Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`La.`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`En.`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., Cod. T, Vat., ed. 1).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de ratione Augustini, quae ponitur in littera: Si Pater est sapiens sapientia genita, quam genuit, et hoc est ei esse quod sapere, ergo est sapientia genita. Videtur enim istud argumentum non valere, quia illud non valet: hoc est Patri esse quod operari; sed operatur per Filium: ergo est per Filium. Ergo nec similiter illud argumentum valet. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia operari connotat effectum: obiicitur, quod idem est Patri esse quod esse Patrem; sed tamen istud argumentum non valet: Pater deitate est Deus, ergo deitate est Pater: ergo similiter non valet hoc argumentum est sapiens sapientia genita, ergo est sapientia genita¹.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod argumentum Augustini est necessarium: quoniam esse sapientem et esse in divinis non differunt modo dicendi a parte rei, sed solum a parte nostra. Non sic autem est esse et operari, quoniam, etsi operari quantum ad principale significatum sit idem quod esse, tamen quantum ad connotatum differt, et potest esse extraneum, et ita potest ibi esse accidens². Tamen hoc quod est esse Deum et esse Patrem, quamvis non differant quantum ad essentiam vel modum essendi, differunt tamen quantum ad modum se habendi, qui vere est in divinis, scilicet³ absolutum et comparatum; et ideo non transit paternitas in substantiam, sicut sapientia; ideo habet alium modum dicendi, qui potest esse extraneus respectu alicuius attributi. Ideo ibi est accidens, non autem in argumento Augustini.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Pater non est sapiens sapientia genita, sed ingenita. Videtur enim male dicere, quia sicut aeternitas appropriatur Patri, ita sapientia Filio; sed aeternitas non debet dici ingenita, sicut dicit Anselmus in libro de Incarnatione Verbi⁴: ergo nec sapientia potest nec debet dici ingenita. Item, si potest dici sapientia ingenita⁵, pari ratione potest dici sapientia procedens; et ita videtur, quod sapientia sit appropriabilis Spiritui sancto, sicut et Filio.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quare non dicitur potentia de potentia, sicut sapientia de sapientia?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sapientia est de nominibus mediis⁶, quae sunt nata supponere pro persona. Et ideo sicut dicitur Deus de Deo, et Deus genitus et ingenitus, ita dicitur etiam sapientia; non tamen ita proprie, quia nomen abstractum est quodam modo. Magis tamen dicitur sapientia de sapientia quam aeternitas de aeternitate, quia aeternitas significat in maiori abstractione quam sapientia, et ideo magis abstrahit a ratione originis. Secundum hoc etiam est concedendum, quod possit dici sapientia procedens, licet adhuc minus proprie. Nec valet illud argumentum; quamvis enim sapientia non sit appropriabilis Spiritui sancto⁷, tamen per determinationem adiunctam potest trahi.

