Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 28
ARTICULUS UNICUS. De proprietate innascibilitatis.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum nomen ingenitus sive innascibilis secundum substantiam, vel relationem dicatur.
Quantum ergo ad primum, quod hoc nomen ingenitus dicatur secundum relationem, ostenditur:
1. Per Augustinum, qui dicit libro quinto de Trinitate1 et habetur in littera: « Non receditur a relativo praedicamento, cum ingenitus dicitur »: ergo dicitur secundum relationem.
2. Item eodem libro2: « Sicut genitus ad genitorem, ita ingenitus ad non-genitorem »; sed quod dicitur ad aliud dicitur relative sive secundum relationem: ergo etc.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia omne illud, in quo differt persona a persona, dicitur secundum relationem — hoc patet — sed secundum hoc quod est ingenitus differt Pater a Filio: ergo etc.
4. Item, nulla negatio privat modum significandi sive dicendi3; sed genitus secundum relationem dicitur, ergo addita negatione, adhuc dicetur: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Omnis relatio in divinis aliquid ponit — illud certum est — sed ingenitus nihil ponit: ergo etc. Probatio mediae: si hoc nomen aliquid ponit, aut ergo secundum quod negative, aut secundum quod privative tenetur. Non secundum quod negative; hoc constat. Si ergo secundum quod privative tenetur; sed privatio tollit actum et ponit aptitudinem4: ergo secundum hoc ingenitus idem erit quod aptus generari, et non genitus; sed hoc nulli convenit: ergo etc.
2. Item, omnis relatio in divinis in concretione significata importat distinctionem, et ideo nulla dicitur de essentia secundum modum denominationis — haec enim est falsa: essentia generat — sed ingenitus dicitur de essentia, nam divina essentia est non genita5, cum eius oppositum de essentia non praedicetur, scilicet genitus: ergo etc.
3. Item, negationes se habent e contrario affirmationibus; sed genitus est in minus quam relatus, et generatio quam relatio: ergo ingenitus est in plus quam non-relatus, et ingeneratio quam non-relatio. Sed non-relatus vel non-relatio non dicitur secundum relationem, quia tunc opposita implicaret: ergo cum in plus sit hoc quod est ingenitus, non est in genere relationis: ergo etc.
4. Item, omnis relatio in divinis aut est respectu principii, aut respectu principiati: ergo si hoc quod est ingenitus dicit relationem, aut6 respectu principii, aut respectu principiati. Sed non respectu principii, quia tunc Pater haberet principium, quod est inconveniens. Si respectu principiati, tunc ergo non eius est negatio, cuius fuit affirmatio — nam genitus dicitur respectu principii, quia ab aliquo — ergo si ingenitus non dicitur respectu principii, tunc ergo negatio non dicitur respectu eius, respectu cuius fuit affirmatio. Ergo nec dicit relationem ad principiatum, quia non permittit nomen, nec ad principium, quia non permittit res.
CONCLUSIO. Nomen ingenitus in principali intellectu dicit relationem privative, sed ex consequenti intellectu positive, scilicet fontalem plenitudinem.
Respondeo: Dicendum est, quod circa hoc diversae sunt positiones. Omnes enim posuerunt, quod hoc quod est ingenitus dicitur secundum relationem, sed differenter.
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod ingenitus solum dicit relationis privationem; et illud solum sufficit ad hoc quod dicatur notionaliter, quoniam privatio potest esse principium distinguendi et innotescendi, sicut ovis non signata a signata. Et iterum, negatio dicit nobilitatem, sicut non regi in rege, non causari in causa, non produci in principio. — Sed ista positio non potest stare, quia pura negatio nec distinguit nec dicit nobilitatem7: non distinguit, nam negatio relationis dicitur de essentia; non dicit nobilitatem, nam omnis nobilitas ponit aliquid per modum positionis.
Alii posuerunt, quod hoc quod est ingenitus dicitur secundum relationem et positive, quia privando unam ponit aliam: sicut inaequale privat aequalitatem et ponit relationem illi oppositam, similiter et hoc quod est dissimile, unde et relationem importat positive; sic hoc quod est ingenitus privando relationem ad genitorem ponit relationem oppositam ad non-genitorem. Et hoc dicunt sensisse Augustinum, qui dicit, quod « sicut genitus ad genitorem, ita non-genitus ad non-genitorem dicitur »8. — Sed ista positio non potest stare, quia non-genitus aut dicitur ad principium, aut ad principiatum. Si ad principiatum, ergo respectu illius non potest dici hoc nomen ingenitus, cum genitus dicatur in respectu ad principium, et idem significatum sit in hoc nomine genitus et ingenitus, et ingenitus differat sola negatione: ergo necesse est, quod hoc nomen ingenitus dicatur respectu principii. Si autem hoc est verum: ergo secundum hoc poneretur9 Pater habere principium, respectu cuius dicatur. Et iterum, illud principium diceretur non-genitor; sed non generare non dicit principium, sed privationem illius.
