Dist. 39
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 39
DISTINCTIO XXXIX.
Cap. I.
Utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui vel aliquo modo mutari.
Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui. Utrumque enim videtur posse probari. Quod enim divina scientia possit augeri vel mutari1, hoc modo probatur: quia potest Deus scire quod nunquam scit. Est enim aliquis, qui non est lecturus hodie, et tamen potest esse, ut legat hodie; potest enim hodie legere. Nihil autem potest fieri, quod non possit a Deo sciri. Potest ergo Deus scire, hunc lecturum hodie, potest igitur aliquid scire, quod non scit: ergo potest eius scientia augeri vel mutari. Eademque videtur posse minui. Est enim aliquis hodie lecturus, quem Deus scit lecturum. At potest esse, ut non legat, ergo potest Deus non scire, hunc lecturum, potest igitur non scire aliquid quod scit: ergo potest minui eius scientia, vel mutari. — Ad quod dicimus, quia Dei scientia omnino immutabilis est, nec augeri potest vel minui. Nam, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate2: « Scientia Dei est ipsa sapientia, et sapientia est ipsa essentia sive substantia Dei; quia in illius naturae simplicitate mirabili non est aliud sapere, aliud esse, sed quod est sapere, hoc est et esse ». « Ideoque novit omnia Verbum, quae novit Pater; sed ei nosse de Patre est, sicut esse; nosse enim et esse ibi unum est. Et ideo Patri, sicut esse non est a Filio, ita nec nosse. Proinde, tanquam se ipsum dicens, Pater genuit Verbum sibi coaequale per omnia. Non enim se ipsum integre perfecteque dixisset, si aliquid minus aut amplius esset in eius Verbo quam in se ipso. Hoc est ergo omnino Verbum, quod Pater, non tamen est Pater, quia iste Filius, ille Pater. Sciunt ergo invicem Pater et Filius, sed ille gignendo, iste nascendo. Et omnia quae sunt in eorum scientia, in eorum sapientia, in eorum essentia, unusquisque eorum simul videt, non particulatim aut singillatim, velut alternante conspectu hinc illinc, et inde huc et rursum inde, vel inde in aliud atque aliud, ut aliqua videre non possit, nisi non videns alia; sed omnia simul videt, quorum nullum est, quod non semper videat et sciat ». « Eius itaque scientia inamissibilis et invariabilis est. Nostra vero scientia et amissibilis est et receptibilis, quia non hoc est nobis esse, quod scire. Propter hoc, sicut nostra scientia illi scientiae Dei dissimilis est, sic et nostrum verbum quod nascitur de scientia nostra, dissimile est illi Verbo quod natum est de Patre scientia ». — Ex hac auctoritate clare ostenditur, scientiam Dei omnino invariabilem esse, sicut ipsa essentia Dei omnino invariabilis est; et quod Pater et Filius cum Spiritu sancto simul omnia sciunt et vident. Sicut ergo non potest augeri vel minui divina essentia, ita nec divina scientia. Et tamen conceditur, posse scire quod non scit, et posse non scire quod scit; quia posset aliquid esse subiectum eius scientiae quod non est, et posset non esse subiectum aliquid, quod est, sine permutatione ipsius scientiae.
Cap. II.
An Deus possit noviter vel ex tempore scire vel praescire aliquid.
Hic opponitur a quibusdam ita: si Deus potest scire vel praescire quod nunquam scivit vel praescivit, potest ergo ex tempore aliquid scire vel praescire. — Ad quod dicimus: potest quidem Deus scire vel praescire omne quod potest facere, et potest facere quod nunquam fiet. Potest igitur scire vel praescire, quod nunquam fiet nec est nec fuit. Nec illud scit vel scivit, neque praescit vel praescivit, quia scientia eius non est, nisi de his quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt; et praescientia non est nisi de futuris. Et licet possit scire vel prae-
scire quod nunquam est nec erit; non tamen potest aliquid scire vel praescire ex tempore. Potest utique scire vel praescire quod nunquam est nec erit, nec illud scitum vel praescitum est ab aeterno; non tamen potest incipere scire vel praescire illud, sed ita potest modo scire vel praescire, sicut potest scisse vel praescisse ab aeterno. Si enim dicas, eum modo posse scire vel praescire quod ab aeterno non scivit vel praescivit, id est, ita quod ab aeterno non sciverit vel praesciverit, quasi utrumque simul esse possit; falsum est. Si vero dicas, eum posse modo scire vel praescire quod ab aeterno non scivit vel praescivit, id est, habere potentiam sciendi vel praesciendi ab aeterno et modo aliquid, nec illud tamen praescitum est vel futurum; verum est. Non potest ergo noviter vel ex tempore scire vel praescire aliquid, sicut non potest noviter vel ex tempore velle aliquid; et tamen potest velle quod nunquam voluit.