Ad illud⁸ — quare non dicitur potentia de potentia? — dicendum, quod non ita proprie dicitur sicut sapientia de sapientia. Quoniam sapientia appropriatur Filio, qui est ab alio et ab alio habet omne quod habet, ergo et sapientiam ab illo⁹ habet: ideo sapientia genita ex sua appropriatione praesupponit sapientiam ingenitam. Sed potentia appropriatur Patri, qui non est ab alio; ideo non sic dicitur potentia de potentia, vel potentia genita.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus in libro Retractationum et ponitur in littera: Melius istam quaestionem in libro de Trinitate tractavi. Videtur enim non recte loqui, quia, cum comparativum in utroque extremorum praesupponat rem sui positivi¹⁰, si ibi melius, ergo utrobique bene: ergo si ibi dicit, quod Pater est sapiens sapientia, quam genuit, videtur quod dicat verum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod abusiva est comparatio¹¹, quoniam in libro de Trinitate dicit contrarium huius, et ideo si ibi bene, constat quod hic male. Quantum ad hoc tamen, quod aliqua vera dixit in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum de hac quaestione, ideo non omnino male, sed quodam modo bene, quodam modo male: et ideo dicit, quod ibi melius, innuens quod aliquid sit ibi male dictum. Qui enim unum oppositorum astruit, per consequens destruit alterum.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hac responsione Magistri, quod sapientia genita est sapiens de sapientia ingenita. Videtur enim non esse bona, quia non videtur respondere ad quaestionem. Non enim quaeritur, quod sapientia genita sive Filius sit de Patre, sed hoc quaeritur, utrum Filius sit sapiens¹² sapientia ingenita.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister bene respondet, licet verbis paucis, in quibus innuit hanc distinctionem, quod aliquem esse sapientem aliquo, hoc est dupliciter: aut ita, quod ablativus teneatur formaliter, et sic Filius est sapiens sapientia genita et Pater sapientia ingenita; aut ita, quod teneatur originaliter, et sic, cum sapientia genita sit de sapientia ingenita, Filius est sapiens sapientia ingenita. Sed quia ablativus ut plurimum construitur in ratione formae, ideo Magister caute locutus dixit¹³, quod Filius, qui est sapientia genita, est de sapientia ingenita sapiens, ut verbum non haberet calumniam; et ideo bene respondet.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod uterque est una sapientia, et tamen solus Pater est sapientia ingenita. Videtur enim dicere duo opposita, quia istae duae proprietates¹⁴ sapientiam contrahunt, et cum sint proprietates distinctae, distinguunt — et hoc patet, quia solus Pater est sapientia ingenita — quod si sapientia distinguitur, ergo est alia et alia sapientia, ergo non una. Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit, quod solus Pater est sapientia ingenita. Aut enim dicitur sapientia essentialiter, aut personaliter: si personaliter; ergo non una sapientia est genita et ingenita, cum Pater et Filius non sint una persona; si vero essentialiter, non ergo solus Pater est sapientia ingenita.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in hoc nomine sapientia duo est considerare, scilicet significatum et suppositum. Et quantum ad significatum dicit essentiam; sed¹⁵ suppositum est persona. Et illae determinationes genita et ingenita non respiciunt significatum, sed suppositum, et ita distinguunt suppositum, manente unitate in significato sive forma; et sapientia genita et ingenita est alia et alia, scilicet persona, sed non est alia et alia sapientia, sicut non est alia essentia. Et ideo Magister bonum exemplum ponit in hoc termino Deus, quod significat essentiam et supponit personam. — Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum dicatur essentialiter, an personaliter; dicendum, quod quantum ad significatum dicitur essentialiter, sed quantum ad suppositum dicitur personaliter; et ideo nulla est controversia.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit¹⁶, quod Filius non a se agit, cum Pater in eo manere monstratur; sed similiter Filius manet in Patre: ergo pari ratione Pater non a se agit. Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit: Infirmus sit non a se agendo, nisi a Deo ipse agat, quia secundum hoc, cum omnis creatura agat a Deo, tunc videtur esse agens infirmum, nec in hoc videtur differre Filius ab aliis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Hilarius duo intendit ostendere ex verbis Domini in Ioanne, et illa duo ostendit deducendo ad impossibile. Ipse enim Dominus dicit Ioannis decimo quarto¹⁷: Verba, quae ego loquor vobis, a me ipso non loquor; Pater in me manens ipse facit opera. Ex hoc ergo arguit, quod Filius non agit a se, sed a Patre manente in se, non tantum ut consubstantialis, sed ut principium; sic autem non manet Filius in Patre, sed tantum ut consubstantialis. — Alia est auctoritas Domini, Ioannis octavo¹⁸, ubi dicit: Qui misit me non reliquit me solum, quia quae placita sunt ei facio semper. Si ipse agit semper una cum Patre, tunc ergo per se agit. — Haec duo probat per deductionem ad impossibile: quia omnis potentia est a prima potentia, quae primo residet in Patre: ergo si Filius non potest a Deo, simpliciter est impotens vel infirmus, quia infirmus habet potentiam deficiendi a se, non a Deo. Item si Filius non agit per se, non agit per virtutem propriam sibi connaturalem: ergo alia est virtus Patris et Filii. A se enim et non a se, non facit distinctionem in natura, sed solum in persona, quia dicit rationem principii vel originis. Per se autem et non per se — quia per se dicitur contra per accidens, sive contra per aliud — ponit diversitatem in natura¹⁹; et ideo Filius agit per se, quamvis non a se.

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod una est tantum sapientia Patris, sed non uno modo dicitur²⁰. Videtur enim male dicere²¹, quia sapientia semper est essentialiter: ergo falsum dicit, cum dicit: non uno modo dicta.

