Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 28
QUAESTIO III. Utrum innascibilitas, an paternitas sit proprietas personalis Patris.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum innascibilitas sit proprietas sive relatio personalis personae1 Patris, an paternitas. Et quod sit paternitas, videtur:
1. Quia illa est proprietas personalis, per quam persona ab omnibus separatur; sed talis est haec relatio paternitas: ergo etc.
2. Item, illa est proprietas personalis, per quam persona propriissime nominatur et exprimitur; sed persona Patris propriissime exprimitur per paternitatem: ergo etc.
3. Item, sicut filiatio se habet ad Filium, sic paternitas ad Patrem; sed filiatio est personalis relatio personae Filii: ergo et paternitas Patris.
4. Item, illa est proprietas personae, quae dicit2 per modum positionis et propriae habitudinis; sed inter omnes relationes, quae dicuntur de Patre, sola paternitas est talis: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Proprietas sive relatio personalis dat esse personae; sed paternitas non dat esse personae Patris, quia nihil habet esse ex hoc, quod alteri dat esse; sed persona Patris dicitur pater, quia alteri dat esse: ergo etc.
2. Item, non intellecta proprietate personali, impossibile est intelligere personam; sed non intellecta paternitate, est intelligere habentem deitatem et innascibilitatem: ergo cum innascibilitas sit proprietas personae Patris, ergo etc.
3. Item, proprietas personalis debet dicere totum esse personae; sed paternitas non nominat personam Patris secundum omnem plenitudinem fecunditatis, sed innascibilitas: ergo etc.
4. Item, Damascenus3: «In divinis omnia sunt unum praeter generationem, ingenerationem et processionem»; constat quod non nominat omnes proprietates, ergo solum personales: ergo ingeneratio est proprietas personalis, et non nisi Patris: ergo etc.
CONCLUSIO. Proprietas personalis Patris est paternitas, non innascibilitas nec spiratio activa.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit communis opinio et habetur ex verbis Magistri4 et Sanctorum, scilicet Hilarii et Augustini, paternitas est notio personalis Patris. Ad hoc enim, quod aliqua relatio sit personalis, oportet quod dicat illius personae primam et propriam habitudinem, et per modum positionis et completionis; sed constat, quod innascibilitas quantum ad primum intellectum non dicit positionem, quantum ad consequentem intellectum non dicit specialem relationem, sed fontalem plenitudinem. Similiter spiratio non dicit propriam relationem Patris5; et ideo necesse est, quod paternitas dicat. Unde et rationes ad hoc inductae concedendae sunt.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod proprietas dat esse personae: dicendum, quod illud non est intelligendum de esse simpliciter, sed de esse personali sive de esse distincto6: et ipsa paternitatis auctoritas in divinis non accidit illi hypostasi, immo dicit illius personae complementum, ratione cuius est hoc. Quamvis ergo Pater non habeat esse ex hoc, quod dat alteri esse, tamen nihil impedit, ipsum ex hoc esse personam distinctam.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est intelligere personam Patris etc.; dicendum, quod intellectu plene apprehendente et rationabiliter procedente, non est intelligere personam Patris vel hypostasim sine paternitate7; quia si intelligatur innascibilis, ita quod non adsit paternitas, innascibilis dicit privationem nec aliquid dicit circa Patrem, quod non dicat etiam circa essentiam; et ideo non intelligitur ut proprietas personalis nec est alia8, et ideo non
intelligitur persona Patris ut distincta sive hypostasis illa. Nam proprietas innascibilitatis, ut proprietas, includit proprietates et relationes respectu principiati; alioquin, ut supra ostensum est, non est proprietas.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas personalis dicit totum esse personae; dicendum, quod si dicatur totum esse, id est perfectum, completum et proprium, sic habet veritatem. Si autem intelligatur, quod dicat totum esse, id est omnem habitudinem; sic falsum est, quia non debet dicere omnem, sed necesse est, quod dicat unam determinatam, aut nullam determinate diceret, et ita non erit notio personalis.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, dicendum, quod non enumerat omnes proprietates personales, secundum quod personales, sed intendit relationes sub illis comprehendere: et sub generatione duas personales comprehendit, sub processione duas, unam personalem, aliam non personalem; sed in ingeneratione dicit solum innascibilitatem, quae proprietas est, licet non personalis.
