Bonaventure

## DISTINCTIO XLIII.

Cap. I.

Invectio contra illos qui dicunt, Deum nil posse nisi quod vult et facit.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).

Quidam tamen de suo sensu gloriantes, Dei potentiam coarctare sub mensura conati sunt. Cum enim dicunt: hucusque potest Deus et non amplius, quid est hoc aliud, quam eius potentiam, quae infinita est, concludere et restringere ad mensuram? Aiunt enim: Non potest Deus aliud facere, quam facit; nec melius facere id quod facit; nec aliquid praetermittere de his quae facit. Istamque primam¹ suam opinionem verisimilibus argumentis causisque commentitiis nec non et sacrarum auctoritatum testimoniis munire nituntur dicentes: Non potest Deus facere, nisi quod bonum est et iustum fieri. Non est autem iustum et bonum fieri ab eo, nisi quod facit. Si enim aliud iustum est et bonum eum facere, quam facit, non ergo facit omne quod iustum est et bonum eum facere. Sed quis audeat hoc dicere?

Addunt etiam: Non potest facere, nisi quod iustitia eius exigit[^2]; sed non exigit eius iustitia, ut faciat, nisi quod facit: non ergo potest facere, nisi quod facit. Eademque iustitia exigit, ut id non faciat, quod non facit; non autem potest facere contra iustitiam suam; non ergo potest aliquid eorum facere, quae dimittit.

His autem respondemus duplicem verborum intelligentiam aperientes et ab eis involuta evolventes sic: Non potest Deus facere, nisi quod bonum est et iustum, id est, non potest facere, nisi illud quod, si faceret, bonum esset et iustum, verum est; sed multa potest facere, quae non bona sunt nec iusta, quia nec sunt nec erunt, nec bene fiunt nec fient, quia numquam fient.

Item, quod secundo propositum fuit: Non potest facere, nisi quod iustitia sua exigit; et non potest id p. 762 facere, quod iustitia sua exigit, ut non fiat; dicimus, quia exactionis verbum de Deo congrue non dicitur nec proprie accipitur. Et in illis locutionibus duplex est sensus. Si enim intelligas: non potest facere, nisi quod iustitia sua exigit, id est, nisi quod iusta voluntas sua vult, falsum dicis. Iustitia enim Dei ipsius aequissima voluntas accipitur, qualiter accipit Augustinus³, illa verba Domini in Genesi loquentis ad Lot Non possum quidquam facere, donec illo introeas exponens: «Non posse, inquit, se dixit, quod sine dubio poterat per potentiam, sed non poterat per iustitiam»; quasi diceret: poterat quidem, sed non volebat, et illa voluntas iusta erat. Si vero per haec verba intelligas, non posse facere nisi illud quod, si fieret, iustitiae eius conveniret, verum dicis. Similiter distingue illud; Non potest facere quod sua iustitia exigit, ut non faciat, id est, non potest facere id quod ipse, qui est summa iustitia, non vult facere, falsum est. Si autem intelligas his verbis, eum non posse facere id quod iustitiae eius convenire non potest, verum dicis.

Addunt quoque et alia dicentes: Non potest Deus facere nisi quod debet; non autem debet facere nisi quod facit. Si enim debet alia facere, non ergo facit omne quod debet; si vero facit omne quod debet, nec potest facere nisi quod debet: non ergo potest facere nisi quod facit. — Item, aut debet dimittere quod dimittit, ne faciat, aut non debet. Si non debet, non recte dimittit; si vero debet dimittere: ergo non debet facere. Si autem non debet, nec decet nec oportet eum facere; et si non decet nec oportet eum facere, ergo non potest facere: non ergo potest facere nisi quod facit. Nec potest illud dimittere quod facit, quin faciat, quia debet illud facere; et quod debet facere, non potest illud dimittere. — Sed ut mihi videtur, hoc verbum debet venenum habet. Multiplicem enim et involutam continet intelligentiam; nec Deo proprie competit, qui non est debitor nullius, nisi forte ex promisso; nos vero et debitores sumus ex commisso. Ut autem venenum evacuetur, distingue verbi sensus: non potest Deus facere nisi quod debet, id est, nisi quod vult, falsum est; sic enim potest ipse dici debere aliquid, quia vult illud. Si autem dicatur: non potest nisi quod debet, id est, non potest nisi illud quod, si faceret, ei bene conveniret, verum est.

