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Dist. 41

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 41

Textus Latinus
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DISTINCTIO XLI.

Cap. I. Utrum aliquod sit meritum obdurationis vel misericordiae.

Si autem quaerimus meritum obdurationis et misericordiae, obdurationis meritum invenimus, misericordiae autem meritum non invenimus, quia nullum est misericordiae meritum, ne gratia evacuetur, si non gratis donatur1, sed meritis redditur. Miseretur itaque secundum gratiam, quae gratis datur; obdurat autem secundum iudicium, quod meritis redditur. « Unde datur intelligi, ut sicut reprobatio Dei est nolle misereri, ita obduratio Dei sit non misereri, ut non ab illo irrogetur aliquid, quo sit homo deterior, sed tantum quo sit melior non erogetur »2. Ex his aperte ostenditur, quid misericordiam, quid obdurationem intellexerit Apostolus3, et quia misericordia nullum advocat meritum, obduratio vero non est sine merito, sed habet nolle misereri. Et misericordiae verbo hic accipitur praedestinatio, et praecipue praedestinationis effectus, obdurationis vero non ipsa Dei aeterna reprobatio, quia eius nullum est meritum, sed gratiae privatio sive subtractio, quae quodam modo est reprobationis effectus. Accipitur tamen aliquando reprobatio pro obduratione, sicut et praedestinatio pro suo effectu, qui est gratia apposita4. Gratia enim, quae apponitur, effectus est praedestinationis. — Cum igitur gratiae, quae apponitur homini ad iustificationem, nulla sint merita; multo minus et ipsius praedestinationis, qua ab aeterno elegit Deus quos voluit, aliqua possunt existere merita, ita nec reprobationis, qua ab aeterno quosdam praescivit futuros malos et damnandos: sicut elegit Iacob, et Esau5 reprobavit, quod non fuit pro meritis eorum, quae tunc haberent, quia nulla habebant, quoniam nec ipsi existebant; nec propter futura merita quae praevideret, vel illum elegit, vel illum reprobavit.

Cap. II. De variis super hoc carnalium opinionibus.

Opinati sunt tamen quidam, Deum ideo elegisse Iacob, quia talem futurum praescivit, qui in eum crederet et ei serviret. Quod aliquando Augustinus se sensisse dicit in libro Retractationum6, ubi aperte ostendit, quod si propter futura merita electus esset, iam non ex gratia esset electio. Non ergo ideo electus est a Deo, quia talis futurus erat, sed ex electione talis est factus, ita dicens: «Disputans, quid elegerit Deus in nondum nato, cui dixit serviturum esse maiorem, et quid in eodem maiore similiter nondum nato reprobaverit, ad hoc perduxi ratiocinationem, ut dicerem: Non ergo elegit Deus opera cuiusquam in praescientia, quae ipse daturus est, sed fidem elegit in praescientia, et quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit, cui Spiritum sanctum daret, ut bona operando etiam aeternam vitam consequeretur». — Ecce hic aperte dicit, non propter opera eum elegisse, sed propter fidem qua eum praescivit7 crediturum. Sed quia et in fide meritum est, sicut et in operibus, hoc retractavit dicens8: « Nondum diligentius quaesiveram nec adhuc inveneram, qualis sit electio gratiae, de qua dicit Apostolus: Reliquiae per electionem gratiae salvae fient; quae utique non est gratia, si ex meritis procedit, ut iam quod datur non secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum reddatur potius meritis, quam donetur. Proinde quod continuo dixi: Dicit enim idem Apostolus9: Idem Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus. Nusquam autem dictum est: Deus credit omnia in omnibus. Ac deinde subiunxi: Quod ergo credimus, nostrum est; quod vero bonum operamur, illius est, qui credentibus dat Spiritum sanctum. Profecto non dicerem, si iam scirem, etiam ipsam fidem inter Dei munera reperiri, quae dantur in eodem spiritu.

