Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XXXIII.

Cap. I.

Utrum proprietates personarum sint ipsae personae, vel divina usia.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives the Quaracchi critical apparatus (Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum, reflowed from the two-column footer band on printed pp. 568–569) in Latin, followed by an English rendering. Where an OCR-bracketed inline marker had no separately printed gloss, the marker is preserved without an apparatus entry.

Post supradicta interius considerari atque subtiliter inquiri oportet, utrum proprietates personarum, quibus ipsae personae determinantur, sint ipsae personae et sint Deus, id est divina essentia, an ita sint personis, ut non sint personae, ac per hoc nec divina essentia. — Quod enim in personis sint proprietates, nemo inficiari audet, cum aperte clamet auctoritas¹ quod « in personis est proprietas, et in essentia unitas ». Superius² quoque multis Sanctorum testimoniis astruximus, per-

sonas proprietatibus distingui atque determinari, ipsasque proprietates, tres scilicet propriis expressimus vocabulis³. Cum ergo proprietates ipsae ab aeterno fuerint, quibus ipsae personae determinantur et differunt; quomodo essent, si in eis non essent; et quomodo in eis essent, et ipsae personae non essent, quin ibi esset multiplicitas? Quocirca sicut proprietates esse in personis, ita et eas esse personas confitemur, sicut supra auctoritate Hieronymi, ut non pigeat revocare ad mentem, protestati sumus, in expositione fidei ita dicentis: « Sabellii haeresim declinantes, tres personas expressas sub proprietate distinguimus. Non enim nomina tantummodo, sed etiam nominum proprietates, id est personas vel, ut Graeci exprimunt, hypostases, hoc est subsistentias, confitemur ». — Ecce aperte dicit, personas proprietatibus distingui, et ipsas proprietates esse personas; cuius hic verba perstringimus, quia supra latius posuimus.

Cumque de simplicitate deitatis supra⁸ dissereremus, auctoritatibus Sanctorum, scilicet Augustini, Hilarii, Isidori nec non et Boethii, evidenter monstravimus, Deum hoc esse omnino quod in se habet, excepto quod Pater habet Filium, nec est Filius, et Filius habet Patrem, nec est Pater; et sic esse in natura trium, ut qui habet hoc sit quod habet, et totum, quod ibi est, unum esse, unam vitam esse; quae modo non iteramus, ne fastidium lectori ingeramus. Si ergo proprietates ibi sunt, singula earum est id in quo est, et unum eademque vita singulae sunt. Fateamur ergo, et proprietates esse in tribus personis, et ipsas esse personas atque divinam essentiam.

Quod enim proprietas etiam divina natura sit, ostendit Hilarius dicens, nativitatem Filii esse naturam. Idem in libro septimo de Trinitate⁴ ait: « Utriusque natura non differt: unum sunt Pater et Filius. Habet igitur hoc sacramenti nativitas, ut complectatur in se et nomen et naturam et potestatem, quia nativitas non potest non esse ea natura, unde nascatur Filius ». Idem in sexto⁵: « Nativitas, proprietas est, veritas est ». Idem in septimo dicit, « quod naturae nativitas sit intelligenda esse in natura Dei ». Supra⁶ etiam dicit, « quod proprium Patris est, quod semper Pater est, et proprium Filii, quod semper Filius est », significans quod proprietas Patris est Pater, et proprietas Filii est Filius. — His aliisque pluribus auctoritatibus aperte significari videtur, quod proprietas Filii filius sit, sic et Deus; ita et proprietas Patris et proprietas Spiritus sancti.

Hoc autem aliqui negant dicentes, quidem proprietates in personis esse, sed non esse personas ipsas, quia ita dicunt⁷ esse in personis vel in essentia divina, ut non sint interius, sicut ea sunt quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, ut bonitas, iustitia, sed extrinsecus affixae sunt. Atque ita esse rationibus probare contendunt. Si enim, inquiunt, proprietates sunt personae, non eis personae determinantur. — Contra quod dicimus, quia etiam se ipsis personae differunt, sicut supra Hieronymus loquens de Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto dicit: « Substantia unum sunt, sed personis ac nominibus distinguuntur ». — Sed iterum addunt: Si proprietates ipsae divina essentia sunt, cum essentia non differant tres personae, nec proprietatibus differunt. Quomodo enim differt Pater a Filio, eo quod divina essentia est, cum in essentia unum sint?

