Dist. 27, Part 1, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 27
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
DUB. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: Proprium est Patris quod semper est pater. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia omnis proprietas differt ab eo cuius est proprietas, vel re vel ratione; sed pater et pater conveniunt re, ratione et nomine: ergo unum non est proprietas alterius.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in Patre intelligimus et illum1 qui est pater, et quo est pater. Quando ergo pater praedicatur de se, ratione unius subiicitur et ratione alterius praedicatur. Similiter, quando assignatur esse patrem proprium Patris, quia assignatur ut in ratione attributi, ideo ratione ipsius proprietatis attribuitur ipsi hypostasi. Unde dicit, quod esse patrem est proprium Patris, non quod Pater sit pater.
DUB. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Eadem dicitur nativitas vel origo. Videtur enim dicere contra illud, quod dictum est supra, distinctione tertia capitulo2 de vestigio3, et tractum est ab Augustino4 de Vera Religione, scilicet quod origo appropriatur Patri.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod origo semper dicitur relative5. Potest ergo accipi origo vel respectu creaturae, vel respectu personae. Si respectu creaturae, sic est totius Trinitatis et appropriatur Patri; si autem respectu personae, sic potest accipi active, vel passive: si active, sic est Patris et Filii, sed appropriatur Patri; si passive, sic Filii et Spiritus sancti, et appropriatur Filio, non secundum quod simpliciter dicitur, sed secundum quod origo dicit emanationem per modum naturae. Sic enim cum illud sit proprium Filii, similiter et origo, secundum quod sic accipitur; et hoc modo accipitur hic, et ideo non est contra illud.
DUB. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod gignere et gigni6, ipsas tantum relationes, non hypostases significant. Videtur enim falsum, quia cum relationes significantur in concretione7, non solum important relationes, sed etiam suppositum; sed quando tantum important relationes, significantur abstracte. Si ergo hoc quod est gignere et gigni non important relationem abstracte, sed concrete: videtur, quod non tantum importent relationes.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod differenter importatur concretio. Aliter enim importatur per verbum, aliter per nomen adiectivum. Quia enim verbum importat actum ut egredientem, ideo in quadam distantia; et ideo etiam8 importat sub quadam inclinatione. Et propter hoc, quia in distantia importat, non claudit intra se suppositum, immo oportet, quod addatur extra, nisi locum exterioris additionis suppleat demonstratio, quae est in actu propriae primae et secundae personae, quoniam semper sunt praesentes et demonstrativae. Et ideo, quamvis importet in concretione, tamen non importat nisi relationem,
quantum est de se, non suppositum. — Sed nomen adiectivum, idem significans, significat9 proprietatem informantem, et ideo in quadam unione et indistantia; et ideo simul importat formam et suppositum, ut cum dicitur album, nisi significetur in abstractione, ut cum dicitur albedo. Hoc attendens Magister dicit, quod paternitas et filiatio, gignere et gigni dicunt tantum relationes.
DUB. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit10: Cum nomina relationum ponimus in praedicatis, ipsas tantum notiones significamus, non hypostases; quia si hoc verum est, quando dicitur: essentia est Pater, cum Pater ponatur in praedicato, stat tunc11 pro notione: ergo idem est dicere: essentia est Pater, ac si diceretur: essentia generat; sed haec est falsa: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quaedam ponuntur in praedicato per naturam propriam et significationem: et talia sunt quae de se important compositionem, sicut sunt verba13; et de talibus loquitur Magister. Quaedam ita ponuntur in praedicato, quod sunt nata subiici, ut hoc nomen pater et hoc nomen filius; et talia, quia non solum nata sunt praedicari, verum etiam subiici, possunt importare intellectum hypostasis. Unde verbum Magistri intelligendum est cum praecisione12, scilicet de illis14 quae ita nata sunt praedicari, quod non subiici; et ita non habet instantiam.
DUB. V.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Characteristica idiomata determinativa sunt hypostaseon, non naturae etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia proprietates, quae non determinant naturam, sunt non naturales; quia omnis proprietas naturalis, eo ipso quod naturalis est, naturam determinat: ergo si proprietates in divinis non determinant naturam, non sunt naturales, ergo praeter naturam: ergo acci[?]…15
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut ordo naturae dicitur dupliciter: aut quo natura ordinatur, aut in quo natura est ratio ordinandi; sic etiam de proprietatibus intelligendum: et quando dicimus proprietatem naturalem, non oportet, quod proprietas habeat naturam ut subiectum, sed quod sit consonans naturae ipsius subiecti, sicut filius naturalis non dicitur, quia sit a natura vel essentia, sed a patre naturaliter producente16; sic et in proposito est intelligendum.