Tertius modus dicendi est, quod hoc nomen ingenitus, secundum quod assignatur notio Patris, dicitur secundum relationem partim privative, partim positive. Propter hoc notandum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus10, « idem est ingenitus et non-genitus ». Non-genitus autem tripliciter potest accipi, sicut non-album, quia potest esse negatio in genere, vel extra genus, vel partim in genere et partim extra genus11. Secundum quod est negatio extra genus, sic generaliter privat et non ponit aliquam qualitatem, sicut potest dici non-album quod non est in genere coloris nec qualitatis. Secundum quod est negatio in genere, sic privat albedinem et ponit qualitatem contrariam, ut non-album, quia caret albedine, sed tamen est nigrum. Secundum quod partim in genere, partim extra genus, in genere scilicet remoto12 et extra genus proximum; sic non-album dicitur quod caret tam albedine quam colore, habet tamen qualitatem nihilominus.
Per hunc modum intelligendum est in proposito. Nam hoc quod est ingenitum13 importat ordinem in ratione generis remoti, et ordinem ad principium in ratione proximi, et ordinem talem per modum naturae in ratione completivi. Si igitur ingenitus sit negatio extra genus, sic dicitur ingenitus quod non generatur nec etiam habet ordinem vel14 relationem; et hoc modo pure dicit privationem et dicitur de essentia, nec dicitur secundum substantiam nec secundum relationem, eo quod privatio solum est. — Alio modo potest esse negatio in genere; et tunc ingenitus dicitur quod non generatur, habet tamen ordinem ad principium, et hoc modo dicit relationem substratam; sed tamen ex hoc non dicit nobilitatem, et sic convenit Spiritui sancto, nec tamen est notio. — Tertio modo potest esse negatio quodam modo in genere, quodam modo extra genus; et sic dicitur ingenitus quod non generatur, habet tamen ordinem, sed non ad principium; et hoc modo dicit privationem relationis respectu principii. Si enim habet ordinem, et non ad principium, ergo ipsum est primum et principium; et hoc modo dicit nobilitatem, sicut et principium. Et decuit illam per negationem significari, quia prima cognoscuntur per negationem15, et hoc modo est notio.
Sed quoniam ingenitus de ratione sui nominis non videtur dicere nisi privationem vel negationem generationis, propter hoc dicendum est quarto modo, quod hoc nomen ingenitus, secundum quod convenit Patri proprie, dicit relationem privative, sed ex hoc ipso dicit ex consequenti relationem positive.
Quod patet sic. Non generari enim dicitur qui simpliciter non generatur; et sic convenit non tantum Patri, sed essentiae et Spiritui sancto. Sed ultra hunc intellectum, prout proprie convenit Patri, addit, quia Pater non generatur, nec per generationem accipitur; et sic excluditur essentia, quae per generationem accipitur, sed adhuc convenit Spiritui sancto. Prout autem convenit soli Patri, sic dicitur ingenitus, quia non generatur, nec per generationem accipitur, nec generationem consequitur. Per primum membrum excluditur Filius, per secundum essentia, per tertium Spiritus sanctus, cuius processio praesupponit generationem secundum ordinem originalem, quia procedit ut nexus a Patre et Filio16. Quamvis enim non sit in divinis prius et posterius, tamen secundum originem et rationem intelligendi prior est generatio Filii quam processio Spiritus sancti, ut supra ostensum fuit17, et tamen simul sunt natura.
Sic ergo large accepto verbo consequendi, cum ibi proprie non sit praecedere et sequi, tripliciter dicitur aliquis esse ingenitus: aut quia non producitur per generationem, aut quia non producitur per generationem nec per generationem habetur sive accipitur, aut quia nec producitur nec accipitur nec consequitur18. Hoc igitur modo ingenitus importat nullo modo esse ab alio, et ita primitatem ac per hoc fontalem plenitudinem, sicut ostensum fuit in principio distinctionis praecedentis19, et sicut patet ex principio distinctionis sequentis, ubi dicitur, quod « Pater est principium totius deitatis, quia a nullo est »; et ita in principali intellectu dicit relationem privative, ex consequenti positive; et ita non dicit negationem, quae nihil ponit.
Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod nihil ponit secundum quod negative; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia non est negatio extra genus, sicut si dicatur: chimaera est ingenita, immo est negatio cum constantia subiecti; et talis negatio in subiecto summam relinquit nobilitatem.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dicitur de essentia; dicendum, quod verum est, sed secundum quod solum dicitur privative, et sic non est proprietas Patris; secundum autem quod proprietas Patris, non dicitur de essentia.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod negationes e contrario se habent affirmationibus; dicendum, quod illud non semper est verum de negatione in genere, sed extra genus. Non-album enim, prout est negatio in genere, non dicitur superius ad hoc quod est non-quale; similiter ingenitum ad hoc quod est non-relatum non est superius.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod20 dicit relationem; dicendum, quod secundum quod importat relationem privative, dicitur respectu principii; et ex hoc non sequitur, quod Pater habeat principium, immo quod non habeat, quia non dicitur secundum positionem, sed secundum remotionem. Unde bene dicit Augustinus, « quod dicitur ad non-genitorem », quia ingenitus significat remotionem genitoris. Secundum vero quod importat relationem positive et ex consequenti, sic21 respectu principiati; et sic non est inconveniens, quod aliquod nomen privativum aliquid ex consequenti importet, quod non importat affirmativum sibi oppositum. Et sic patent cetera.
