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Dist. 40

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus
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DISTINCTIO XL.

Praedestinatio1 vero de bonis salutaribus est et de hominibus salvandis. Ut enim ait Augustinus in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum2: « praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, quae sine praescientia esse non potest. Potest autem sine praedestinatione esse praescientia. Praedestinatione quippe Deus ea praescivit, quae fuerat ipse facturus; sed praescivit Deus etiam quae non esset ipse facturus, id est omnia mala ». Praedestinavit eos quos elegit, reliquos vero reprobavit, id est, ad mortem aeternam praescivit peccaturos.

Cap. I.

An aliquis praedestinatus possit damnari, vel reprobus salvari.

Praedestinatorum nullus videtur posse damnari, nec reproborum aliquis posse salvari. Unde Augustinus in libro de Correptione et gratia3: « In Apocalypsi4, inquit, dicitur: Tene quod habes, ne alius accipiat coronam tuam. Si alius non est accepturus, nisi iste per-

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differt, certus est electorum numerus », id est, non potest augeri vel minui. — Ad hoc autem obiiciunt5 quidam, nitentes probare, numerum electorum posse augeri et minui, sic: posset Deus non apponere gratiam quibus apponit, et posset subtrahere quibus non subtrahit; quod si fieret, utique damnarentur. Possent ergo damnari isti, qui tamen salvabuntur. Posset itaque minui electorum numerus; ita etiam posset augeri, quia posset apponi gratia quibus non apponitur, per quam salvarentur. Possent ergo salvari, habita gratia, qui tamen sine ea damnabuntur: posset itaque augeri numerus electorum. — Quibus respondemus6 ex ea ratione dictum esse et verum esse, numerum electorum non posse augeri vel minui, quia non potest utrumque simul esse, scilicet, ut aliquis salvetur et non sit praedestinatus, vel ut aliquis praedestinatus sit et damnetur. Intelligentia enim conditionis implicitae veritatem facit in dicto, et impossibilitatem in re. Si vero simpliciter intelligatur, impossibilitas non admittitur, ut cum dicitur: praedestinatus non potest [damnari], vel reprobus potest salvari. In his enim et huiusmodi locutionibus ex ratione dicti diiudicanda est sententia dictionis. Alia namque fit intelligentia, si per coniunctionem haec accipiantur dicta, atque alia, si per disiunctionem, ut supra7, cum de praescientia agebatur, praetaxatum est. Si enim, cum dicis: praedestinatus non potest damnari, intelligas ita: id est non potest esse, ut praedestinatus sit et damnetur, verum dicis, quia coniunctim intelligis; falsum autem, si disiunctim, ut si intelligas, istum non posse damnari, quem dico praedestinatum. Potuit enim non esse praedestinatus, et ita damnaretur.