Horum doctrinis novis et humanis commentis verbo Hilarii⁹ respondeo: « Immensum est quod exigitur et incomprehensibile; extra significantiam est sermonis, extra sensus intentionem; non enuntiatur, non attingitur, non tenetur; verborum significantiam rei ipsius natura consumit; sensus contemplationem imperspicabile lumen obcaecat; intelligentiae capacitatem quod fine nullo continetur excedit. Mihi ergo in sensu labes est, in intelligentia stupor est, in sermone vero non iam infirmitatem, sed silentium confitebor; periculosum nimis est de rebus tantis ac tam reconditis aliquid ultra praescriptum caeleste proferre, ut ultra praefinitionem Dei sermo de Deo sit. Forma fidei certa est. Non ergo aliquid addendum est, sed modus constituendus audaciae; quidquid ultra quaeritur, non intelligitur ».

Ceterum haereticorum improbitas, instinctu diabolicae fraudulentiae excitata, nondum quiescit, sed in tanta rerum quaestione addit: si paternitas et filiatio in Deo, sive in divina essentia sunt, eadem igitur res sibi Pater est et Filius. Nam in quo paternitas est, Pater est; et in quo filiatio, Filius est. Si igitur una eademque res habet in se paternitatem et filiationem, ipsa et generat et generatur; quod dicentes in Sabellianam haeresim pertrahuntur, extendentes Patrem in Filium, cum ipsum sibi Filium proponant et Patrem. Si vero negaverint, in una Dei essentia paternitatem esse et filiationem, quomodo ergo dicunt esse Deum? — His atque aliis argumentorum aculeis utuntur in suae opinionis assertionem, ut veritatis formam dissecent.

Quorum audaciae resistentes atque ignorantiae providentes, audebimus aliquid super hoc loqui. Paternitas et filiatio non ita esse omnino dicuntur in divina substantia, sicut in ipsis hypostasibus, in quibus ita sunt, quod eas determinant, ut ait Ioannes Damascenus¹⁰: « Characteristica idiomata sunt, id est determinativae proprietates hypostaseos, et non naturae; etenim hypostasim determinant et non naturam ». Ideoque, licet paternitas et filiatio sint in divina essentia, cum eam non determinent; non ideo potest dici, quod divina essentia et generet et generetur, vel quod eadem res sit ibi¹¹ Pater et Filius. Ita enim proprietas determinat personam, ut hac proprietate hypostasis sit generans, et illa alia hypostasis sit genita; et ita non idem generat et generatur, sed alter alterum.

Cap. II.

Quomodo proprietates possint esse in natura Dei, nec eam determinent.

Sed forte quaeres, cum hae proprietates non possint esse in personis, quin eas determinent, quomodo in essentia divina esse possint, ita ut non eam determinent. — Respondeo tibi et hic cum Hilario¹²: « Ego nescio, non requiro, et consolabor me tamen: Archangeli nesciunt, Angeli non audierunt, saecula non tenent, Propheta non sensit, Apostolus non interrogavit, Filius ipse non edidit. Cesset ergo dolor querelarum; non putet homo sua intelligentia generationis sacramentum posse consequi. Absolute tamen intelligendus est Pater et Filius », et Spiritus sanctus. « Stat in hoc fine intelligentia verborum: Filius est a Patre, qui est unigenitus ab ingenito, progenies a parente, vivus a vivo, non natura deitatis alia et alia, quia ambo unum ». « Hoc credendo incipe, percurre, persiste; etsi non perventurum sciam, tamen gratulabor profecturum. Qui enim pie infinita prosequitur, etsi non contingat, aliquando tamen proficiet prodeundo. Sed ne te inseras in illud secretum et arcanum inopinabilis nativitatis, ne te immergas, summam intelligentiae comprehendere praesumens; sed intellige incomprehensibilia esse ». His aliisque multis evidenter ostenditur, nobis nullatenus licere maiestatem perscrutari¹³, ius ponere potestati, modum circumscribere infinito.