I. Aliqua praenotanda videntur de multiplici sensu vocabuli ingeniti — de significatione huius notionis in Patre — et utrum sit proprietas constitutiva Patris.
1. Multiplex huius vocabuli sensus, ut recte observat Scotus (hic q. 2, n. 3, 4), ex duplici fonte manat, cum genitus in diverso sensu accipi, et particula in triplicem modum privationis significare possit (cfr. S. Thom., S. I, q. 34, a. 4, ad 2; Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 17, 27, ed. Paris. IV, c. 12, 22). Specialiter attendendi sunt quatuor sensus vocabuli ingeniti: a) cum privatione propria, quae ponit aptitudinem ad aliquam formam et ipsam formam negat — hic sensus omnino excluditur a Deo; b) cum simplici negatione formae, et sic dici potest de persona Patris et Spiritus S. et etiam de divina essentia, quatenus non generatur, licet per generationem communicetur; c) extenso nomine generari etiam ad communicari, divina essentia non est ingenita; d) negando omnino, quod persona sit ab alio ullo modo, vel, ut dicit Seraphicus, ponendo « quod non generatur, nec per generationem accipitur, nec generationem consequitur »; et sic convenit principio sine principio et est proprium solius Patris.
— Hinc facile componi potest apparens contradictio inter verba SS. Patrum et doctorum (cfr. d. 13, q. 4).
2. De significatione notionis ingeniti in Patre non penitus conveniunt doctores. Nonnulli dixerunt, innascibilitate significari aliquid positivum, nempe positionem relationis, quae opposita sit relationi genitoris. S. Thomas et Scotus volunt, eam formaliter dicere puram negationem. Cum autem omnis negatio vel privatio fundata sit super aliquid positivum, hi duo doctores discrepant in assignando fundamento istius conceptus negativi. Scotus docet, fundamentum formale huius negationis esse paternitatem sub ratione paternitatis. S. Thomas a suis interpretibus non in eodem sensu exponitur. Videtur autem docere, hoc nomine importari negationem principii ab alio, fundatam in ratione principii ad alium. Vasquez putat eum convenire cum S. Bonaventura, qui iuxta morem suum media via incedit et docet, innascibilitatem primario et formaliter dicere negationem, sed secundario, consequenter et etiam fundamentaliter positionem, ut manifeste patet ex quaest. seq. in corp., et supra d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3. Hoc positivum, in ratione ingeniti connotatum, iuxta ipsum est fontalis plenitudo in Patre (cfr. loci citt., et d. 7, q. 2; d. 13, q. 3, et passim).
3. Proprietatem constitutivam Patris formaliter esse paternitatem, est sententia communis, et manifeste docetur a S. Doctore (hic q. 3). Addit tamen Seraphicus, sibi constans, quod etiam innascibilitas aliquo modo, id est ex consequenti intellectu, dicit relationem positive, et sic constituit Patrem, sed tantum radicaliter sive inchoative. Nam iuxta ipsum (d. 27, p. I, q. 2) paternitas supponit generationem tanquam radicem, generatio vero fecunditatem, quae importatur in innascibilitate, quatenus dicit fontalem plenitudinem in Patre. Haec concipitur ut radix communis duarum emanationum atque ut fecunda non in actu secundo, sed primo, sive, ut dicit Richard. a Med., in habitu. Firmum fundamentum haec doctrina habet in illa communi doctrina, quae a Concilio Florentino (Decret. unionis pro Iacobitis) consecrata est, quod « Pater quidquid est aut habet, non habet ab alio, sed ex se, et est principium sine principio. Filius quidquid est aut habet, habet a Patre et est principium de principio etc. » (cfr. infra d. 29, a. 1 et 2, et dub. 1 et 2).