Cap. III.
Utrum Deus possit scire plura, quam scit.
Item a quibusdam dicitur Deus posse plura scire, quam sciat, quia potest scire omnia quae scit, et potest aliqua facere, quae nunquam erunt, et illa potest scire. Non enim aliqua incognita facere potest. Si vero omnia essent, quae modo sunt, et alia quaedam faceret, quae non sunt nec erunt, et illa omnia sciret, pro certo plura sciret, quam modo sciat. Nec tamen eius scientia augeri potest3, quia hoc totum fieri posset sine mutabilitate scientiae. Constat ergo, Dei scientiam omnino esse immutabilem nec augeri posse vel minui, sed ei subiecta.
Cap. IV.
Quod Deus et semper et simul scit omnia.
Ei vero quod praedictum est, scilicet quod Deus omnia semper videt et simul, videtur obviare, quod ait Hieronymus in expositione Habacuc4: « Absurdum est, inquit, ad hoc deducere Dei maiestatem, ut sciat per momenta singula, quot culices nascantur, quotve moriantur, quota pulicum et muscarum sit multitudo, quotve pisces natent in aquis, et similia. Non simus tam fatui adulatores Dei, ut dum providentiam eius etiam ad ima retrudimus, in nos ipsos iniuriosi simus, eandem irrationabilium et rationabilium providentiam esse dicentes ». Hic videtur dicere Hieronymus, quod Deus illorum minimorum scientiam sive providentiam non habeat. Quodsi hoc est, tunc non omnia simul scit et semper. — Ex tali itaque sensu illud dictum esse noverimus, ut Deum illa alternatim vel particulatim scire neget, nec per diversa temporum momenta sic illa cognovit, sicut per varia momenta illorum quaedam deficiunt, quaedam incipiunt. Neque illis aliisque irrationabilibus ita providet, quemadmodum rationabilibus. Numquid enim, ut ait Apostolus5, cura est Deo de bobus? Et sicut non est cura Deo de bobus, ita nec de aliis irrationabilibus. Dicit tamen Scriptura, quia ipsi cura est de omnibus. Providentiam ergo et curam universaliter de cunctis, quae condidit, habet, ut habeat unumquodque quod sibi debetur et convenit. Sed specialem providentiam atque curam habet de rationabilibus, de quibus6 praecepta tradidit eisque recte vivendi legem praescripsit ac praemia promisit. Hanc providentiam et curam de irrationabilibus non habet. Ideo Apostolus dicit, quia non est cura Deo de bobus. Providet tamen omnibus et curat, id est gubernat omnia, qui omnibus solem suum oriri facit et pluviam dat7. Scit itaque Deus, quanta sit multitudo pulicum, culicum ac muscarum et piscium, et quot nascantur, quotve moriantur; sed non scit hoc per momenta singula, immo simul et semper8 omnia, neque ita scit, ut eandem habeat providentiam irrationabilium et rationabilium, id est, ut eodem penitus modo provideat irrationabilibus et rationabilibus. Rationabilibus enim et praecepta dedit et Angelos ad custodiam delegavit. Simul itaque et immutabiliter scit Deus omnia quae fuerunt et sunt et erunt, tam bona quam mala; praescit quoque omnia futura, tam bona quam mala.
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DISTINCTION XXXIX.
Chapter I.
Whether God's science can be increased or diminished or in any way changed.
