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Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 4

Textus Latinus
p. 101

Quaestio III

Utrum congrue iuxta regulas grammaticae dici possit: plures dii.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen Deus grammatice significet pluralem numerum, sive utrum congrue possit dici: plures dii. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia secundum Philosophum1 intellectus sunt idem apud omnes, quamvis voces sint diversae; sed modi significandi consequuntur modos intelligendi: ergo cum apud Hebraeos congrue dicatur Heloim, quod aequipollet ei quod est dii, ergo et apud nos.

2. Item, sicut vult Philosophus2, verum supponit congruum; unde «Catonis est, vel non est, nec verum nec falsum significat»; sed haec vera est: non sunt plures dii: ergo congrua: ergo et haec congrua: plures sunt dii, quia negatio non removet incongruitatem.

3. Item, sicut Deus convenit uni soli, ita principium3 creaturarum uni soli; sed quamvis falso dicantur plura principia, tamen dicuntur congrue: ergo pari ratione possumus dicere: plures dii.

4. Item, hoc nomen phoenix non habet nisi unicum suppositum4; tamen congrue dicitur: plures phoenices. Si tu dicas, quod suppositum plurificatur per successionem temporis; obiicio tibi de hoc nomine sol, quod nullo tempore plurificatur; et tamen congrue dicitur: plures soles: ergo et plures dii.

Contra:

1. Omne nomen, quod habet plurale, est nomen appellativum; propria enim nomina non plurificantur, non enim dicitur: plures Petri vel Ioannes5; sed hoc nomen Deus non est nomen appellativum, quia non significat formam multiplicabilem: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc nomen Deus est proprie6 proprium divinae naturae; sed nullum tale multiplicatur: ergo etc.

p. 102
Conclusio. Nomen Deus, proprie loquendo, non habet plurale.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hoc nomen Deus dicitur tripliciter, scilicet nuncupative, adoptive et naturaliter. Primis duobus modis plurificatur; unde Apostolus primae ad Corinthios octavo: Si quidem sunt dii multi, et domini multi; sed tertio modo non, quia sic hoc nomen Deus significat divinam naturam cum conditionibus, quarum collectiones impossibile est in alio reperire; et ideo sicut nomen proprium non habet plurale, secundum artem loquendo, sic nec hoc nomen Deus.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod apud Hebraeos habet plurale quod est Heloim; dicendum, quod modi significandi non tantum sequuntur7 diversos modos intelligendi generales, sed etiam modos exprimendi. Et quoniam ipsi habent articulos et modos exprimendi diversos, quos nos non habemus, ideo illi possunt habere, sed nos non.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod verum supponit congruum; dicendum, quod duplex est incongruitas: una est ex discohaerentia accidentium8, ut Catonis est; alia ex discohaerentia intellectuum, ut cum dicitur: plures Petri. Prima incongruitas tollit veritatem et falsitatem; secunda vero incongruitas habet falsitatem coniunctam: et ideo, quia per negationem removetur falsitas, et Sancti malunt loqui vere, quam proprietatem sermonis servare et loqui minus vere, ideo negant plures deos. Posset9 tamen dici, quod quamvis haec vox dii non sit vox significativa secundum artem et impositionem, tamen est vox significativa ex accommodatione usus, ut olli pro illi: et ideo generat falsum intellectum affirmativa, et negativa verum, quamvis non grammatice.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod principium uni soli convenit, similiter et phoenix; dicendum, quod convenire uni soli est tripliciter. Aut enim est, quia imponitur nomen a forma immultiplicabili, ut in propriis nominibus; et sic tollit pluralitatem re et consignificatione. Aut imponitur a forma, quae nata est communicari, quamvis non communicetur propter determinationem, ut cum10 dicitur: principium creaturarum. Aut propter defectum materiae, ut phoenix; et tale tollit pluralitatem secundum rem, non secundum consignificationem, quia potest consignificari talis forma, ut potest multiplicari per supposita.

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English Translation
p. 101

Question III

Whether it can be said congruously according to the rules of grammar: several gods.