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Utrumque ergo nostrum est propter arbitrium voluntatis, et utrumque datum est per spiritum fidei et caritatis. — Et quod paulo post dixi: Nostrum enim est credere et velle, illius autem dare credentibus et volentibus facultatem bene operandi per Spiritum sanctum, per quem caritas diffunditur in cordibus nostris10, verum est quidem, sed eadem regula et utrumque ipsius est, quia ipse praeparat voluntatem, et utrumque nostrum, quia non fit, nisi volentibus nobis ». Ergo et meritum fidei de misericordia Dei venit. Non ergo propter fidem vel aliqua merita elegit Deus aliquos ab aeterno vel apposuit gratiam iustificationis11 in tempore, sed gratuita bonitate sua elegit, ut boni essent. Unde Augustinus in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum12: « Non quia futuros nos tales esse praescivit, ideo elegit, sed ut essemus tales per ipsam electionem gratiae suae, qua gratificavit nos in dilecto Filio suo».

His tamen adversari videtur, quod dicit Augustinus13 super Malachiam prophetam, ubi scriptum est: Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui: « Cui14 vult, inquit, miseretur, et quem vult indurat. Sed haec voluntas Dei iniusta esse non potest. Venit enim de occultissimis meritis, quia et ipsi peccatores cum propter generale peccatum unam massam fecerunt, non tamen nulla15 inter eos est diversitas. Praecedit ergo aliquid in peccatoribus, quo, quamvis nondum sint iustificati, digni efficiantur iustificatione. Et item praecedit in aliis peccatoribus, quo digni sunt obtusione». — Ecce hic videtur Augustinus dicere, quod et ipsa Dei voluntas, qua alios ex meritis eligit, alios reprobat, non16 proveniat, sed occultissimis, id est, quod pro meritis alios voluerit eligere, alios reprobare, et quod pro meritis aliis apponitur gratia iustificationis, aliis non, unde obtunduntur. Sed quid intelligere voluerit, ignoratur, nisi forte hoc dicatur intellexisse, quod supra diximus eum retractasse. Nam ibidem etiam quaedam17 alia continue subdit, quae in libro Retractationum aperte retractat; quod utrumque legenti patebit. Unde verisimile est, in praemissis etiam hoc retractasse.

Quidam tamen ex eo sensu accipiunt fore dictum, non quia aliquis praedestinetur pro meritis vel iustificationis gratiam mereatur, sed quia aliqui non adeo mali sunt, ut mereantur sibi gratiam non impertiri. Nullus enim Dei gratiam mereri potest, per quam iustificatur; potest tamen mereri, ut non apponatur, ut penitus abiiciatur. Et quidem aliqui in tantum profundum iniquitatis devenerunt, ut hoc mereantur, ut hoc digni sint; alii vero ita vivunt, ut, etsi non mereantur gratiam iustificationis, non tamen mereantur omnino repelli et gratiam sibi subtrahi. Ideoque dixit, in quibusdam peccatoribus praecedere quo digni sint iustificatione, et in aliis quo digni sint obtusione. — Sed hoc frivolum est.

« Multi vero de isto profundo quaerentes reddere rationem, atque secundum coniecturas cordis sui inscrutabilem altitudinem iudiciorum Dei cogitare conantes, in fabulas vanitatis abierunt dicentes, quod animae sursum in caelo peccant et secundum sua peccata ad corpora pro meritis diriguntur, et dignis sibi quasi carceribus includuntur. Ierunt hi tales post cogitationes suas, et volentes disputare de Dei profundo, versi sunt in profundum, dicentes, animas in caelo ante conversatas et ibi aliquid boni vel mali egisse et pro meritis ad corpora terrena detrusas esse. Hoc autem respuit catholica fides propter evidentem Apostoli sententiam, qua ait18: Cum nondum nati essent, aut aliquid boni vel mali egissent19» etc. Melior est ergo fidelis ignorantia quam temeraria scientia. « Elegit ergo quos voluit gratuita misericordia, non quia fideles futuri erant, sed ut fideles essent, eisque gratiam dedit, non quia fideles erant, sed ut fierent. Ait enim Apostolus20: Misericordiam consecutus sum, ut fidelis essem; non ait, quia fidelis eram. Datur quidem et fideli, sed data est etiam prius, ut esset fidelis». Ita etiam reprobavit quos voluit, non propter merita futura, quae praevideret, veritate tamen rectissima et a nostris sensibus remota21.

