Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 31
Quaestio II.
Utrum una creatura cum alia simpliciter unum dici possit.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Secundo quaeritur, utrum una creatura possit dici unum cum alia; et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Apostolus primae ad Corinthios tertio1: Qui plantat et qui rigat unum sunt; sed alius erat plantans, ut Paulus, alius rigans, ut Apollo: ergo secundum hoc patet, quod una creatura potest dici unum cum alia.
2. Item, Augustinus dicit et Magister ponit in littera2, quod recte dicuntur unum quae conveniunt in natura et voluntate; sed hoc habet una creatura cum alia: ergo etc.
3. Item, Dominus Matthaei decimo nono3: Itaque iam non sunt duo, sed una caro; hoc dixit de viro et uxore; sed si sunt, et non sunt duo, ergo sunt unum: ergo vir cum uxore potest dici unum, et sic etc.
4. Item, ab unitate principii materialis venit unitas simpliciter, quae est unitas numero4; sed corpus est materiale principium in homine — qui autem adhaeret meretrici, unum corpus efficitur, sicut dicitur primae ad Corinthios sexto — ergo unum simpliciter, et sic etc.
Sed contra:
1. Idem, simpliciter dictum, stat pro eodem numero5: ergo unum, simpliciter dictum, stat pro uno numero; sed duae creaturae non sunt unum numero, quantumcumque conveniant: ergo non debent dici unum.
2. Item, si aliqua dicuntur unum propter convenientiam in natura, tunc ergo, cum homo et asinus conveniant in natura, sunt unum; quod non conceditur. Si dicas, quod ultra requiritur conformitas voluntatis6; cum ergo viri peccatores conveniant et in natura et in voluntate, ergo debent dici unum: quod cum non dicantur, non sufficit ergo conformitas naturae et voluntatis.
3. Item, si homo ex coniunctione meretricis efficitur unum, cum omnis unitas sit a prima unitate7, haec unitas erit a prima unitate; sed talis unitas est detestabilis: ergo prima unitas facit unitatem detestabilem, ergo ipsa est vituperabilis.
Conclusio.
Illa quae naturae, voluntatis et operationis conformitatem retinent, simpliciter unum possunt congrue dici; aliqua tamen istarum conditionum deficiente, non nisi unum secundum quid dicuntur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod duae creaturae distinctae non possunt habere unitatem nisi per conformitatem; quaelibet autem conformitas non facit dici unum simpliciter, sed illa quae est conformitas simpliciter, non secundum quid. Ad plenam autem conformitatem requiritur triplex conformitas, scilicet in natura, in voluntate et in operatione; et quando illa tria concurrunt ad aliqua duo, tunc illa duo8 dicuntur unum: sicut Paulus et Apollo in natura erant conformes, quia uterque homo; in voluntate similiter, quia uterque salutem fidelium cupiebat; in actione similiter, quia uterque ad eam procurandam se exercebat, ille plantando et hic rigando, et utraque actio conformis, quia utraque erat per divini verbi praedicationem. Verbum enim divinum primo iactatum est semen, deinde accipit irrigationem pluviae. — Si autem sit conformitas in natura solum, non debent9 dici unum nisi secundum quid, scilicet cum determinatione diminuente, ut unum genere vel specie. Si solum in voluntate, tunc sunt unus spiritus, qui dicit amorem. Si unum in natura et voluntate, tunc unum corpus et una anima. Si unum in natura et actione, possunt dici unum cum determinatione, ut fornicator cum meretrice potest dici unum corpus; tamen non potest dici unum simpliciter, sicut vir et uxor. Nec viri mali ita unum, sicut viri boni, quia disconveniunt in volitis principaliter intentis. Quilibet enim malus bonum proprium quaerit et non commune.
Ex his patent quaesita. Concedendum enim est, aliqua duo dici unum simpliciter10, si habeant conformitatem, sicut dictum est, sicut probant primae rationes.
Ad argumenta in oppositum:
1. Ad illud autem quod quarto obiicitur, dicendum, quod non concludit, quia fornicator et meretrix non dicuntur unum corpus ratione substantiae corporalis, sed ratione operis carnalis, in quo uniuntur: et ideo non sequitur, quod debeant dici unum simpliciter.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de uno in numero, dicendum, quod duplex est unitas, scilicet indivisionis et conformitatis. Unitas indivisionis attenditur in uno numero, et haec unitas est simpliciter; unitas vero conformitatis non est in uno numero, sed in his quibus contingit aliis conformari, ut dictum est.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, si propter conformitatem in natura dicuntur unum etc.; dicendum, quod propter conformitatem in natura et voluntate; et in natura non solum, secundum quod est rei essentia, sed ex qua pullulat pullulam11, hoc est in quantum est operationis principium; sic patet, quod homo et asinus non dicuntur unum. Patet etiam, quod mali homines non dicuntur unum, quia etsi
concordant in fine propinquo et in opere, differunt tamen in remoto, quia quilibet quaerit quod suum est. Iusti autem e contrario; si enim aliquando dissentiant voluntates eorum in fine propinquo, conveniunt in remoto.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas meretricis nullo modo est a Deo; dicendum, quod sicut in peccato est substantia actionis — et haec est a Deo — et deformitas — et haec non est a Deo: sic in unitate tali intelligendum est.
