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Dist. 22, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 22

Textus Latinus
p. 399

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: His adiiciendum est, quaedam etiam nomina etc., quia aut divisiones Augustini et Ambrosii sunt sufficientes, aut non. Si sic: ergo Magister superflue addit; si dicantur insufficientes, pro inconvenienti est habendum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nec divisio Augustini nec Ambrosii est diminuta; nec additio Magistri superflua, quoniam1 membra divisionis Magistri includuntur in membris divisionis Ambrosii. Illa enim est per immediata; cum enim sit trimembris2, reducitur ad has divisiones3: quia omne nomen Dei aut est proprium, aut translativum; si proprium, aut spectat ad substantiam, aut ad personas. Magister autem ista membra magis specificat, quia nomen aliquod potest spectare ad unitatem substantiae4 ab aeterno, vel ex tempore; similiter ad personas ab aeterno, vel5 ex tempore; et ad personas dupliciter: vel divisim, ut hoc nomen Pater, vel simul et coniunctim, ut hoc nomen Trinitas; et ita6 sunt sex membra.

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DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Trinitas est quasi collectivum. Videtur enim male dicere, quia «unitas collectiva, ut dicit Bernardus7, est minima unitas; sed unitas Trinitatis arcem tenet inter omnes unitates»: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc nomen Trinitas differt8 in duobus a nomine proprie collectivo. Primo, quia illa quae nomen collectivum colligit, habent simpliciter diversitatem; et secundo, quia habent unitatem secundum quid; sed9 e contra est in nomine Trinitatis. Tamen in hoc est similitudo, quia sicut nomen collectivum plures simul dicit et de nullo per se praedicatur, ita nec hoc nomen Trinitas praedicatur de aliqua personarum, et tamen omnes simul importat; et10 ideo Magister non dicit, quod sit collectivum simpliciter, sed quasi11.

Quinque Regulae de Nominibus Divinis.

Sciendum est igitur, quod illa quae proprie etc. Circa hoc notandum, quod ex verbis Augustini, quae hic ponuntur et in libro de Trinitate12, eliciuntur quinque13 regulae de nominibus divinis. Prima est haec: omne nomen, quod dicitur de Deo, dicitur secundum substantiam vel secundum relationem, excepto hoc nomine homo. Secunda est haec: omne nomen, quod dicitur de tribus personis, ita quod de qualibet singulariter, dicitur secundum substantiam14, exceptis nominibus partitivis. Tertia est haec: omne nomen dictum secundum substantiam praedicatur de tribus personis simul sumtis singulariter, excepto hoc nomine persona. Quarta est haec: omne nomen dictum de Deo respectu creaturae indicat essentiam, exceptis his quae pertinent ad unionem. Quinta est haec: omne nomen, quod dicitur de Deo ex tempore et non dicitur de personis singulis, praedicat notionem vel quasi; hoc15 dicitur propter hoc nomen missus, quod dicit esse ab alio.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Non tres omnipotentes, sed unus omnipotens; quia cum dicamus16 tres potentes, videtur quod pari ratione possumus dicere tres omnipotentes.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod verbum semper adiective et in adiacentia significat, et17 ideo semper trahit numerum a supposito; similiter participium manens participium, quia habet naturam verbi. Sed nomen, quia in quiete significat, aliquando substantivatur, et quando numeratur, tunc numeratur sicut nomen substantivum a parte suae formae. Et ideo, quia potens potest esse participium, omnipotens est nomen tantum: ideo non sic recipitur, tres omnipotentes, sicut tres potentes, nisi omnipotens sit adiectivum vel adiective retentum18. Ratio autem, quare omnipotens non potest esse participium, est propter compositionem, quam non admittit verbum. Participium enim, ut dicit Grammaticus19, transit in nomen quatuor modis: scilicet compositione, ut indoctus; comparatione, ut doctior; constructione, ut amans illius; temporis amissione, ut amandus, secundum quod idem significat vel20 idem sonat, quod amari dignus.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de ratione ista Augustini: Si est participatione magnus, ergo magnitudo est maior quam ipse, et ponitur ibi: Deus non est magnus ea magnitudine etc. Et videtur ista ratio non valere. Non enim valet: iste est albedine albus per participationem: ergo albedo est albior vel maior21 quam ipse.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ratio Augustini bona est et fundatur supra ipsam nominis expositionem, quia participare est partem capere, et si partem capit, ergo minus est quam totum. Quod ergo obiicitur de albedine, dicendum, quod esse maius est22 dupliciter; vel quantum ad esse, vel quantum ad

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posse. Dicendum igitur, quod participatio subiecti attenditur respectu formae universalis; et quamvis ipsa sit tota in subiecto quantum ad esse, non tamen quantum ad posse, quia potest in aliis esse; Deo autem23 nihil potest esse maius nec quantum ad esse, nec quantum ad posse. Et ideo argumentum Augustini bene tenet, quod Deus nihil possit participare.

