Bonaventure

Articulus II.

De appropriatione Augustini.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Consequenter est quaestio principalis de appropriatione Augustini¹, quae est: «In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia». Et circa haec quaeruntur alia tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus possit dici esse unum cum creatura.

Secundo, utrum creatura possit dici unum cum creatura.

Tertio, de ratione appropriationis illorum trium.

Quaestio I.

Utrum Deus unum cum creatura dici possit.

Quod autem Deus possit dici unum cum creatura, ostenditur:

1. Per auctoritatem Apostoli primae ad Corinthios sexto²: Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est. Si unus spiritus³: ergo unum ens et una res; et si hoc: ergo unum.

2. Item, homo qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est: aut ergo creatus, aut increatus; non creatus, quia Deus non est creatura: ergo unus increatus. Sed spiritus increatus est omnino unus: ergo homo adhaerens Deo est simpliciter unum cum Deo.

3. Item, magis unitur medium extremo quam extremum extremo; sed Spiritus sanctus est medium uniens viros iustos, et viri iusti, per ipsum uniti, sunt unum — Ioannis decimo septimo⁴: Ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus — ergo vir iustus cum Spiritu sancto potest dici unum.

4. Item, magis unitur membrum capiti quam membrum cum membro: ergo cum membra Christi sint unum in Christo, multo fortius membrum est idem capiti. Sed Christus est caput non tantum secundum humanitatem, sed etiam secundum divinitatem: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Ex illo verbo, quod dicitur Ioannis decimo⁵: Ego et Pater unum sumus, impugnant Sancti haeresim Arianam, et maxime Augustinus, ex hoc concludens, Arium errare, qui dicit, Filium

aliam habere naturam. Si ergo ratio Augustini bona est, unum dicit unitatem in natura; sed tali modo non est unum Creator cum creatura: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc videtur alia ratione, quia quae maxime distant minimo sunt unum; sed Creator et creatura maxime distant: ergo non possunt simpliciter dici unum.

3. Item, si sunt unum, ergo aliquod unum; sed si aliquod unum sunt, ergo Deus et creatura habent aliquod commune; et si hoc, univocantur in aliquo. Ergo cum univocum simplicius sit, quam quae univocantur in ipso, aliquid est simplicius Deo.

4. Item, si Deus et creatura sunt unum, cum in infinitum distet a qualibet, qua ratione dicitur unum cum una, et cum qualibet. Sed quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem: ergo secundum hoc omnia sunt unum.

Conclusio.

Deus non potest dici simpliciter unum cum creatura; sed cum quadam determinatione, ut unus spiritus, haec locutio recte usurpatur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Augustinus, ad hoc, quod aliqua sint unum, non sufficit conformitas voluntatis, sed necesse est praesupponi convenientiam in natura. Quoniam ergo Deus et creatura summe differunt in natura, ideo non debent dici unum, sicut probant rationes ad hoc inductae.

Quia vero vir iustus conformatur per caritatem voluntati divinae et ei adhaeret magis quam alicui alii, recte dicitur unum cum determinatione, ut puta unus spiritus. Spiritus enim voluntas dicitur et amor, unde qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est, quia unius et conformis voluntatis est.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur: est unus spiritus, ergo una res; dicendum, quod ibi est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter. Nam unus distrahitur a ratione sua per hoc quod est spiritus, et dicit ibi unitatem non per indivisionem sive unitatem naturae, sed per conformitatem voluntatis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut unus spiritus creatus, aut increatus etc.; dicendum, quod nec creatus, nec increatus. Nam spiritus non stat ibi pro substantia, sed pro actu voluntatis; et unus non importat nisi conformitatem affectus humani ad divinam voluntatem sive ad divinum amorem, quia amor transformat amantem in amatum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur quod Spiritus est medium uniens; dicendum, quod unit quantum ad voluntatem, sed non quantum ad conformitatem naturae; et non dicuntur unum ratione conformitatis voluntatis solum. Ideo non valet, quia ligamen Spiritus non est tota causa quare sint unum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod membra Christi sunt unum; dici potest, quod membra Christi non dicuntur unum simpliciter, sed unum corpus; et sic etiam Christus est unum cum membris, sed hoc est ratione humanitatis assumtae.

