Dist. 27, Part 2, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 27
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
DUB. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: Secundum quod sapientia est essentia, hoc est quod Pater; secundum quod Verbum, non est hoc quod Pater, quia aut hoc tenetur essentialiter, aut personaliter. Si essentialiter, non solum secundum quod sapientia, est unum per essentiam cum Patre, sed etiam in quantum Verbum. Si personaliter, tunc est falsum, quod secundum quod sapientia, sit hoc quod Pater personaliter. — Item, cum hoc, sit neutri1 generis, videtur quod stet pro essentia, et ita Verbum semper est hoc quod Pater, scilicet unum per essentiam vel substantiam.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc stat ibi pro significato termini, ut sit sensus: Verbum, secundum quod sapientia, hoc est quod Pater; quia secundum quod sapientia, aliquid ei attribuitur, quod etiam Patri, scilicet significatum huius nominis sapientia. Similiter altera est vera: Filius, secundum quod Verbum, non est hoc quod Pater, quia aliquid attribuitur Filio, secundum quod Verbum, quod non convenit Patri. Unde secundum dicit ibi habitudinem sub ratione formali, et pronomen hoc importat et demonstrat proprium significatum termini; et ideo, quia sapientia significat essentiale, tenetur in prima essentialiter; quia significatum Verbi est personale, tenetur in secunda personaliter.
Vel aliter potest dici, quod tenetur essentialiter, et secundum quod dicit habitudinem per modum formalis; unde sicut alio est Deus, alio est Pater — quia deitate est Deus, paternitate Pater —, ita quod nec paternitate Deus, nec deitate Pater — ita accipit Augustinus, cum dicit: secundum quod Verbum, non est hoc quod Pater2, ut non negetur unitas in natura, sed ut negetur habitudo eius quod est secundum; quia Verbum, in quantum verbum, non dicit unitatem essentiae, sed distinctionem personae, econtra sapientia.
DUB. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Eadem proprietate sive notione dicitur verbum, imago et filius; quia si hoc est verum, ergo ibi est synonymia vel inculcatio verborum, aut aliqua differentia.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod differentia est; et una differentia potest accipi sic, ut verbum dicatur quod3 procedit ex interioribus, imago quod imitatur in exterioribus, et filius complectitur utrumque; et ideo magis et communius dicitur filius quam aliquod aliorum.
Vel aliter: omnia haec tria important similitudinem alterius; sed filius importat illam similitudinem naturaliter emanantem, imago ut expresse imitantem, verbum ut aliis exprimentem, quantum est de se sive natum exprimere; ideo filius frequentius nominatur illa persona propter hoc, quod ipsam emanationem et habitudinem illam nomine importat proprio.
Vel aliter: imago importat illam similitudinem ut conformem, verbum importat illam ut mentalem sive spiritualem, sed filius connaturalem. Et sic patet diversa ratio significandi eandem habitudinem, et ita eadem proprietas est, nec tamen synonymia. — Et in prima acceptione praeit intentio verbi, in secunda intentio filii, in tertia intentio imaginis; tamen inter omnes medius modus est convenientior.4
DUB. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod solus Filius est Deus de Deo. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia «Spiritus sanctus est Deus de Deo»5: non ergo solus Filius.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista exclusio arctatur ex modo loquendi. Quod patet, quia non dicit simpliciter hoc, sed loquens de Patre et Filio dicit6: «non ambo Deus de Deo, sed solus Filius», ita
quod ex ipso modo loquendi solus arctatur ad faciendam exclusionem pro Patre.
DUB. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Secundum nomina substantiae dicitur: illud de illo. Videtur enim falsum, quia bene dicitur Filius de Patre per nomina, quae non sunt nomina substantiae. Si tu dicas, quod intelligitur secundum idem nomen; obiicitur, quod bene dicitur procedens de procedente, et principium de principio, sive spirans de spirante, haec tamen nomina non dicuntur secundum substantiam.
Item quaeritur de hoc, quod statim addit ibi: Licet illa nomina substantiam non significent; quia si hoc, ergo significant relationem; ergo hoc nomen Deus significat relationem. Et iterum, si non significant substantiam, sed relationem, ergo possunt pro eis poni nomina relativa: ergo Pater de Patre.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dici hoc de hoc est dupliciter, scilicet secundum idem nomen, vel secundum aliud. Secundum idem non potest esse, nisi conveniat duobus; et quia nomina duabus personis convenientia fere omnia sunt essentialia, licet aliqua sint notionalia; ideo regula Magistri ut plurimum veritatem habet. Tamen quidam libri habent maxime7; in quibus non est, potest poni pro glossa; et sic cessat obiectio, quia Magister non intendit excludere nisi nomina propria, quae dicuntur de uno solo. — Quod obiicitur, quod nomina non significant substantiam; dicendum, quod significationem accipit pro suppositione, et tantum valet non significant quantum non supponunt.
---
DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first concerning what [the Master] says: Insofar as [the Word] is wisdom, he is what the Father is; insofar as he is the Word, he is not what the Father is, because either this is taken essentially or personally. If essentially, then not only insofar as wisdom is he one in essence with the Father, but also insofar as he is the Word. If personally, then it is false that, insofar as he is wisdom, he is personally what the Father is. — Likewise, since hoc ("this") is of neuter1 gender, it seems that it stands for the essence, and so the Word is always what the Father is, namely one in essence or substance.
