Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`La.`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`En.`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., Cod. T, Vat., ed. 1).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister: Huius dicti occasione praefati haeretici etc. Videtur enim, quod Magister male reputet haereticos illos, qui dicebant, naturam non dici de personis. Quia videtur Damascenus dicere idem quod illi dicebant, cum dicit: «De hypostasi non est deitatem dicere»¹: ergo cum deitas dicat naturam, patet etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod verbum Damasceni, simpliciter intellectum, generat sinistrum intellectum, et qui sic intelligeret, sicut sonat, haereticus esset. Sed ipse Damascenus intelligit cum praecisione, scilicet quod deitas non dicitur de unica hypostasi tantum, immo de omnibus.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In spiritu Dei aliquando significari Patrem, sicut illud Isaiae sexagesimo primo: Spiritus Domini super me etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia Hieronymus dicit ibi in Glossa, quod de illo spiritu intelligitur, de quo dicitur Isaiae undecimo²: Requiescet super eum Spiritus Domini etc.; et constat, quod ibi accipitur pro persona Spiritus sancti. Item, hoc videtur alia auctoritate, quia alius evangelista Lucas undecimo³ dicit: Si in digito Dei eiicio daemonia, et Glossa exponit digito pro Spiritu sancto, qui est tertia in Trinitate persona.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod istae rationes non concludunt contrarietates⁴, quia una Scriptura pluribus modis potest exponi. Nam in illa auctoritate, in qua dicitur Isaiae sexagesimo primo: Spiritus Domini super me etc., agitur de missione Filii⁵; et quoniam Filius potest intelligi missus secundum divinam naturam, et sic intelligitur, proprie loquendo, missus a Patre solum; ideo Spiritus Domini stat ibi pro Patre. Si autem intelligatur de missione secundum humanam naturam, sic intelligitur de Spiritu sancto, prout est tertia in Trinitate persona. — Similiter intelligendum de auctoritate sequenti, quod potest intelligi utroque modo, sed tamen spiritus accipitur aliter et aliter.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius, quod in aliquo differt Christi et Dei natura, ne eadem sit, si praestari potest, quod spiritus, qui Dei est, non sit etiam Christi. Videtur enim sic male dicere, quia argumentum hoc non valet: Filius est filius Patris et non Spiritus sancti, ergo differt natura Patris et Spiritus sancti: ergo cum spiritus dicat personam, argumentum illud non valet, quod facit Hilarius⁶.

Respondeo: Potest dici, quod Hilarius loquitur de spiritu, secundum quod nominat naturam; sic autem non habet instantiam suum verbum. Nihilominus tamen, si intelligatur de spiritu, prout dicitur personaliter, adhuc veritatem habet. Nam cum Verbum non possit esse sine spiritu, tunc haberent Pater et suum Verbum duos spiritus, et ita non essent unius naturae.⁷ — Praeterea, si spiritus Patris non esset Filii, non oriretur a Christo, et si non procederet ab eo, non distingueretur originaliter, ergo essentialiter; sed spiritus Dei et Deus sunt unum essentialiter: ergo oporteret, quod spiritus et Deus essentialiter differrent a Filio⁸ sive distinguerentur.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod verbum Hilarii: Non est idem natura quod naturae res, intelligitur solum in creaturis. Videtur illa solutio non esse conveniens, quia Hilarius loquitur de spiritu Dei, prout significat naturam et rem naturae; quodsi nulla est differentia, nullam deberet vim facere⁹, ut videtur; quodsi facit vim in spiritu, prout significat naturam et rem naturae, ergo videtur distinctio inter huiusmodi facienda.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur ab Hilario: aliud est natura, aliud res naturae, aut intelligitur de alietate a parte rei, sicut illi haeretici intelligebant; et sic habet veritatem solum in creaturis. Alio modo potest dicere alietatem sive differentiam secundum rationem; et sic habet veritatem in divinis, et sic intelligit Hilarius, et dicit Augustinus¹⁰, quod «aliud est esse Patrem, aliud esse Deum»: non, inquam, aliud secundum rem, sed aliud secundum rationem significandi et intelligendi et se habendi.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hac responsione Magistri, quod non debet dici persona unius Dei, quia nihil est in Trinitate creatum, vel serviens, vel subiectum. Videtur enim male dicere, quia genitivus de sui ratione non importat subiectionem nec dominium: ergo non videtur sufficiens ratio. Si dicas, quod hoc venit a parte termini; hoc nihil est, quia terminus de se non importat respectum dominii.¹¹