Thirdly it is asked, whether this name God grammatically signifies the plural number, or whether it can be said congruously: several gods. And that it can, seems thus:

1. Because according to the Philosopher1 understandings are the same among all, although vocal expressions are diverse; but the modes of signifying follow the modes of understanding: therefore since among the Hebrews it is congruously said Heloim, which is equivalent to that which is gods, therefore also among us.

2. Likewise, as the Philosopher will have it2, the true presupposes the congruous; whence "Cato's is, or is not, signifies neither true nor false"; but this is true: there are not several gods: therefore congruous: therefore also this is congruous: there are several gods, because negation does not remove incongruity.

3. Likewise, just as God belongs to one alone, so principle3 of creatures belongs to one alone; but although several principles are said falsely, nevertheless they are said congruously: therefore by parity of reasoning we can say: several gods.

4. Likewise, this name phoenix has only a single supposit4; nevertheless it is congruously said: several phoenixes. If you should say that the supposit is multiplied through succession of time, I object to you concerning this name sun, which is at no time multiplied; and nevertheless it is congruously said: several suns: therefore also several gods.

On the contrary:

1. Every name which has a plural is an appellative name; for proper names are not pluralized, for one does not say: several Peters or Johns5; but this name God is not an appellative name, because it does not signify a multipliable form: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this name God is properly6 proper to the divine nature; but no such [name] is multiplied: therefore etc.

p. 102
Conclusion. The name God, properly speaking, does not have a plural.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that this name God is said in three ways, namely nuncupatively, adoptively and naturally. In the first two modes it is pluralized; whence the Apostle in First Corinthians, chapter eight: If indeed there are many gods, and many lords; but in the third mode not, because thus this name God signifies the divine nature together with conditions whose collection is impossible to find in another; and therefore, just as a proper name does not have a plural, speaking according to art, so neither does this name God.

1. Therefore to that which is objected, that among the Hebrews there is a plural which is Heloim; it must be said that the modes of signifying do not follow7 only the diverse general modes of understanding, but also the modes of expressing. And because they themselves have articles and diverse modes of expressing, which we do not have, therefore they can have [it], but we cannot.