Furthermore it is wont to be asked whether God's science can be increased or diminished. For both seem capable of being proved. That divine science can be increased or changed1 is proved in this way: because God can know what He never knows. For there is someone who is not going to read today, and yet it can be that he reads today; for he can read today. But nothing can come to be which cannot be known by God. Therefore God can know that this man will read today; therefore He can know something which He does not know: therefore His science can be increased or changed. And the same [thing] seems capable of being diminished. For there is someone who is going to read today, whom God knows is going to read. But it can be that he does not read; therefore God can not know that this man is going to read; therefore He can not know something which He does know: therefore His science can be diminished, or changed. — To which we say that God's science is wholly immutable, and cannot be increased or diminished. For, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity2: « God's science is His very wisdom, and [His] wisdom is His very essence or substance; because in the wonderful simplicity of that nature it is not one thing to be wise and another to be, but what it is to be wise, this also is to be ». « And therefore the Word knows all things which the Father knows; but for Him to know is from the Father, just as to be [is from the Father]; for to know and to be are there one. And therefore for the Father, just as to be is not from the Son, so neither [is] to know. Accordingly, as it were saying Himself, the Father has begotten a Word coequal to Himself in all things. For He would not have said Himself entirely and perfectly, if there were anything less or more in His Word than in Himself. This therefore is wholly the Word, that the Father [is], yet [it] is not the Father, because this [one] is the Son, that [one] the Father. Therefore the Father and the Son know each other in turn — but the [Father] by begetting, the [Son] by being born. And all things which are in their science, in their wisdom, in their essence, each of them sees at once — not in piecemeal or one-by-one fashion, as though by an alternating gaze [moving] from here to there, and from there hither and back again, or from there to one thing and another, so that He could not see some things unless not seeing others; but He sees all at once, and there is none of them which He does not always see and know ». « His science therefore is unlosable and unchangeable. But our science is both losable and receptible, because for us to be is not [the same as] to know. For this reason, just as our science is unlike that science of God, so also our word, which is born of our science, is unlike that Word which has been born of the Father by [the divine] science ». — From this authority it is clearly shown that God's science is wholly unchangeable, just as the very essence of God is wholly unchangeable; and that the Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit at once know and see all things. As therefore the divine essence cannot be increased or diminished, so neither [can] the divine science. And yet it is conceded that He can know what He does not know, and can not know what He knows; because something could be the subject of His science which is not, and something which is could not be a subject, without any change of the science itself.
Chapter II.
Whether God can know or foreknow anything anew or in time.
Here it is objected by certain [persons] thus: if God can know or foreknow what He never knew or foreknew, He can therefore know or foreknow something in time. — To which we say: God can indeed know or foreknow everything which He can do, and He can do what will never come to pass. Therefore He can know or foreknow what will never come to pass and is not nor has been. Nor does He know or has known [it], nor does He foreknow or has foreknown [it], because His science is only of those things which are or were or will be; and [His] foreknowledge is only of future things. And although He can know or fore-
know what neither is nor will be; yet He cannot know or foreknow anything in time. He can certainly know or foreknow what neither is nor will be, nor [is] that thing known or foreknown from eternity; yet He cannot begin to know or foreknow it, but He can know or foreknow [it] now in such [a] way as He could have known or foreknown [it] from eternity. For if you should say [that] He can now know or foreknow what from eternity He did not know or foreknow — that is, in such a way that from eternity He did not know or foreknow [it], as though both could be at once — [it is] false. But if you should say [that] He can now know or foreknow what from eternity He did not know or foreknow — that is, [that He has] the power of knowing or foreknowing from eternity and [also] now something — yet [that thing] is neither foreknown nor future — [it is] true. Therefore He cannot know or foreknow anything anew or in time, just as He cannot will anything anew or in time; and yet He can will what He never has willed.
Chapter III.
Whether God can know more [things] than He knows.
Likewise it is said by certain [persons] that God can know more [things] than He knows, because He can know all things which He knows, and He can do certain things which will never be, and these He can know. For He cannot do anything unknown. But if all things were [there] which now are, and He should make certain other things which neither are nor will be, and should know all those things, He would assuredly know more things than He now knows. And yet His science cannot be increased3, because all this could come to pass without any mutability of [His] science. It is established therefore that God's science is wholly immutable, nor can it be increased or diminished, but [only] the things subject to it.
Chapter IV.
That God knows all things both always and at once.
