Bonaventure

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXIX.

De perfectione divinae scientiae.

Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui.

Divisio textus.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).

Supra egit Magister de scientiae divinae certitudine, hic agit de perfectione. Et quoniam vere perfectum est cui non est possibilis additio¹, ideo Magister quaerit, utrum divina scientia possit augeri vel minui. Et habet haec pars tres partes. In prima Magister quaerit et determinat quod divina scientia non recipit augmentum nec diminutionem nec alterationem, sed omnia simul et uno aspectu cognoscit. In secunda opponit contra hoc, quod divina scientia non potest augeri, per hoc, quod videtur aliquid posse scire ex tempore, et determinat, et hoc facit secundo capitulo, ibi: Hic opponitur a quibusdam. In tertia obiicit auctoritate Hieronymi contra hoc quod dictum erat, divinam scientiam esse respectu omnium, et hoc ibi: Ei autem quod praedictum est, scilicet quod Deus etc.

Et quaelibet harum trium partium potest subdividi, quia primo in eis opponit et secundo solvit; tamen in secunda ponit duplicem responsionem, et in tertia post responsionem subiungit epilogationem, ultimo capitulo².

Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quaeritur de perfectione divinae cognitionis, et circa hoc duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de perfectione divinae cognitionis quantum ad numerum cognoscibilium.

Secundo quaeritur de ipsa quantum ad modum cognoscendi.

Quantum ad primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat omnia alia a se.

Tertio, utrum Deus possit scire vel praescire plura, quam sciat.

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## Commentary on Distinction XXXIX.

On the perfection of the divine knowledge.

"Furthermore, it is wont to be asked whether the knowledge of God can be increased or diminished."

Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the certitude of the divine knowledge; here he treats of [its] perfection. And since that is truly perfect to which no addition is possible¹, therefore the Master inquires whether the divine knowledge can be increased or diminished. And this part has three parts. In the first the Master inquires and determines that the divine knowledge admits neither increase nor diminution nor alteration, but knows all things at once and by a single regard. In the second he raises an objection against this — namely, that the divine knowledge cannot be increased — through this, that it seems that [God] can know something from [a point in] time, and he determines [the matter], and he does this in the second chapter, there: "Here it is objected by some." In the third he objects with the authority of Jerome against this which had been said, namely that the divine knowledge is in respect of all things, and this [is] there: "To this however which was said before, namely that God etc."

And each of these three parts can be subdivided, because in them he first raises an objection and second resolves [it]; however, in the second [part] he sets forth a twofold response, and in the third, after the response, he appends a recapitulation, in the last chapter².

Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction, the perfection of divine cognition is asked about, and concerning this two [matters] are principally asked.

First, [the question] is asked concerning the perfection of the divine cognition as to the number of knowables.

Second, [the question] is asked concerning the same as to the mode of knowing.

As to the first, three [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether God knows things other than himself.

Second it is asked, whether God knows all things other than himself.

Third, whether God can know or foreknow more [things] than he [actually] knows.

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