I. Pro distinctione, posita in solutione sive ulteriori determinatione 1. argumenti ad oppositum, et in quaest. seq. ad 1, aliquid est indistinctum in se, distinctum a quolibet alio; unitas conformitatis, quae conformitas potest esse triplex, ut exponitur in textu. In sensu rigoroso solummodo unitas indivisionis est unitas simpliciter. Nihilominus in sensu largiore interdum, etiam deficiente unitate indivisionis, unitas conformitatis dici potest unitas simpliciter, scilicet quando conformitas est perfecta in natura, in voluntate, in actione, ut explicatur in corp. Ita apte exponuntur varii loci s. Scripturae. — Quoad solutionem ad ult., quod substantia actionis, quae est quasi substratum deformitatis, sit a Deo, cfr. II. Sent. d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.
II. Ipsa quaestio explicite tractatur tantum a B. Alberto, hic a. 13.
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Question II. Whether one creature can be said simply to be one with another.
Second, it is asked whether one creature can be said to be one with another; and that it can be, is shown in this way.
1. The Apostle, in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] three1: He who plants and he who waters are one; but Paul was one planting, and Apollos another watering: therefore from this it appears that one creature can be said to be one with another.
2. Likewise, Augustine says, and the Master sets down in [his] text2, that those things are rightly said to be one which agree in nature and will; but one creature has this with another: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the Lord, [in] Matthew nineteen3: And so they are now not two, but one flesh; this he said of husband and wife; but if they are, and are not two, therefore they are one: therefore husband with wife can be said to be one, and so etc.
4. Likewise, from the unity of the material principle there comes unity simply, which is unity in number4; but the body is the material principle in man — and he who adheres to a harlot is made one body, as is said in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] six — therefore one simply, and so etc.
On the contrary:
1. The same, said simply, stands for the same thing in number5: therefore one, said simply, stands for one in number; but two creatures are not one in number, however much they agree: therefore they ought not to be said to be one.
2. Likewise, if certain things are said to be one on account of an agreement in nature, then, since man and ass agree in nature, they are one; which is not granted. If you should say that conformity of will is further required6, — since, then, sinful men agree both in nature and in will, they ought therefore to be said to be one: which, since they are not so said, conformity of nature and of will therefore does not suffice.
3. Likewise, if a man, by union with a harlot, is made one, since every unity is from the first unity7, this unity will be from the first unity; but such a unity is detestable: therefore the first unity makes a detestable unity, therefore it is itself blameworthy.
Conclusion.
Those things which retain conformity of nature, of will, and of operation can fittingly be said simply to be one; yet, with any one of these conditions failing, they are said to be one only in a qualified sense.
I respond: It must be said that two distinct creatures cannot have unity except by conformity; yet not every conformity makes [things] said to be one simply, but [only] that which is conformity simply, not in a qualified sense. For full conformity, however, a threefold conformity is required, namely in nature, in will, and in operation; and when those three concur in some two [things], then those two8 are said to be one: as Paul and Apollos were conformed in nature, since each was a man; in will likewise, since each desired the salvation of the faithful; in action likewise, since each exerted himself to procure it, the one by planting and the other by watering, and each action conformed [to the other], since each was through the preaching of the divine word. For the divine word, first cast forth, is the seed; thereafter it receives the watering of rain. — But if there is conformity in nature alone, they ought not9 to be said to be one except in a qualified sense, namely with a diminishing qualification, as one in genus or species. If [conformity is] in will alone, then they are one spirit, which expresses love. If [they are] one in nature and in will, then [they are] one body and one soul. If [they are] one in nature and in action, they can be said to be one with a qualification, as the fornicator with the harlot can be said to be one body; yet they cannot be said to be one simply, as husband and wife [can]. Nor are evil men one in the same way as good men, since they disagree in the things willed as principally intended. For every evil man seeks his own good and not the common [good].
From these things the points inquired into are clear. For it is to be granted that some two things are said to be one simply10, if they have conformity, as has been said, as the first reasons prove.