Aliter potest dici, quod argumentum Augustini bene tenet in his formis, quae natae sunt aliquid denominare per essentiam; et in talibus, quod est per participationem, reducitur ad illud quod est per essentiam; et quandocumque sic est, illud quod est ens per essentiam, excellit illud quod habet24 ens per participationem. Si ergo magnitudo est magna per essentiam, et Deus per participationem, necessario sequitur, quod magnitudo est maior quam Deus. Non sic est de albedine, quia non est nata se denominare nec de aliquo per25 essentiam praedicari, denominando illud.

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English Translation

DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first concerning what he says: To these are to be added certain names also etc., because either the divisions of Augustine and Ambrose are sufficient, or not. If [they are] so, then the Master superfluously adds [more]; if they are said to be insufficient, [this] is to be held as unfitting.

I respond: It must be said that neither the division of Augustine nor of Ambrose is deficient, nor is the Master's addition superfluous, since1 the members of the Master's division are included in the members of Ambrose's division. For that [division of Ambrose] is by way of immediate [members]; for since it is three-membered2, it is reduced to these divisions3: for every name of God either is proper, or transferred; if proper, either it pertains to substance, or to persons. But the Master specifies these members further, because some name can pertain to the unity of substance4 from eternity, or in time; likewise to the persons from eternity, or5 in time; and to the persons in two ways: either dividedly, as this name Father, or together and conjointly, as this name Trinity; and so6 there are six members.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Trinity is as it were a collective [noun]. For he seems to speak ill, because «a collective unity, as Bernard says7, is the least unity; but the unity of the Trinity holds the citadel among all unities»: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that this name Trinity differs8 in two [respects] from a properly collective noun. First, because the things which a collective noun gathers have diversity simply; and second, because they have unity in a certain respect; but9 the contrary is the case in the name of the Trinity. Yet in this there is a likeness, because just as a collective noun says many at once and is predicated of none per se, so neither is this name Trinity predicated of any of the persons, and yet it imports them all together; and10 therefore the Master does not say that it is collective simply, but as it were (quasi)11.

Five Rules on the Divine Names.

It must be known therefore that those things which properly etc. On this it is to be noted that from the words of Augustine, which are placed here and in the book On the Trinity12, five13 rules concerning the divine names are drawn forth. The first is this: every name which is said of God is said according to substance or according to relation, except this name man. The second is this: every name which is said of the three persons, in such a way that [it is said] of each one singly, is said according to substance14, with the exception of partitive names. The third is this: every name said according to substance is predicated of the three persons taken together in the singular, except this name person. The fourth is this: every name said of God in relation to a creature signifies the essence, except those which pertain to the union. The fifth is this: every name which is said of God in time and is not said of the persons singly, predicates a notion or as it were [a notion]; this15 is said on account of this name sent, which says a being-from-another.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: Not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent; for since we say16 three powerful [ones], it seems that by parity of reasoning we can say three omnipotents.

I respond: It must be said that the verb always signifies adjectivally and in adjacency, and17 therefore always draws its number from the supposit; likewise the participle, while remaining a participle, because it has the nature of the verb. But the noun, because it signifies in rest, is sometimes substantivized, and when it is enumerated, then it is enumerated as a substantive noun on the side of its form. And therefore, because powerful (potens) can be a participle, omnipotent (omnipotens) is a noun only: hence one does not so receive three omnipotents as three powerful, unless omnipotens be an adjective or held adjectivally18. But the reason why omnipotens cannot be a participle is on account of composition, which the verb does not admit. For the participle, as the Grammarian says19, passes into a noun in four ways: namely by composition, as unlearned (indoctus); by comparison, as more learned (doctior); by construction, as loving him (amans illius); by loss of tense, as to-be-loved (amandus), insofar as it signifies the same or20 sounds the same as worthy to be loved (amari dignus).