Sed quaeritur, utrum, sicut dicitur elegisse quosdam, ut boni fierent et fideles, ita etiam concedi debeat, reprobasse quosdam, ut mali essent et infideles et obdurare, ut peccent; quod nullatenus concedi oportet. Non enim reprobatio ita est causa mali, sicut praedestinatio est causa boni; neque obduratio ita facit hominem malum, quemadmodum misericordia facit bonum.

Cap. III. An ea quae semel scit Deus vel praescit, semper sciat et praesciat, et semper scierit et praescierit.

Praeterea considerari oportet, utrum ea omnia quae semel scit vel praescit Deus, semper sciat et scierit, ac praesciat et praescierit; an olim scierit vel praescierit quod modo non scit vel praescit. — De praescientia primo respondemus dicentes, multa eum praescisse, quae modo non praescit. Cum enim eius praescientia non sit nisi de futuris, ex quo illa quae futura erant, praesentia fiunt vel praetereunt, sub Dei praescientia esse desinunt, sub scientia vero semper sunt.

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Praescivit ergo Deus omnia ab aeterno, quae futura erant, neque praescire desinit, nisi cum futura esse desinunt. Neque cum praescire desinit aliqua, quae ante praesciebat, minus ea noscit, quam ante cognoscebat. Non enim dicitur ex defectu scientiae eius, quod aliqua praescierit aliquando, quae modo non praesciat, sed ex ratione verbi quod est praescientia. Praescire enim est ante scire, quam fiat aliquid. Ideoque non potest dici Deus praescire, nisi quae futura sunt.

De scientia autem aliter dicimus. Scit enim Deus semper omnia quae aliquando scit. Omnem enim scientiam, quam aliquando habet, semper habuit et habet et habebit. — Ad hoc autem opponitur ita: olim scivit, hunc hominem nasciturum, qui natus est, modo non scit, eum nasciturum: scivit ergo aliquid, quod modo non scit. Item scivit mundum esse creandum, modo non scit, eum esse creandum: aliquid ergo scivit, quod modo non scit; et alia huiusmodi infinita induci possent. — Sed ad hoc dicimus, quod idem de nativitate huius hominis et mundi creatione nunc etiam scit, quod sciebat, antequam fierent, licet tunc et nunc hanc scientiam eius diversis exprimi verbis oporteat. Nam quod tunc futurum erat, nunc praeteritum est; ideoque verba commutanda sunt ad ipsum designandum; sicut diversis temporibus loquentes eandem diem modo per hoc adverbium cras designamus, dum adhuc futura est, modo per hodie, dum praesens est, modo per heri, dum praeterita est. Itaque antequam crearetur mundus, sciebat Deus hunc creandum, postquam creatus est, scit eum creatum. Nec est hoc scire diversa, sed omnino idem de mundi creatione; sicut antiqui patres crediderunt, Christum nasciturum et moriturum, nos autem credimus, eum iam natum et mortuum; nec tamen diversa credimus nos et illi, sed eadem. « Tempora enim, ut ait Augustinus22, variata sunt; et ideo verba sunt mutata, non fides ». Indubitanter igitur teneamus, Deum semper omnia scire, quae aliquando scit.

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English Translation
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DISTINCTION XLI.

Chap. I. Whether there is any merit of hardening or of mercy.