II. His suppositis, et tres solutiones, quas S. Bonav. non approbat, et quarta ab ipso recepta et in fine responsionis posita facile intelliguntur. Haec sententia, quod innascibilitas fundamentaliter dicat fontalem plenitudinem in Patre, et ex consequenti relationem quasi communem ad duas personas emanantes, fuit antiqua positio magnorum doctorum (supra d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3), cui favent Alex. Hal. (S. p. I, q. 69, m. 2 et 4), et Petrus a Tar. (hic q. 2, a. 3), et quam defendit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2, q. 1 et 2). Attamen a posterioribus Scholasticis solutio haec antiqua derelicta, immo a Scoto (hic q. 2, n. 6 seqq.) impugnata est tribus argumentis, quorum principale nihil concludit, cum contra mentem Seraphici supponat, in fontali illa plenitudine importari aliquam relationem realem, distinctam a generatione et spiratione activa. Etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; et S. I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 1) obiicit: « Non videtur verum, quia sic innascibilitas non esset alia proprietas a paternitate et spiratione, sed includeret eas, sicut includitur proprium in communi ». Ad quod ex mente Seraphici responderi poterit cum distinctione: loquendo de principali et formali significatione innascibilitatis, quae dicit negationem principii, haec notio non est eadem cum paternitate et spiratione; loquendo de secundaria significatione, quae importat illam fontalem plenitudinem, « realiter est idem cum paternitate et spiratione activa... differt tamen secundum rationem » (Richard. a Med., hic a. 2, q. 2). Ita quoad sensum etiam S. Bonav., hic q. 2, et dub. 1, et q. 3, ad 2; cfr. etiam d. 29, dub. 1, circa finem.
III. Praeter auctores iam citatos cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 1, 2; d. 13, a. 9, 10; S. p. I, tr. 9, q. 39, m. 1, particula 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. 1. — Richard. Med., hic a. 2, q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 57, q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
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ARTICLE UNIQUE. On the property of unbegottenness.
QUESTION I. Whether the name "ingenerate" or "unbegotten" is said according to substance or according to relation.
As to the first [point], that this name ingenerate is said according to relation, is shown:
1. Through Augustine, who says in the fifth book On the Trinity1 and as is found in the littera: "One does not depart from the relative predicament when one says ingenerate": therefore it is said according to relation.
2. Likewise in the same book2: "Just as the begotten [is said] to the begetter, so the ingenerate [is said] to the non-begetter"; but what is said to another is said relatively or according to relation: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the same is seen by reason, since everything in which person differs from person is said according to relation — this is plain — but according to this [name], that is ingenerate, the Father differs from the Son: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, no negation deprives the mode of signifying or saying3; but begotten is said according to relation; therefore with negation added, it will still be said [according to relation]: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. Every relation in divine [things] posits something — that is certain — but ingenerate posits nothing: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [premise]: if this name posits something, then either as it is taken negatively, or as it is taken privatively. Not as taken negatively; this is plain. If therefore as taken privatively; but privation removes the act and posits the aptitude4: therefore according to this ingenerate will be the same as apt to be begotten, and not begotten; but this fits no one: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, every relation in divine [things] signified in concretion imports distinction, and therefore none is said of the essence according to the mode of denomination — for this is false: the essence begets — but ingenerate is said of the essence, for the divine essence is not begotten5, since its opposite is not predicated of the essence, namely begotten: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, negations stand opposite to affirmations; but begotten is in less than related, and generation than relation: therefore ingenerate is in more than non-related, and ingeneration than non-relation. But non-related or non-relation is not said according to relation, since then it would imply opposites: therefore since this [word] ingenerate is in more, it is not in the genus of relation: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, every relation in divine [things] is either with respect to a principle, or with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle: therefore if this [word] ingenerate expresses relation, [it is] either6 with respect to a principle, or with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle. But not with respect to a principle, since then the Father would have a principle, which is unfitting. If with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle, then the negation is not of that of which the affirmation was — for begotten is said with respect to a principle, since [it is] from someone — therefore if ingenerate is not said with respect to a principle, then the negation is not said with respect to that with respect to which the affirmation was. Therefore neither does it express relation to that-which-is-from-the-principle, since the name does not permit [it], nor to a principle, since the thing does not permit [it].
CONCLUSION. The name ingenerate in its principal sense expresses relation privatively, but in its consequent sense positively, namely fontal fullness.
I respond: It must be said that there are diverse positions on this. For all have held that this [name] ingenerate is said according to relation, but differently.
For some have said that ingenerate expresses only the privation of relation; and that alone suffices for it to be said notionally, since privation can be a principle of distinguishing and of making known, just as a sheep that is unmarked [is distinguished] from one that is marked. And again, negation expresses nobility, as not being ruled in a king, not being caused in a cause, not being produced in a principle. — But this position cannot stand, since pure negation neither distinguishes nor expresses nobility7: it does not distinguish, for the negation of relation is said of the essence; it does not express nobility, for all nobility posits something through the mode of position.
Others have held that this [word] ingenerate is said according to relation and positively, since by privating the one it posits the other: just as unequal privates equality and posits the relation opposed to it, similarly also dissimilar, whence it imports relation positively; so this [word] ingenerate, by privating the relation to the begetter, posits the opposite relation to the non-begetter. And this they say Augustine held, who says that "just as the begotten [is said] to the begetter, so the non-begotten [is said] to the non-begetter"8. — But this position cannot stand, since non-begotten is said either to a principle, or to that-which-is-from-the-principle. If to that-which-is-from-the-principle, then this name ingenerate cannot be said with respect to it, since begotten is said with respect to a principle, and the same is signified in this name begotten and ingenerate, and ingenerate differs only in the negation: therefore it is necessary that this name ingenerate be said with respect to a principle. But if this is true: then according to this the Father would be posited9 to have a principle with respect to which it is said. And again, that principle would be called non-begetter; but not to beget does not express a principle, but the privation of it.
