suo significato interius relationem, ut cum dicitur incarnatus — sensus enim est, id est carni unitus; unio enim dicit relationem, quae singularem personam respicit — sive assumere carnem et huiusmodi. Quaedam dicuntur relative, quia claudunt relationem in suppositis, ut similis et aequalis; non enim sunt similes, nisi qui referuntur et distinguuntur.

Scholion

I. Pro statu quaestionis facilius intelligendo notamus, quod substantia sumitur duplici sensu, uti patet ex solut. ad 2. Intelligitur enim vel ut res per se stans; et sic distinguitur contra accidens, quod est in alio, et in hoc sensu est substantia quidquid est in Deo; et ipsae relationes non manent in praedicamento accidentis, sed transeunt in praedicamentum substantiae. Vel substantia sumitur ut res absoluta sive ad se, et sic distinguitur contra relationem; in hoc secundo sensu intelligitur quaestio principalis, ut patet ex argumentis in fundam. Praeter hoc dubium etiam aliae quaestiones solvuntur. Quaesivit enim S. Bonav. supra (in divisione quaestionum), utrum nomina dicta de Deo dicantur secundum substantiam, an etiam aliquo alio modo. Quare hic primo loco explicat tres diversos modos dicendi de Deo et respondet ad quaesitum iuxta hanc triplicem distinctionem.

II. Ut melius intelligantur quae hic dicuntur de modo dicendi secundum substantiam et secundum relationem, haec ex Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit. § 3.) notamus: «Dicendum, quod (in Deo) omnia praedicamenta mutantur, sed tamen dissimiliter. Alia enim praedicamenta a substantia et relatione mutantur dupliciter: secundum rationem sui generis et secundum rationem qua sunt in creatura... Substantia vero et ad aliquid mutantur uno modo; mutantur enim a ratione, qua sunt in creatura, sed manent secundum intentionem primam sui generis. Nam substantia, ut est in creatura subsistens sub accidentibus, non est in divinis; tamen in divinis est substantia ut ens per se. Iterum in creatura ad aliquid est accidens, quo modo non est in divinis; sed tamen in divinis est ad aliquid, hoc est ad aliud se habens, vel potius ad alium se habens».

III. Attentione digna sunt quae hic in corp. et ad 5. de variis speciebus differentiae sive distinctionis et de nominibus relationem significantibus docentur. Cfr. supra d. 13. q. 3; d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 4, et praesertim d. 26. q. 1. Idem docet Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. § 4. b.

IV. Quoad conclusionem omnes consentiunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. — S. Thom., de Potent. q. 7. a. 4. 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 14. q. 37. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 5. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. circa med. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 32. q. 5. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

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English Translation

QUESTION IV. Whether all names said of God are said according to substance.

Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether all names said of God are said according to substance. And that they are not, but rather otherwise, is shown:

1. By the authority of Augustine in the fifth [book] On the Trinity1: «Let us hold this especially, that whatever is said of that most excellent and divine sublimity with respect to itself (ad se) is said substantially: but what is said in relation to something (ad aliquid) [is said] not substantially, but relatively»; but Father and Son are said in relation to something: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Boethius in the book On the Trinity2: «God is great without quantity, good without quality, but is not related without relation»: therefore relation truly and properly remains in God, therefore also the mode of being said relatively.

3. Likewise, this same [point] is seen by reason, since in the divinity there are certain incommunicable names, as is clear in all3 the personal [names]; but substance is communicable, since it is one in three: therefore such names do not indicate substance: therefore in the divine [things] there is another mode of being said than according to substance.

4. Likewise, in the divine [things] there is a being-disposed in one way and another, since the Son stands toward the Father otherwise than the Holy Spirit; but there is not another and another being or subsisting: therefore since this happens to be understood and the understood thing said, it is necessary that there be another mode of being said and of being understood than according to substance: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. Everything that is said is said either according to substance or according to accident, since substance and accident sufficiently divide being4; but in the divine [things] nothing is said according to accident: therefore [it is said] according to substance.

2. Likewise, everything that is said is said either per se (through itself), or not per se. If per se, then according to substance; if not per se, then therefore through another and in another; but all things which are said of God are said per se: therefore all are said according to substance.

3. Likewise, to be said according to substance and5 according to relation either expresses a diversity on the side of the thing, or on the side of the mode of understanding or the mode of being said. If on the side of the thing: then in God there is diversity and composition; if on the side of the mode of being said: then since the mode of being said is diverse in this, that he is good, and in this, that he is great, and in this, that he is God — for if it be asked, how great is God? the response is6 great, the response is not good; similarly if it be asked, what kind is God? the response is good, not great — therefore there would not only be two modes, but also many more than two.