If however we inquire about the merit of hardening and of mercy, we find a merit of hardening, but we do not find a merit of mercy, because there is no merit of mercy, lest grace be made void if it is not freely given1 but rendered for merits. He has mercy therefore according to grace, which is given freely; but he hardens according to judgment, which is rendered for merits. « Hence it is given to understand that, just as God's reprobation is not to will to have mercy, so God's hardening is not to have mercy, in such a way that nothing is inflicted by him by which a man might be made worse, but only that by which he might be made better is not bestowed »2. From these things it is plainly shown what the Apostle3 understood by mercy and what by hardening, and that mercy invokes no merit, but hardening is not without merit, but has [as its merit] the not willing to have mercy. And by the word mercy here is taken predestination, and especially the effect of predestination; but by hardening is taken not God's eternal reprobation itself, since of that there is no merit, but the privation or subtraction of grace, which in a certain manner is the effect of reprobation. Yet sometimes reprobation is taken for hardening, just as predestination is taken for its own effect, which is grace applied4. For the grace which is applied is the effect of predestination. — Since therefore for the grace which is applied to a man unto justification there are no merits; much less also for predestination itself, by which from eternity God chose those whom he willed, can any merits exist; nor for reprobation, by which from eternity he foreknew certain ones as future evil men and as those to be damned: just as he chose Jacob, and reprobated Esau5, which was not on account of their merits which they then might have had, because they had none, since they did not yet exist; nor on account of future merits which he might foresee, did he either choose this one, or reprobate that one.

Chap. II. On the various opinions of carnal men on this matter.

Yet certain ones have held the opinion that God therefore chose Jacob because he foreknew him as such a future man as would believe in him and serve him. Which Augustine says he himself sometimes held, in [his] book Retractationes6, where he plainly shows that, if [Jacob] had been chosen on account of future merits, then the election would no longer be from grace. Therefore he is not chosen by God because he was going to be such, but he was made such by election, [Augustine] thus saying: «Disputing what God chose in the not-yet-born one, to whom he said that the elder would serve [the younger], and what in the same elder, likewise not yet born, he reprobated, I carried the reasoning to this point, that I said: Therefore God did not choose the works of anyone in foreknowledge, [works] which he himself was to give, but he chose faith in foreknowledge; and whom he foreknew as one going to believe in him, that one he chose, to whom he would give the Holy Spirit, that by performing good works he might also obtain eternal life». — Behold, here he plainly says that he did not choose him on account of works, but on account of the faith by which he foreknew7 him as one going to believe. But because there is merit also in faith, just as in works, he retracted this, saying8: « I had not yet more diligently inquired, nor had I yet found out, of what sort is the election of grace, of which the Apostle says: The remnants shall be saved by the election of grace; which is not at all grace, if it proceeds from merits, so that now what is given is rendered not according to grace but according to debt — rather to merits than bestowed [as a gift]. Accordingly, what I went on to say: For the same Apostle says9: The same God who works all things in all. But it is nowhere said: God believes all things in all. And then I subjoined: What therefore we believe is ours; but the fact that we work good is His, who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe. Surely I would not say [this], if I knew already, that faith itself also is found among the gifts of God, which are given in the same Spirit.

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Therefore each is ours through the choice of the will, and each has been given through the spirit of faith and charity. — And what I said a little after: For ours it is to believe and to will, but His to give to those believing and willing the capacity of working well through the Holy Spirit, through whom charity is poured out in our hearts10, is indeed true, but the same rule [applies] and each is His, because He himself prepares the will, and each is ours, because [it] does not come about unless we are willing ». Therefore even the merit of faith comes from God's mercy. Therefore not on account of faith nor on account of any merits did God choose certain ones from eternity, nor [did he] apply the grace of justification11 in time, but by his gratuitous goodness he chose [them], that they might be good. Whence Augustine in [his] book On the Predestination of the Saints12: « Not because he foreknew us as going to be such, did he therefore choose [us], but [he chose us] that we might be such, through that very election of his grace by which he has made us pleasing in his beloved Son».