The third manner of speaking is that this name ingenerate, insofar as it is assigned as the notion of the Father, is said according to relation partly privatively, partly positively. Concerning this it must be noted that, as Augustine says10, "ingenerate and non-begotten are the same". But non-begotten can be taken in three ways, like non-white, since it can be a negation in a genus, or outside a genus, or partly in a genus and partly outside a genus11. Insofar as it is a negation outside a genus, thus it generally privates and does not posit any quality, just as one can call non-white that which is not in the genus of color nor of quality. Insofar as it is a negation in a genus, thus it privates whiteness and posits a contrary quality, as non-white, since it lacks whiteness, but yet is black. Insofar as [it is] partly in a genus, partly outside a genus, namely in a remote genus12 and outside the proximate genus; thus non-white is said [of that] which lacks both whiteness and color, yet has a quality nonetheless.
In this manner [it is] to be understood in the matter at hand. For this [word] ingenerate13 imports order in the account of remote genus, and order to a principle in the account of proximate [genus], and such an order through the mode of nature in the account of completive [genus]. If therefore ingenerate be a negation outside a genus, thus ingenerate is said [of him] who is not begotten and does not even have order or14 relation; and in this mode it expresses pure privation and is said of the essence, and is said neither according to substance nor according to relation, since it is privation only. — In another mode it can be a negation in a genus; and then ingenerate is said [of him] who is not begotten, yet has order to a principle, and in this mode it expresses an underlying relation; but yet from this it does not express nobility, and so it fits the Holy Spirit, yet is not a notion. — In a third mode it can be a negation in a certain manner in a genus, in a certain manner outside a genus; and thus ingenerate is said [of him] who is not begotten, yet has order, but not to a principle; and in this mode it expresses the privation of relation with respect to a principle. For if it has order, and not to a principle, therefore it itself is first and a principle; and in this mode it expresses nobility, just as also a principle [does]. And it was fitting that it be signified through negation, since first [things] are known through negation15, and in this mode it is a notion.
But since ingenerate, by the account of its name, does not seem to express anything but the privation or negation of generation, on this account it must be said in a fourth manner, that this name ingenerate, insofar as it fits the Father properly, expresses relation privatively, but by this very fact expresses consequently relation positively.
This is plain thus. Not to be begotten is said of him who simply is not begotten; and so [it] fits not only the Father, but the essence and the Holy Spirit. But beyond this sense, as it properly fits the Father, it adds, since the Father is not begotten, nor received through generation; and thus the essence is excluded, which is received through generation, but it still fits the Holy Spirit. As it fits the Father alone, thus he is called ingenerate, since he is not begotten, nor received through generation, nor follows upon generation. Through the first member the Son is excluded, through the second the essence, through the third the Holy Spirit, whose procession presupposes generation according to the original order, since he proceeds as the bond from the Father and the Son16. For although in divine [things] there is no prior and posterior, yet according to origin and the account of understanding, the generation of the Son is prior to the procession of the Holy Spirit, as was shown above17, and yet they are simultaneous in nature.
Thus therefore, with the verb to follow taken broadly, since there properly is no preceding and following there, in three ways someone is said to be ingenerate: either since he is not produced through generation, or since he is not produced through generation nor had or received through generation, or since he is neither produced nor received nor follows18. In this mode therefore ingenerate imports being from another in no mode, and so primacy and through this fontal fullness, as was shown at the beginning of the preceding distinction19, and as is plain from the beginning of the following distinction, where it is said that "the Father is the principle of the whole deity, since he is from no one"; and so in its principal sense it expresses relation privatively, in its consequent sense positively; and so it does not express the negation that posits nothing.
Whence the reasons for this [conclusion] must be conceded.
1. To that therefore which is objected, that it posits nothing insofar as [taken] negatively; it must be said that this is false, since it is not a negation outside a genus, as if one said: a chimaera is ingenerate, but rather it is a negation with the constancy of the subject; and such a negation in the subject leaves the highest nobility.
2. To that which is objected, that it is said of the essence; it must be said that it is true, but according to as it is said only privatively, and so it is not a property of the Father; but according to as [it is] a property of the Father, it is not said of the essence.
3. To that which is objected, that negations stand opposite to affirmations; it must be said that this is not always true of negation in a genus, but [is true] outside a genus. For non-white, insofar as it is a negation in a genus, is not said as superior to this which is non-qualitative; similarly ingenerate is not superior to this which is non-related.