Verumtamen adhuc instant et secundum coniunctionem argumentando ita procedunt. Non enim, inquiunt, potest esse, ut aliquis praedestinatus sit et damnetur. Utrumque istorum simul esse non potest; sed alterum horum non potest non esse, scilicet, quin iste sit praedestinatus: ab aeterno enim praedestinatus est et non potest modo non esse praedestinatus. Cum ergo impossibile sit, simul utrumque esse, et impossibile sit, alterum non esse, videtur, non posse alterum esse, scilicet ut damnetur. Quod si est, ergo non potest esse, ut non salvetur. — In huius quaestionis solutione mallem alios audire quam docere. Dicimus tamen, similem de praescientia posse moveri quaestionem; ideoque, tam hic quam ibi, unam facimus responsionem dicentes determinandum fore illud, cui innititur tota haec quaestio, scilicet impossibile est, alterum8 non esse, scilicet, quin iste modo sit praedestinatus; ab aeterno enim iste praedestinatus est. Distinguendum enim est, cum ait: iste non potest modo non esse praedestinatus, vel non potest modo esse, quin sit praedestinatus. Hoc enim et coniunctim et disiunctim intelligi potest. Non enim potest esse, ut ab aeterno sit praedestinatus et modo non sit praedestinatus, nec potest esse simul, ut sit praedestinatus et non sit praedestinatus; sed tamen potuit esse ab aeterno, quod non esset praedestinatus, et potuit ab aeterno non esse praedestinatus. Et sicut ab aeterno Deus potuit eum non praedestinare, ita conceditur a quibusdam, quod et modo potest Deus eum non praedestinasse. Ab aeterno ergo potest Deus non praedestinasse eum: ergo potest iste non fuisse praedestinatus. Si vero non fuisset praedestinatus, nec modo esset praedestinatus: ergo potest modo non esse praedestinatus. Ita et de praescientia et de praescitis dicunt; quod in actionibus vel in operationibus Dei et hominum nullatenus concedunt. Ex quo enim aliquid factum est vel dictum, non concedunt, quod possit non esse vel non fuisse, immo impossibile est, non esse vel fuisse quod factum est vel dictum, referentes possibilitatem vel impossibilitatem ad naturam rei existentis. Cum vero de praescientia vel praedestinatione Dei agitur, possibilitas vel impossibilitas ad potentiam Dei refertur, quae semper eadem fuit et est, quia praedestinatio, praescientia, potentia unum in Deo est.

Cap. II.

Quid sit reprobatio Dei, et in quibus consideretur, et quis sit praedestinationis effectus.

Cumque praedestinatio sit gratiae praeparatio, id est divina electio, qua elegit quos voluit ante mundi constitutionem, ut ait Apostolus9; reprobatio e converso intelligenda est praescientia iniquitatis quorumdam et praeparatio damnationis eorundem. Sicut enim praedestinationis effectus illa gratia est, qua in praesenti iustificamur atque ad recte vivendum et in bono perseverandum adiuvamur, et illa qua in futuro beatificamur; ita reprobatio Dei, qua ab aeterno non eligendo quosdam reprobavit, secundum duo consideratur, quorum alterum praescit et non praeparat, id est iniquitatem, alterum praescit et praeparat, scilicet aeternam poenam. Unde Augustinus ad Prosperum et Hilarium10: « Haec, inquit, regula inconcusse tenenda est, peccatores in peccatis praescitos esse, non praeparatos, poenam autem esse praeparatam ». « Praeparavit enim Deus, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Bono perseverantiae11, in praescientia sua, quibus voluit bona sua; et quibuscumque donat, proculdubio se donaturum esse praescivit ». « Praeparavit etiam Deus, ut ait Fulgentius12, malis ignem aeternum, illis utique, quos iuste praeparavit ad luenda supplicia; nec tamen

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praeparavit ad facienda peccata. Praeparavit enim Deus, quod divina aequitas redderet, non quod humana iniquitas admitteret. Non enim, sicut praeparavit Sanctos ad iustitiam percipiendam, sic praeparavit iniquos ad iustitiam amittendam, quia pravitatis praeparator nunquam fuit ».

Sicut ergo praedestinatio Dei proprie est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur13; ita reprobatio Dei est praescientia malitiae in quibusdam non finiendae et praeparatio poenae non terminandae. Et sicut praedestinationis effectus est gratiae appositio, ita reprobationis aeternae quodam modo effectus esse videtur obduratio. « Nec obdurat Deus, ut ait Augustinus ad Sixtum14, impertiendo malitiam, sed non impertiendo gratiam, sicut nec digni sunt. Quibus enim non impertitur nec digni sunt nec merentur; potius ut non impertiatur, hoc digni sunt, hoc merentur ». Unde Apostolus15 ait: Cuius vult miseretur Deus, et quem vult indurat; misericordiam appellans praedestinationem et praecipue praedestinationis effectum, id est gratiae appositionem, obdurationem vero gratiae privationem. « Non enim, ut ait Augustinus ad Simplicianum16, intelligendum est, quod Deus ita induret, quasi quemquam peccare cogat; sed tamen quibusdam peccatoribus misericordiam iustificationis suae non largitur, et ob hoc eos indurare dicitur, quia non eorum miseretur, non quia impellit, ut peccent. Eorum autem non miseretur, quibus gratiam non esse praebendam aequitate occultissima et ab humanis sensibus remotissima iudicat »; « quam non aperit, sed miratur Apostolus dicens: altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei! »

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English Translation
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DISTINCTION XL.

