Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XXV.

Cap. I. Quid significetur hoc nomine persona in plurali numero, scilicet[^1] cum dicitur personae.

Praeterea considerandum est, cum hoc nomen persona, ut praedictum est, secundum substantiam dicatur, quae sit intelligentia dicti, cum pluraliter profertur: tres personae, vel: duae personae, et cum dicitur: alia est persona Patris, alia est persona Filii, alia est persona Spiritus sancti. Si enim in his locutionibus personae vocabulum essentiae intelligentiam facit, plures essentias confiteri videmur, et ita plures deos. Si vero essentiae significationem ibi non tenet, alia est huius nominis ratio, cum dicitur: Pater est persona, vel Filius est persona; et alia, cum dicitur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres personae; et cum dicitur: alia est persona Patris, alia Filii, et huiusmodi.

«Persona enim, ut supra² ait Augustinus, ad se dicitur, et idem est Deo esse personam quod esse, sicut idem est ei esse quod Deum esse». Unde manifeste colligitur, quod essentiam divinam praedicamus, dicentes: Pater est persona, Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona, id est divina essentia; et omnino unum et idem significatur nomine personae, id est essentia divina, cum dicitur: Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, quod significatur nomine Dei, cum dicitur: Pater est Deus, Filius est Deus. Ita etiam idem significatur, cum dicitur: Deus est Deus, et Deus est persona; utroque enim nomine essentia divina intelligitur, quia utrumque secundum substantiam dicitur.

Cum vero dicitur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres personae, quid nomine personae significamus? An essentiam? Hoc enim videtur, si supra posita verba Augustini diligenter scrutemur. Supra enim dixit, quod «ideo tres personas dicimus, quia id quod persona est commune est tribus»³. Et item: «quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona, ideo tres personae dicuntur». Videtur ergo, eandem tenere significationem hoc nomen persona, cum dicitur: tres personae, quam habet, cum dicitur: Pater est persona, Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona; quia, ut ostendit Augustinus, hoc dicitur — id est tres personae — propter illud, quia id quod persona est commune est eis. Id ergo quod commune est eis, id est Patri et Filio et Spiritui sancto, videtur significari nomine personae, cum dicitur tres personae.

Aliter etiam potest⁴ ostendi, quod ibi nomine personae significetur essentia, cum dicitur tres personae. Ut enim supra dixit Augustinus, ea necessitate diximus tres personas, ut responderemus quaerentibus, quid tres, vel quid tria. Cum ergo quaeritur, quid tres vel quid tria, convenienter respondetur, cum dicitur: tres personae. At cum quaeritur, quid tres, vel quid tria, per quid de essentia quaeritur. Non enim invenitur, quid illi tres sint, nisi essentia. Si ergo quaestioni recte respondemus, oportet ut respondendo essentiam significemus; alioquin non ostendimus, quid tres sint. Si vero respondentes essentiam significamus, ipsam essentiam personae nomine intelligimus, cum dicitur: tres personae.

Quibusdam videtur, quod nomine personae significetur essentia, cum dicitur tres personae, propterea quia Augustinus dicit, ideo dici tres personas, quia commune est eis id quod est persona, ut sit talis intelligentia: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres personae, id est, sunt tres id habentes commune, quod est persona, id est, tres sunt, quorum quisque est persona, id est essentia. Sed quomodo iuxta hanc intelligentiam dicetur: alia est persona Patris, alia Filii? Et hoc etiam ita volunt intelligere, scilicet alius est Pater, et alius est Filius, id tamen commune habentes quod est persona. Et hoc confirmant auctoritate Augustini, qui in septimo libro de Trinitate⁵ ait: «Tres personas eiusdem essentiae, vel tres personas unam essentiam dicimus. Tres autem personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus, quasi aliud ibi sit quod essentia est, aliud quod persona»⁶. Hac auctoritate et praemissis conantur asserere in praedictis locutionibus, nomen personae essentiam significare.

