Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 28
QUAESTIO II. Utrum innascibilitas et paternitas important eandem relationem.
Secundo, supposito quod hoc nomen ingenitus dicatur secundum relationem, quaeritur, utrum importet eandem relationem, quam hoc nomen Pater, utrum scilicet eadem relatio sit innascibilitas et paternitas. Et quod non, ostenditur sic.
1. Augustinus quinto de Trinitate1: «Aliud est dicere esse patrem, et aliud ingenitum»; sed non differt4 secundum essentiam: ergo secundum relationem.
2. Item, hoc videtur per rationem, quia possibile est, aliquem intelligi esse ingenitum et non esse patrem, ut in Adam2, et e converso, ut in Cain. Si ergo una relatio potest intelligi, altera non intellecta, et e converso; et poni, altera non posita: ergo sunt diversae relationes.
3. Item, relationes diversificantur penes terminos, quia relatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, ad alterum est3; sed ingenitus dicitur per privationem prioris, scilicet patris, et pater secundum positionem germinis sive filii: ergo dicunt respectum secundum aliam et aliam partem: ergo etc.
4. Item, plus differt generatio et ingeneratio quam generatio et spiratio — nam hic est oppositio propria, ibi autem solum disparatio — sed alia relatio est generatio et spiratio: ergo et generatio et ingeneratio. Sed generatio et paternitas est eadem, ut supra ostensum est4: ergo innascibilitas et paternitas non sunt eaedem relationes.
Contra:
1. Omnis relatio in divinis est perso-
nae ad personam; si ergo ingenitus dicit relationem, aut ergo ad Filium, aut ad Spiritum sanctum, aut ad utrumque. Non ad utrumque, quia Pater non comparatur unica relatione, sed diversis ad Filium et Spiritum sanctum; non ad personam Spiritus sancti — hoc constat — ergo ad Filium. Si ergo relatio ad Filium est paternitas: ergo innascibilitas est eadem relatio.
2. Item, relationes in divinis personis non accidunt, sed esse tribuunt personae5: ergo si unius personae unicum est esse, unica erit eius relatio. Sed Pater est una persona, et convenit ei innascibilitas et paternitas: ergo etc.
3. Item, sicut se habet nascibilitas in Filio ad filiationem, ita innascibilitas in Patre ad paternitatem; sed in Filio eadem est relatio nascibilitas et filiatio: ergo etc.
4. Item, Philosophus6: «Primum et principium idem dico»; sed innascibilis dicit illud quod dicit in ratione primi, pater in ratione principii: ergo dicunt eandem habitudinem et relationem: non ergo sunt duae relationes, sed una tantum.
CONCLUSIO. Innascibilitas est alia notio ac paternitas, cum utraque aliam relationem importet tum secundum intellectum principalem, tum secundum intellectum consequentem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc quod est innascibilis7 aliam relationem importat, quam hoc quod est pater, sive quantum ad principalem intellectum, sive quantum ad consequentem. Quantum ad principalem, manifestum est, quia8 importat respectum ad principium per modum privationis, pater autem importat respectum ad principiatum per modum positionis et generationis; et ita dicunt diversas habitudines, quarum una est vera habitudo, altera privatio habitudinis. — Quantum ad consequentem intellectum similiter differunt, licet non tantum. Nam pater dicit relationem principii solum respectu Filii et per modum generationis, sed innascibilis universalem dicit principalitatem sive fontalem plenitudinem in producendo, non tantum quantum ad generationem, sed etiam quantum ad spirationem, non tantum respectu Filii, sed etiam respectu Spiritus sancti. Et hoc patet, quia innascibilis dicitur, eo quod non generatur nec generationem consequitur: ergo in nomine innascibilis aufertur ratio nascendi et procedendi; et si hoc, ponitur ratio omnimodae principalitatis, et ideo fontalis plenitudinis.