Respondeo: Magister non vult, quod sapientia sit dicta multipliciter, sed quod sapientia Patris: quia genitivus potest construi in ratione originis, et sic dicitur Filius sapientia Patris, vel ipsa sapientia genita sapientia Patris, quia est a Patre; vel potest intelligi in ratione subiecti, ut dicatur sapientia Patris, sicut albedo Petri, et sic sapientia genita non dicitur esse Patris, sed Filii²². Quia ergo ratio passiva, importata per hoc adiectivum genita, non est in persona Patris et Filii una, falsa est locutio ratione determinationis, non ratione eius quod est sapientia: quia una et eadem est sapientia Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et illa est sapientia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning Augustine's argument, which is set down in the text: If the Father is wise by a begotten wisdom, which he begot, and this — to be — is the same for him as to be wise, then he is begotten wisdom. For that argument seems not to hold, because this does not hold: to be is for the Father the same as to operate; but he operates through the Son: therefore he is through the Son. Therefore likewise that argument does not hold. If you say that it is not similar, because to operate connotes an effect: it is objected that to be is for the Father the same as to be the Father; but nevertheless this argument does not hold: the Father is God by deity, therefore by deity he is Father: therefore similarly this argument does not hold: he is wise by begotten wisdom, therefore he is begotten wisdom¹.

I respond: It must be said that Augustine's argument is necessary: since to be wise and to be in divine things do not differ in mode of speaking on the side of the thing, but only on our side. It is not so, however, with to be and to operate, since, although to operate with respect to its principal signification is the same as to be, nevertheless with respect to what is connoted it differs, and can be extraneous, and so there can be an accident there². Yet to be God and to be the Father, although they do not differ as to essence or mode of being, nevertheless differ as to the mode of comporting [oneself], which truly exists in divine things, namely³ absolute and comparative; and therefore paternity does not pass over into substance, as wisdom does; therefore it has another mode of being said, which can be extraneous in respect of some attribute. Therefore in that case there is an accident, but not in Augustine's argument.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the Father is not wise by begotten wisdom, but unbegotten wisdom. For he seems to speak ill, because, just as eternity is appropriated to the Father, so wisdom to the Son; but eternity ought not to be called unbegotten, as Anselm says in the book On the Incarnation of the Word⁴: therefore neither can nor ought wisdom to be called unbegotten. Likewise, if it can be said unbegotten wisdom⁵, by parity of reasoning it can be said proceeding wisdom; and so it seems that wisdom is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, just as also to the Son.

Alongside this it is asked, why is it not said power from power, as wisdom from wisdom?

I respond: It must be said that wisdom is among the middle nouns⁶, which are apt to supposit for the person. And therefore, just as one says God from God, and God begotten and unbegotten, so also is wisdom said; not, however, so properly, because it is in some way an abstract noun. Yet wisdom from wisdom is said more [properly] than eternity from eternity, because eternity signifies in greater abstraction than wisdom, and therefore abstracts more from the account of origin. According to this, also, it is to be conceded that one can say proceeding wisdom, though still less properly. Nor does that argument hold; for although wisdom is not appropriable to the Holy Spirit⁷, yet by an added determination it can be drawn over [to him].

To that⁸ — why is power from power not said? — it must be said that it is not so properly said as wisdom from wisdom. For wisdom is appropriated to the Son, who is from another and from another has all that he has, therefore he has wisdom also from him⁹: thus begotten wisdom by its appropriation presupposes unbegotten wisdom. But power is appropriated to the Father, who is not from another; therefore power from power, or begotten power, is not said in this way.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says in the book Retractations and which is set down in the text: I treated this question better in the book On the Trinity. For he seems not to speak rightly, because, since the comparative presupposes in each of its extremes the thing of its positive¹⁰, if there [it is] better, then in both [places] well: therefore if there he says that the Father is wise by the wisdom which he begot, it seems that he speaks truly.

I respond: It must be said that the comparison is misused¹¹, since in the book On the Trinity he says the contrary of this, and therefore if there [he speaks] well, it is established that here [he speaks] ill. Yet inasmuch as he said certain true things in the book Of the Eighty-three Questions about this question, [he did] therefore not entirely ill, but in some way well, in some way ill: and therefore he says better there, hinting that something is there said ill. For he who supports one of two opposites, by consequence destroys the other.

DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this response of the Master, that begotten wisdom is wise by unbegotten wisdom. For it seems not to be good, because it does not seem to answer the question. For it is not asked whether the begotten wisdom or the Son is from the Father, but this is asked: whether the Son is wise¹² by unbegotten wisdom.