Item quaeritur, quare hoc nomen essentia non importat superexcellentiam in genitivo, sicut hoc nomen Deus? — Item, quare non dicitur: Tres personae essentiae, sicut unius essentiae?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod¹² genitivus vere construatur et proprie, necesse est aliquam habitudinem secundum rem, vel importari vel secundum modum intelligendi. Genitivus autem importat habitudinem principiati ad principium, vel e converso, ut possidentis ad possessum, vel formae ad informatum, vel specificantis ad specificatum. Habitudinem autem formae non importat nisi cum termino abstracto, quod significat per modum formae; et quoniam forma se habet per modum exprimentis et declarationis: ideo talis constructio non attenditur nisi cum genitivo nominis abstracti alio determinato. Unde convenienter dicitur: mulier egregiae formae, sed nihil est dictum: mulier formae. Ideo bene dicitur: tres personae unius essentiae, non autem: tres personae essentiae¹³. — Deus autem non est nomen abstractum, ideo non construitur cum genitivo nisi vel in habitudine subiecti, ut forma Dei; vel in habitudine specificantis, ut persona Dei, sicut creatura salis; vel in habitudine principii, ut creatura Dei. Et quoniam, quando dicitur: tres personae unius Dei, nulla habitudinum importatur proprie nisi habitudo principii sive possessoris; hinc est, quod cum in illo sensu sit falsa locutio, non est recipienda. — Alia ratio est ista, quia locutio, quae est in vi declarationis essentiae, convertitur, ut, cum dicitur: mulier egregiae formae, potest dici: egregia forma mulieris. Ergo si diceretur: tres personae unius Dei, diceretur: unus Deus trium personarum; et iste intellectus non est sanus, ut videtur: sic enim posset intelligi, sicut dicitur: unus Deus trium hominum.¹⁴

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod in istis tribus consistit summum bonum, scilicet potentia, sapientia, bonitate. Videtur enim male dicere, quia summum bonum specificat bonum: ergo si bonitas distinguitur contra potentiam et sapientiam, pari ratione summum bonum. Item, non videtur in his tribus esse, quia summum bonum est aggregativum omnium bonorum et collectivum¹⁵: ergo non tantum horum trium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod bonum uno modo distinguitur contra potentiam et sapientiam, alio modo non. Si enim accipiatur pro bonitate moris, sic consistit in voluntate et distinguitur contra alia duo. Si autem bonum accipiatur communiter, sic complectitur omnia. Est enim bonum naturae, et hoc ad potentiam; et bonum gratiae, et hoc aut perficit intellectum, et sic est scientia, aut affectum, et ita bonitas: et haec tria complectitur bonum in sua universalitate, et summum in sua integritate. Quoniam igitur omne bonum ad haec reducibile est, ideo summum bonum in his tribus consistit.