4. Likewise, that which7 is given in answer to a question framed by what (per quid) is said according to substance both as to the thing and as to the mode; but relative names are given in answer to a question framed by what concerning God: therefore they are said according to substance. Proof of the minor: Augustine in the book On Christian Doctrine8: If it be asked, what is God, the fitting response is: Father and Son and Holy Spirit.

5. Likewise, since there are certain things in the divine [order] which

are not said according to substance nor9 according to relation, as this name incarnate, this name unbegotten, it seems that this division does not embrace all the divine names.

Conclusion. Not all names are said of God according to substance, but some also by mode of quantity or quality, and moreover some according to relation.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that to be said diversely (dici diversimode) [occurs] according to a threefold difference.

In one way, to be said diversely is considered according to a diverse mode of being, which is per se and per accidens (through itself and through accident); and in this mode there is no being-said-diversely in the divine [things], since this diversity of mode posits an essential10 diversity in the thing said; and as to this there is in God only one mode of being said. For all things which are said of God are God himself and his substance.

In another way, to be said diversely is according to a diverse mode of understanding, which is considered according to one and another account or means11 of knowing; and so there is not only being-said-diversely among the divine names, but rather in every way, since God is known not only through diverse [things], but through all the genera of things; and so among the names said of God, some are said by mode of substance, as God; some by mode of quantity, as great12; some by mode of quality, as good; and so of all the others.

In the third way, to be said diversely is according to a diverse mode of being-disposed; which13 indeed is considered as regards the absolute and the compared or related; and this mode of diversity is less than the first, and greater than the second. Less than the first, because according to the first an essential diversity and composition is considered; greater than the second, because according to that [second] no14 distinction at all is considered in the thing. But according to this [third] mode unity and plurality are considered in him: unity according to the absolute, plurality according to relation. And as to this mode there are only two modes of being said, namely according to substance, as those things which are said with respect to itself (ad se)15, and according to relation, as those things which are said in relation to something (ad aliquid). But because these do not bespeak another mode of being, therefore these are predicated of those and are one; and because they bespeak another mode of being-disposed, therefore according to the former [there is] unity, according to the latter plurality16. From these [points] the objections are clear.

1. For as to what is objected, that everything which is said is said according to substance or according to accident; it must be said that in the divine [things] it has an instance [against it], where relation is not an accident, nor yet is said according to substance.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that everything which is said in the divine [things] is being per se; it must be said that this is true, but yet it does not follow: it is said as being per se, therefore according to substance, since "name to be said according to substance" is not used in the sense in which substance is said per se, but as it is said with respect to itself (ad se)17.

3. To that which is objected, of what kind this diversity is — whether according to the thing, or according to the mode of understanding; it must be said that [it is] according to the mode of being-18disposed (se habendi), which is not only in our intellect, but also in the thing.

4. To that which is objected fourthly, that relative names are given in answer to an interrogation framed concerning substance; it must be said that substance is said in two ways: either as being per se, or as ad se19. If as being per se, then all [names], both relatives and absolutes, bespeak substance in God; and because in this mode substance is given in answer to a question framed by what, therefore all [names] can be given in answer. But if substance be said as being absolute, not compared, then that is said according to substance which is said with respect to itself. And it is not in this [sense]20

that Augustine takes [it]; and so Father and Son, and the relative names, are not said according to substance.

5. To that which is objected lastly, that many [things] are said of God which are said neither according to substance nor according to relation; it must be said that to be said relatively in the divine [things] can be in two ways. For some names are said relatively from the principal understanding of the name, some from a consequent [understanding].

And the first difference is divided into three: for some [names] signify relation and are said relatively, as Father; some signify relation [as such], as paternity, which is not said in relation to another, but is itself that by which the other is referred; some are said relatively because they take away (privant) relation, as unbegotten, improcessible; yet this is not pure privation, as will be seen below.

But those which import relation from a consequent understanding likewise are according to a threefold difference. For some are said to be said relatively, because they are put in place of relatives, as when it is said: God begets God, that is, the Father [begets] the Son. Some are said relatively, because they enclose relation inwardly in their signified [meaning], as when it is said incarnate — for the sense is, that is, united to flesh; for union bespeaks a relation, which regards the singular person — or to assume flesh and the like. Some are said relatively, because they enclose relation in their supposita, as like and equal; for they are not like, except those which are referred and distinguished.

Scholion

I. For more easily understanding the state of the question we note that substance is taken in a twofold sense, as is clear from the solution to [argument] 2. For it is understood either as a thing standing through itself (res per se stans); and so it is distinguished against accident, which is in another, and in this sense whatever is in God is substance; and the relations themselves do not remain in the predicament of accident, but pass over into the predicament of substance. Or substance is taken as a thing absolute or with respect to itself (res absoluta sive ad se), and so it is distinguished against relation; in this second sense the principal question is to be understood, as is clear from the arguments in the foundations. Besides this difficulty, other questions also are solved. For St. Bonaventure asked above (in the division of the questions), whether the names said of God are said according to substance, or also in some other way. Wherefore here, in the first place, he explains three diverse modes of being said of God, and responds to what was asked according to this threefold distinction.