4. To that which is finally objected, that20 it expresses relation; it must be said that insofar as it imports relation privatively, it is said with respect to a principle; and from this it does not follow that the Father has a principle, but rather that he does not have [one], since it is not said according to position, but according to removal. Whence Augustine well says, "[it] is said to the non-begetter", since ingenerate signifies the removal of the begetter. But insofar as it imports relation positively and consequently, thus21 [it is said] with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle; and so it is not unfitting that some privative name should consequently import something which the affirmative opposed to it does not import. And thus the rest are plain.
I. Some [things] seem to need noting beforehand concerning the manifold sense of the word ingenerate — concerning the signification of this notion in the Father — and whether it is the constitutive property of the Father.
1. The manifold sense of this word, as Scotus rightly observes (here q. 2, n. 3, 4), flows from a twofold source, since begotten can be taken in a different sense, and the particle in can signify a threefold mode of privation (cf. St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 34, a. 4, ad 2; Aristotle, V. Metaph. text. 17, 27, ed. Paris. IV, c. 12, 22). Specially to be attended to are four senses of the word ingenerate: a) with proper privation, which posits the aptitude for some form and denies that very form — this sense is altogether excluded from God; b) with simple negation of the form, and thus it can be said of the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, and even of the divine essence, insofar as it is not begotten, although it is communicated through generation; c) with the name to be begotten extended also to to be communicated, the divine essence is not ingenerate; d) by denying altogether that the person be from another in any way, or, as the Seraphic [Doctor] says, by positing "that he is not begotten, nor received through generation, nor follows upon generation"; and thus it fits a principle without principle and is proper to the Father alone. — Hence the apparent contradiction between the words of the Holy Fathers and the doctors can easily be reconciled (cf. d. 13, q. 4).
2. On the signification of the notion ingenerate in the Father the doctors do not entirely agree. Some have said that by unbegottenness something positive is signified, namely the position of a relation that is opposed to the relation of begetter. St. Thomas and Scotus hold that it formally expresses pure negation. But since every negation or privation is founded upon something positive, these two doctors disagree in assigning the foundation of this negative concept. Scotus teaches that the formal foundation of this negation is paternity under the account of paternity. St. Thomas is not expounded in the same sense by his interpreters. He seems, however, to teach that by this name is imported the negation of a principle from another, founded in the account of a principle to another. Vasquez thinks he agrees with St. Bonaventure, who according to his usual manner takes a middle way and teaches that unbegottenness primarily and formally expresses negation, but secondarily, consequently and even fundamentally [expresses] position, as is manifestly plain from the following question in the body, and above d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3. This positive [reality], connoted in the account of ingenerate, according to him is fontal fullness in the Father (cf. the cited places, and d. 7, q. 2; d. 13, q. 3, and elsewhere).
3. That the constitutive property of the Father is formally paternity is the common opinion, and is manifestly taught by the holy Doctor (here q. 3). The Seraphic [Doctor] adds, however, consistent with himself, that unbegottenness also in some way, that is, in its consequent sense, expresses relation positively, and thus constitutes the Father, but only radically or inchoatively. For according to him (d. 27, p. I, q. 2) paternity presupposes generation as a root, but generation [presupposes] fecundity, which is imported in unbegottenness insofar as it expresses fontal fullness in the Father. This is conceived as the common root of the two emanations and as fecund not in second act, but in first, or, as Richard of Mediavilla says, in habit. This doctrine has a firm foundation in that common doctrine which was consecrated by the Council of Florence (Decree of Union for the Jacobites), that "the Father, whatever he is or has, has not from another, but from himself, and is the principle without principle. The Son, whatever he is or has, has from the Father, and is the principle from a principle, etc." (cf. below d. 29, a. 1 and 2, and dub. 1 and 2).
II. With these things presupposed, both the three solutions which St. Bonaventure does not approve, and the fourth received by him and placed at the end of the response, are easily understood. This view, that unbegottenness fundamentally expresses fontal fullness in the Father, and consequently relation as quasi-common to the two emanating persons, was the ancient position of great doctors (above d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3), to which Alexander of Hales (Summa p. I, q. 69, m. 2 and 4), and Petrus a Tarantasia (here q. 2, a. 3) lend support, and which Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 1 and 2) defends. However, by later Scholastics this ancient solution has been left aside, indeed has been impugned by Scotus (here q. 2, n. 6 ff.) with three arguments, of which the principal concludes nothing, since it supposes against the mind of the Seraphic [Doctor] that in that fontal fullness some real relation, distinct from generation and active spiration, is imported. St. Thomas also (here q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; and Summa I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 1) objects: "It does not seem true, since thus unbegottenness would not be a property other than paternity and spiration, but would include them, just as the proper is included in the common." To which from the mind of the Seraphic [Doctor] one will be able to respond with a distinction: speaking of the principal and formal signification of unbegottenness, which expresses the negation of a principle, this notion is not the same as paternity and spiration; speaking of the secondary signification, which imports that fontal fullness, "it is really the same as paternity and active spiration... yet it differs according to account" (Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2). So also, with respect to sense, St. Bonaventure, here q. 2 and dub. 1, and q. 3, ad 2; cf. also d. 29, dub. 1, near the end.