Predestination1, however, is of saving goods and of human beings to be saved. For as Augustine says in [his] book On the Predestination of the Saints2: « predestination is the preparation of grace, which cannot be without foreknowledge. But foreknowledge can be without predestination. For by predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was about to do; but God also foreknew those things which He was not Himself about to do, that is, all evils ». He predestined those whom He chose, but the rest He reprobated, that is, He foreknew [them] as being about to sin unto eternal death.

Chapter I.

Whether any predestined [person] can be damned, or any reprobate be saved.

None of the predestined seems able to be damned, nor any of the reprobate able to be saved. Whence Augustine in [his] book On Rebuke and Grace3: « In the Apocalypse4, he says, it is said: Hold what you have, lest another receive your crown. If another is not going to receive [it], unless this man dif-

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fers, the number of the elect is certain », that is, [it] cannot be increased or diminished. — But against this certain [persons] object5, striving to prove that the number of the elect can be increased and diminished, thus: God could not apply grace to those to whom He [does] apply [it], and could withdraw [it] from those from whom He does not withdraw [it]; if this should happen, they would assuredly be damned. Therefore those could be damned who nevertheless will be saved. Thus the number of the elect could be diminished; just so it could be increased, because grace could be applied to those to whom it is not applied, by which they would be saved. Therefore those could be saved, having received grace, who nevertheless without it will be damned: thus the number of the elect could be increased. — To which we respond6 [that] from that ratio [of speaking] it is said and is true, [that] the number of the elect cannot be increased or diminished, because both cannot be at once, namely that anyone be saved and not be predestined, or that anyone be predestined and damned. For the understanding of an implicit condition makes truth in the saying and impossibility in the matter. But if [the saying] is understood simply [i.e., absolutely], the impossibility is not admitted, as when it is said: the predestined [one] cannot [be damned], or the reprobate can be saved. For in these and similar locutions, the meaning of the expression is to be judged from the ground of the saying. For one understanding arises if these sayings are taken by way of conjunction, and another if [taken] by way of disjunction, as was previously prefaced7 above, when foreknowledge was being treated. For if, when you say the predestined [one] cannot be damned, you understand it thus — that is, [it] cannot be that he be predestined and [also] damned — you speak truly, because you understand [it] conjunctively; but [it is] false if [understood] disjunctively, as if you should understand that this [person] cannot be damned whom I call predestined. For he could have been not predestined, and so be damned.

Yet still they press on and, arguing by way of conjunction, proceed thus. For, they say, it cannot be that anyone be predestined and damned. Both of these cannot be at once; but one of them cannot not-be, namely that this [person] be predestined: for he is predestined from eternity and cannot now not-be predestined. Since therefore it is impossible that both be at once, and impossible that one not-be, it seems that the other cannot be — namely, that he be damned. But if this is so, then it cannot be that he not be saved. — In the solution of this question I would rather hear others than teach. Yet we say [that] a similar question can be raised about foreknowledge; and so, both here and there, we make one response, saying that what must be determined is that on which the whole of this question rests, namely it is impossible that the other8 not-be, namely, that this [person] now is predestined; for from eternity this [person] is predestined. For a distinction must be made when he says: this [one] cannot now not-be predestined, or cannot now be without being predestined. For this can be understood both conjunctively and disjunctively. For [it] cannot be that he be predestined from eternity and now not be predestined, nor can [it] be at once that he be predestined and not be predestined; yet it could have been from eternity that he were not predestined, and he could from eternity not have been predestined. And just as from eternity God could have not predestined him, so it is conceded by certain [persons] that even now God can not have predestined him. Therefore from eternity God can not have predestined him: therefore this [person] can not have been predestined. But if he had not been predestined, neither would he now be predestined: therefore he can now not-be predestined. So also they say of foreknowledge and of the foreknown; which they in no way concede with regard to actions or operations of God and human beings. For from the [moment] something has been done or said, they do not concede that it can not-be or not have been; on the contrary, [it is] impossible that what has been done or said not-be or [not] have been — referring possibility or impossibility to the nature of the existing thing. But when treating God's foreknowledge or predestination, possibility or impossibility is referred to God's power, which always was and is the same, because predestination, foreknowledge, [and] power are one in God.