Item aliud adiungunt dicentes: Nihil facit aut dimittit, nisi optima et rationabili causa, licet nobis occulta sit, secundum quam oportet eum facere ac dimittere quae facit vel dimittit. Ratio enim penes eum est, qua illa facit et illa dimittit; quae ratio aeterna est et semper manens, praeter quam non potest aliquid facere vel dimittere. Illa ergo manente, non potest quod facit dimittere, nec quod dimittit facere, et ita non potest facere nisi quod facit. — Et ad hoc respondemus, ambiguitatem aperientes. Causa enim dicitur ratio, et hoc modo aptius dicimus, Deum causa optima facere quae facit, et dimittere ea quae dimittit; verum quidem est, quia in eo voluntas est aequissima, qua facit et dimittit quae vult. Qui non potest, nec praeter eam facere, nec ea quae facit dimittere, nec ea quae dimittit facere; sed eadem manente ratione potest et alia facere et dimittere. Licet ergo ratio sit penes eum, qua alia facit alia dimittit, potest tamen secundum eandem rationem et dimittere quae facit, et facere quae dimittit.

Ipsi autem adiungunt: Ratio est, eum facere quae facit et non alia; et non potest facere, nisi quod ratio est eum facere: et ita non potest facere nisi quod facit. Item, ratio est, eum dimittere quod dimittit; et non potest non dimittere quod ratio est eum dimittere: et ita non potest non dimittere quod dimittit. — Et ad hoc dicimus, locutiones ambiguas esse, et ideo determinandas. Si enim, cum dicitur: non potest facere, nisi quod ratio est eum facere, intelligas, eum non posse facere, nisi ea quae rationabilia sunt, et ea quae, si fierent, rationabilia essent, verus est sensus. Si autem intelligas, eum non posse facere alia rationabilia et bona, nisi ea quae vult et facit, falsus est intellectus.

Item aliud adiungunt dicentes: Si potest Deus aliud facere quam facit, potest igitur facere quod non praescivit; et si potest facere quod non praescivit, potest sine praescientia operari, quia omne quod facturum se praescivit facit, nec facit aliquid quod non praescivit. Quod si praeter praescientiam eius aliquid fieri impossibile est, omne quod praescitum est, fieri necesse est: ergo aliud fieri, quam fit, nulla ratione possibile est: non ergo potest a Deo fieri, nisi quod fit. — Haec autem quaestio de praescientia facile determinari potest per ea quae superius dicta sunt, cum de praescientia ageretur.

His autem illi scrutatores, qui defecerunt scrutantes scrutinio, Sanctorum annectunt testimonia. Dicit enim Augustinus in libro de Symbolo: «Hoc solum non potest Deus, quod non vult.» Per quod videtur non posse facere aliquid, nisi quod vult; sed non vult nisi quod facit: et ita videtur non posse nisi quod facit. — Illud autem ita intelligendum est: Id solum non potest Deus, quod non vult, scilicet se posse. — Idem in septimo libro Confessionum ad Deum loquens ait: «Nec cogeris invitus ad aliquid, quia voluntas tua non est maior quam potentia; esset autem maior, si te ipso tu ipse maior esses». Ex hoc videtur, quod Deus non possit plura, quam vult, sicut non vult plura, quam potest. Sicut enim voluntas non est maior potentia, ita p. 763 nec potentia maior est voluntate. Ideoque, sicut plura non vult, quam potest, ita eum non plura posse quam velle dicunt. — Sed ad hoc dicimus, quia nec voluntas potentia, nec potentia voluntate maior est, quia una et eadem res est potentia et voluntas, scilicet ipse Deus, qui esset maior se ipso, si voluntas esset maior potentia, vel potentia voluntate. Nec hac auctoritate negatur, Deum plura posse quam velle, quia plura sunt subiecta eius potentiae quam voluntati.