III. Besides the authors already cited, cf. Bl. Albert, here a. 1, 2; d. 13, a. 9, 10; Summa p. I, tr. 9, q. 39, m. 1, particula 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 57, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here unique question.
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- Cap. 7, n. 8, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.Chapter 7, n. 8, and here in the littera of the Master, c. 1.
- Loc. cit. — Vat. sola post Sicut addit dicitur, pro quo in originali legitur refertur. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, circa finem.At the place cited. — The Vatican [edition] alone after Sicut adds dicitur ("is said"), in place of which in the original one reads refertur ("is referred"). — See here the littera of the Master, c. 1, near the end.
- Hanc propositionem probat August., V. de Trin. c. 7, n. 8, exponendo exempla ex omnibus decem praedicamentorum generibus, quorum aliqua Magister, hic in lit., c. 1, adducit. S. Bonav., infra de verbis Augustini dubium movens (dub. 2), ea approbat munitque hac ratione: Quoniam terminus negatus trahit significationem ab affirmato, idem est modus dicendi quantum ad significationem in termino negato et affirmato. — Cfr. et Aristot., II. Elench. c. 6 (c. 31), ubi iste dicit, includi facere in non-facere et omnino in negatione affirmationem.Augustine proves this proposition in V. de Trin. c. 7, n. 8, by setting out examples from all ten genera of predicaments, some of which the Master adduces here in the littera, c. 1. St. Bonaventure, raising a doubt below on the words of Augustine (dub. 2), approves them and supports them with this reason: Since a negated term draws its signification from the affirmed [term], the mode of saying with respect to signification is the same in the negated and the affirmed term. — Cf. also Aristotle, II. Elench. c. 6 (c. 31), where he says that doing is included in non-doing and altogether affirmation in negation.
- Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et V. Metaph. text. 27 (IV. c. 22), nec non IV. Metaph. text. 4 (III. c. 2), ubi differentia inter negationem et privationem ostenditur. — Mox Vat. absque auctoritate codd. nec suffragante ed. I sed nondum genitus pro et non genitus.Cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments, c. On Opposites, and V. Metaph. text. 27 (IV. c. 22), and also IV. Metaph. text. 4 (III. c. 2), where the difference between negation and privation is shown. — A little later the Vatican [edition], without the authority of any codex and without the support of ed. I, [reads] nondum genitus ("not yet begotten") for et non genitus ("and not begotten").
- Cod. Y ingenita.Cod. Y [reads] ingenita ("ingenerate" [feminine]).
- Cod. V adiungit hoc erit. Paulo inferius post haberet codd. F T inserunt aliquod.Cod. V adds hoc erit ("this will be"). A little below, after haberet ("would have"), codices F T insert aliquod ("some").
- Vat. textum codd. nec non ed. I corrupit substituendo distinguitur pro distinguit, dein post nobilitatem addendo nec distinguit, et demum paulo inferius post positionis inserendo propositionem: Non distinguit, quia non est relatio.The Vatican [edition] corrupted the text of the codices and also of ed. I by substituting distinguitur ("is distinguished") for distinguit ("distinguishes"), then after nobilitatem ("nobility") adding nec distinguit ("nor does it distinguish"), and finally a little below, after positionis ("of position"), inserting the proposition: Non distinguit, quia non est relatio ("It does not distinguish, since it is not a relation").
- Vide supra, fundam. 2. — Explicationem huius dicti Augustini invenies infra, dub. 3. — Mox pro non genitus cod. R ingenitus.See above, fundamentum 2. — The explanation of this saying of Augustine you will find below, dub. 3. — A little later, in place of non genitus ("not begotten") cod. R [reads] ingenitus ("ingenerate").
- Plures codd. ut A T V Y cum ed. 1 ponetur.Several codices, such as A T V Y, with ed. 1 [read] ponetur ("will be posited" [future]).
- Libr. V. de Trin. c. 7, n. 8: Ingenitus porro quid est, nisi non genitus? — Paulo ante pro assignatur sola Vat. assimilatur; mendose.Book V. On the Trinity, c. 7, n. 8: "Furthermore, what is ingenerate except not begotten?" — A little before, in place of assignatur ("is assigned") the Vatican [edition] alone [reads] assimilatur ("is likened"); erroneously.