To the arguments on the opposite side:
1. But to that which is objected fourthly, it must be said that it does not conclude, since the fornicator and the harlot are not said to be one body by reason of corporeal substance, but by reason of the carnal act, in which they are united: and therefore it does not follow that they ought to be said to be one simply.
2. To that which is objected concerning [being] one in number, it must be said that unity is twofold, namely [the unity] of indivision and [the unity] of conformity. The unity of indivision is regarded in [being] one in number, and this unity is [unity] simply; but the unity of conformity is not in [being] one in number, but in those things to which it happens to be conformed to others, as has been said.
3. To that which is objected, if on account of conformity in nature [some things] are said to be one etc.; it must be said: on account of conformity in nature and in will; and [conformity] in nature, not only insofar as it is the essence of the thing, but [in nature] from which [the essence] sprouts forth a sprout11, that is, insofar as [the nature] is the principle of operation; thus it is clear that man and ass are not said to be one. It is also clear that evil men are not said to be one, since although
they agree in the proximate end and in the work, they nevertheless differ in the remote [end], since each seeks what is his own. The just, however, [are] on the contrary; for if at some time their wills should disagree in the proximate end, they agree in the remote [end].
4. To that which is objected, that the unity of the harlot is in no way from God; it must be said that, just as in sin there is the substance of the action — and this is from God — and the deformity — and this is not from God: so it is to be understood in such a unity.
I. As for the distinction set down in the solution, or rather in the further determination of the 1. argument on the opposite side, and in the following question, ad 1: something is undivided in itself, [yet] distinct from anything else; the unity of conformity, which conformity can be threefold, as is expounded in the text. In the strict sense, only the unity of indivision is unity simply. Nevertheless, in a broader sense, sometimes — even with the unity of indivision failing — the unity of conformity can be called unity simply, namely when the conformity is perfect in nature, in will, in action, as is explained in the body [of the question]. Thus the various passages of holy Scripture are aptly expounded. — As for the solution to the last [argument], that the substance of the action, which is as it were the substrate of the deformity, is from God, cf. II Sent. d. 37, a. 2, q. 1.
II. The question itself is treated explicitly only by B. Albert, here a. 13.
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- Vers. 8. De verbis seqq. cfr. ibid. v. 6. — Mox pro una Val. omnis.Verse 8. On the following words, cf. ibid. v. 6. — Soon, in place of una, the Vatican [edition reads] omnis.
- Hic, c. 1. — In fine argumenti pro creatura, quam vocem ex codd. K Q T (ee u secunda manu) restituimus, Vat. natura.Here, c. 1. — At the end of the argument, in place of creatura, which word we have restored from codices K Q T (ee u in a second hand), the Vatican [edition reads] natura.
- Vers. 6.Verse 6.
- Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.): Numero quidem (sunt unum), quorum materia una. — Textus s. Scripturae hic citatus invenitur loc. cit. vers. 16.Aristotle, V Metaphysics, text 12 (IV, c. 6): They are one in number whose matter is one. — The text of holy Scripture here cited is found in the place cited, verse 16.
- Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 3.): Maxime autem indubitanter, quod unum est numero, idem ab omnibus videtur dici.Aristotle, I Topics, c. 6 (c. 3): Most indubitably of all, what is one in number is seen by all to be called the same.
- Supple cum Vat. contra.Supply, with the Vatican [edition], contra ["against this"].
- Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 13. § 1. seq., et Boeth., de Unitate ut uno.Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 13, § 1ff., and Boethius, On Unity as One.
- Vat. et cod. cc omittunt tunc illa duo.The Vatican [edition] and codex cc omit tunc illa duo ["then those two"].
- Aliqui codd. ut F H K Y Z deberet (deberent?).Some codices, such as F H K Y Z, [read] deberet (deberent?).
- Vat. cum cod. cc addit tres.The Vatican [edition], together with codex cc, adds tres ["three"].
- Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 8. (IV. c. 4.) ait: «Natura vero dicitur uno quidem modo nascentium generatio... alio vero ex quo primo inexistente generatur quod gignitur». Haec verba in versione Arabico-latina sic redduntur: «Et dicitur natura uno modo de omnibus pullulantibus; et etiam dicitur natura illud, cum...» [Quaracchi quotation truncated mid-clause; remainder continues in printed apparatus but is not transcribed in this chunk.]Aristotle, V Metaphysics, text 8 (IV, c. 4), says: "But nature is said in one way [of] the generation of things being born... in another way [of] that from which, primarily inexisting, what is begotten is begotten." These words in the Arabic-Latin version are rendered thus: "And nature is said in one way of all things sprouting forth; and nature is also said [of] that, when..." [Quaracchi quotation truncated mid-clause; remainder not transcribed in this chunk.]