Verumtamen nondum desistunt impatientiae spiritu agitati, sed opinionem suam etiam Sanctorum auctoritatibus munire conantur, quibus ostendere volunt, proprietatem, qua Pater est Pater, et proprietatem, qua Filius est Filius, non esse Deum, ad hoc inducentes verba Augustini super illum locum Psalmi: Et non est substantia, ita dicentis¹⁴: « Deus est quaedam substantia. Unde etiam in fide catholica sic aedificamur, ut dicamus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unius esse substantiae. Quid est unius substantiae? Quidquid est Pater, quod Deus est, hoc est Filius, hoc est Spiritus sanctus. Cum autem Pater est, non illud est quod¹⁵ est. Pater enim non ad se, sed ad Filium dicitur; ad se autem Deus dicitur. Eo ergo quod vel quo¹⁶ Deus est, substantia est. Et quia eiusdem substantiae est Filius, proculdubio et Filius est Deus. At vero quod Pater est, quia non substantiae nomen est, sed refertur ad Filium, non sic dicimus, Filium Patrem esse, sicut dicimus, Filium Deum esse ». — Ex his verbis significari dicunt, quod proprietas Patris vel proprietas Filii non sit Deus vel essentia divina. Cum enim dicit: Eo quod Deus est, substantia est, sed quod Pater est, substantia non est; aperte, inquiunt, ostendit, id esse substantiam, quo Deus est; id vero quo Pater est, non esse substantiam. Item cum ait: Pater non illud est quod est, ostendit, eum non esse Patrem, eo quod substantia est. Non enim simpliciter dixit: Pater non illud est quod est, sed ait: cum Pater est, non est illud quod est, significans, quo Pater est non esse illud quo est, id est essentiam. Haec illi ita exponentes, sua commenta simplicibus et incautis vera videri faciunt. — Nos autem aliter fore ista intelligenda dicimus. Dicens enim: eo quod Deus est, substantia est; sed quod Pater est, substantia[^17] non est, hoc intelligi voluit, quia essentia Deus est et deitate substantia est. Eo enim substantia est, quo Deus est, et e converso, cuius ea est deitas, quae est substantia, et substantia, quae deitas; sed quod Pater est non est substantia¹⁸, id est, non quo Pater est, eo substantia est, quia proprietate generationis Pater est, qua substantia non est. Ipsam tamen proprietatem substantiam esse non negavit. Ita etiam illud intelligendum est quod ait: Cum Pater est non illud est quod est, id est, non illo Pater est, quod vel quo¹⁹ ipse est, id est essentia, sed notione.

Item illis verbis Augustini vehementer insistunt superius positis, scilicet: Verbum, secundum quod sapientia est et essentia, hoc est quod Pater; secundum quod verbum, non hoc est quod Pater. Si, inquiunt, Verbum non est hoc quod Pater, secundum quod est verbum, id ergo, quod verbum est, non est illud quod Pater est: proprietas igitur, qua verbum est, non est id quod Pater est, non est igitur divina essentia. — Ad quod dicimus, quia licet secundum quod verbum non sit hoc quod Pater est, ea tamen proprietas, qua verbum est, est id quod Pater est, id est divina essentia, sed non est hypostasis Patris.

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DISTINCTION XXXIII.

Chapter I.

Whether the properties of the persons are the persons themselves, or the divine usia [essence].

After what has been said above, it must be considered more inwardly and subtly inquired into, whether the properties of the persons, by which the persons themselves are determined, are themselves the persons and are God — that is, the divine essence — or whether they are so [present] in the persons that they are not persons, and on this account neither divine essence. — That properties are in the persons, no one dares to deny, since authority openly proclaims¹ that "in the persons there is property, and in the essence unity." Above² also we have established by many testimonies of the Saints, that the per-

sons are distinguished and determined by their properties, and we have expressed the properties themselves — three, namely — by their proper terms³. Since therefore the properties themselves have existed from eternity, by which the persons themselves are determined and differ; how would they be, if they were not in [the persons]; and how would they be in [the persons], and the persons themselves not be, without there being multiplicity there? Wherefore, just as we confess properties to be in the persons, so also we confess them to be persons — as we above, on the authority of Jerome, declared (and let it not be irksome to call back to mind), in his exposition of the faith speaking thus: "Avoiding the heresy of Sabellius, we distinguish three persons set forth under property. For we confess not only the names, but also the properties of the names — that is, the persons, or, as the Greeks express it, the hypostases, that is, the subsistences." — Behold, he plainly says that the persons are distinguished by their properties, and that the properties themselves are persons; whose words we here merely touch upon, since above we set them down at greater length.