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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first concerning what [the Master] says: It is proper to the Father that he is always Father. For he seems to say [something] false, because every property differs from that of which it is the property, either in reality or in reason; but father and father agree in reality, in reason, and in name: therefore the one is not the property of the other.
I respond: It must be said that in the Father we understand both him1 who is Father, and that by which he is Father. When therefore father is predicated of himself, by reason of the one [aspect] he is made the subject and by reason of the other he is predicated. Likewise, when "to be Father" is assigned as proper to the Father, because it is assigned in the manner of an attribute, therefore by reason of the property itself it is attributed to the hypostasis. Whence he says that to be Father is proper to the Father, not that the Father is Father.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about what he says: The same [thing] is called nativity or origin. For he seems to say [something] against what was said above, in the third distinction, in the chapter2 On the vestige3, and [what] was drawn from Augustine4 On True Religion, namely that origin is appropriated to the Father.
I respond: It must be said that origin is always said relatively5. Therefore origin can be taken either in respect of a creature, or in respect of a person. If in respect of a creature, thus it belongs to the whole Trinity and is appropriated to the Father; but if in respect of a person, thus it can be taken actively or passively: if actively, thus it belongs to the Father and the Son, but is appropriated to the Father; if passively, thus it belongs to the Son and the Holy Spirit, and is appropriated to the Son, not insofar as it is said simply, but insofar as origin states an emanation by way of nature. For thus, since that [emanation by nature] is proper to the Son, so likewise [is] origin, in the sense in which it is so taken; and in this way it is taken here, and therefore it is not against [what was said earlier].
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that to beget and to be begotten6 signify only the relations themselves, not the hypostases. For it seems false, because when relations are signified in concretion7, they import not only the relations, but also the supposit; but when they import only the relations, they are signified abstractly. If therefore this which is to beget and to be begotten does not import the relation abstractly, but concretely: it seems that they do not import only the relations.
I respond: It must be said that concretion is imported differently. For it is imported in one way through a verb, in another way through an adjectival noun. For because a verb imports the act as going forth, therefore [it imports it] at a certain distance; and therefore it also8 imports [it] under a certain inclination. And on account of this, because it imports [it] at a distance, it does not enclose the supposit within itself; on the contrary, it must be added externally, unless a demonstrative pronoun supplies the place of the external addition — [a demonstrative] which is in the act of properly the first and second person, since [these] are always present and demonstrative. And therefore, although [a verb] imports [the relation] in concretion, nevertheless of itself it imports nothing but the relation,
not the supposit. — But an adjectival noun, signifying the same [thing], signifies9 the property informing [the supposit], and so [imports it] in a certain union and non-distance; and therefore it imports the form and the supposit at the same time, as when one says white, unless it is signified in the abstract, as when one says whiteness. Attending to this, the Master says that paternity and filiation, to beget and to be begotten state only the relations.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked about what he says10: When we place the names of the relations in the predicates, we signify only the notions themselves, not the hypostases; because if this is true, when it is said: the essence is the Father, since Father is placed in the predicate, it then11 stands for a notion: therefore it is the same to say: the essence is the Father, as if it were said: the essence generates; but this is false: therefore etc.
I respond: It must be said that some [things] are placed in the predicate through their own proper nature and signification: and such are those which of themselves import composition, as verbs13 are; and the Master speaks about such [things]. Some [things] are placed in the predicate in such a way that they are by nature [fit] to be made the subject, as this name father and this name son; and such, because they are by nature not only [fit] to be predicated, but also to be made the subject, can import the understanding of a hypostasis. Hence the Master's word must be understood with [a certain] precision12, namely of those [things]14 which are by nature [fit] to be predicated in such a way that [they are] not [fit] to be made the subject; and so it has no instance against it.
Doubt V.
Likewise it is asked about what he says: The characteristic idioms are determinative of the hypostases, not of the nature, etc. For he seems to say [something] amiss, because properties which do not determine the nature are non-natural; since every natural property, by the very fact that it is natural, determines the nature: therefore, if the properties in divine [things] do not determine the nature, they are not natural — therefore [they are] outside of nature, and therefore acci[?]… [accidental?]15
I respond: It must be said that, just as the order of nature is said in two ways — either [as that] by which nature is ordered, or [as that] in which nature is the ground of ordering — so too is it to be understood concerning the properties: and when we speak of a natural property, it is not required that the property have nature as its subject, but [only] that it be consonant with the nature of the subject itself; just as a son is not called natural because he is from a nature or essence, but [because he is] from a father naturally producing16; so too in the case at hand it is to be understood.
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- Vat. cum uno vel altero cod. illa, minus congrue.The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] illa (those [feminine]), less suitably.