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Scriptura appropriat Patri potentiam, ne videatur minus potens. Videtur hoc plus debere dici de Filio, quod minus potens, cum fuerit passus et mortuus: ergo magis deberet ei potentia appropriari.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, quia propter passionem visus est fecisse stultitiam et habuisse impotentiam — propter quod Iudaeis praedicatio crucis erat in scandalum, et Graecis in stultitiam¹⁶ — ipse Apostolus, egregius doctor, non tantum sapientiam appropriat Christo, immo etiam virtutem, ut sic excludat a divinitate infirmitatem: et maluit ei appropriare virtutem quam potentiam, quia virtus dicit potentiam ultimam et summum de potentia, sicut vult Philosophus¹⁷, quod «virtus est ultimum de potentia»; ideo maluit ei appropriare virtutem. Nec est inconveniens ex diversis considerationibus idem modo appropriari uni, modo alii, cum aequaliter conveniat tribus. Unde Patri attribuimus potentiam, ne videatur impotens propter antiquitatem; Filio virtutem, ne videatur impotens sive debilitatus propter assumtam infirmitatem. Nihilominus tamen facienda est vis inter potentiam et virtutem, sicut dictum est trigesima secunda distinctione.¹⁸

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says: On occasion of this saying the aforesaid heretics etc. For it seems that the Master ill-judges those heretics who said that nature is not predicated of the persons. Because Damascene seems to say the same thing as those said, when he says: "It is not [permitted] to predicate deity of the hypostasis"¹: therefore since deity says the nature, this is plain etc.

I respond: It must be said that the word of Damascene, taken simply, generates a sinister understanding, and one who would so understand it as it sounds would be a heretic. But Damascene himself understands it with a precision, namely that deity is not predicated of one hypostasis alone, but rather of all.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: that in [the term] "Spirit of God" the Father is sometimes signified, as that of Isaiah 61: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me etc. For he seems to speak ill, because Jerome says there in the Gloss that this is to be understood of that Spirit of whom is said in Isaiah 11²: The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him etc.; and it is established that there it is taken for the person of the Holy Spirit. Likewise, this seems [shown] by another authority, because another evangelist, Luke 11³, says: If by the finger of God I cast out demons, and the Gloss expounds finger for the Holy Spirit, who is the third person in the Trinity.

I respond: It must be said that these reasons do not conclude contraries⁴, because one Scripture can be expounded in many ways. For in that authority, in which is said in Isaiah 61: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me etc., it is treating of the mission of the Son⁵; and since the Son can be understood as sent according to the divine nature, and so it is understood, properly speaking, of one sent by the Father alone; therefore Spirit of the Lord there stands for the Father. But if it be understood of the mission according to the human nature, so it is understood of the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as he is the third person in the Trinity. — Similarly is to be understood of the following authority, which can be understood in either way, but nevertheless spirit is taken in one way and another.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Hilary says, that the nature of Christ and of God differs in something, lest it be the same, if it can be granted that the spirit which is of God should not also be of Christ. For thus he seems to speak ill, because this argument does not hold: The Son is son of the Father and not of the Holy Spirit, therefore the nature of the Father and of the Holy Spirit differs: therefore since spirit says a person, that argument is not valid, which Hilary makes⁶.

I respond: It can be said that Hilary speaks of the spirit insofar as it names the nature; and so his word does not have a counter-instance. Nevertheless, if it be understood of the spirit insofar as it is said personally, it still holds the truth. For since the Word cannot be without spirit, then the Father and his Word would have two spirits, and so they would not be of one nature.⁷ — Moreover, if the Spirit of the Father were not [the Spirit] of the Son, he would not arise from Christ, and if he did not proceed from him, he would not be distinguished originally, therefore essentially; but the Spirit of God and God are one essentially: therefore it would have to follow that Spirit and God would essentially differ from the Son⁸, or be distinguished [from him].

DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that the word of Hilary: Nature is not the same as the thing of nature, is to be understood only in creatures. That solution seems not to be fitting, because Hilary speaks of the Spirit of God, insofar as he signifies nature and the thing of nature; whereas if there is no difference, [the Master] should give it no force⁹, as it seems; but if [the Master] does give force in spirit, insofar as it signifies nature and the thing of nature, therefore the distinction seems to be made between such things.

I respond: It must be said that when Hilary says: nature is one thing, the thing of nature another, either it is understood of an otherness on the side of the thing, as those heretics understood; and so it holds the truth only in creatures. In another way it can mean an otherness or difference according to reason; and so it holds the truth in divine things, and so Hilary understands it, and Augustine says¹⁰ that "to be Father is one thing, to be God another": not, I say, another according to the thing, but another according to the account of signifying and of understanding and of comporting.

DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that response of the Master, that one is not to say "the person of one God," because nothing in the Trinity is created, or serving, or subject. For he seems to speak ill, because the genitive does not by its own account import subjection or dominion: therefore the reason does not seem sufficient. If you say that this comes on the side of the term, this is nothing, because the term of itself does not import a respect of dominion.¹¹

Likewise it is asked, why the noun essentia does not import super-excellence in the genitive, as does this noun Deus? — Likewise, why is it not said: Three persons of the essence, as [it is said] of one essence?

I respond: It must be said that, for the genitive truly and properly to be construed, it is necessary that¹² some relation according to the thing be imported, either according to the mode of understanding. Now the genitive imports a relation of the principiated to the principle, or conversely, as of the possessor to the possessed, or of the form to the informed, or of the specifying to the specified. But it does not import the relation of form except with an abstract term, which signifies in the manner of a form; and since form holds itself in the manner of an expressing and declaration: therefore such a construction is not allowed except with the genitive of an abstract noun [accompanied by] another determinant. Hence it is fittingly said: a woman of distinguished form, but it is nothing said: a woman of form. Therefore it is well said: three persons of one essence, not however: three persons of essence.¹³ — But Deus is not an abstract noun, therefore it is not construed with the genitive except either in the relation of subject, as form of God; or in the relation of specifying, as person of God, just as creature of salt; or in the relation of principle, as creature of God. And since, when it is said: three persons of one God, no relation is properly imported except the relation of principle or of possessor; hence it is, that since in that sense it is a false locution, it is not to be received. — Another reason is this, that a locution which is in the force of declaring the essence is convertible, so that, when it is said: a woman of distinguished form, it can be said: distinguished form of a woman. Therefore if it were said: three persons of one God, it would be said: one God of three persons; and that understanding is not sound, as is seen: for so it could be understood, just as is said: one God of three men.¹⁴

DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that in these three the highest good consists, namely in power, wisdom, goodness. For he seems to speak ill, because the highest good specifies good: therefore if goodness is distinguished against power and wisdom, by parity of reasoning [so is] the highest good. Likewise, it does not seem to be in these three, because the highest good is aggregative of all goods and collective¹⁵: therefore not only of these three.

I respond: It must be said that good in one way is distinguished against power and wisdom, in another way not. For if it is taken for goodness of moral life, so it consists in the will and is distinguished against the other two. But if good is taken commonly, so it embraces all things. For there is good of nature, and this [pertains] to power; and good of grace, and this either perfects the intellect, and so is knowledge, or the affection, and so is goodness: and these three [the term] good embraces in its universality, and the highest in its integrity. Since therefore every good is reducible to these, therefore the highest good consists in these three.

DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that Scripture appropriates power to the Father, lest he seem less powerful. This seems rather to have to be said of the Son, [namely] that [he was] less powerful, since he suffered and died: therefore power should rather be appropriated to him.

I respond: It must be said that, because on account of the passion he was seen to have committed folly and to have had impotence — on account of which the preaching of the cross was to the Jews a scandal, and to the Greeks for folly¹⁶ — the Apostle himself, the eminent doctor, appropriates to Christ not only wisdom but also virtue, so as to exclude infirmity from divinity: and he preferred to appropriate to him virtue rather than power, because virtue says ultimate power and the highest of power, as the Philosopher will have it¹⁷, that "virtue is the utmost of power"; therefore he preferred to appropriate to him virtue. Nor is it unfitting, from diverse considerations, that the same be appropriated now to one, now to another, since it equally belongs to the three. Hence to the Father we attribute power, lest he seem impotent on account of [his] antiquity; to the Son virtue, lest he seem impotent or weakened on account of the assumed infirmity. Nevertheless force must be put on [the distinction between] power and virtue, as was said in the thirty-second distinction.¹⁸

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