But to that which has been said before — namely that God always sees all things and at once — there seems to run contrary what Jerome says in [his] exposition of Habakkuk4: « It is absurd, he says, to bring down God's majesty to such [a degree] that He should know moment by moment how many gnats are born or how many die, what is the number of fleas and flies, how many fishes swim in the waters, and the like. Let us not be such foolish flatterers of God that, while we drag down His providence even to the lowest things, we should be injurious to ourselves, saying that the providence of irrational and rational [creatures] is the same ». Here Jerome seems to say that God does not have science or providence of those least things. But if this is so, then He does not know all things at once and always. — From such a sense therefore let us understand that saying [to mean]: that He denies God to know those [things] alternately or piecemeal, nor [does He know them] through diverse moments of time as [if] through varied moments of those [things] some perish and some begin. Nor does He provide for those and other irrational [creatures] in the way [He does] for rational ones. For "Is there any care to God for oxen?" as the Apostle says5. And as there is no care to God for oxen, so neither for the other irrational [creatures]. Yet Scripture says that to Him is care for all [things]. He has therefore providence and care universally for all [things] which He has founded, so that each may have what is owed and fitting to it. But He has special providence and care for the rational [creatures], to whom6 He has handed down precepts and prescribed for them a law of right living and promised rewards. This providence and care for the irrational [creatures] He does not have. Therefore the Apostle says that there is no care to God for oxen. Yet He provides for and cares for all [things] — that is, He governs all [things] — He who makes His sun rise upon all and gives rain7. God therefore knows what is the multitude of fleas, gnats and flies and fishes, and how many are born, and how many die; but He does not know this moment by moment, nay rather at once and always8 [knows] all things — nor does He know [them] in such [a] way as to have the same providence of irrational and rational [creatures], that is, so as to provide for the irrational and the rational in entirely the same manner. For to the rational [creatures] He has given precepts and has assigned Angels for [their] custody. So therefore at once and immutably God knows all things which were and are and will be, both good and evil; and He also foreknows all future things, both good and evil.
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- Vat. cum edd. 2, 3 sub.The Vatican edition with editions 2 and 3 [reads] sub [in place of mutari].
- Cap. 13. n. 22. Sequens locus est c. 14. — In ultimo textu solummodo Vat. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 post inamissibilis addunt et invariabilis, refragante etiam originali. Immediate post pro quod scire legit Vat. quod sapere vel scire; originale quod scire vel sapere. Cod. D minui, cod. E minui vel mutari.[Augustine, On the Trinity book XV,] c. 13, n. 22. The next passage [quoted] is c. 14. — In the last text, only the Vatican edition and editions 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 after inamissibilis ("unlosable") add et invariabilis ("and unchangeable") — the original [of Augustine] also opposing. Immediately after, in place of quod scire ("what [it is] to know"), the Vatican reads quod sapere vel scire ("what [it is] to be wise or to know"); the original [reads] quod scire vel sapere ("what [it is] to know or to be wise"). Codex D [reads] minui ("to be diminished"), codex E minui vel mutari ("to be diminished or changed").
- Cod. R addit vel mutari.Codex R adds vel mutari ("or changed").
- Ad c. 1, 14.[Jerome, Commentary on Habakkuk,] on c. 1, [v.] 14.
- I. Cor. 9, 9; alius locus est Sap. 12, 13.1 Corinthians 9:9; the other passage is Wisdom 12:13.
- Intellige: respectu quorum dedit septem praecepta posteriora decalogi. Haec est lectio codd. et ed. 1; aliae edd. omittunt de, quia tunc sensus verborum idem est cum eo, quem exprimunt verba, quae sequuntur: eisque recte vivendi legem praescripsit.Understand: with respect to whom He gave the [last] seven precepts of the decalogue. This is the reading of the codices and edition 1; the other editions omit de, because then the sense of the words is the same as that which is expressed by the words which follow: eisque recte vivendi legem praescripsit ("and prescribed for them a law of right living").
- Respicitur Matth. 5, 45: Qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos et pluit super iustos et iniustos.[The text] looks back to Matthew 5:45: He who makes His sun rise upon the good and the wicked and rains upon the just and the unjust.
- Solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 semel.Only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 [read] semel ("once") [in place of semper]. ---