Article II. On the appropriation of Augustine.

Next there is the principal question concerning the appropriation of Augustine¹, which is: "In the Father, unity; in the Son, equality; in the Holy Spirit, the concord of unity and equality." And concerning these, three further matters are inquired into.

First, it is asked whether God can be said to be one with a creature.

Second, whether a creature can be said to be one with [another] creature.

Third, concerning the account of the appropriation of those three.

Question I. Whether God can be said to be one with a creature.

That God can be said to be one with a creature is shown:

1. By the authority of the Apostle, in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] six²: He who adheres to God is one spirit. If [he is] one spirit³: therefore one being and one thing; and if this: therefore one.

2. Likewise, the man who adheres to God is one spirit: either, then, created or uncreated; not created, since God is not a creature: therefore one uncreated [spirit]. But the uncreated Spirit is altogether one: therefore the man adhering to God is simply one with God.

3. Likewise, the middle is more united to the extreme than extreme to extreme; but the Holy Spirit is the middle uniting just men, and just men, united through him, are one — John seventeen⁴: That they may be one, as we also are one — therefore the just man with the Holy Spirit can be said to be one.

4. Likewise, the member is more united to the head than member to member: therefore, since the members of Christ are one in Christ, much more strongly is the member one with the head. But Christ is head not only according to humanity, but also according to divinity: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. From that word which is said in John ten⁵: I and the Father are one, the holy [doctors] attack the Arian heresy, and especially Augustine, concluding from this that Arius errs, who says that the Son has

another nature. If, then, Augustine's reasoning is good, one expresses unity in nature; but in this manner the Creator is not one with a creature: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this is shown by another reason, since those things which are most distant are least one; but the Creator and the creature are most distant: therefore they cannot be said simply to be one.

3. Likewise, if they are one, therefore some [unity is] one; but if they are some one [thing], therefore God and the creature have something in common; and if this, they are univocally [predicated] in something. Therefore, since the univocal is simpler than those things which are univocally [predicated] in it, something is simpler than God.

4. Likewise, if God and the creature are one — since he is infinitely distant from each one — by what reason is he said to be one with one [creature], rather than with any [creature]? But whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another: therefore according to this all things are one.

Conclusion.

God cannot be said simply to be one with a creature; but with a certain qualification, as one spirit, this manner of speaking is rightly employed.

I respond: It must be said that, just as Augustine says, for some things to be one, conformity of will does not suffice, but it is necessary that an agreement in nature be presupposed. Since therefore God and the creature differ supremely in nature, on that account they ought not to be said to be one, as the reasons adduced for this prove.

But since the just man is conformed by charity to the divine will and adheres to it more than to anything else, he is rightly said to be one [with God] with a qualification, namely one spirit. For spirit is said [to be] will and love, whence he who adheres to God is one spirit, since he is of one and conformed will.

To the arguments:

1. To that which is objected: he is one spirit, therefore one thing; it must be said that there is here a fallacy of secundum quid and simpliciter. For one is drawn off from its [proper] account by [the addition of] the [word] spirit, and there expresses unity not by indivision or unity of nature, but by conformity of will.

2. To that which is objected: either one spirit created or uncreated etc.; it must be said: neither created nor uncreated. For spirit does not stand there for substance, but for the act of will; and one implies nothing but the conformity of human affection to the divine will or to divine love, since love transforms the lover into the beloved.

3. To that which is objected, that the Spirit is the uniting middle; it must be said that he unites with respect to the will, but not with respect to conformity of nature; and they are not said to be one by reason of conformity of will alone. Therefore [the argument] does not hold, since the bond of the Spirit is not the whole cause why they are one.

4. To that which is objected, that the members of Christ are one; it can be said that the members of Christ are not said to be one simply, but one body; and thus also Christ is one with [his] members, but this is by reason of the humanity assumed.