Fateamur itaque, Deum multa⁴ posse facere, quae non vult, et posse dimittere quae facit. Quod ut certius firmiusque teneatur, Scripturae testimoniis afferamus, Deum plura posse facere, quam faciat. Veritas ipsa secundum Matthaeum⁵ ait: An putas, quia non possum rogare Patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi modo plus quam duodecim legiones Angelorum? Ex quibus verbis patenter innuitur, quia et Filius poterat rogare quod non rogabat, et Pater exhibere quod non exhibebat. Uterque igitur poterat facere quod non faciebat. Augustinus etiam in Enchiridio⁶ ait: Omnipotentis voluntas multa potest facere, quae non vult nec facit: potuit enim facere, ut duodecim legiones Angelorum pugnarent contra illos qui Christum ceperunt. Item in eodem⁷: «Cur apud quosdam non factae sunt virtutes, quae si factae fuissent, egissent illi homines poenitentiam; et factae sunt apud eos qui non erant credituri? Tunc non latebit quod nunc latet. Nec utique iniuste Deus noluit salvos fieri, cum possent salvi esse, si vellet⁸. Tunc in clarissima Sapientiae luce videbitur quod nunc piorum fides habet, antequam manifesta cognitione videatur, quam certa et immutabilis et efficacissima sit voluntas Dei, quae multa possit et⁹ non velit, nihil autem quod non possit, velit». Idem in libro de Natura et gratia¹⁰: «Dominus Lazarum suscitavit in corpore. Numquid dicendum est, non potuit Iudam suscitare in mente? Potuit quidem, sed noluit».

His auctoritatibus aliisque multis aperte docetur, quod Deus multa possit facere, quae non vult. Quod etiam ratione probari potest. Non enim vult Deus omnes homines iustificare, et tamen quis dubitat, eum posse? Potest ergo Deus aliud facere, quam facit, et tamen, si aliud faceret, alius ipse non esset. Et potest aliud velle, quam vult, et tamen eius voluntas nec alia nec nova nec mutabilis aliquo modo esse potest. Etsi enim possit velle quod numquam voluit, non tamen noviter nec nova voluntate, sed sempiterna tantum voluntate velle potest. Potest enim velle quod ab aeterno potest voluisse. Habet enim potentiam volendi et nunc et ab aeterno, quod tamen nec modo vult nec ab aeterno voluit.

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## DISTINCTION XLIII.

Chapter I.

An invective against those who say that God can do nothing except what he wills and does.

That, however, certain men, glorying in their own sense, have tried to constrict God's power within a measure. For when they say: "Up to this point God can [act] and no further," what else is this than to confine and restrict to a measure his power, which is infinite? For they say: "God cannot do anything other than what he does; nor can he do better that which he does; nor can he omit anything from those things which he does." And this their first¹ opinion they strive to fortify with probable arguments and contrived reasons, and likewise with the testimonies of the sacred authorities, saying: "God cannot do [anything] except what is good and just to be done. But it is not just and good to be done by him except what he does. For if some other thing is just and good for him to do than he does, then he does not do everything which is just and good for him to do. But who would dare to say this?"

They add also: "He cannot do [anything] except what his justice requires[^2]; but his justice does not require him to do anything except what he does: therefore he cannot do [anything] except what he does. And the same justice requires that he not do that which he does not do; nor can he do anything against his justice: therefore he cannot do any of those things which he omits."