I. In respons. explicatur, quod quatuor requiruntur, ut proprietas sit personalis, scil. quod sit proprietas prima, quia primo distinguit, propria, non communis (qualis est spiratio activa), per modum positionis, et completionis, qua persona perfecte constituitur in esse personali. Duae ultimae differentiae non conveniunt innascibilitati; unde est quidem proprietas, sed non personalis (cfr. supra d. 26. q. 4.). — Solutio ad 1. supponit, quod esse personale in Deo est esse relativum, quia sola relatio in Deo distinguit personas. Unde relatio paternitatis resultat ex genito Filio (cfr. hic dub. 1.).
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 69. m. 2. 5. — Scot., hic q. 2; Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 33. a. 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 57. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. in fine.
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QUESTION III. Whether unbegottenness or paternity is the personal property of the Father.
Thirdly it is asked whether unbegottenness is the personal property or relation of the person1 of the Father, or paternity. And that it is paternity, [it is shown] thus:
1. Because that is the personal property by which the person is separated from all others; but such is this relation paternity: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, that is the personal property by which the person is most properly named and expressed; but the person of the Father is most properly expressed through paternity: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, just as filiation stands to the Son, so paternity to the Father; but filiation is the personal relation of the person of the Son: therefore also paternity [is the personal relation] of the Father.
4. Likewise, that is the property of the person which is said2 by way of position and proper relation; but among all the relations which are said of the Father, paternity alone is such: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. The personal property or relation gives being to the person; but paternity does not give being to the person of the Father, since nothing has being from the fact that it gives being to another; but the person of the Father is called father because he gives being to another: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, with the personal property not being understood, it is impossible to understand the person; but with paternity not being understood, [one is still able] to understand [the person] as having the deity and unbegottenness: therefore since unbegottenness is a property of the person of the Father, therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the personal property ought to express the whole being of the person; but paternity does not name the person of the Father according to all the plenitude of fecundity, but unbegottenness [does]: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, [the] Damascene3: «In divine [things] all are one except generation, ingeneration, and procession»; it is established that he does not name all the properties, therefore [he names] only the personal ones: therefore ingeneration is a personal property, and of none but the Father: therefore etc.
CONCLUSION. The personal property of the Father is paternity, not unbegottenness nor active spiration.
I respond: It must be said that, as the common opinion says and is held from the words of the Master4 and of the Saints, namely Hilary and Augustine, paternity is the personal notion of the Father. For in order that any relation be personal, it is required that it express that person's primary and proper relation, and by way of position and completion; but it is established that unbegottenness, as to its first sense, does not express position, [and] as to its consequent sense, does not express a special relation, but rather a fontal plenitude. Likewise spiration does not express the proper relation of the Father5; and therefore it is necessary that paternity express [it]. Hence the reasons brought forward to this effect are to be conceded.
1. To that which is objected, then, that the property gives being to the person: it must be said that this is not to be understood of being absolutely, but of personal being or of distinct being6: and the very authority of paternity in divine things does not befall that hypostasis [accidentally], rather it expresses the completion of that person, by reason of which it is this [person]. Although therefore the Father does not have being from the fact that he gives being to another, yet nothing prevents that, from this, he be a distinct person.
2. To that which is objected, that one can [still] understand the person of the Father, etc.; it must be said that, with the intellect fully apprehending and proceeding rationally, one cannot understand the person of the Father or [his] hypostasis without paternity7; for if [the Father] be understood as unbegotten in such a way that paternity is not present, "unbegotten" expresses a privation and does not express anything around the Father which it does not also express around the essence; and therefore it is not understood as a personal property, nor is it any other [property]8, and therefore
the person of the Father is not understood as distinct or as that hypostasis. For the property of unbegottenness, as a property, includes properties and relations with respect to the principled [persons]; otherwise, as was shown above, it is not a property.