Chapter II.

What God's reprobation is, and in what it is considered, and what the effect of predestination is.

And since predestination is the preparation of grace — that is, the divine election by which He chose those whom He willed before the founding of the world, as the Apostle says9 — reprobation, conversely, is to be understood as the foreknowledge of certain ones' iniquity and the preparation of damnation for those same. For just as the effect of predestination is that grace by which in the present we are justified and helped to live rightly and to persevere in the good, and that [grace] by which we are beatified in the future; so God's reprobation, by which from eternity by not electing He reprobated certain ones, is considered according to two [things], one of which He foreknows and does not prepare, that is iniquity, [and] the other He foreknows and prepares, namely eternal punishment. Whence Augustine to Prosper and Hilary10: « This, he says, rule must be unshakably held: that sinners have been foreknown in [their] sins, not prepared [for them], but punishment has been prepared ». « For God prepared, as Augustine says in [his] book On the Gift of Perseverance11, in His foreknowledge those to whom He willed His own good things; and to whomever He gives, undoubtedly He foreknew Himself as about to give ». « God also prepared, as Fulgentius says12, an eternal fire for the wicked — for those, namely, whom He justly prepared for the suffering of punishments; yet He did not

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prepare [them] for the doing of sins. For God prepared what divine equity would render, not what human iniquity would commit. For He did not, just as He prepared the saints for the receiving of justice, [so also] prepare the wicked for the losing of justice — because He has never been a preparer of depravity ».

Therefore just as God's predestination, properly [speaking], is the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits, by which most certainly are freed whoever are freed13; so God's reprobation is the foreknowledge of malice in certain [persons] not [to be] ended and the preparation of punishment not [to be] terminated. And just as the effect of predestination is the application of grace, so of eternal reprobation the effect seems in some manner to be hardening. « God does not harden, as Augustine says to Sixtus14, by imparting malice, but by not imparting grace, just as [the wicked] are not worthy. For those to whom [grace] is not imparted are neither worthy nor deserving; rather they are worthy and deserve that it should not be imparted ». Whence the Apostle says15: On whom He wills, God has mercy, and whom He wills He hardens — calling mercy predestination and especially the effect of predestination, that is, the application of grace, and [calling] hardening the privation of grace. « For one ought not, as Augustine says to Simplician16, understand that God so hardens as if He compelled anyone to sin; yet to certain sinners He does not bestow the mercy of His justification, and on this account He is said to harden them, because He does not have mercy on them — not because He impels [them] to sin. But He does not have mercy on those to whom He judges grace not [to be] given, by an equity most hidden and most remote from human senses »; « which the Apostle does not unveil but admires, saying: O depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! »