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this argument of Augustine: If he is great by participation, then greatness is greater than he himself, and there is set down: God is not great by that greatness etc. And it seems this argument does not hold. For it does not hold [thus]: this [thing] is white by whiteness through participation: therefore whiteness is whiter or greater21 than it [the thing].

I respond: It must be said that the argument of Augustine is good and is founded upon the very explication of the name, because to participate is to take a part, and if it takes a part, then it is less than the whole. To what therefore is objected concerning whiteness, it must be said that to be greater is22 [so] in two ways: either as to being, or as to power.

It must be said therefore that the participation of a subject is regarded with respect to a universal form; and although it [the form] is wholly in the subject as to being, yet not as to power, because it can be in others; but to God23 nothing can be greater either as to being or as to power. And therefore the argument of Augustine holds well, [namely] that God can participate in nothing.

Otherwise it can be said that the argument of Augustine holds well in those forms which are by nature [apt] to denominate something through essence; and in such [forms], that which is by participation is reduced to that which is through essence; and whenever it is so, that which is being through essence excels that which has24 being through participation. If therefore greatness is great through essence, and God [is great] by participation, it necessarily follows that greatness is greater than God. It is not so concerning whiteness, because it is not [by nature apt] to denominate itself nor to be predicated of anything through25 essence, denominating it.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Postulantibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, substituimus quoniam pro nam. Paulo ante in pluribus mss. ut A S T V etc. et ed. 1 desunt verba Augustini nec.
    With many manuscripts and edition 1 demanding [it], we have substituted quoniam in place of nam. A little earlier, in several manuscripts such as A S T V etc., and in edition 1, the words Augustini nec are missing.
  2. In cod. X additur et non dicuntur relative. Paulo infra post primam cod. S addit ipsam.
    In codex X there is added and they are not said relatively. A little below, after primam, codex S adds ipsam.
  3. Dist. 28. q. 1.
    Distinction 28, question 1.
  4. In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 hic et paulo infra post personis omittitur vel, quod Vat. adiungit.
    In several manuscripts and edition 1, here and a little below after personis, vel is omitted, which the Vatican [edition] adds.
  5. In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 hic et paulo infra post personis omittitur vel, quod Vat. adiungit. (Continuation of preceding note's anchor.)
    [Same apparatus entry as note 4, second anchor — see note 4.]
  6. In Vat. deest particula Et, quam antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 exhibent. — Vat. cum uno alterove codice ista pro ita. — De conciliatione harum diversarum divisionum vide etiam B. Albert., hic a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
    In the Vatican [edition] the particle Et is missing, which the older codices and edition 1 exhibit. — The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] ista in place of ita. — On the reconciliation of these various divisions see also B. Albert, here a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
  7. Libr. V. de Consid. c. 8.
    Book V On Consideration, c. 8.
  8. Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 differt, quae et paulo ante, antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 contradicentibus, omittit Dicendum.
    The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, [reads] differt [or is at variance], which [edition] also a little earlier, with the older codices and edition 1 contradicting [it], omits Dicendum.
  9. Vat. cum cod. cc solum et pro sed. Mox post similitudo pauci codd. ut A V V Y quod loco quia.
    The Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] solum et in place of sed. Soon after similitudo, a few codices such as A V V Y [read] quod in place of quia.
  10. Suffragantibus plurimis codd. cum ed. 1, supplevimus et.
    With many codices supporting [it], together with edition 1, we have supplied et.
  11. Plura de hoc videsis in Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3.
    See more on this in Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 66, m. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 3.
  12. Libr. V. c. 8. seqq. n. 9. seqq.
    Book V, c. 8 ff., n. 9 ff. [of Augustine, De Trinitate].
  13. Mox auctoritate vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus quinque pro quaedam.
    Soon, on the authority of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted quinque in place of quaedam.
  14. In cod. H additur ut Deus, potens, bonus, magnus et huiusmodi; in cod. O autem post partitivis adiungitur ut unus, aliquis; et distinctivis ut distinctus, distinctio, discretio.