To these we reply, opening up a twofold understanding of the words and unrolling from them the things wrapped up, thus: "God cannot do [anything] except what is good and just," that is, he cannot do [anything] except that which, if he did it, would be good and just — [this] is true; but he can do many things which are not good nor just, because they neither are nor will be, neither are well done nor will be done, because they will never be done.

Likewise, what was proposed in the second [argument]: "He cannot do [anything] except what his justice requires; and he cannot do that p. 762 which his justice requires, so that it not be done;" we say that the word "requires" is not properly nor congruously said of God. And in those expressions there is a twofold sense. For if you understand: "he cannot do [anything] except what his justice requires," that is, except what his just will wills, you say what is false. For the justice of God is taken to be his own most equitable will, in the way that Augustine³ takes it when, expounding those words of the Lord in Genesis spoken to Lot, "I cannot do anything until you enter there" [Gen. 19:22], he says: «"Not to be able," he says, "he said of himself — what without doubt he could do by power, but could not do by justice"»; as if he meant: he could indeed, but he did not will, and that will was just. But if through these words you understand [it to mean] that he cannot do anything except that which, if it were done, would befit his justice, you speak truly. Similarly distinguish that: "He cannot do what his justice requires, so that he not do it," that is, he cannot do that which he himself, who is supreme justice, does not will to do — this is false. But if by these words you understand that he cannot do what cannot befit his justice, you speak truly.

They add also other [things] saying: "God cannot do [anything] except what he ought; but he ought not to do [anything] except what he does. For if he ought to do other [things], then he does not do everything which he ought; but if he does everything which he ought, then he cannot do [anything] except what he ought: therefore he cannot do [anything] except what he does." — "Likewise, either he ought to omit what he omits, so that he not do it, or he ought not. If he ought not, he does not rightly omit it; but if he ought to omit it, then he ought not to do it. But if he ought not, then it is neither becoming nor fitting for him to do it; and if it is neither becoming nor fitting for him to do it, then he cannot do it: therefore he cannot do [anything] except what he does. Nor can he omit that which he does, without doing it, because he ought to do it; and what he ought to do, he cannot omit." — But as it seems to me, this word "ought" has venom. For it contains a manifold and convoluted understanding; nor does it properly belong to God, who is debtor to no one, unless perhaps by promise; whereas we are debtors by commission. But that the venom may be drained, distinguish the senses of the word: "God cannot do [anything] except what he ought," that is, except what he wills — this is false; for thus he can himself be said "to owe" something, because he wills it. But if it is said: "He cannot [do anything] except what he ought," that is, he cannot [do anything] except that which, if he did it, would well befit him — this is true.

Likewise they adjoin another [thing] saying: "He neither does nor omits anything except by an optimal and rational cause, although it be hidden from us, according to which it is fitting for him to do or omit those things which he does or omits. For the ground is in him, by which he does these things and omits those; and this ground is eternal and ever-abiding, beyond which he cannot do or omit anything. With that [ground], therefore, remaining, he cannot omit what he does, nor do what he omits, and so he cannot do [anything] except what he does." — And to this we reply, opening up the ambiguity. For "cause" is called "ground," and in this mode it is more fitting to say that God by an optimal cause does what he does, and omits what he omits; it is indeed true, because in him there is a most equitable will, by which he does and omits what he wills. He cannot [act] otherwise, nor act apart from that [will], nor omit those things which he does, nor do those which he omits; but with the same ground remaining, he can do and omit other things. Although therefore the ground is in him, by which he does some things, omits others, nevertheless according to that same ground he can both omit what he does, and do what he omits.

They themselves moreover adjoin: "It is the ground that he does what he does and not other things; and he cannot do [anything] except what it is a ground for him to do: and so he cannot do [anything] except what he does. Likewise, it is a ground that he omits what he omits; and he cannot not-omit what it is a ground for him to omit: and so he cannot not-omit what he omits." — And to this we say that the expressions are ambiguous, and therefore must be determined. For if, when it is said: "He cannot do [anything] except what it is a ground for him to do," you understand that he cannot do [anything] except those things which are rational, and those which, if they were done, would be rational — the sense is true. But if you understand that he cannot do other rational and good things, except those which he wills and does — the understanding is false.