Sed quid respondebunt ad id quod ipse Augustinus in libro de Fide ad Petrum⁷ dicit, «scilicet, quod alius est Pater in persona sive personaliter, alius personaliter Filius, alius personaliter Spiritus sanctus»? Quomodo enim alius personaliter Pater, alius personaliter Filius, alius personaliter Spiritus sanctus, si in esse personam omnino conveniunt, id est, si persona essentiae tantum intelligentiam facit? Ideo nobis videtur aliter hoc posse dici congruentius iuxta catholicorum Doctorum auctoritates.

Cap. II. De triplici acceptione huius nominis persona in Trinitate.

Sciendum est igitur, quod hoc nomen persona multiplicem intelligentiam facit, non unam tantum. Et ut Hilarius ait in libro quarto de Trinitate⁸: «Intelligentia dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi, quia non sermoni res, sed rei sermo subiectus est». Discernentes ergo dicendi causas huius nominis, scilicet personae, significationem distinguimus dicentes, quod hoc nomen, scilicet persona, proprie secundum substantiam dicitur et essentiam significat, sicut supra⁹ ostendit Augustinus, cum dicitur: Deus est persona, Pater est persona. Quadam tamen necessitate, ut supra dixit Augustinus, translatum est hoc nomen, ut pluraliter diceretur tres personae, cum quaereretur, quid tres, vel quid tria; ubi non significat essentiam, id est naturam divinam, quae communis est tribus personis, sed subsistentias, vel hypostases secundum Graecos. Graeci quippe, ut supra¹⁰ dixit Augustinus, aliter accipiunt substantiam, id est hypostasim, aliter nos. Nos enim substantiam dicimus essentiam sive naturam. Personas autem dicimus, sicut illi dicunt, substantias, id est hypostases. Si¹¹ ergo nos ita accipimus personas, ut illi accipiunt substantias vel hypostases; at illi aliter accipiunt hypostases, quam nos substantiam: aliter ergo nos accipimus personas quam substantiam. Cum ergo dicimus: tres personas, non ibi personae nomine essentiam significamus. Quid ergo dicimus? Dicimus, quia tres personae sunt, id est tres subsistentiae¹², scilicet tres entes; pro quo Graeci dicunt: tres hypostases.

Et hic sensus adiuvatur ex verbis Augustini praemissis, si interius intelligantur. Quia enim Pater est persona, id est essentia, et Filius persona, et Spiritus sanctus persona; ideo dicuntur tres personae, id est tres subsistentiae¹³, tres entes. Non enim possent dici tres subsistentiae vel entes, nisi singulus eorum esset persona, id est essentia. Quia ergo eis commune est id quod est persona, id est essentia; ideo recte dicuntur tres personae, id est subsistentiae vel subsistentes, ut, sicut essentia, quae est eis communis, vere ac proprie est, ita illi tres vere ac proprie subsistentiae vel entes intelligantur. Ideoque Augustinus¹⁴, causas dictorum discernens, dicit, tres personas esse unam essentiam vel eiusdem essentiae, non ex eadem essentia, ne aliud intelligatur ibi esse persona, aliud essentia. Tres enim personae, id est subsistentiae, una sunt essentia et unius essentiae, non autem sunt una persona vel unius personae, licet persona secundum substantiam aliquando dicatur. Nam si hoc diceretur, confusio fieret in personis.