To these things, however, seems to be opposed what Augustine13 says on the prophet Malachi, where it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated: « On whom14 he wills, he says, he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens. But this will of God cannot be unjust. For it comes from most hidden merits, since even the sinners themselves, although on account of the general [original] sin they have made one mass, yet there is not no15 diversity among them. Something therefore precedes in [some] sinners, by which, although they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification. And likewise something precedes in other sinners, by which they are worthy of being made dull». — Behold, here Augustine seems to say that even God's very will, by which he elects some from merits and reprobates others, does not16 arise [from open merits], but from most hidden ones — that is, [he means] that on account of [hidden] merits he willed to elect some, [and] to reprobate others, and that on account of [hidden] merits to some the grace of justification is applied, to others not, whence they are made dull. But what he wished to understand is unknown, unless perchance he be said to have understood this, which we said above that he retracted. For there too he goes on at once to subjoin certain17 other things which in [his] book Retractationes he plainly retracts; both of which will be plain to the reader. Whence it is likely that in the foregoing he retracted this also.

Yet certain ones take it in this sense, that what was said was [meant] not that anyone is predestined on account of merits or merits the grace of justification, but that some are not so evil as to merit that grace not be imparted to them. For no one can merit God's grace, by which he is justified; but he can yet merit that it not be applied, that it be utterly cast away. And indeed some have come into so great a depth of iniquity that they merit this, that they are worthy of this; but others so live that, even if they do not merit the grace of justification, yet they do not merit to be altogether driven away and to have grace withdrawn from them. And therefore he said that in certain sinners something precedes by which they are worthy of justification, and in others by which they are worthy of being made dull. — But this is frivolous.

« But many, seeking to render a reason of this depth, and striving according to the conjectures of their own heart to think out the inscrutable height of God's judgments, have departed into fables of vanity, saying that the souls aloft in heaven sin and according to their sins are directed to bodies for [their] merits, and are enclosed in worthy [bodies] as in prisons. These such men have gone after their own thoughts, and willing to dispute about God's depth, have been turned into the depth, saying that souls have lived in heaven before [embodiment] and there have done some good or evil and on account of [their] merits have been thrust down into earthly bodies. But the catholic faith refuses this, on account of the plain saying of the Apostle, by which he says18: When they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil19» etc. Better therefore is faithful ignorance than rash knowledge. « He chose therefore those whom he willed by gratuitous mercy, not because they were going to be faithful, but that they might be faithful; and he gave them grace, not because they were faithful, but that they might become [so]. For the Apostle says20: I have obtained mercy, that I might be faithful; he does not say, because I was faithful. It is given indeed also to one [already] faithful, but it has also been given previously, that he might be faithful». So also he reprobated those whom he willed, not on account of future merits which he might foresee, yet by a most upright truth and one remote from our senses21.

But it is asked whether, just as he is said to have chosen some so that they might become good and faithful, so also it must be conceded that he reprobated some so that they might be evil and unfaithful, and to harden [them] so that they might sin; which it in no way behooves to concede. For reprobation is not the cause of evil in the way predestination is the cause of good; nor does hardening make a man evil in the way mercy makes [him] good.

Chap. III. Whether those things which God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and foreknows, and always has known and foreknown.

Furthermore it must be considered whether all those things which God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and has known, and foreknows and has foreknown; or whether he once knew or foreknew what he does not now know or foreknow. — Concerning foreknowledge, we first respond by saying that he has foreknown many things which he does not now foreknow. For since his foreknowledge is only of future things, from the moment those things which were future become present or pass by, they cease to be under God's foreknowledge, but they are always under [his] knowledge.