I respond: It must be said that hoc there stands for the [thing] signified by the term, so that the sense is: the Word, insofar as he is wisdom, is what the Father is; because insofar as he is wisdom, something is attributed to him which is also [attributed] to the Father, namely the [thing] signified by this name wisdom. Likewise the other [proposition] is true: the Son, insofar as he is the Word, is not what the Father is, because something is attributed to the Son insofar as he is the Word, which does not belong to the Father. Hence secundum ("insofar as") states there a relation under a formal aspect, and the pronoun hoc imports and points out the proper [thing] signified by the term; and therefore, because wisdom signifies something essential, in the first [proposition] it is taken essentially; because the [thing] signified by Word is something personal, in the second [proposition] it is taken personally.
Or it can be said otherwise, that it is taken essentially, and insofar as it states a relation in the manner of a formal [aspect]; whence, just as it is by one [thing] that he is God, by another [thing] that he is Father — because by deity he is God, by paternity Father —, in such a way that he is neither God by paternity nor Father by deity — so does Augustine take it, when he says: insofar as he is the Word, he is not what the Father is2, in such a way that the unity in nature is not denied, but the relation expressed by secundum is denied; because the Word, insofar as he is word, does not state unity of essence but distinction of person — the contrary [holds] for wisdom.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about what he says: Word, image, and son are said by the same property or notion; because if this is true, then either there is a synonymy or a piling-up of words there, or [there is] some difference.
I respond: It must be said that there is a difference; and one difference can be taken thus: that word is said [of him] who3 proceeds from the interior [parts], image [of him] who imitates in the exterior [parts], and son embraces both; and therefore the [name] son is said more [emphatically] and more commonly than any of the others.
Or otherwise: all these three import a likeness to another; but son imports that likeness as naturally emanating, image as expressly imitating, word as expressing [the likeness] to others, insofar as it is of itself or born to express; therefore that person is more frequently named son on account of this, that he imports by [his] own name the very emanation and that relation.
Or otherwise: image imports that likeness as conformed, word imports it as mental or spiritual, but son [imports it] as connatural. And so it is plain that there is a different account of signifying the same relation, and so it is the same property, and yet not synonymy. — And in the first acceptation the meaning of word takes precedence, in the second the meaning of son, in the third the meaning of image; nevertheless among them all the middle way is the more fitting.4
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Son alone is God from God. For it seems false to say [this], because "the Holy Spirit is God from God"5: therefore not the Son alone.
I respond: It must be said that this exclusion is restricted by the manner of speaking. Which is plain, because he does not say this simply, but speaking of the Father and the Son he says6: "not both [are] God from God, but the Son alone", in such a way
that from the very manner of speaking alone is restricted to making an exclusion with regard to the Father.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked about what he says: According to the names of substance it is said: this from that. For it seems false, because the Son is rightly said [to be] from the Father by names which are not names of substance. If you say that it is understood with regard to the same name; it is objected that proceeding is rightly said [to be] from a proceeding [one], and principle from principle, or spirating from spirating; yet these names are not said according to substance.
Likewise it is asked about what he immediately adds there: Although those names do not signify substance; for if this [is so], then they signify a relation; therefore this name God signifies a relation. And again, if they do not signify substance but relation, then relative names can be put in their place: therefore Father from Father.
I respond: It must be said that to say this of that is twofold, namely according to the same name, or according to another. According to the same [name] it cannot be, unless it belongs to two; and because the names belonging to two persons are nearly all essential, though some are notional; therefore the Master's rule for the most part holds true. However, certain books have maxime ("most of all")7; in those in which it is not [present], it can be put as a gloss; and so the objection ceases, because the Master does not intend to exclude any [names] except proper [ones], which are said of one alone. — As to the objection that the names do not signify substance; it must be said that he takes "signification" for "supposition", and non significant ("they do not signify") amounts to non supponunt ("they do not supposit").
---
- Forma antiquior pro neutrius; praesertim verba neutri generis apud antiquos grammaticos saepe saepius occurrunt.An older form for neutrius; especially [forms with] words of neuter gender occur very often among the ancient grammarians.
- Cod. hic finem propositionis facit. Deinde adiungit: Aliter videtur posse dici, quod stat semper ly hoc personaliter, et tantum valet hoc est Pater, ac si diceretur: est Pater. Sapientia enim, secundum quod essentia, est Pater; secundum quod est Verbum, non est Pater, ut non etc.A codex here makes the end of the sentence. Then it adds: It seems it can be said otherwise, that ly hoc always stands personally, and "hoc est Pater" amounts to as much as if it were said: "he is the Father". For wisdom, insofar as it is essence, is the Father; insofar as it is the Word, it is not the Father, so that not etc.
- Ed. 1 hic et rursum paulo inferius post imago substituit quia pro quod, quo secundo loco etiam permulti codd. cum ed. 1 conveniunt. Cod. Y subinde etiam post verba immediate subsequentia et filius coniunctionem quia repetit.Edition 1 here, and again a little below after imago, substitutes quia for quod; in which second place very many codices also agree with edition 1. Codex Y thereafter also repeats the conjunction quia after the immediately following words et filius.
- Cfr. supra q. 3. huius dist.Cf. above q. 3 of this distinction.
- Verba Augustini vide supra in lit. Magistri, d. X. c. 2.For the words of Augustine see above in the littera of the Master, d. 10, c. 2.
- Textus Augustini habetur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 5. — Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert., hic a. 9, et Richard., hic circa lit.The text of Augustine is had here in the littera of the Master, c. 5. — This doubt is also resolved by B. Albert, here a. 9, and Richard [of Middleton], here near the littera.
- [Vat.] nunc legitur tantum; vide lit. Magistri hic c. 5. — Paulo ante pro ut plurimum cod. cc ut in pluribus.[The Vatican edition] now reads only [maxime]; see the littera of the Master here c. 5. — A little before, in place of ut plurimum ("for the most part") codex cc [reads] ut in pluribus ("as in many [books]").