Likewise they adjoin another, saying: "If God can do anything other than he does, then he can do what he did not foreknow; and if he can do what he did not foreknow, he can act without foreknowledge, since everything which he foreknew himself to be about to do, he does, nor does he do anything which he did not foreknow. But if it is impossible for anything to come into being apart from his foreknowledge, then everything which is foreknown must necessarily come into being: therefore that another thing should come into being than what comes into being is by no reason possible: therefore nothing can be done by God except what is done." — But this question concerning foreknowledge can easily be determined by the things which were said above, when we treated of foreknowledge.

To these moreover those searchers, "who have failed in searching out the scrutiny," attach the testimonies of the Saints. For Augustine says in the book On the Symbol: «This alone God cannot [do], namely, what he does not will.» By which it seems that he cannot do anything except what he wills; but he wills only what he does: and so it seems he cannot [do anything] except what he does. — But this must be understood thus: This alone God cannot [do], namely, what he does not will — namely, that he himself be able. — The same in the seventh book of the Confessions, speaking to God says: «Nor are you forced unwilling to anything, because your will is not greater than your power; but it would be greater, if you yourself were greater than yourself». From this it seems that God cannot [do] more than he wills, just as he does not will more than he can. For just as the will is not greater than the power, so p. 763 neither is the power greater than the will. And therefore, as he does not will more than he can, so [they say] that he cannot [do] more than he wills. — But to this we say that neither is the will greater than the power, nor the power than the will, because the power and the will are one and the same reality, namely, God himself, who would be greater than himself if his will were greater than his power, or his power than his will. Nor is it denied by this authority that God can [do] more than he wills, since more things are subjects of his power than of his will.

Let us therefore confess that God can do many⁴ things which he does not will, and can omit those which he does. And that this may be the more certainly and firmly held, let us bring forward testimonies of Scripture, [showing] that God can do more than he does. Truth himself according to Matthew⁵ says: "Do you think that I cannot ask my Father, and he will furnish me at once more than twelve legions of Angels?" From which words it is patently signified that the Son could have asked what he was not asking, and the Father exhibit what he was not exhibiting. Each, therefore, was able to do what he was not doing. Augustine also in the Enchiridion⁶ says: "The will of the Omnipotent can do many things which it neither wills nor does: for he could have made twelve legions of Angels fight against those who seized Christ." Likewise in the same work⁷: «Why have miracles not been done among certain men, which, if they had been done, would have brought those men to repentance; and have been done among those who were not to be believers? Then will not lie hidden what now lies hidden. Nor did God unjustly will not [those] to be saved who could have been saved, if he had willed⁸ [it]. Then in the most brilliant light of Wisdom will be seen what now the faith of the godly holds, before it is seen by manifest cognition — how certain and immutable and most efficacious is the will of God, who is able to do many things and⁹ does not will, but wills nothing which he cannot». The same in the book On Nature and Grace¹⁰: «The Lord raised Lazarus in body. Is it to be said that he could not raise Judas in mind? He could indeed, but he did not will».

By these authorities and many others it is openly taught that God can do many things which he does not will. Which can also be proved by reason. For God does not will to justify all men, and yet who doubts that he can? God therefore can do other than he does, and yet, if he were to do otherwise, he himself would not be other. And he can will other than he wills, and yet his will can in no way be other or new or mutable. For even if he can will what he never willed, nevertheless [he can will it] not newly nor by a new will, but only by an eternal will. For he can will what from eternity he was able to have willed. For he has the power of willing both now and from eternity, that which nevertheless he neither now wills nor from eternity has willed.

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