And since we discussed above⁸ the simplicity of the deity, by the authorities of the Saints — namely, Augustine, Hilary, Isidore, and also Boethius — we plainly showed that God is altogether this which He has in Himself, except that the Father has the Son and is not the Son, and the Son has the Father and is not the Father; and that thus the being is in the nature of three, so that He who has [something] is what He has, and the whole, that is there, is one being, one life — which we do not now repeat, lest we bring weariness upon the reader. If therefore the properties are there, each of them is that in which it is, and the several are one and the same life. Let us therefore confess that the properties are in the three persons, and that they themselves are persons and the divine essence.

For that the property is also the divine nature, Hilary shows, saying that the nativity of the Son is nature. The same in the seventh book On the Trinity⁴ says: "The nature of both does not differ: the Father and the Son are one. The nativity of this sacrament therefore has [this property], that it embraces in itself both name and nature and power, since the nativity cannot but be that nature whence the Son is born." The same in the sixth⁵: "The nativity is property, is truth." The same in the seventh says, "that the nativity of nature is to be understood as being in the nature of God." Above⁶ he also says, "that it is the property of the Father, that He is always Father, and the property of the Son, that He is always Son" — signifying that the property of the Father is the Father, and the property of the Son is the Son. — By these and many other authorities it seems plainly to be signified that the property of the Son is son, and so also God; and likewise the property of the Father and the property of the Holy Spirit.

But some deny this, saying that the properties are indeed in the persons, but are not the persons themselves; because they say⁷ that they are so in the persons or in the divine essence, that they are not within, as those things are which are said of God according to substance, such as goodness, justice, but are affixed extrinsically. And they undertake to prove this thus by reasons. For if, they say, the properties are persons, then the persons are not determined by them. — Against this we say that the persons also differ by themselves, as Jerome above, speaking of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, says: "They are one in substance, but are distinguished by persons and by names." — But again they add: If the properties themselves are the divine essence, since the three persons do not differ in essence, then they do not differ in properties either. For how does the Father differ from the Son, in that He is the divine essence, when they are one in essence?

To these new doctrines and human inventions of theirs I respond with the word of Hilary⁹: "Immense is what is required, and incomprehensible; it is beyond the meaning of speech, beyond the intention of the senses; it is not enunciated, not attained, not held; the nature of the thing itself consumes the meaning of words; an unsearchable light blinds the contemplation of the senses; what is contained by no end exceeds the capacity of the understanding. To me therefore there is a slip in the senses, there is stupor in the understanding, but in speech I shall now confess no longer infirmity, but silence; it is too dangerous concerning matters so great and so hidden to bring forth anything beyond the heavenly prescription, so that the discourse about God might be beyond the predefinition of God. The form of faith is certain. Nothing therefore must be added, but a manner must be set to audacity; whatever is sought beyond is not understood."

For the rest, the wickedness of the heretics, stirred up by the instinct of diabolical fraudulence, does not yet rest, but in so great a question of things adds: if paternity and filiation are in God, or in the divine essence, then the same thing is to itself Father and Son. For in whom paternity is, He is Father; and in whom filiation, He is Son. If therefore one and the same thing has in itself paternity and filiation, it both begets and is begotten; in saying which they are dragged into the Sabellian heresy, extending the Father into the Son, when they propose the same to themselves as Son and as Father. If however they should deny that paternity and filiation are in the one essence of God, how then do they say that He is God? — By these and other goads of arguments they make use of for the assertion of their opinion, that they may dissect the form of truth.

Resisting their audacity and providing for their ignorance, we shall dare to say something on this. Paternity and filiation are not said to be altogether in such a way in the divine substance, as in the very hypostases, in which they are so [present] that they determine them, as John Damascene says¹⁰: "They are characteristic idioms, that is, determinative properties of hypostasis, and not of nature; for they determine hypostasis, and not nature." And therefore, although paternity and filiation are in the divine essence, since they do not determine it, on that account it cannot be said that the divine essence both begets and is begotten, or that one and the same thing is there¹¹ Father and Son. For property in this way determines the person, that by this property the hypostasis is generating, and the other hypostasis is generated; and so it is not the same that begets and is begotten, but the one [begets] the other.