I respond: It must be said that the Master answers well, though in few words, in which he hints at this distinction: that someone's being wise by something is twofold: either thus, that the ablative is taken formally, and so the Son is wise by begotten wisdom and the Father by unbegotten wisdom; or thus, that it is taken originally, and so, since begotten wisdom is from unbegotten wisdom, the Son is wise by unbegotten wisdom. But because the ablative is for the most part construed in the account of form, therefore the Master, speaking cautiously, said¹³ that the Son, who is begotten wisdom, is wise from unbegotten wisdom, so that the verb might not have any cavil; and therefore he answers well.

DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that each is one wisdom, and yet the Father alone is unbegotten wisdom. For he seems to say two opposites, because these two properties¹⁴ contract wisdom, and since they are distinct properties, they distinguish [it] — and this is plain, because the Father alone is unbegotten wisdom — but if wisdom is distinguished, then there is one and another wisdom, therefore not one. Likewise, he seems to say what is false, when he says that the Father alone is unbegotten wisdom. For wisdom is said either essentially or personally: if personally, then there is not one wisdom which is begotten and unbegotten, since the Father and the Son are not one person; if however essentially, then the Father is not the only one [who is] unbegotten wisdom.

I respond: It must be said that in this name wisdom two things are to be considered, namely the significate and the supposit. And as to the significate it says essence; but¹⁵ the supposit is person. And those determinations begotten and unbegotten do not regard the significate, but the supposit, and so they distinguish the supposit, while unity remains in the significate or form; and begotten and unbegotten wisdom is one and another, namely [one and another] person, but it is not one and another wisdom, just as it is not one and another essence. And therefore the Master sets down a good example in this term God, which signifies the essence and supposits for the person. — When therefore it is asked whether it is said essentially or personally, it must be said that as to the significate it is said essentially, but as to the supposit it is said personally; and so there is no controversy.

DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says¹⁶, that the Son does not act of himself, since the Father is shown to remain in him; but the Son likewise remains in the Father: therefore by parity of reasoning the Father does not act of himself. Likewise, he seems to say what is false when he says: He would be infirm, were he not to act of himself unless God himself were to act, because, according to this, since every creature acts from God, then [every creature] would seem to be an infirm agent, nor in this would the Son seem to differ from others.

I respond: It must be said that Hilary intends to show two things from the words of the Lord in John, and shows those two by reduction to impossibility. For the Lord himself says in John 14¹⁷: The words that I speak to you, I do not speak from myself; the Father remaining in me, he himself does the works. From this therefore he argues that the Son does not act of himself, but with the Father remaining in him, not only as consubstantial but as principle; for the Son does not so remain in the Father, but only as consubstantial. — There is another authority of the Lord, John 8¹⁸, where he says: He who sent me has not left me alone, because the things that are pleasing to him I always do. If he himself always acts together with the Father, then therefore he acts through himself. — These two he proves by reduction to impossibility: because every power is from the first power, which first resides in the Father: therefore if the Son cannot [act] from God, he is simply impotent or infirm, because the infirm has the power of failing of himself, not from God. Likewise if the Son does not act through himself, he does not act through a power proper and connatural to himself: therefore the power of the Father and of the Son is different. For of himself and not of himself makes no distinction in nature, but only in person, because it expresses the account of principle or origin. But through himself and not through himself — because through himself is said in opposition to through accident, or in opposition to through another — posits diversity in nature¹⁹; and therefore the Son acts through himself, although not of himself.

DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that there is only one wisdom of the Father, but it is not said in one mode²⁰. For he seems to speak ill²¹, because wisdom is always [predicated] essentially: therefore he says what is false when he says: not said in one mode.

I respond: The Master does not mean that wisdom is said in many ways, but that the wisdom of the Father [is]: because the genitive can be construed in the account of origin, and so the Son is called the wisdom of the Father, or the begotten wisdom itself [is called] the wisdom of the Father, because it is from the Father; or it can be understood in the account of subject, so that it is called the wisdom of the Father as the whiteness of Peter [is so called], and in this way begotten wisdom is not said to be of the Father but of the Son²². Because therefore the passive account, imported by this adjective begotten, is not one in the person of the Father and of the Son, the locution is false by reason of the determination, not by reason of that which is wisdom: because the wisdom of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one and the same, and that is the wisdom of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

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