Ad oppositum:
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod dicit respectum personae ad personam; dicendum, quod privative sive negative non dicit respectum ad personam. Et quod dicit, quod omnis relatio dicit respectum ad personam, intelligitur de illa quae dicit positionem. Secundum autem quod accipitur quantum ad consequentem intellectum, dicit respectum ad utramque personam. — Quod obiicitur, quod non est una communis relatio; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad principalem intellectum, tamen bene potest esse quantum ad consequentem, ut aliquod nomen dicat plenitudinem respectu utriusque.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod relatio dat personae existere; dicendum, quod non quaecumque, sed quae est relatio personalis. Quae autem sit illa, infra patebit9.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Filio idem est nascibilitas et filiatio: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia non opponuntur eodem genere oppositionis; quia paternitas et filiatio opponuntur relative, non sic nascibilitas et innascibilitas, immo magis contradictorie vel contrarie.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod primum et principium est idem; dicendum, quod primum dicitur dupliciter: aut per privationem prioris; et sic primum et principium idem sunt re, et non ratione. Alio modo primum dicitur respectu secundi; et sic primum et principium idem sunt re et ratione, et sic non significatur primum per hoc nomen innascibilis. Importat enim primitatem per privationem prioris, ut patet ex ipsa nominis impositione.
Haec quaestio explicatur ex praecedenti. Auctores, qui intellectum consequentem, in ista notione connotatum et in praeced. declaratum, non admittunt, etiam hic solummodo primam partem responsionis approbant.
Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 59. m. 1. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 33. q. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., a. 37. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
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QUESTION II. Whether unbegottenness and paternity import the same relation.
Secondly, having supposed that this name unbegotten is said according to relation, it is asked whether it imports the same relation as this name Father — that is, whether unbegottenness and paternity are the same relation. And that they are not, is shown thus.
1. Augustine, fifth book On the Trinity1: «It is one thing to say [a person] is Father, and another [to say a person is] unbegotten»; but [they] do not differ4 according to essence: therefore according to relation.
2. Likewise, this is seen by reason, since it is possible for someone to be understood to be unbegotten and not to be a father, as in Adam2, and conversely, as in Cain. If, therefore, one relation can be understood, the other not being understood, and conversely; and one posited, the other not posited: therefore they are diverse relations.
3. Likewise, relations are diversified according to their terms, since a relation, as such, is to another3; but unbegotten is said by privation of a prior, namely of a father, and father by the position of an offspring or son: therefore they say a respect according to one part and another part: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, generation and ingeneration differ more than generation and spiration — for here there is proper opposition, but there only disparation — but generation and spiration are different relations: therefore generation and ingeneration are also [different relations]. But generation and paternity are the same, as was shown above4: therefore unbegottenness and paternity are not the same relations.
On the contrary:
1. Every relation in divine things is of a person
to a person; if therefore unbegotten names a relation, [it is] either to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, or to both. Not to both, since the Father is not compared by a single relation, but by diverse [relations] to the Son and to the Holy Spirit; not to the person of the Holy Spirit — this is clear — therefore to the Son. If, then, the relation to the Son is paternity: therefore unbegottenness is the same relation.
2. Likewise, relations in the divine persons are not accidents, but bestow being on the person5: therefore if of one person there is one being, there will be one relation of it. But the Father is one person, and unbegottenness and paternity belong to him: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, just as begottenness in the Son stands to filiation, so unbegottenness in the Father stands to paternity; but in the Son begottenness and filiation are the same relation: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, the Philosopher6: «I call first and principle the same»; but unbegotten names that which it names under the account of first, father under the account of principle: therefore they name the same disposition and relation: therefore they are not two relations, but one only.
CONCLUSION. Unbegottenness is a notion other than paternity, since each imports a different relation, both according to the principal understanding and according to the consequent understanding.
I respond: It must be said that what unbegotten7 is imports a different relation from what father is, whether as to the principal understanding, or as to the consequent. As to the principal, it is manifest, since8 unbegotten imports a respect to a principle by way of privation, while father imports a respect to a principiate by way of position and generation; and so they name diverse dispositions, of which one is a true disposition, the other a privation of a disposition. — As to the consequent understanding they likewise differ, although not as much. For father names the relation of principle only with respect to the Son and by way of generation, but unbegotten names a universal principality or fontal fullness in producing, not only as to generation, but also as to spiration, not only with respect to the Son, but also with respect to the Holy Spirit. And this is clear, since one is called unbegotten on the ground that he is not generated nor follows generation: therefore in the name unbegotten the account of being-born and proceeding is taken away; and if so, the account of every-mode principality is posited, and therefore of fontal fullness.