- Haec divisio negationis insinuatur ab Aristot. I. Poster. c. 4: Est enim contrarium aut privatio aut contradictio in eodem genere, ut par aut impar in numeris, secundum quod consequitur. Et IV. Metaph. text. 4 (III. c. 2): Negationem vero et privationem unius est speculari, propterea quod utroque modo unum speculatur id cuius est negatio aut privatio; aut enim simpliciter dicimus, non inesse illud, aut aliquod genus statuentes. In illo siquidem uni differentia est secundum illud quod in negatione, negatio namque absentia illius est; in privatione vero etiam subiecta quaedam natura fit, de qua privatio dicitur (ed. Firmin-Didot). Et ibid. text. 27 (c. 6): Est autem privatio, negatio a quodam determinato genere. — Scotus, Comment. in IV. Metaph. text. 4 dicit: Notandum etiam, quod duplex est negatio: quaedam est simpliciter et extra genus, per quam absolute dicitur, quod hoc non est illud; alia est negatio in genere, sive infinitans, per quam aliquid negatur non absolute, sed intra metas alicuius generis, sicut caecum dicitur, quod non habet visum; non tamen omne non habens visum est caecum, sed in genere animalium quod natum est habere visum. Unde negatio extra genus potest verificari tam de non ente, quod non est natum habere affirmationem, quam de ente, quod est natum habere et non habet. Unde tam chimaera, quam lapis, quam etiam homo potest dici non videns; non sic autem de privatione, quae est negatio infra genus, quia non omne non videns potest dici caecum, sed solum quod est aptum natum habere visum. Cfr. etiam Scoti Comment. in I. Sent. d. 28, q. 2, n. 4. — Mox post aliquam qualitatem cod. K subiicit contrariam.This division of negation is suggested by Aristotle, I. Poster. c. 4: "For the contrary is either a privation or a contradiction in the same genus, as even or odd in numbers, according as it follows." And IV. Metaph. text. 4 (III. c. 2): "It belongs to one [science] to consider negation and privation, because in either mode one considers the one whose [negation or privation] it is; for either we say simply that this does not inhere, or [we say so] establishing some genus. For in that one [the] difference is according to that which [is] in the negation — for negation is the absence of that [thing]; but in privation also a certain underlying nature occurs, of which the privation is said" (ed. Firmin-Didot). And in the same place, text. 27 (c. 6): "Privation, however, is negation from a certain determined genus." — Scotus, Commentary on IV. Metaph. text. 4 says: "It is to be noted also that negation is twofold: one is simply and outside a genus, through which absolutely it is said that this is not that; another is negation in a genus, or infinitating, through which something is denied not absolutely, but within the bounds of some genus, as one says blind of that which does not have sight; yet not everything not having sight is blind, but [only] in the genus of animals which are by nature [meant] to have sight. Whence negation outside a genus can be verified both of non-being, which is not by nature [meant] to have an affirmation, and of being, which is by nature [meant] to have it and does not have it. Whence chimaera as well as stone and even man can be called not seeing; but not so concerning privation, which is negation within a genus, since not everything not seeing can be called blind, but only that which is fit by nature to have sight." Cf. also Scotus' Commentary on I. Sent. d. 28, q. 2, n. 4. — A little later, after aliquam qualitatem ("any quality"), cod. K adds contrariam ("contrary").
- Vat., suffragantibus solis edd. 4, 5, omittit remoto, et paulo inferius nihilominus.The Vatican [edition], with only edd. 4, 5 supporting [it], omits remoto ("remote"), and a little below nihilominus ("nonetheless").
- Codd. M Z genitum, cod. genitus.Codices M Z [read] genitum ("begotten" [neuter]), [another] cod. genitus ("begotten" [masculine]).
- Ed. I nec.Ed. I [reads] nec ("nor").
- Cfr. supra pag. 421, nota 6.Cf. above p. 421, note 6.
- Vide supra d. 10, a. 2, q. 2.See above d. 10, a. 2, q. 2.
- Supra d. 12, q. 4.Above d. 12, q. 4.
- Sic potiores codd. In Vat. et nonnullis mss. desideratur secundum membrum: aut quia non producitur per generationem. — In cod. F interpolatoris manus textum sic ampliavit: ingenitus, aut quia non producitur per generationem, sed per generationem communicatur, ut essentia; aut quia non producitur per generationem nec per generationem habetur sive accipitur, sed generationem consequitur, ut Spiritus sanctus; aut quia non producitur nec accipitur nec consequitur, ut Pater.Thus the better codices. In the Vatican [edition] and in some manuscripts the second member is missing: "or because he is not produced through generation". — In cod. F the hand of an interpolator amplified the text thus: "ingenerate, either since he is not produced through generation, but is communicated through generation, as the essence; or since he is not produced through generation nor had or received through generation, but follows upon generation, as the Holy Spirit; or since he is neither produced nor received nor follows, as the Father."
- Pars I, q. 2, ad 3. — Dictum Augustini, quod mox ex dist. seq. citatur, scil. quod Pater est principium totius deitatis, invenies ibi in lit. Magistri, c. 1, et eius explanationem ibi dub. 1.Part I, q. 2, ad 3. — The saying of Augustine which is shortly cited from the following distinction, namely that the Father is the principle of the whole deity, you will find there in the littera of the Master, c. 1, and its explanation there in dub. 1.
- Cod. T respectu cuius pro quod.Cod. T [reads] respectu cuius ("with respect to which") for quod ("that").
- Supple: dicitur.Supply: dicitur ("is said").