II. That what is here said of the mode of being said according to substance and according to relation may be better understood, we note this from Alexander of Hales (loc. infra cit. § 3): «It must be said that (in God) all the predicaments are changed, but yet dissimilarly. For the other predicaments — beyond substance and relation — are changed in a twofold way: according to the account of their genus and according to the account by which they are in the creature... But substance and ad aliquid are changed in one way [only]; for they are changed from the account by which they are in the creature, but they remain according to the first intention of their genus. For substance, as it is in the creature subsisting under accidents, is not in the divine [things]; yet in the divine [things] there is substance as being per se. Again, in the creature ad aliquid is an accident, in which mode it is not in the divine [things]; but yet in the divine [things] there is ad aliquid, that is, being-disposed-toward-another (ad aliud se habens), or rather being-disposed-toward-Another (ad alium se habens)».

III. Worthy of attention are the things taught here in the body and in [reply] to [argument] 5 concerning the various species of difference or distinction and concerning names signifying relation. Cf. above d. 13, q. 3; d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 4, and especially d. 26, q. 1. The same is taught by Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 4. b.

IV. As to the conclusion all agree. Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3. — St. Thomas, de Potentia q. 7, a. 4, [ad] 3; S. I, q. 13, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 14, q. 37. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 5. — Aegidius Romanus (Giles of Rome), here 1 princ., q. 4, near the middle. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 32, q. 5. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 8. n. 9. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, in quibus verbis Vat. contra originale et mss. nec non ed. 1, posito dicitur pro dici et ad aliud loco ad aliquid, tum post autem tum post relative addit dicitur. In fine argumenti ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus aliquid pro incongruo aliud.
    [Augustine, On the Trinity V,] c. 8, n. 9. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3, in which words the Vatican [edition], against the original and the manuscripts and also against ed. 1 — having set dicitur in place of dici, and ad aliud in place of ad aliquid — adds dicitur both after autem and after relative. At the end of the argument, from the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted aliquid for the incongruous aliud.
  2. Cap. 4, ubi quoad sensum continetur haec propositio, in quantum scil. Boethius ibi ostendit, quod cum quis alia praedicamenta praeter relationem in divinam verterit praedicationem, cuncta mutantur in substantiam. Quod si verba propositionis attendas, videntur sumta ex Augustino, V. de Trin. c. 1. et 8.
    C. 4, where this proposition is contained as to the sense, namely insofar as Boethius there shows that when one transfers the other predicaments — beyond relation — into divine predication, all are changed into substance. But if you attend to the words of the proposition, they seem to be drawn from Augustine, V On the Trinity, c. 1 and 8.
  3. Ed. 1 nominibus pro omnibus.
    Ed. 1 [reads] nominibus in place of omnibus.
  4. Cfr. supra pag. 116 nota 6.
    Cf. above page 116, note 6.
  5. Vat. cum cod. cc incongrue et contra alios codd. cum ed. 1 aut loco et.
    The Vatican [edition] with codex cc, incongruously and against the other codices together with ed. 1, [reads] aut in place of et.
  6. In cod. V hic et mox post non respondetur adiicitur quod est, ac paulo infra post modi additur dicendi.
    In codex V, here and soon after non respondetur, quod est is added; and a little below, after modi, dicendi is added.
  7. Codd. PQ quidquid. Ed. 1 cum cod. cc propositionem minorem exhibet sic: sed per nomina relativa respondetur ad quaestionem etc., ac dein ed. 1 nomini Deo praefigit ipso.
    Codices PQ [read] quidquid. Ed. 1 with codex cc exhibits the minor proposition thus: but by relative names answer is given to the question etc.; and then ed. 1 prefixes ipso to the noun Deo.
  8. Libr. I. c. 5. n. 8; secundum sensum. Verba Augustini sunt: Non enim facile nomen, quod tantae excellentiae conveniat, potest inveniri, nisi quod melius ita dicitur: Trinitas haec, unus Deus ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia; ita Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus etc.
    Book I, c. 5, n. 8; according to the sense. The words of Augustine are: For a name which would befit such excellence cannot easily be found, except that it is better said thus: This Trinity, one God from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things; thus the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, etc.
  9. Plures codd. ut AIKMS etc., contradicente contextu, sed loco nec; Vat. cum paucis mss. sed nec; ceteri mss. cum ed. 1 exhibent lectionem in textum receptam. Mox post incarnatus codd. OX addunte[?], ac dein plures mss. ut AFHTV etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 complectitur pro complectatur.