Ad hoc autem, quod illi dicunt: cum quaeritur, quid tres, vel quid¹⁵ tria, de essentia quaeritur, quia non invenitur, quid illi tres sint nisi essentia — per hoc volentes nos inducere, ut nomine personae essentiam intelligamus, cum respondemus: tres personas — ita dicimus: indubitabiliter verum est, quia non invenitur unum aliquid, quod illi tres sint nisi essentia. Unum enim sunt illi tres, id est essentia divina. Unde Veritas ait¹⁶: Ego et Pater unum sumus. Verumtamen, cum quaeritur, quid tres, vel quid tria, non de essentia quaeritur, nec ibi quid ad essentiam refertur; sed cum fides catholica tres esse profiteretur, sicut Ioannes in Epistola canonica¹⁷ ait: Tres sunt, qui testimonium perhibent in caelo, quaerebatur, quid illi tres essent, id est, an essent tres res, et quae tres res, et quo nomine illae tres res significarentur. Et ideo loquendi necessitate inventum est ad respondendum hoc nomen persona, et dictum est: tres personae.

Non autem te moveat quod diximus tres res. Non enim hoc dicentes diversarum rerum numerum ponimus in Trinitate, sed ita tres res dicimus, ut easdem esse unam quandam summam rem confiteamur. Unde Augustinus in primo libro de Doctrina christiana¹⁸ sic ait: «Res, quibus fruendum est, nos beatos faciunt». «Res igitur, quibus fruendum est, sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Eademque Trinitas una quaedam summa res est communisque fruentibus ea, si tamen res, et non rerum omnium causa sit, si tamen et causa¹⁹. Non enim facile potest inveniri nomen, quod tantae excellentiae conveniat, nisi quod melius dicitur: Trinitas haec unus Deus». Sicut ergo tres res dicuntur, et hae sunt una res, ita tres subsistentiae²⁰ dicuntur, et hae sunt una substantia. — Ecce ostensum est, quae sit intelligentia huius nominis persona, cum dicimus: tres personas.

Cap. III. Ex quo sensu dicatur: alia persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti; sive alius in persona Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus sanctus.

Nunc inspiciamus, utrum secundum eandem rationem et causam dicatur: alia est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti. Quod utique sane intelligi potest, ut sit sensus talis: alia est subsistentia vel hypostasis Patris, alia subsistentia Filii, alia subsistentia Spiritus sancti; et alia subsistentia Pater, alia Filius, alia Spiritus sanctus.

Deinde quaeritur, utrum secundum eandem rationem accipiatur, cum dicitur: alius est in persona Pater, alius in persona Filius, alius in persona Spiritus sanctus; sive alius personaliter Pater, alius personaliter Filius, alius personaliter Spiritus sanctus.

Ad quod dicimus, quia etsi possit eodem modo accipi, congruentius tamen ex ratione dicti alia variatur intelligentia, ut hic personae nomine proprietas personae intelligatur, ut sit sensus talis: alius est in persona vel personaliter Pater, id est, proprietate sua Pater alius est quam Filius, et Filius proprietate sua alius quam Pater; paternali enim proprietate distinguitur hypostasis Patris ab hypostasi Filii, et hypostasis Filii filiali proprietate discernitur a Patre, et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque distinguitur processibili proprietate.

Hoc etiam modo sane potest accipi persona in praemissis locutionibus, cum dicitur: alia est persona Patris, alia Filii²¹, id est, alia est proprietas, qua Pater est Pater, alia qua Filius est Filius, alia qua Spiritus sanctus est Spiritus sanctus. Ita etiam nomine personae quidam proprietates intelligere volunt, cum dicuntur tres personae; sed melius est, ut subsistentias vel hypostases intelligamus, cum dicimus tres personas.

Ex praedictis colligitur, quod nomen personae in Trinitate triplicem tenet rationem. Est enim ubi facit intelligentiam essentiae, et est ubi facit intelligentiam hypostasis, et est ubi facit intelligentiam proprietatis. Quod autem secundum substantiam dicatur et essentiam aliquando significet, supra²² ex dictis Augustini aperte ostendimus. Quod vero pro hypostasi atque proprietate accipiatur, ex auctoritatibus Sanctorum ostendi