- Cap. I, ubi et verba Augustini habentur.Chapter 1, where also the words of Augustine are had.
- Cfr. supra pag. 152, nota I.Cf. above page 152, note 1.
- Codd. P Q W adiungunt signanter.Codices P Q W add signanter (expressly).
- Vat. cum cod. cc relatio. — Proxime post pro Potest ergo codd. L Potest autem. Paulo inferius Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 verbis totius Trinitatis praefigit respectu.The Vatican [edition], with codex cc, [reads] relatio (relation). — Immediately after, in place of Potest ergo (it can therefore), codices L [read] Potest autem (it can however). A little further below, the Vatican [edition], against nearly all the codices and edition 1, prefixes respectu (in respect of) to the words totius Trinitatis (of the whole Trinity).
- Vat. omittit et gigni, contra codd. L P Q W X etc., et dein cum codd. L O, nec non contextu exigente, substituimus important pro importat.The Vatican [edition] omits et gigni (and to be begotten), against codices L P Q W X etc.; and then, with codices L O, and as the context requires, we have substituted important (they import) for importat (it imports).
- Sic recte legitur in codd. P Q reliqui codd. cum ed. 1 et Vat. minus bene: quia relationes significant in concretione et ideo non solum important.Thus correctly is it read in codices P Q; the remaining codices with edition 1 and the Vatican [edition] [read] less well: quia relationes significant in concretione et ideo non solum important (because the relations signify in concretion and therefore not only do they import).
- Multi codd. cum Vat. omittunt etiam, contra codd. M P Q T et ed. 1.Many codices with the Vatican [edition] omit etiam (also), against codices M P Q T and edition 1.
- Vat., fere omnibus codd. et edd. obnitentibus, significet formam pro significetur.The Vatican [edition], with nearly all the codices and editions opposing, [reads] significet formam (let it signify the form) in place of significetur (it is signified).
- Haec quaestio de significatione formarum grammaticalium non parvi momenti est pro rebus abstrusis exacte enuntiandis. Plurima et subtilissima de hoc argumento habentur in «Grammatica speculativa» Scoti. In formis verbi suppositum tantum indeterminate significatur, excepta prima et secunda persona (amo, amas); nam tertia persona (amat, amant) non significat aliquod distinctum suppositum, nisi addatur subiectum. — Mox codd. L O, verbis transpositis, proprietatem ut informantem pro ut proprietatem informantem.This question concerning the signification of grammatical forms is of no small moment for stating abstruse matters exactly. Very many and most subtle [observations] on this topic are had in Scotus's Grammatica speculativa. In the forms of the verb the supposit is signified only indeterminately, except [in] the first and second person (amo, amas); for the third person (amat, amant) does not signify any distinct supposit unless a subject is added. — Soon, codices L O, with the words transposed, [read] proprietatem ut informantem in place of ut proprietatem informantem.
- Vat. cum cod. cc tantum pro tunc.The Vatican [edition], with codex cc, [reads] tantum (only) in place of tunc (then).
- Cfr. supra d. 20. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. quaest. — Paulo post pro quando Vat. quoniam, refragantibus codd. F L O P Q T Y nec non ed. 1.Cf. above d. 20, a. 2, q. 2, in the body of the question. — A little after, in place of quando (when) the Vatican [edition] [reads] quoniam (since), against codices F L O P Q T Y as well as edition 1.
- Cfr. dub. praeced. — Paulo superius verba de se omittuntur a Vat. et nonnullis codd. et edd.Cf. the preceding doubt. — A little above, the words de se ("of itself") are omitted by the Vatican [edition] and by some codices and editions.
- Pro illis quae ita codd. P Q illis de quibus constat quod ita.In place of illis quae ita ("of those which thus") codices P Q [read] illis de quibus constat quod ita ("of those of which it is established that thus").
- Editorial note. The Quaracchi text breaks at the page-bottom band of p. 480 col. B with `ergo acci-`; the OCR preserves no continuation, and the printed page resumes with Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut ordo naturae... The truncated word is presumably accidentales ("accidental"), but verification at 600-dpi PDF eyes-on is needed; logged in `manual-review/tier2-ambiguities-d27-p1-dubia.md`.Editorial note. The Quaracchi text breaks at the page-bottom band of p. 480 col. B with ergo acci-; the OCR preserves no continuation, and the printed page resumes with Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut ordo naturae... The truncated word is presumably accidentales, but verification at 600-dpi PDF eyes-on is needed.
- Pro producente plures codd. ut AG H T X Y aa perperam procedente; codd. L rectius procedens.In place of producente ("producing") many codices, such as A G H T X Y aa, mistakenly [read] procedente ("proceeding"); codices L more correctly [read] procedens ("proceeding [nominative]").