To the opposite [arguments]:
1. To that, then, which is objected, that [unbegottenness] names a respect of person to person; it must be said that, privatively or negatively, it does not name a respect to a person. And as to what is said — that every relation names a respect to a person — this is to be understood of that [relation] which names a position. But according as it is taken as to the consequent understanding, it does name a respect to each [other] person. — As to what is objected, that there is not one common relation; it must be said that this is true as to the principal understanding, yet it can well be [so] as to the consequent, so that some name names a fullness with respect to both.
2. To that which is objected, that a relation gives existing to a person; it must be said that not just any [relation does so], but [the one] which is a personal relation. What that is, will appear below9.
3. To that which is objected, that in the Son begottenness and filiation are the same: therefore etc.; it must be said that this does not follow, since [these pairs] are not opposed by the same kind of opposition; for paternity and filiation are opposed relatively, but not so begottenness and unbegottenness, but rather contradictorily or contrarily.
4. To that which is objected, that first and principle are the same; it must be said that first is said in two ways: either by the privation of a prior; and so first and principle are the same in reality, and not in account. In another way first is said with respect to a second; and thus first and principle are the same in reality and in account, and so the first is not signified by this name unbegotten. For [the name unbegotten] imports primacy by privation of a prior, as is plain from the very imposition of the name.
This question is explained from the preceding. The authors who do not admit the consequent understanding — connoted in this notion and declared in the preceding [question] — here likewise approve only the first part of the response.
Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 59, m. 1. — St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 33, q. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, a. 37, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
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- Cap. 6, n. 7. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.Chapter 6, n. 7. Cf. here the littera of the Master, c. 1.
- Cod. Y quod Adam in paradiso. Mox Vat. Abel pro Cain; mendose.Cod. Y [reads] quod Adam in paradiso ("that Adam in paradise"). Soon, the Vatican [reads] Abel for Cain; erroneously.
- Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relatione, et V. Metaph. text. 20 (IV. c. 15.).Cf. Aristotle, On the Categories, chapter on Relation, and V Metaphysics, text 20 (IV, c. 15).
- Dist. 27. p. 1. q. 1. — In principio argumenti ed. 1 differunt pro differt; in fine verba non sunt eaedem relationes in multis codd. omittuntur, cod. T pro eis substituit sunt diversae relationes.Distinction 27, p. 1, q. 1. — At the beginning of the argument ed. 1 [reads] differunt in place of differt; at the end the words non sunt eaedem relationes are omitted in many codices, [and] cod. T substitutes for them sunt diversae relationes ("are diverse relations").
- Plura de hoc vide supra d. 26. q. 3.See more on this above d. 26, q. 3.
- Libr. 1. Poster. c. 2. — Circa finem argumenti multi codd. voci relationem praefigunt non, pro qua particula codd. L O non nisi.Book 1 Posterior [Analytics], c. 2. — Around the end of the argument many codices prefix to the word relationem the [particle] non, for which particle codices L O [read] non nisi.
- Permulti codd. cum sex primis edd. innascibilitas.Very many codices, with the first six editions, [read] innascibilitas.
- Ita plurimi codd. ut A C L N P Q R S T U V Y Vat.; cod. F adiicit innascibilis. — Mox plures codd. innascibilitas pro innascibilis. — Cod. W addit non positive secundum principalem intellectum.Thus very many codices such as A C L N P Q R S T U V Y [and] the Vatican; cod. F adds innascibilis ("the unbegotten"). — Soon, several codices [read] innascibilitas in place of innascibilis. — Cod. W adds non positive secundum principalem intellectum ("not positively, according to the principal understanding").
- Quaest. seq.The following question.