oportet, ne coniecturis nostris aliquid ausi dicere videamur. De hoc Hieronymus in expositione fidei catholicae ad Damasum²³ ita ait: «Non est prorsus aliquis in Trinitate gradus, nihilque quod inferius superiusve dici possit, sed tota deitas sui perfectione aequalis est, ut exceptis vocabulis, quae proprietatem indicant personarum, quidquid de una persona dicitur, de tribus dignissime possit intelligi. Atque ut confutantes Arium, unam eandemque Trinitatis dicimus esse substantiam, et unum in tribus personis fatemur Deum; ita impietatem Sabellii declinantes, tres personas expressas sub proprietate distinguimus, non ipsum sibi Patrem, ipsum sibi Filium, ipsum sibi Spiritum sanctum esse dicentes, sed aliam Patris, aliam Filii, aliam Spiritus sancti esse personam. Non enim nomina tantummodo, sed etiam nominum proprietates, id est personas, vel, ut Graeci exprimunt, hypostases, id est subsistentias confitemur. Nec Pater Filii vel Spiritus sancti personam aliquando excludit; nec Filius vel Spiritus sanctus Patris nomen personamque recipit, sed Pater semper Pater, et Filius semper Filius, et Spiritus sanctus semper Spiritus sanctus. Itaque substantia unum sunt, sed personis ac nominibus distinguuntur». Ecce hic aperte dicit Hieronymus, proprietates esse personas, et personas esse subsistentias. Unde manifestum fit quod diximus, scilicet personae nomine significari et hypostasim et proprietatem. — Ioannes etiam Damascenus²⁴ personas dicit esse hypostases, et eas dicit entes, ita inquiens: «In deitate unam naturam confitemur et tres hypostases secundum veritatem entes, id est personas».

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DISTINCTION XXV.

Cap. I. What is signified by this name "person" in the plural number, namely[^1] when one says "persons".

Furthermore it must be considered, since this name person, as has been said before, is said according to substance, what is the understanding of the saying when it is uttered in the plural: three persons, or two persons, and when it is said: the person of the Father is one, the person of the Son another, the person of the Holy Spirit another. For if in these locutions the term person makes the understanding of the essence, we would seem to confess several essences, and so several gods. But if it does not there hold the signification of essence, the meaning of this name is different, when it is said: the Father is a person, or the Son is a person; and another, when it is said: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons; and when it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, and the like.

"For person, as Augustine says above², is said to itself, and it is the same for God to be a person as to be, just as it is the same for Him to be as to be God." From which it is plainly gathered that we predicate the divine essence when we say: the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person, that is, divine essence; and altogether one and the same is signified by the name person, that is, the divine essence, when it is said: the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, as is signified by the name God, when it is said: the Father is God, the Son is God. So also the same is signified, when it is said: God is God, and God is a person; for by both names the divine essence is understood, since both are said according to substance.

But when it is said: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, what do we signify by the name person? The essence? For this seems so, if we diligently scrutinize the words of Augustine set forth above. For he said above that "we therefore say three persons, because that which person is is common to the three"³. And likewise: "since the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, therefore they are called three persons". It seems therefore that this name person, when it is said: three persons, holds the same signification which it has when it is said: the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person; since, as Augustine shows, this — that is, three persons — is said on account of this, that that which person is is common to them. Therefore that which is common to them, that is, to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, seems to be signified by the name person, when one says three persons.

In another way also it can⁴ be shown that there by the name person the essence is signified, when one says three persons. For as Augustine said above, by that necessity we said three persons, that we might answer those inquiring, what three, or what three things. When therefore it is asked, what three or what three things, it is fittingly answered when one says: three persons. But when it is asked, what three, or what three things, by what one inquires about the essence. For nothing is found what those three are, except essence. If therefore we rightly answer the question, it is necessary that in answering we should signify the essence; otherwise we do not show what the three are. But if in answering we signify the essence, we understand the essence itself by the name person, when one says: three persons.