    Several codices such as A, I, K, M, S etc., the context contradicting, [read] sed in place of nec; the Vatican [edition] with a few manuscripts [reads] sed nec; the rest of the manuscripts together with ed. 1 exhibit the reading received into the text. Soon after, after incarnatus, codices O, X [read] addunte[?]; and then several manuscripts such as A, F, H, T, V etc. with editions 1, 2, 3, 6 [read] complectitur in place of complectatur.
  10. Cod. R essendi loco essentialem. Mox pauci codd. ut FO[?] de Deo pro in Deo. — Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 13 (IV. c. 7.).
    Codex R [reads] essendi in place of essentialem. Soon after, a few codices such as F, O [?] [read] de Deo in place of in Deo. — Cf. Aristotle, V Metaphysics, text 13 (IV, c. 7).
  11. Sic plures et quidem bonae notae codd. ut AGHKRTVW ee ff cum ed. 1, dum Vat. habet modum.
    So [read] several codices, and indeed of good standing, such as A, G, H, K, R, T, V, W, ee, ff together with ed. 1, while the Vatican [edition] has modum.
  12. Vat. praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 perperam omittit quaedam per modum quantitatis, ut magnus.
    The Vatican [edition], against the witness of nearly all the manuscripts and ed. 1, wrongly omits quaedam per modum quantitatis, ut magnus ("some by mode of quantity, as great").
  13. Codd. IOZ cum ed. 1 qui. Mox cod. R relativum pro [relatum?].
    Codices I, O, Z together with ed. 1 [read] qui. Soon after, codex R [reads] relativum in place of [relatum?].
  14. In Vat. substituitur non pro nulla, sed minus apte et contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3.
    In the Vatican [edition] non is substituted in place of nulla, but less aptly and against nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, 3.
  15. Indebita omissio verborum ut illa quae dicuntur, quae habetur in Vat., resarcitur ope mss. et ed. 1. Mox aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 Quae quia, aliqui vero Quia quod, pauci Quia pro Quia vero haec, quod ceteri cum Vat. exhibent.
    The undue omission of the words ut illa quae dicuntur ("as those things which are said"), which is found in the Vatican [edition], is restored by the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1. Soon after, some codices with ed. 1 [read] Quae quia, some indeed Quia quod, a few Quia in place of Quia vero haec, which the rest with the Vatican [edition] exhibit.
  16. Communissima lectio mss. et sex primarum edd., in qua, transpositis verbis illa et haec (aliqui codd. ut AHIK cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 hoc), habetur secundum haec unitas, secundum illa pluralitas, contextu ut reiicienda comprobatur.
    The most common reading of the manuscripts and the first six editions, in which, with the words illa and haec transposed (some codices such as A, H, I, K with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] hoc), there is secundum haec unitas, secundum illa pluralitas ("according to these unity, according to those plurality"), is shown by the context to be such as ought to be rejected.
  17. Sensus est: in hac propositione nomen dici secundum substantiam, verba secundum substantiam non sumuntur in eo sensu, quo per substantiam intelligitur ens per se, sed ens ad se, ideoque relationes divinae, licet sint per se, non vero ad se, non secundum substantiam dicuntur. Vide paulo infra ad 4.
    The sense is: in this proposition name to be said according to substance, the words according to substance are not taken in the sense in which by substance is understood being per se, but being ad se; and therefore the divine relations, though they be per se, yet not ad se, are not said according to substance. See a little below, at [reply to argument] 4.
  18. Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 restituimus perperam omissum se. Paulo ante cod. V quaeritur pro obiicitur.
    From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have restored the wrongly omitted se. A little before, codex V [reads] quaeritur in place of obiicitur.
  19. Plures codd. ut FMXYZ cum ed. 1 duplex hoc membrum ita exhibent: aut ens per se aut ens per se et ad se. Paulo ante cod. I quod per nomina relativa respondetur loco quod nomina relativa respondentur, et cod. K quaestionem pro interrogationem. Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 posuimus sic pro tunc. Dein cod. S dicuntur in Deo secundum substantiam loco dicunt in Deo substantiam.
    Several codices such as F, M, X, Y, Z with ed. 1 exhibit this twofold member thus: aut ens per se aut ens per se et ad se ("either being per se, or being per se and ad se"). A little before, codex I [reads] quod per nomina relativa respondetur in place of quod nomina relativa respondentur, and codex K [reads] quaestionem in place of interrogationem. Soon after, on the witness of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have set sic in place of tunc. Then codex S [reads] dicuntur in Deo secundum substantiam in place of dicunt in Deo substantiam.
  20. Fere omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt non, sed male, ut ex contextu patet. Mox ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus nomina, quod Vat. cum cod. cc omittit et pro quo cod. S ponit omnia.
    Nearly all the codices together with editions 1, 2, 3 omit non, but wrongly, as is clear from the context. Soon after, from the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied nomina, which the Vatican [edition] with codex cc omits and in place of which codex S sets omnia.
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