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. In codd. CDE et ed. 1 d. XL. incipit cum sequente capitulo: Praedestinatorum nullus videtur. Et revera, secundum distributionem capitulorum hae quinque propositiones pertinent ad ultimum capitulum distinctionis praecedentis. S. Bonaventura autem, ut patet ex divisione textus, hic incipit distinctionem XL.
    In codices CDE and edition 1, distinction XL begins with the following chapter: Praedestinatorum nullus videtur ("None of the predestined seems"). And in fact, according to [their] distribution of chapters, these five propositions belong to the last chapter of the preceding distinction. St. Bonaventure however, as is plain from his division of the text, here begins distinction XL.
  2. Cap. 10. n. 19; sed ultima verba ex Glossa ad Rom. 8, 29.
    [Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints,] c. 10, n. 19; but the last words [are taken] from the Gloss on Romans 8:29.
  3. Cap. 13. n. 39. In codd. et edd., excepta 9, intitulatur liber de Correctione et gratia.
    [Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace,] c. 13, n. 39. In the codices and editions, with the exception of [edition] 9, the book is titled On Correction and Grace.
  4. Cap. 3, 11.
    [Apocalypse,] c. 3, [v.] 11.
  5. In codd. et ed. 1 (5 in margine) in aliis faceret. — Unde Magister plura quae sequuntur, nonnullis mutatis, depromsit.
    In the codices and edition 1 (with [edition] 5 in the margin) [the reading is] in aliis faceret ("in others he would make [it]"). — Whence the Master drew much of what follows, with several [things] changed.
  6. Dist. XXXVIII. c. 2. — Paulo superius post dicta, atque edd. 4, 6, 8, 9 omittunt alia.
    [Cf.] Distinction XXXVIII, c. 2. — A little above, after dicta ("sayings") and before atque ("and"), editions 4, 6, 8, 9 omit alia ("other").
  7. Vel de Dono perseverantiae, c. 17. n. 41.
    Or [equivalently, Augustine,] On the Gift of Perseverance, c. 17, n. 41.
  8. Vat. et aliae edd. contra codd. et ed. 1 addunt istorum.
    The Vatican edition and other editions, against the codices and edition 1, add istorum ("of these").
  9. Libr. I. ad Monimum, c. 25; secundum sensum, sed ad verbum in Glossa (loc. cit.). In quo textu codd. B E ante ad facienda peccata praemittunt eos. — Paulo inferius codd. A B D et edd. 2, 3, 7, 8 (5 in margine) iniustitiam admittendam pro iustitiam amittendam.
    [Cf. Fulgentius,] book I to Monimus, c. 25; according to the sense, but verbatim in the Gloss (at the place cited). In which text codices B and E, before ad facienda peccata ("to the doing of sins"), prefix eos ("them"). — A little below, codices A B D and editions 2, 3, 7, 8 (with [edition] 5 in the margin) [read] iniustitiam admittendam ("admitting injustice") in place of iustitiam amittendam ("losing justice").
  10. Cod. D addit et erit.
    Codex D adds et erit ("and will be").
  11. Ephes. I, 4.
    Ephesians 1:4.
  12. Non invenitur in citatis libris, sed in VI. Hypognosticon. Vide etiam Glossam ad Rom. 8, 29 apud Lyranum.
    [The passage] is not found in the books cited, but in [book] VI of the Hypognosticon. See also the Gloss on Romans 8:29 in [Nicholas of] Lyra.
  13. August., de Bono persever. c. 14. n. 33.
    Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, c. 14, n. 33.
  14. Epist. 194. c. 3. n. 14.
    [Augustine,] Letter 194, c. 3, n. 14.
  15. Rom. 9, 19.
    Romans 9:19.
  16. Libr. I. quaest. 2. n. 19; sed plurimum a Magistro mutatis. Ultima verba paene non aperit etc. usque sunt ex Epist. (loc. cit.). — Lectio b. Scripturae est Rom. 11, 33.
    [Augustine, To Simplician,] book I, question 2, n. 19; but with very much changed by the Master. The last words paene non aperit ("almost does not unveil") etc. and onward are from the Letter (at the place cited). — The reading of holy Scripture is Romans 11:33. ---
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