To some it seems that by the name person the essence is signified when one says three persons, on this account, because Augustine says it is therefore said three persons, since that which person is is common to them, so that the understanding may be such: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, that is, they are three having that in common which is person, that is, they are three of whom each is a person, that is, an essence. But how, according to this understanding, will it be said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another? And this also they wish to understand thus, namely the Father is one and the Son another, having yet that in common which is person. And they confirm this by the authority of Augustine, who in the seventh book On the Trinity⁵ says: "We say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence. But we do not say three persons out of the same essence, as if there were something else there which is essence, and something else which is person"⁶. By this authority and the foregoing they attempt to assert that in the aforesaid locutions the name person signifies the essence.

But what shall they answer to that which Augustine himself in the book On the Faith to Peter⁷ says, "namely, that the Father is one in person or personally, the Son is personally another, the Holy Spirit is personally another"? For how is the Father personally one, the Son personally another, the Holy Spirit personally another, if in being a person they wholly agree, that is, if person makes the understanding of the essence only? Therefore it seems to us that this can be said otherwise more fittingly according to the authorities of the catholic Doctors.

Cap. II. On the threefold acceptance of this name "person" in the Trinity.

It must be known therefore that this name person makes a manifold understanding, not one only. And as Hilary says in the fourth book On the Trinity⁸: "The understanding of what is said is to be drawn from the causes of speaking, since the matter is not subject to the speech, but the speech to the matter". Distinguishing therefore the causes of speaking of this name, namely person, we distinguish the signification, saying that this name, namely person, properly is said according to substance and signifies the essence, just as Augustine showed above⁹, when one says: God is a person, the Father is a person. Yet by a certain necessity, as Augustine said above, this name has been transferred so that it might be said in the plural three persons, when it was asked, what three, or what three things; where it does not signify the essence, that is, the divine nature, which is common to the three persons, but the subsistences, or hypostases according to the Greeks. For the Greeks, as Augustine said above¹⁰, understand substance, that is hypostasis, otherwise than we do. For we call substance the essence or nature. But we call persons, as they call substances, that is hypostases. If¹¹ therefore we so understand persons as they understand substances or hypostases — yet they understand hypostases otherwise than we do substance — therefore we understand persons otherwise than substance. When therefore we say: three persons, we do not there signify the essence by the name person. What therefore do we say? We say that there are three persons, that is three subsistences¹², namely three beings; for which the Greeks say: three hypostases.

And this sense is supported by the words of Augustine cited above, if they are understood inwardly. For since the Father is a person, that is, an essence, and the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a person; therefore they are called three persons, that is, three subsistences¹³, three beings. For they could not be called three subsistences or beings, unless each of them were a person, that is, an essence. Since therefore that which is person, that is, essence, is common to them; therefore they are rightly called three persons, that is, subsistences or subsisting [things], so that, just as the essence which is common to them truly and properly is, so those three may be understood truly and properly as subsistences or beings. And therefore Augustine¹⁴, distinguishing the causes of what is said, says that the three persons are one essence or of the same essence, not out of the same essence, lest something else there be understood to be person, and something else essence. For the three persons, that is, the subsistences, are one essence and of one essence, but they are not one person nor of one person, although person is sometimes said according to substance. For if this were said, confusion would arise in the persons.

But to that which they say: when it is asked, what three, or what¹⁵ three things, the question is about the essence, since it is not found what those three are except essence — by which they wish to lead us to understand by the name person the essence, when we answer: three persons — we say thus: it is undoubtedly true that no one thing is found which those three are except essence. For those three are one, that is, the divine essence. Whence the Truth says¹⁶: I and the Father are one. Yet, when it is asked, what three or what three things, the question is not about the essence, nor is what there referred to the essence; but since the catholic faith was professing them to be three, as John in his canonical Epistle¹⁷ says: There are three who give testimony in heaven, it was being asked what those three were, that is, whether they were three things, and what three things, and by what name those three things were to be signified. And therefore by the necessity of speaking the name person was found for answering, and it was said: three persons.