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Therefore God foreknew all things from eternity that were future, nor does he cease to foreknow, unless when [things] cease to be future. Nor when he ceases to foreknow certain things, which he previously foreknew, does he know them less than he was knowing them before. For it is not said from a defect of his knowledge that he sometimes foreknew certain things, which he does not now foreknow, but from the meaning of the word, which is foreknowledge. For to foreknow is to know before something comes to be. And therefore God cannot be said to foreknow except those things which are future.

But concerning [his] knowledge we say otherwise. For God always knows all those things which he ever knows. For every knowledge which he ever has, he always has had and has and will have. — To this, however, it is objected thus: he once knew that this man would be born, who is [now] born; he does not now know that he is going to be born: therefore he knew something which he does not now know. Likewise he knew that the world was to be created; he does not now know that it is to be created: therefore he knew something which he does not now know; and other infinite things of this sort could be adduced. — But to this we say that he now knows the same about the birth of this man and the creation of the world as he was knowing before they came to be, although then and now this knowledge of his must be expressed by different words. For what was then future is now past; and therefore the words must be exchanged to designate the same thing: just as, speaking at different times, we designate the same day now by the adverb tomorrow, while it is still future; now by today, while it is present; now by yesterday, while it is past. So before the world was created, God was knowing that it was to be created; after it has been created, he knows it as created. Nor is this to know diverse things, but altogether the same thing concerning the creation of the world: just as the ancient fathers believed that Christ was going to be born and to die, but we believe that he is now born and dead; nor yet do we and they believe diverse things, but the same things. « For times, as Augustine says22, have been varied; and therefore the words have been changed, not the faith ». Without doubt therefore let us hold that God always knows all things which he ever knows.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. et plures edd. cum cod. C donetur... reddatur.
    The Vatican edition and several editions with codex C [read] donetur... reddatur.
  2. August., l. ad Simplician. q. 2. n. 13.
    Augustine, book to Simplician, q. 2, n. 13.
  3. Rom. 9, 18: Ergo cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat. — Paulo inferius codd. BD et ed. 1 addunt semper et legunt: non est semper sine merito. Immediate post praeter Vat. aliae edd. omittunt verba sed habet nolle misereri.
    Romans 9:18: Therefore on whom he wills, he has mercy, and whom he wills, he hardens. — A little below, codices BD and edition 1 add semper and read non est semper sine merito. Immediately after, except the Vatican edition, the other editions omit the words sed habet nolle misereri.
  4. Cod. A gratiae appositio.
    Codex A [reads] gratiae appositio.
  5. Respicitur ad Malach. I, 2. 3: Nonne frater erat Esau Iacob, dicit Dominus, et dilexi Iacob, Esau autem odio habui. Cfr. Rom. 9, 13.
    Reference is made to Malachi 1:2–3: Was not Esau brother to Jacob, says the Lord, and I loved Jacob, but Esau I hated. Cf. Romans 9:13.
  6. Libr. I. c. 23. n. 2. 3. Retractatio refertur ad ea quae ipse dixerat in Exposit. Epist. ad Romanos, c. 60. Cfr. I. ad Simplician. q. 2. n. 8, et de Praedest. Sanctor. c. 3. n. 7. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum edd. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 ea tali electione talis pro ex electione talis.
    Book I, c. 23, nn. 2–3. The retractation refers to what he himself had said in the Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, c. 60. Cf. [book] I to Simplician, q. 2, n. 8, and On the Predestination of the Saints, c. 3, n. 7. — A little below, the Vatican edition with editions 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 [reads] ea tali electione talis in place of ex electione talis.