Chapter II.

How the properties can be in the nature of God, without determining it.

But perhaps you will ask, since these properties cannot be in the persons without determining them, how they can be in the divine essence in such a way that they do not determine it. — I answer you here too with Hilary¹²: "I do not know, I do not seek, and I shall console myself nevertheless: the Archangels do not know, the Angels have not heard, the ages do not hold, the Prophet did not perceive, the Apostle did not ask, the Son Himself did not declare. Let the grief of complaints therefore cease; let not man think that he can attain by his own understanding the sacrament of generation. Yet the Father and the Son are to be understood absolutely," and the Holy Spirit. "In this end the understanding of the words stands fast: the Son is from the Father, who is the only-begotten of the unbegotten, offspring from a parent, living from the living, not by a nature of deity that is one thing and another, because both are one." "Believing this, begin, run on, persist; even though I know I shall not arrive, yet I shall rejoice that I am making progress. For he who piously pursues infinite things, even if he does not attain, yet at some time profits by going forward. But do not insert yourself into that secret and inscrutable mystery of an unimaginable nativity, do not immerse yourself, presuming to comprehend the height of understanding; rather, understand that incomprehensible things exist." By these and many others it is plainly shown that we are in no wise permitted to scrutinize the majesty¹³, to set law upon power, to circumscribe a measure upon the infinite.

Yet they still do not desist, agitated by the spirit of impatience, but they strive to fortify their opinion even by the authorities of the Saints, by which they wish to show that the property by which the Father is Father, and the property by which the Son is Son, are not God — bringing forward to this end the words of Augustine on that passage of the Psalm: And it is not substance, [Augustine] speaking thus¹⁴: "God is a certain substance. Whence in the catholic faith we are also so built up, as to say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one substance. What is of one substance? Whatever the Father is, [namely] that He is God, this the Son is, this the Holy Spirit is. But when He is Father, He is not that which¹⁵ He is. For the Father is not said with reference to Himself, but with reference to the Son; but with reference to Himself He is called God. By that therefore by which, or with which¹⁶, He is God, He is substance. And because the Son is of the same substance, beyond doubt the Son also is God. But that He is Father, since it is not the name of substance but is referred to the Son, we do not say that the Son is Father in the same way as we say that the Son is God." — From these words they say it is signified that the property of the Father, or the property of the Son, is not God or the divine essence. For when he says: In that He is God, He is substance, but [in that] He is Father, He is not substance; openly, they say, he shows that that is substance by which He is God; but that by which He is Father is not substance. Likewise when he says: Father is not that which He is, he shows that He is not Father in that He is substance. For he did not simply say: Father is not that which He is, but said: when He is Father, He is not that which He is, signifying that that by which He is Father is not that by which He is, that is, the essence. They, expounding these things in this way, make their inventions appear true to the simple and the unwary. — But we say that these things are to be understood otherwise. For when he says: In that He is God, He is substance; but [in that] He is Father, He is not substance¹⁷, he wished this to be understood: that He is God by essence, and substance by deity. For He is substance in that by which He is God, and conversely, whose is that deity which is substance, and substance which is deity; but that He is Father, He is not substance¹⁸ — that is: not by that by which He is Father, by that, is He substance, since He is Father by the property of generation, by which He is not substance. Yet [Augustine] did not deny that the property itself is substance. So also that is to be understood which he says: When He is Father, He is not that which He is — that is, He is not Father by that by which, or with which¹⁹, He Himself is, that is, [by] essence, but [by] notion.

Likewise they vehemently insist on those words of Augustine set down above, namely: The Word, according as it is wisdom and essence, is this which the Father is; according as it is Word, is not this which the Father is. If, they say, the Word is not this which the Father is, according as it is Word, then that, which is Word, is not that which the Father is: therefore the property by which it is Word, is not that which the Father is — therefore it is not the divine essence. — To which we say that, although according as it is Word it is not this which the Father is, that property nevertheless, by which it is Word, is that which the Father is — that is, the divine essence — but it is not the hypostasis of the Father.

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