    In codex H there is added as God, powerful, good, great and the like; in codex O, however, after partitivis there is added as one, some; and [as] distinctive [names] as distinct, distinction, discretion.
  15. Vat. praefigit particulam et, ac paulo ante ed. 1 voci personis praemittit tribus. — Easdem regulas expositas invenies apud B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6.
    The Vatican [edition] prefixes the particle et, and a little earlier edition 1 prefixes tribus to the word personis. — You will find the same rules expounded in B. Albert, here a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 6.
  16. Nonnulli codd. ut G T ee dicimus, et mox cod. Y possemus loco possumus.
    Some codices such as G T ee [read] dicimus, and soon codex Y [reads] possemus in place of possumus.
  17. A codd. V X hic additur et.
    From codices V X, here et is added.
  18. Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 et, ac mox tentum loco retentum.
    The Vatican [edition], against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] et, and soon tentum in place of retentum.
  19. Cfr. Priscian., V. Grammat. c. 11, ubi agit de primo modo, scil. compositione, et XI. c. 1, ubi de aliis modis, ac VIII. c. 10, ubi et de ultimo modo loquitur. — Paulo post supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 scilicet.
    Cf. Priscian, V. Grammar c. 11, where he treats of the first mode, namely composition, and XI. c. 1, where [he treats] of the other modes, and VIII. c. 10, where he also speaks of the last mode. — A little later we have supplied from the older manuscripts and edition 1 scilicet.
  20. Aliqui codd. ut A S X etc. quod loco vel, ed. 1 secundum quod idem et pro vel idem, e contra cod. W omittit significat vel idem.
    Some codices such as A S X etc. [read] quod in place of vel; edition 1 [reads] secundum quod idem, and in place of vel idem; on the contrary codex W omits significat vel idem.
  21. Vat., refragantibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, omittit vel maior.
    The Vatican [edition], with the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 resisting, omits vel maior.
  22. In Vat. et uno alterove codice male deest esse. Cod. T quod esse maius dicitur dupliciter. Paulo ante cod. X sed si pro et si.
    In the Vatican [edition] and in one or another codex esse is wrongly missing. Codex T [reads] quod esse maius dicitur dupliciter. A little earlier codex X [reads] sed si in place of et si.
  23. Ex omnibus fere codd. et ed. 1 substituimus autem loco tamen.
    From almost all the codices and edition 1 we have substituted autem in place of tamen.
  24. Vat. est, sed contra mss. et sex primas edd.
    The Vatican [edition reads] est, but against the manuscripts and the first six editions.
  25. Cod. G quantum ad. — Idem dubium resolvit B. Albert., hic a. 8, ubi tenet primam solutionem. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 4. a. 3. § 6. ait: Unde Augustinus (V. c. 10.) de Trinit. dicit: Quod cum dicitur magnum de creatura, ut de domo vel de monte, dicitur magnum participatione, et non est creatura sua magnitudo; sed cum dicitur magnum de Deo, dicitur magnitudo per essentiam, et ipse est sua magnitudo. Accipit autem hic magnum Augustinus, secundum quod est commune ad magnum dimensione et magnum virtute; nam in Deo non est magnum dimensione, sed magnum in virtute; ita etiam intelligendum, cum dicitur bonus et huiusmodi. Hoc ergo modo vult dicere Augustinus, quod dicuntur de Deo proprie huiusmodi nomina abstrahendo a modo, quo sunt in creatura etc. — Ultimam propositionem, quam S. Bonav. de albedine ponit, S. Thomas, hic circa lit. sic demonstrat: Rem albam dicimus albam, sed albedinem dicimus albedinem (non denominatur alba). Non enim quod est in causato oportet esse in causa eodem modo, sed eminentiori. — Vide etiam Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
    Codex G [reads] quantum ad. — B. Albert resolves the same doubt here a. 8, where he holds the first solution. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 18, m. 4, a. 3, § 6, says: Whence Augustine (V. c. 10) on the Trinity says: That when "great" is said of a creature, as of a house or of a mountain, it is called great by participation, and the creature is not its [own] greatness; but when "great" is said of God, greatness is said through essence, and he himself is his [own] greatness. But Augustine here takes "great" insofar as it is common to "great in dimension" and "great in power"; for in God there is no greatness of dimension, but greatness in power; so also it is to be understood when "good" and the like is said. In this way, then, Augustine wishes to say that names of this kind are properly said of God by abstracting from the mode in which they are in a creature, etc. — The last proposition, which St. Bonaventure sets down concerning whiteness, St. Thomas, here on the littera, demonstrates thus: We call a white thing white, but we call whiteness whiteness (it is not denominated white). For what is in the caused does not need to be in the cause in the same mode, but in a more eminent [mode]. — See also Peter of Tarentaise, here on the littera.
← Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 4