  7. Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, praemittit, refragantibus codd.
    The Vatican edition and the other editions, except [edition] 1, [read] praemittit, against the codices.
  8. Loc. cit. — Locus s. Scripturae est Rom. 11, 5. Ed. August. infra habet: quae utique non est gratia, si eam merita ulla praecedant, ne iam. Vat.: quae utique non ex gratia, si eam merita praecedant. Textum nostrum exhibent edd. 1, 6, 8, cui aliae editiones et nostri codd. consentiunt, nisi quod aliquae edd. habent et ex gratia, aliae ex gratia pro ex gratia.
    At the place cited. — The passage of holy Scripture is Romans 11:5. The Augustinian edition below has: quae utique non est gratia, si eam merita ulla praecedant, ne iam. The Vatican edition: quae utique non ex gratia, si eam merita praecedant. Our text is shown by editions 1, 6, 8, with which the other editions and our codices agree, except that some editions have et ex gratia, others ex gratia in place of ex gratia.
  9. I. Cor. 12. 6.
    1 Corinthians 12:6.
  10. Rom. 5, 5.
    Romans 5:5.
  11. Sola Vat. sancti.
    The Vatican edition alone [reads] sancti.
  12. Cap. 19. n. 38. — Locus s. Scripturae est Ephes. I, 6.
    Chapter 19, n. 38. — The passage of holy Scripture is Ephesians 1:6.
  13. Libr. 83 Quaest. q. 68. n. 4. — Loci s. Scripturae sunt Malach. I, 2. 3, et Rom. 9, 18. Vulgata et Augustin. Cuius vult pro Cui vult. — Vat. et edd. 4, 6, 8, pluribus omissis, exhibent: Augustinus lib. 83 Quaestionum: Cui vult.
    [Augustine,] book of 83 Questions, q. 68, n. 4. — The Scriptural passages are Malachi 1:2–3 and Romans 9:18. The Vulgate and Augustine [read] Cuius vult in place of Cui vult. — The Vatican edition and editions 4, 6, 8, with many things omitted, exhibit: Augustinus lib. 83 Quaestionum: Cui vult.
  14. Ita codd., edd. 1, 6 et originale. Vat. cum pluribus edd. fecerunt: tamen nonnulla inter eos.
    Thus the codices, editions 1, 6, and the original. The Vatican edition with several editions [reads] fecerunt: tamen nonnulla inter eos.
  15. Codd. et ed. 1 veniat.
    The codices and edition 1 [read] veniat.
  16. Libr. I. c. 26. — Paulo ante Vat. et edd. 1, 6 omittunt etiam ante quaedam alia.
    Book I, c. 26. — A little before, the Vatican edition and editions 1, 6 omit etiam before quaedam alia.
  17. Rom. 9, 11. 12. Apostolus prosequitur sic: ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est ei: Quia maior serviet minori.
    Romans 9:11–12. The Apostle continues thus: that according to election the purpose of God might stand, not from works, but from him who calls it was said to her: For the elder shall serve the younger.
  18. Quae praecedunt sumta sunt ex August., Serm. 169. c. 5. n. 6, sed nonnullis transpositis vel mutatis.
    What precedes is taken from Augustine, Sermon 169, c. 5, n. 6, but with several [things] transposed or changed.
  19. I. Cor. 7, 25. — Quoad sensum hae propositiones sumtae sunt ex August., 1. Retract. c. 23. n. 1, et de Praedest. Sanctor. c. 3. n. 7.
    1 Corinthians 7:25. — As to the sense, these propositions are taken from Augustine, [book] 1 Retractationes, c. 23, n. 1, and On the Predestination of the Saints, c. 3, n. 7.
  20. Libr. I. de Diversis Quaest. ad Simplician. q. 2. n. 16, paucis mutatis.
    Book I, On Various Questions to Simplician, q. 2, n. 16, with a few [things] changed.
  21. Vat. et edd. 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 minus congrue scit, sed refragantibus omnibus codd.
    The Vatican edition and editions 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 less fittingly [read] scit, but against all the codices.
  22. In Ioan. tract. 99. n. 1, secundum sensum. — Paulo ante Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 omittunt iam ante natum et mortuum.
    On John, tractate 99, n. 1, according to the sense. — A little before, the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 omit iam before natum et mortuum. ---
Dist. 41, Part 1, Divisio Textus→