2. To that which is objected, that the true presupposes the congruous; it must be said that incongruity is twofold: one is from disharmony of accidents8, as Cato's is; the other from disharmony of understandings, as when it is said: several Peters. The first incongruity takes away truth and falsity; but the second incongruity has falsity conjoined: and therefore, because through negation falsity is removed, and the Saints prefer to speak truly than to preserve the propriety of speech and speak less truly, therefore they deny several gods. It could9 nevertheless be said, that although this utterance gods is not a significative utterance according to art and imposition, it is nevertheless a significative utterance from the accommodation of usage, as olli for illi: and therefore the affirmative generates a false understanding, and the negative a true [understanding], although not grammatically.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that principle belongs to one alone, and likewise phoenix; it must be said that to belong to one alone is in three ways. For either it is because the name is imposed from an unmultipliable form, as in proper names; and thus it removes plurality in reality and in cosignification. Or it is imposed from a form which is suited by nature to be communicated, although it is not communicated because of determination, as when10 it is said: principle of creatures. Or on account of a defect of matter, as phoenix; and such [a name] removes plurality according to the thing, not according to cosignification, because such a form can be cosignified, as it can be multiplied through supposits.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. I. Periherm. c. 1: Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eaedem sunt, ita nec voces omnibus eaedem: quorum tamen haec signa primo sunt, ea omnibus sunt eaedem passiones animae.
    Book I of On Interpretation, c. 1: And just as letters are not the same for all, so neither are vocal expressions the same for all: but those of which these [vocal expressions] are primarily signs, are the same affections of the soul for all.
  2. Libr. I. Periherm. c. 2, iuxta translationem Boethii: «Nomen vero semper, ut Catonis est, vel non est; nondum enim aliquid verum dicit aut falsum»; in quo textu ceterae translationes Philonis pro Catonis ponunt. Ad quem locum auctor libri Auctoritatum Aristot. etc. (a. 1500) addit: «Ex quo communiter trahitur, quod verum et falsum praesupponunt congruum». Incongruitas huius dictionis consistit in discohaerentia accidentium, ut infra in solutione dicitur; deest enim subiectum genitivi.
    Book I of On Interpretation, c. 2, according to Boethius's translation: "A noun, however, always — as in 'Cato's is' or 'is not' — does not yet say anything true or false"; in which text the other translations put Philo's for Cato's. To which passage the author of the book of Aristotelian Authorities etc. (a. 1500) adds: "From which it is commonly drawn that the true and the false presuppose the congruous." The incongruity of this expression consists in the disharmony of accidents, as is said below in the solution; for the subject of the genitive is lacking.
  3. Cod. S addit omnium. Codd. cum ed. 1 in fine argumenti deos loco dii.
    Codex S adds of all. The codices with edition 1 at the end of the argument [read] deos in place of dii.
  4. S. Doctor loquitur secundum antiquam opinionem fabulosam, quod haec avis in uno solo individuo existat, ex cuius cineribus resurgat alius. Idem exemplum adducit Boeth., I. de Categoriis Aristot. c. de Denominativis.
    The holy Doctor speaks according to the ancient fabulous opinion, that this bird exists in one sole individual, from whose ashes another arises. Boethius adduces the same example in Book I of [his commentary on] Aristotle's Categories, chapter on Denominatives.
  5. Cfr. Priscian., II. Grammat. c. 5.
    Cf. Priscian, Grammar II, c. 5.
  6. Postulantibus mss. et edd. 1, addidimus proprie. Paulo infra aliqui codd. ut H ff post multiplicatur adiiciunt vel plurificatur; ed. 1 nec plurificatur.
    With the manuscripts and edition 1 demanding it, we have added proprie. A little below, some codices such as H ff after multiplicatur add vel plurificatur; edition 1 [reads] nec plurificatur.
  7. Ex plurimis mss. ut A C F G H M N R S T V X Y Z etc. substituimus sequuntur loco requirunt; alii codd. ut I U ff cum ed. 1 consequuntur. Lectio mss. certe praeferenda lectioni Vat. Paulo infra Vat. contra plurimos codd. ut A C G H I K S T V W Y etc. et ed. 1 quoniam ergo pro Et quoniam. Demum circa finem argumenti, obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, ponit Vat. dicere loco habere; in lectione mss. supple: plurale.
    From very many manuscripts such as A C F G H M N R S T V X Y Z etc. we have substituted sequuntur (follow) in place of requirunt (require); other codices such as I U ff with edition 1 [read] consequuntur (follow upon). The reading of the manuscripts is certainly to be preferred to the Vatican reading. A little below, the Vatican against many codices such as A C G H I K S T V W Y etc. and edition 1 [reads] quoniam ergo in place of Et quoniam. Finally, near the end of the argument, with the manuscripts and edition 1 resisting, the Vatican places dicere (to say) in place of habere (to have); in the reading of the manuscripts supply: plurale.
  8. Priscian., XVII. Grammat. c. 1. (de Constructione): Nam si incongrua (ratio contextus) sit, soloecismum faciet, quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus, quomodo inconcinnitas litterarum vel syllabarum vel eis accidentium in singulis dictionibus facit barbarismum. — Vat. sola adiacentium loco accidentium, quae et paulo supra contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 habet praesupponit pro supponit.
    Priscian, Grammar XVII, c. 1 (On Construction): For if (the order of the context) be incongruous, it will make a solecism, as it were by the elements of speech coming together inelegantly, just as the inelegance of letters or of syllables or of what is accidental to them in single words makes a barbarism. — The Vatican alone [reads] adiacentium (of adjacent things) in place of accidentium (of accidental things), which [Vatican] also a little above, against nearly all codices and edition 1, has praesupponit (presupposes) for supponit (presupposes/posits).
  9. Vat. potest, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1. Circa finem huius responsionis aliqui codd. ut A C L O R S V Y ex intellectu pro intellectum.
    The Vatican [reads] potest (it can), but the manuscripts and edition 1 stand against [it]. Near the end of this response, some codices such as A C L O R S V Y [read] ex intellectu (out of understanding) in place of intellectum (understanding).
  10. Supplevimus ex mss. et primis sex edd. cum. In fine responsionis antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 significari pro consignificari.
    We have supplied cum (when) from the manuscripts and the first six editions. At the end of the response, the more ancient codices with edition 1 [read] significari (to be signified) in place of consignificari (to be cosignified).
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