3. To that which is objected, that the personal property expresses the whole being of the person; it must be said that if [by] whole being is meant the perfect, complete, and proper [being], then it holds true. But if it be understood that [the personal property] expresses the whole being, that is, every relation; then it is false, because it ought not to express every [relation], but it is necessary that it express one determinate [relation], or it would express none determinately, and so it will not be a personal notion.
4. To that which is objected concerning [the] Damascene, it must be said that he does not enumerate all the personal properties, insofar as personal, but rather he intends to comprehend the relations under them: and under generation he comprehends two personal [relations], under procession two, one personal, the other not personal; but in [the term] ingeneration he expresses only unbegottenness, which is a property, although not a personal one.
I. In the response it is explained that four [conditions] are required for a property to be personal, namely that it be a primary property, since it primarily distinguishes; proper, not common (such as is active spiration); by way of position; and of completion, by which the person is perfectly constituted in personal being. The last two differences do not belong to unbegottenness; whence it is indeed a property, but not a personal one (cf. above d. 26, q. 4). — The solution to [objection] 1 supposes that personal being in God is relative being, since relation alone in God distinguishes the persons. Whence the relation of paternity results from the begotten Son (cf. here, dub. 1).
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 69, m. 2, 5. — Scotus, here q. 2; Reportata here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; Summa I, q. 33, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following question here a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, here I, princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 57, q. 4. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1, at the end.
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- Codd. PQ omittunt vocem personae, alii codd. cum edd. vocem personalis. — Principia, quae in seqq. argumentis adhibentur, deducenda sunt ex d. 26. q. 1-4.Codd. PQ omit the word personae; other codices with the [printed] editions [omit] the word personalis. — The principles which are employed in the following arguments are to be derived from d. 26, q. 1-4.
- Vat. cum aliquibus mss. dicitur.The Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts [reads] dicitur ("is said").
- Lib. I. de Fide orthod. c. 8. Vide supra d. 26. q. 1. arg. 4. ad opp.Bk. I On the Orthodox Faith, c. 8. See above d. 26, q. 1, arg. 4 ad oppositum.
- Dist. 26. c. 2. seq., et hic c. 1-3, ubi etiam verba Hilarii et Augustini habentur.Distinction 26, c. 2 ff., and here c. 1-3, where the words of Hilary and Augustine are also found.
- In Vat. et solo cod. cc deest Patris.In the Vatican [edition] and only cod. cc, Patris is missing.
- Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 3. in corp. — De propositione subsequenti vide supra d. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 1. et 3, et hic dub. 1. — Paulo inferius post non habeat plurimi codd. parum congrue omittunt esse.Cf. above d. 26, q. 3, in the body. — On the following proposition see above d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 1 and 3, and here dub. 1. — A little below, after non habeat, very many codices, somewhat incongruously, omit esse.
- Plurimi codd. omittunt vel hypostasim sine paternitate; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 solummodo verba vel hypostasim; ed. 1 pro sine paternitate exhibet nisi intellecta paternitate. — De intellectu apprehendente consule infra dub. 1.Very many codices omit vel hypostasim sine paternitate; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [omit] only the words vel hypostasim; ed. 1, in place of sine paternitate, exhibits nisi intellecta paternitate. — On the apprehending intellect consult below, dub. 1.
- Vat. et ed. 1 hic addunt immo sunt proprietates naturales, quae verba, quia contextui non respondent et in omnibus codd. et edd., except. 1, desunt, in textum non recepimus.The Vatican [edition] and ed. 1 here add immo sunt proprietates naturales ("rather they are natural properties"); these words, because they do not correspond to the context and are missing in all codices and editions except [ed.] 1, we have not received into the text.