But let it not move you that we have said three things. For we, in saying this, do not place a number of diverse things in the Trinity, but we say three things in such a way that we confess them to be one certain supreme thing. Whence Augustine in the first book On Christian Doctrine¹⁸ thus says: "The things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed". "The things therefore which are to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And the same Trinity is one certain supreme thing common to those who enjoy it, if nevertheless it is a thing, and not the cause of all things, if nevertheless even a cause¹⁹. For a name cannot easily be found which would befit so great an excellence, except that it is better said: this Trinity is one God". Just therefore as three things are said, and these are one thing, so three subsistences²⁰ are said, and these are one substance. — Behold, it has been shown what is the understanding of this name person, when we say: three persons.

Cap. III. In what sense it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another; or, the Father is one in person, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another.

Now let us inspect whether it is said according to the same reason and cause: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another. Which can certainly be soundly understood, so that the sense be such: the subsistence or hypostasis of the Father is one, the subsistence of the Son another, the subsistence of the Holy Spirit another; and the Father is one subsistence, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another.

Then it is asked whether it is taken according to the same reason, when it is said: the Father is one in person, the Son another in person, the Holy Spirit another in person; or, the Father is one personally, the Son another personally, the Holy Spirit another personally.

To which we say that, although it can be taken in the same way, more fittingly however from the meaning of the saying the understanding is varied, so that here by the name person the property of the person is understood, so that the sense is such: the Father is one in person or personally, that is, by His own property the Father is other than the Son, and the Son by His own property other than the Father; for by the paternal property the hypostasis of the Father is distinguished from the hypostasis of the Son, and the hypostasis of the Son by the filial property is discerned from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is distinguished from both by the processional property.

In this way also person can be soundly taken in the foregoing locutions, when it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another²¹, that is, the property by which the Father is Father is one, another that by which the Son is Son, another that by which the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit. So also some wish to understand by the name person the properties, when three persons are spoken of; but it is better that we should understand subsistences or hypostases, when we say three persons.

From the foregoing it is gathered that the name person in the Trinity holds a threefold meaning. For there is [a place] where it makes the understanding of essence, and there is where it makes the understanding of hypostasis, and there is where it makes the understanding of property. That however it is said according to substance and sometimes signifies the essence, we have plainly shown above²² from the sayings of Augustine. But that it is taken for hypostasis and property, must be shown from the authorities of the Saints, lest we should seem to dare to say something by our own conjectures. Concerning this Hieronymus in his exposition of the catholic faith to Damasus²³ thus says: "There is in the Trinity absolutely no degree, and nothing which can be called inferior or superior, but the whole deity is equal in its perfection, so that, the words excepted which indicate the property of the persons, whatever is said of one person can most worthily be understood of the three. And as, in confuting Arius, we say that the substance of the Trinity is one and the same, and we confess one God in three persons; so, declining the impiety of Sabellius, we distinguish the three persons expressed under [their] property, not saying that the same is to Himself the Father, the same to Himself the Son, the same to Himself the Holy Spirit, but that the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another. For we confess not only the names, but also the properties of the names, that is the persons, or, as the Greeks express it, hypostases, that is subsistences. Nor does the Father ever exclude the person of the Son or of the Holy Spirit; nor does the Son or the Holy Spirit receive the name and person of the Father, but the Father is always Father, and the Son always Son, and the Holy Spirit always Holy Spirit. Therefore in substance they are one, but they are distinguished by persons and names". Behold, here Hieronymus plainly says that the properties are persons, and the persons are subsistences. Whence what we have said becomes manifest, namely that by the name person both the hypostasis and the property are signified. — Ioannes Damascenus²⁴ also says that the persons are hypostases, and calls them beings, thus saying: "In the Deity we confess one nature and three hypostases truly being, that is, persons".

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